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To a large extent, information coming from a worldwide petrochemical company has been used within 
this thesis as, for example, in the statistical analysis and case studies. The author has gathered this 
information to implement the new methodology. Because company-related safety issues and safety 




















Chemical plants and other industrial installations process and store hazardous materials, which represent a 
certain risk to people, equipment and the environment. Overpressure is one of the most common upsets in 
process plants and relief devices (pressure relief valves, rupture discs, overpressure-vacuum valves) are 
required on process equipment to prevent internal pressures from rising to levels, which could cause 
catastrophic equipment failure. They are the ultimate line of protection against equipment rupture and are 
therefore extremely critical safety elements. However, this criticality is not always accounted for in 
existing plants and in the engineering of new ones, as a lot of pressure relief systems audits performed 
recently, especially in US, have demonstrated.  As an example, a 2014 report from Siemens Energy, Inc. 
of Houston, pointed out that, after performing 1,197 pressure relief systems audits between 2005 and 
2014, consisting of 174,943 pieces of equipment and 80,372 pressure relief devices,  47% of the relief 
devices had a deficiency, e.g. 13,4% were undersized. In another statistical study focused on the 
maintenance process of pressure relief valves conducted in 1995 and based on 13,000 items inspected in 
the workshop, it was found that 18% of the valves only opened at a pressure higher than 110% of the set 
pressure and 3% did not open at a pressure of twice the set pressure. 
Therefore, it is clear that a methodology for increasing the reliability of pressure relief devices would be 
very useful. A new methodology has been developed in this thesis based on an extension of the safety life 
cycle concept developed for the safety instrumented systems, according to the IEC 61511. This new 
methodology covers all the steps of the life cycle of a pressure relief valve: a) risk analysis; b) safety 
requirements specification; c) design; d) reception, installation and checking; e) operation, maintenance 
and revision; f) management of change; g) decommissioning h) verification and i) documentation and 
technical audits.  
This methodology has been applied to three existing petrochemical plants, obtaining results that validate 
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1.1 Safety layers in the process industry 
The chemical industry handles, processes, stores and transports hazardous materials. This is why adequate 
safety measures are required at all stages: in the design, the operation and the logistics of installations. 
These measures can be associated with layers of protection: an external emergency plan, an internal 
emergency plan, mitigation, prevention (safety valves/bursting discs, safety instrumented systems, etc.) 
and control (Marszal and Scharpf, 2002; Melhem, 2006). Figure 1-1 shows the different layers of 
protection of a chemical process. 
 
Figure 1-1.Typical layers of protection of an industrial process (taken from IEC61511, 2003). 
Each layer of protection includes equipment, control systems and actions devised to reduce risk. The 
protection layers can be divided into: 
 Layers of Prevention. These act before the loss of material or energy within the plant. For 
example, safe design (inherent safety design concept (CCPS, 2009)), basic process control, safety 
instrumented systems, pressure relief devices, etc. 
 Layers of Mitigation. These act after the loss of material or energy from the plant. For example, 
passive protection, Fire & Gas systems, evacuation plan, etc. 
One of the prevention layers named “mechanical protection system” in Figure 1-1 is related to pressure 
relief devices: pressure relief valves, bursting discs and overpressure-vacuum valves. The Layer of 
Protection Analysis (LOPA) emphasizes the importance of pressure relief devices to decrease the risk 
associated with overpressure (Dowell, 2001). However, any failure of these valves can lead to major 
accidents.  




Pressure relieving systems, comprising of pressure relief devices, are required to be installed on process 
equipment to protect them in case of overpressure situations. They are intended to operate only in 
emergency situations, when a failure, accident or misoperation has caused an overpressure condition that 
the basic system design and its associated control system cannot resolve. It should relieve the excess 
pressure safely so as to protect personnel working in the facility from accidents, prevent damage to 
equipment and adjoining property, and comply with government regulations. 
This thesis will study pressure relief valves, as they are the most representative item of pressure relief 
devices. According to Hellemans (2009) 80% of pressure relief devices are pressure relief valves. The 
experience of the author of this thesis shows that in some plants the figure could be 95% or higher.   
1.2 Pressure relief valves types 
According to API 520 (Part I, 2008) there are different types of pressure relief valves: 
 
Pressure relief valve (PRV): a pressure relief device designed to open and relieve excess pressure and to 
reclose and prevent the further flow of fluid after normal conditions have been restored. 
 
Safety valve (SV): a spring-loaded pressure relief valve actuated by the static pressure upstream of the 
valve and characterized by rapid opening or pop action. A safety valve is normally used with 
compressible fluids. 
 
Relief valve (RV): a spring-loaded pressure relief valve actuated by the static pressure upstream of the 
valve. The valve opens normally in proportion to the pressure increase over the opening pressure. A relief 
valve is used primarily with incompressible fluids. 
 
Safety relief valve (SRV): a spring-loaded pressure relief valve that may be used as either a safety or 
relief valve depending on the application. 
 
Pilot-operated pressure relief valve (POPRV): A pressure relief valve in which the major relieving 
device or main valve is combined with and controlled by a self actuated auxiliary pressure relief valve 
(pilot). 
 
However, the European Pressure Equipment Directive (PED, 1997) uses the overall term “safety valve” 
for every pressure-relieving device subject to the PED code (Hellemans, 2009). In this thesis the terms 
pressure relief valve and safety valve are interchangeable.  
 
This thesis deals with PRVs. The bursting discs and the overpressure-vacuum valves, although they share 
related problems, have been excluded. Figure 1-2 shows the internal configuration of pressure relief 
valves. 
 
Figure 1-2. Internal configuration of PRVs: conventional (left); balanced (center) and pilot-operated (right). 




1.3 Flaws in installed safety valves   
Having exposed the importance of the PRVs in avoiding accidents, a historic survey on accidents related 
to safety valves has been performed. Historic surveys of accidents have been used in the chemical 
industry as a source of information about the hazards associated with a specific chemical process (Vilchez 
et al., 1995). The survey was performed on accidents that could be attributed to overpressure plus the 
simultaneous failure of a safety valve. Among the 48 cases found from 1944 to 2005 (MHIDAS, 2007), 
35 were associated with “mechanical failure of a safety valve”, with considerable associated damage: 56 
fatalities, 292 injured and more than 8000 evacuated. Consequently, the correct engineering of safety 
valves is obviously an important issue for any industrial plant.  
Of course, most latent failures do not lead to accidents; some safety valves will never need to actuate 
under an overpressure situation in their entire life. However, such failures can be decisive in certain 
circumstances. The DIERS Institute (CCPS, 1998) observed that, amongst the 100 worst major accidents 
that occurred in the process industry between 1956 and 1986, twenty-five could be attributed, at least 
partly, to the inadequate design or maintenance of pressure relief systems. Several authors have studied 
these aspects and the results, showed here, have been divided between design and maintenance faults. 
Technical design faults  
Berwanger et al. (2000) analyzed the adequacy of pressure relief systems in 272 process plants in the US. 
In this important study, 14,873 devices were analyzed and the main conclusion was that: approximately 
40% of process equipment has at least one error in its pressure relief system (no relief device 15%; 
undersized device 7%; improper installation 17%; undersized and improperly installed device 2%). 
Kumana and Aldeeb (2014) in a very wide study comprising 80,372 pressure relief devices, taken over 
1197 audits performed between 2005 and 2014, have found that: the number of relief devices with at least 
one major issue is 47% and 13,4% of the equipment was unprotected. In Europe, Westphal and Köper 
(2003), performed a survey of 4,000 safety valves, and found faults in 17%, including undersizing, 
pressure drop in the inlet pipe higher than 3%, and total backpressure higher than 15% for conventional 
safety valves.   
Technical maintenance faults 
Aird (1982) observed that 44% of safety valves opened outside the range +/- 10% of the set pressure in 
the pre-test. Smith (1995) analyzed the behavior of 13,000 safety valves: 18% opened at a pressure higher 
than 110% of the set pressure and 3% did not open at a pressure of twice the set pressure. On the basis of 
an analysis of 750 complaints concerning faulty operation of safety valves, Hellemans (2009) found that 
10% were due to under- or over-sizing, 8% to bad maintenance, 33% to incorrect installation, 29% to 
incorrect transportation or handling, 12% to a manufacturing default and 7% to various other reasons. In a 
pre-test inspection of 292 valves, Chien et al. (2009) found that 4% opened at a pressure higher than 
119% of the set pressure. 
These figures show that there is an impressive quantity of latent deficiencies in the engineering of 
pressure relief valves. As pointed out before, the majority of these deficiencies will never be discovered 
because the valve will never need to open.  
Having this wide problem identified, the main research question of the thesis emerged: how can the 
engineering of pressure relief valves be improved? The answer came from the framework developed for 
the safety instrumented systems according to IEC 61511 (2003) and, specifically with the functional 
safety life cycle concept.  
Therefore, the motivation for this thesis is to improve the reliability of the pressure relief valves, through 
the application of the safety life cycle approach which, although ideal for the proposed objective, has not 
been used in pressure relief systems before.  
 




1.4 Objectives of the thesis 
General objective: to develop a new methodology that allows the reliability of pressure relief valves to be 
increased; this will be done by applying the safety life cycle analysis concept of IEC 61511 to the 
engineering process of protecting pressure vessels from damage due to an overpressure through these 
valves. 
Specific objectives: 
1. To develop and apply a new methodology based on IEC 61511 to all phases of the engineering 
process. 
2. To analyse and recommend the best methods for calculating the required relief load and required 
area for each contingency. 
3. To develop and apply a new procedure for the “engineering analysis” concept of API 520 Part II, 
to check for instability of pressure relief valves. 
4. To improve the methodology for assigning the revision intervals of pressure relief valves through 
a quantitative approach as that of API 581. 
5. To develop and apply a new procedure for the revision of pressure relief valves in a turnaround. 
 




Chapter 2. Critical analysis of the need, design, installation and 




2.1 Historical analysis of accidents 
As pointed out in the introduction, a survey of accidents involving pressure relief valves has been 
performed with the database MHIDAS. Although there are other databases available (FACTS, MARS, 
ARIA, etc.), MHIDAS was selected because it offers more information (Vilchez et al., 1995). This point 
is very important because the interest in each accident relies on the sequence: upset, overpressure and 
consequences of the accident because there was no relief valve or the relief valve had not worked 
properly (undersized, mechanical failure, etc.). The version of MHIDAS used, has data on accidents since 
the beginning of the last century until 2007. The survey was based on three key search words: 
“reliefvalv”: 54 records were found 
“overpressure”: 248 records were found 
“relief”: 142 records were found 
From the information generated in each entry, the code used for the cause of the accident was the basis 
for considering it or not. The information is in the codes GC (general causes) and SC (specific causes). 
Inside SC there is the mechanical failure with the case “reliefvalv”.  
After carefully examining key words “relief” and “overpressure”, it was clear that the information gained 
could not be used to quantify the concept “accidents attributable to a relief valve deficiency” because the 
description in a lot of cases of overpressure did not clarify whether the cause was no relief valve present 
or another design operation or mechanical problem.  
The only information that could give some light on whether the accidents were due a pressure relief valve 
was under the key word “reliefvalv”. From the 54 records, 2 were due to a disk rupture and 4 were 
counted twice (one for each substance involved). The final number of usuable records was therefore 48. 
From this quantity the following results were obtained (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2-1. Summary of the incidents recorded in MHIDAS database related to safety valves. 
Record No. Date of incident Country People affected Specific cause 
13404 11.01.05 US 0 mechanical failure 
12124 25.03.03 US 1 injured undersized 
11470 25.04.02 Sudafrica 0 mechanical failure 
11090 27.07.01 US 0 mechanical failure 
11073 19.07.01 US 1000 evacuated mechanical  failure 
11021 28.06.01 US 10 evacuated mechanical failure (external) 
11002 18.06.01 US 0 mechanical failure (external) 
9903 12.08.99 Great Britain 0 mechanical failure 
9351 29.08.98 US 127 injured incorrect design  
9076 06.04.98 US 0 mechanical failure 
8976 13.02.98 Australia 0 mechanical failure 
8426 18.04.97 Great Britain 0 mechanical failure 
8013 08.05.96 Great Britain 0 mechanical failure 
6960 07.07.94 US 14 injured mechanical Failure 
4592 09.01.90 Great Britain 0 mechanical failure 
4482 31.03.62 Great Britain 0 undersized 
4453 18.06.90 US 0 mechanical failure 




Record No. Date of incident Country People affected Specific cause 
4384 31.01.90 Venezuela 0 undersized  
4224 18.05.90 US 34 injured, 
100 evacuated 
 
4113 02.07.90 Great Britain 0 mechanical failure 
3519 22.07.88 US 1 injured, 500 
evacuated 
mechanical failure 
3495 17.02.82 US > 200 evacuated mechanical failure 
3484 25.06.84 US > 200 evacuated mechanical failure 
3036 1987 Great Britain 0 mechanical failure 
3027 --.07.87 Great Britain 0 mechanical failure 
2994 18.08.75 Great Britain 0 undersized 
2895 17.04.68 Great Britain 0 mechanical failure 
2872 20.07.49 US 0 mechanical failure 
2469 15.09.77 US >2 killed mechanical failure 
2442 05.12.83 US 0 mechanical failure 
2239 02.09.83 Canada 0 mechanical failure 
1981 07.08.80 US 5000 evacuated mechanical failure 
1980 --.01.70 Canada 0 frozen relief valve 
1964 06.04.53 US 0 external cause 
1647 16.06.78 US 7 injured mechanical failure 
1395 11.08.82 US 2 injured mechanical failure 
982 07.02.68 US 9 killed, 7 injured mechanical failure 
903 10.11.67 Great Britain 0 frozen relief valve 
843 31.03.44 US 5 killed, 21 injured Incorrect design 
648 23.03.67 France 0 mechanical failure 
560 04.08.78 Italy >1000 evacuated mechanical failure 
358 30.03.72 Brazil 39 killed,  
51 injured 
mechanical failure + Bleve 
277 30.05.71 Great Britain 0 incorrect set pressure 
211 19.01.71 US 21 injured frozen relief valve 
182 05.06.70 Canada 0 mechanical failure 
119 04.08.62 Saudi Arabia 1 killed, 6 injured mechanical failure 
70 27.01.75 Great Britain 0 external cause 
37 16.05.80 Ireland 0 mechanical failure 
 
The author understood that under “mechanical failure” the valve failed to open on demand or opened 
without demand. Thus the leakages are included here. Moreover, included under this concept are valves 
that relieve at set pressure but release a flammable or toxic product to the atmosphere, even though this is 
not a relief valve failure. From Table 2-1, the following statistical parameters could be derived: 
 Mechanical failure of the safety valve accounts for 73% of the cases 
 Relief valve failure due to a release of a flammable or toxic material to atmosphere was 21 % 
 Tanker had a transport accident and the valve was damaged as a consequence, giving release of 
product to atmosphere 4% 
 Valve was undersized because of another scenarios (polymerization, runaway reaction) 4%  
 The majority of the accidents occurred during tanker transport (road, rail, barge, etc.). Thus as 
already pointed out in the early study of Vilchez et al. (1995) the road transport of hazardous 
materials is the main cause of accidents.  
Another literature survey of accidents attributable to safety valves was performed looking for a specific 
survey in the web of the Chemical Safety Board of US among others; the following accidents were found: 
 A catastrophic vessel explosion occurred on March 4, 1998 in Pitkin, Louisiana, US, in the 
installations of Sonat Exploration Co., which killed four workers and resulted in more than 
$200,000 in damage. The vessel lacked a pressure relief system and ruptured due to 
overpressurization during start-up, releasing flammable material which ignited (CSB, 2000). 
 




 On the morning of April 11, 2003, one worker was killed at the D.D. Williamson food additive 
plant in Louisville, Kentucky, US, when a process vessel became overpressurized and failed 
catastrophically. The failure caused a release of aqueous ammonia as well as causing extensive 
damage to the plant. The root cause was that the company staff did not consider the feed tanks to 
be pressure vessels, consequently they had no relief device for overpressure protection (CSB, 
2004). 
 
 On June 11, 2008, one worker was killed and approximately seven others were injured during a 
maintenance operation on a heat exchanger. Ammonia overpressured inside the exchanger, 
causing it to rupture. Goodyear operators closed an isolation valve between the heat exchanger 
shell (ammonia cooling side) and a relief valve in order to replace a burst rupture disc under the 
relief valve that provided overpressure protection. Maintenance workers replaced the rupture disk 
that day but the closed isolation valve was not reopened (CSB, 2011). 
 
 Politz (1985) reported a case of chattering of safety valves, which produced severe vibration of 
the piping causing a failure in the inlet flange of the valve, spraying hot crude oil on nearby 
equipment. The root cause was the oversizing of the relieving capacity, i.e. two valves were 
installed in parallel with a very similar set pressure (470 and 475 psig) ignoring the fact that for 
the required flow in this blocked outlet scenario, only one valve would be necessary.  
The author wants to remark here, as has been already pointed out by Smith and Burgess (2012), that 
OSHA (Department of Labor, 1992) had difficulties in finding examples of accidents directly attributable 
to the safety valves. Moreover, as it has been seen before, the information available in MHIDAS is not 
enough to find out if the incident was caused by a specific problem with the safety valve. More research 
is necessary especially in the refining/petrochemical/chemical industry private datafiles. 
2.2 Statistical analysis of deficiencies in pressure relief systems. Literature 
survey 
A few authors have developed surveys of deficiencies and failures in pressure relief systems, performing 
the corresponding statistical analysis of the collected data to obtain useful conclusions. The results of the 
most representative ones are commented on this section. 
Berwanger et al. report 
One of the most complete statistical analysis of deficiencies in pressure relief systems was conducted by 
Berwanger and coworkers (Berwanger et al., 2000). Its own company, Berwanger Inc., performed a large 
number of government mandated per OSHA 1910.119 pressure relief systems design audits. Specifically 
in this analyses, 272 processing units were evaluated, which corresponded to 31,509 pieces of equipment 
(the equipment was categorized as: vessels, heat exchangers, air coolers, compressors, filters, pumps and 
others). As the centrifugal pumps normally do not require overpressure protection, they were excluded 
from the original 31,509 items, leaving a total of 24,303 pieces of equipment. All this equipment was 
protected by 14,873 different pressure relief devices (pressure relief valves, rupture discs and pressure-
vacuum valves). 
Approximately 10,000 deficiencies were identified and categorized in three series:  
100 Series: no relief device present on equipment with one or more potential overpressure scenarios. The 
results are presented in Table 2.2. 
Table 2-2. Summary of statistical results for each 100 Series category. 
100 Series  Equipment with      
deficiency 




Category 101. Blocked outlet 440 24303 1.8 
Category 102. Inlet control 
valve failure 
36 22840 0.2 
Category 103. External fire 1315 22840 5.8 




100 Series  Equipment with      
deficiency 




Category 104.Heat exchanger 
tube rupture 
226 7298 3.1 
Category 105. Thermal 
expansion 
627 23640 2.7 
Category 106. Multiple 
overpressure scenarios 
868 24303 3.6 
Category 107. Other 151 24303 0.6 
TOTAL 3663 24303 15.1 
 
The percentages of the different categories in 100 Series based on the equipment with deficiencies is 
presented in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1. Population of different categories of concerns in Group 100 equipment-based. 
200 Series: undersized relief device present on equipment with one or more potential overpressure 
scenarios. The results are presented in Table 2-3. 
Table 2-3. Summary of statistical results for each 200 Series category. 
200 Series Equipment with     
deficiency 




Category 201. Blocked outlet 280 24303 1.2 
Category 202. Inlet control 
valve failure 
282 22840 1.2 
Category 203. Heat 
exchanger tube rupture 
334 7298 4.6 
Category 204. Loss of 
condensing or reflux failure  
34 9741 0.3 
Category 205. External fire 854 22840 3.7 
Category 206. Multiple 
overpressure scenarios 
252 24303 1.0 
Category 207. Other 58 24303 0.2 
TOTAL 2094 24303 8.6 
 
The percentages of different categories in 200 Series based on the equipment with deficiencies is 




















Figure 2-2. Population of different categories of concerns in Group 200 equipment-based. 
300 Series: Improperly installed relief device. The results are presented in Table 2-4. 
Table 2-4. Summary of statistical results for each 300 Series category. 
300 Series  Relief devices                   
with deficiency 




Category 301. Set pressure 
too high 
292 14873 2.0 
Category 302. Potential to 
block relief pathway 
277 14873 1.9 
Category 303. Inlet pressure 
drop too high 
1072 13049 8.2 
Category 304.Outlet pressure 
drop too high 
1606 13049 12.3 
Category 305. Other 
installation deficiencies 
30 14873 0.2 
TOTAL 3277 14873 22.0 
 
The percentages of different categories in 300 Series based on the relief devices with deficiencies is 
presented in Figure 2-3. 
 
Figure 2-3. Population of different categories of concern in Group 300 equipment-based. 
Berwanger et al. draw the following conclusions from their statistical study: 
Conclusion No.1: approximately 40% of equipment surveyed had at least one pressure relief system 
deficiency. 










C202: Inlet control valve failure
C203: Tube rupture









C301: Relief device set pressure too high
C302: Potential to block relief pathway
C303: Inlet pressure drop too high
C304: Outlet pressure drop too high
C305: Other installation deficiencies





Figure 2-4. Equipment overpressure protection status. 
Conclusion No. 2: current Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) methodologies do not capture most 
deficiencies. Berwanger et al. pointed out that most deficiencies were not identified because of time 
constraints and a general lack of pressure relief system expertise in PHA teams. 
Conclusion No. 3: contractor design methods can be improved by adopting an equipment-based approach.  
Although most of the 272 processing units had been designed by reputable design contractors, Berwanger 
and coworkers attributed the high number of deficiencies to the fact that they had not used the equipment-
based approach. 
Conclusion No. 4: current information management techniques have not worked.  
According to these authors “In an effort to comply with the Process Safety Management regulation, many 
operators have recreated their pressure relief system design and design basis information essentially from 
scratch”. Moreover, the only information available was the specification sheet and this implies only 25% 
of the information generated in the engineering phase (Kreder and Berwanger, 1995)  
Kumana and Aldeeb report 
Kumana and Aldeeb (2014), from Siemens Energy, Inc., Houston, performed a statistical analysis of the 
findings obtained in the pressure relief system design audits. The results of 1,197 audits performed in US 
between 2005 and 2014 were checked. The analysis included 174,943 pieces of equipment and 80,372 
pressure relief devices. For this impressive data set, a total of 150,106 findings were reported, of which 
77,679 belonged to the primary query criteria. 
This primary query criteria consisted of: 
 No pressure relief device present for equipment with an applicable overpressure scenario 
 Relief device present on equipment but not adequately sized for at least one applicable 
overpressure scenario 
 The calculated inlet non-recoverable pressure losses for at least one applicable overpressure is 
greater than 3% 
 Outlet pressure losses calculated to be greater than the allowable overpressure for conventional 
valves, greater than 30 % for balanced valves, or greater than 50% for pilot operated valves. It 
should be noted that the outlet pressure loss findings are identified for individual discharges, not 
for accumulative discharges due to audit methodology (one audit is done for individual relief 
systems and the other one for the common discharge header) 
 The pressure relief device has a set pressure above the MAWP of associated equipment 
 Installation issues, including block valves administrative control violations, reduced bore valves 










Undersized and improperly installation




Although these authors worked in classifying the findings according to the refinery units (Alkylation, 
Crude/Vacuum, etc.) and company size, only the data for the completed audit year will be presented here 
in Table 2-5, so that they can be compared with Berwanger et al. results. The last column describes the 
ratio of the five findings presented in the left columns divided by the total number of findings. However, 
the methodology followed by the authors implied that if both inlet and outlet excessive losses were found 
for the same pressure relieve device, it was counted as two findings.  














2005 13.1 13.8 1.3 16.9 49.4 61.9 
2006 9.4 14.4 1.3 14.7 34.1 51.7 
2007 8.8 15.8 1.9 11.4 25.6 46.9 
2008 5.6 12.2 0.6 12.1 28.1 43.5 
2009 10.3 16.2 0.8 11.1 23.6 46.1 
2010 14.2 17.8 3.5 12.3 30.1 51.5 
2011 16.3 16.4 6.9 10.3 27.1 51.5 
2012 13.5 13.1 4.0 8.7 16.6 38.9 
2013 13.8 14.1 2.8 9.4 21.3 43.6 
2014 16.6 15.6 2.4 8.6 24.5 47.7 
Overall Result 13.4 15.6 3.1 10.5 24.9 47.0 
 
Conclusions 
 The percentage of unprotected equipment is 13.4%. This figure agrees with the value of 15.1% of 
Berwanger et al. 
 The number of undersized pressure relief devices is 13.4% 
 The number of pressure relief devices with at least one major issue is 47.0%. Comparison with 
Berwanger et al. data is not possible, because those are expressed in terms of equipment and do 
not necessary map a 1:1 relationship 
 The low numbers of outlet pressure drop issues are not representative, as the valves discharging 
to a flare network are not included 
 The overall picture of the state of the industry has not changed significantly: 13.4 % unprotected 
equipment in the report vs 15% in the Berwanger et al. study. 
Not all possible deficiencies were included in the Berwanger et al. statistical analysis, for example, issues 
not included were: excessive flare radiation levels, inadequate knockout drums, poorly designed quench 
systems, discharge of toxic or flammable fluids to the atmosphere and general process safety information 
upon which to base a safe pressure relief design. Therefore, one can think that the total deficiencies 
reported might even be underestimated. 
Westphal and Köper report 
Westphal and Köper (2003), from the Process Safety Department of Siemens Axiva, performed a multi-
year analysis of pressure relief devices within many process plants. This systematic analysis covered 
about 4,000 already existing safety valves and rupture discs. 









Table 2-6. Results of the investigation of about 4000 safety valves.  
Pressure rise 
cause 
% of total 
number 
% of deficiencies 
per design case 
Diagnosed deficiencies 
Safety valve 
relief diameter is 
not sufficient 
Pressure loss in 
the inlet pipe > 
3% 
Back pressure in 
the vent line > 
15% 
Chemical reaction 3% 6% 33% 50% 17% 
External heating 16% 36% 41% 31% 38% 
Gas feed 18% 46% 82% 16% 18% 
Liquid feed 19% 22% 70% 18% 17% 
Thermal 
expansion 
44% 2% 81% - 23% 
TOTAL 100% 17% 60% 18% 22% 
 
The authors pointed out the following aspects: 
a) Deficiencies were found in 17% of the safety valves. The approach was safety valves focused, 
and not pressure equipment like Berwanger et al.  
b) Only 6% of deficiencies were found in reactors. This was due to the fact that systems with 
chemical reactions had been carefully analyzed and already provided with the necessary safety 
measures. 
c) The very small number of deficiencies in the thermal expansion case was due to the fact that the 
use of a standard DN 25x25 proportional safety valve is generally over-dimensioned, and the 
pressure losses in the inlet pipes and tail pipes are negligible. 
d) The most frequent deficiencies were found in the case of the gas feed, which corresponded to the 
scenario “control valve fails open”; in 46% of cases the safety valves were undersized. 
Conclusions 
According to these authors, the number of deficient safety valves (17%) was not surprising because some 
of these deficiencies were caused by changes in the calculation procedures, some were due to changes in 
process conditions without considering the consequence on the relief system, and some were due to 
changes in piping upstream and downstream the valve.  
Short report 
Short (2003, 2004, 2006) conducted a statistical study for his PhD thesis, based on his work at Pressure 
Systems Engineering, Inc. (Newark, Delaware), related to the survey of  relief devices in 7 chemical 
process plants over 10 years (1993-2003). The plants had about 1000 pressure relief devices (pressure 
relief valves, rupture discs and a combination of them both). A sample of 120 relief devices (67 safety 
valves and 53 rupture discs) were taken as the most representative ones for the 7 scenarios studied for 
each item (external fire, exchanger tube failure, control valve or actuated valve failure, cooling failure, 
blocked outlet, hydraulic expansion and process upset -runaway reaction-). Among these 120 relief 
devices, 35% were new relief device installations and 65% were existing ones. However, from a total of 
840 potential relief calculations only 213 were performed, because some contingencies from the gathered 
information clearly were not the governing case for PRV sizing or were not credible. 
The Short results were as follows: 
 17.5% of the 120 relief devices (both existing and new ones) were undersized for the governing 
relief conditions 
 The undersized range for existing relief devices was an astounding 26.9% 
 For existing relief devices, the range of undersized ones ranged between 12.3% and 26.9% 
Taking into account these percentages, Short deduced that in the US there were between 558,000 
and 1,220,000 undersized relief devices, when considering all the chemical plants and the 
combination of chemical/petroleum and related manufacturing plants 




 Short also investigated whether fire was the most governing contingency in relation to the other 
six scenarios studied; he found that the ratio was about 50% for both.  
Smith report 
Smith (1995) published the results of different surveys undertaken in order to check the actual 
performance of installed safety valves with respect to their cold set pressures in the pre-pop tests. The 
original survey consisted of a sample of 5,073 valves from a variety of industries in the United Kingdom. 
The question that Smith tried to answer was “Would the valve have lifted at the correct pressure?” The 
results of this survey were as following: 
 6.3% of the total valves (321 units) failed to lift (when valves lifted at 1.9 times the cold set 
pressure or above this value, they were adjudged “failed to lift”) 




 The general approach for several companies according to this author was “fit and forget”. 
In 1994 Smith made a second survey, adding the results from plants in France, Germany, Holland and 
Belgium and those from one worldwide survey by a multinational petrochemical company. A total of 






Figure 2-5. Percentage of valves (sample of 12,790) opening above 10% of the set pressure. 
The Smith final conclusions were: 
 13% safety valves did not lift at 10% above set pressure 
 5% safety valves did not lift at 50% above set pressure 
 3% safety valves did not lift at twice set pressure. 
Aird report 
Aird (1982) applied the reliability concept to pressure relief valves. This author accepted the ICI company 
criteria that the failure of a safety valve is lifting at less or more pressure than 10% deviation of the cold 
set pressure.  The database used consisted of the records provided by a large chemical company of 1,041 
inspections performed during 2 years. As in many cases, the valves were so dirty that they had to be 

















range of overpressure  




Moreover, 120 tests had no value recorded for the period covered. Accordingly, the final number of tests 
analyzed was 746.  
The results of Aird are summarized in Table 2-7. 
Table 2-7. Proportion of failures after different periods in service. 




Number of valves 
Number of failures Amount 
% 
1-39 17.1 104 46 44.2 
40-57 48.6 104 36 34.6 
58-90 70.6 107 52 48.6 
91-112 103.0 103 44 42.7 
113-147 130.3 103 43 41.7 
148-182 160.9 106 51 48.1 
183-364 261.0 103 55 53.4 
All 119.1 746 332 44.5 
 
Aird wrote “Thus, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that all the results come from valves having 
the same probability of failure regardless of the period in service”. This result is surprising because it 
implies that 44.5% of the valves in service lift outside the ± 10% of the set pressure. 
The conclusions of this author were: 
 A mean of 44.5% of all valves lifted outside the ± 10% range, independently of the period in 
service from 1 week to 1 year 
 Besides dirt on the seats or product clogging the entrance of the safety valve, other less extreme 
mechanisms were working: spring relaxation, vibration and low temperatures  
 If the spring was loaded and exposed to moderate temperatures for a few days, the stiffness of the 
spring changed, causing a decrease in set pressure of 5 to 10% 
 A test with one valve under vibration caused the set point to fall to approximately 94% of its 
original value 
 A test with a temperature soaked valve (80ºC) produced an almost linear increase in initial lift 
pressure with time, reaching 175% after 800 hours. However, the subsequent lifts (at least 10 
readings were taken) were within a few per cent of the original cold set pressure. 
Hellemans report 
Hellemans (2009) gave a statistical analysis from the manufacturer’s point of view. Based on a period of 
one year, he analyzed 750 complains coming from Europe, Middle East, Africa and Asia only. The results 
can be seen in Figure 2-6. 
 

















According to this author, 75% of the incoming complaints about the so-called “non-functioning SRV,s” 
were because of careless handling during and after transportation, installation, testing or maintenance. 
Hellemans gives support to the Berwanger work, and writes that the results can be transposed to other 
parts of the world, perhaps taking a 5% on the safe side for Western Europe (that means that the 41% of 
equipment, which does not meet standards in US, will be 45 % in Western Europe because old codes still 
apply above PED 97/23/EC (Pressure Equipment Directive)).  
Riha and Streblow report 
Riha and Streblow (2015) presented the results of a statistical survey of significant issues encountered in 
the analysis of the existing flare systems of five US on-shore gas plants. The results are exposed in the 
table 2-8. 
Table 2-8. Significant issues with specific relief system components from multiple flare studies. 
Component design issues from US on-shore gas 
plants 




Number of PRVs 27 10 11 14 28 total: 90 PRVs 
PRV inlet/outlet pipes needed to increase in size  8 11  28 53% 
PRV relieving exceeded data sheet back pressure 25  11 6  48% 
Relief flow exceeded 0.7 Mach number 22  11 9  48% 
Relief flow exceeded maximum piping design 
temperature 
27  2 7  41% 
Relief flow at header exceeds maximum design 
temperature 
25 4    33% 
Relief flow exceeded PRV typical maximum back 
pressure 
10  11 6  31% 
Relief flow exceeded maximum piping design 
pressure 
15   7  25% 
Slug/Chocked flow present in piping 4   9  15% 
Excessive liquid to knock out drum  4   4 9% 
 
The results show that 53% of the valves not fulfill the pressure drop rules in inlet and outlet pipes. This 
demonstrates deficiencies in the detail engineering work conducted by the engineering and contruction 
companies. The figures of plant 5 are fully unacceptable.   
Other reports 
a) Parry (1992) presents the reliability data from Pearce and the results from the Reliability Data 
Bank of the NCSR. A summary of the results are: 
 Pearce reported that from a sample of 1,062 valves, 10% lifted at a pressure < 90% of the 
set pressure and 7% lifted at a pressure > 110% of the set pressure 
 The results of the NCSR Reliability Data Bank, based on a sample of 4,289 valves, are 
reported in the following table: 
 
Table 2-9. Safety valves failure data according to the NCSR Reliability Data Bank. 
 
No. of safety valves 608 
Total experience, years 2576 
No. of failures 821 
Falure rate per year 0.319 
Failure to open at the set pressure 37(5%)* 
Failure to open fully at the relieving pressure 307(37%) 
Premature opening below the set pressure 240 (29%) 
Failure to reseat after opening 2 (0 %) 
Valve chatter 5 (1%) 
Leakage through the valve seat 224 (27%)** 




Leakage through the valve body 0 (0%) 
Rupture of the valve body 6 (1%) 
* Percentage of failures.  
** The high value in this case indicates that failures in operation have been noted whereas failures under test 
have been ignored or not observed. 
  
b) Smith, Burgess and Powers (2011) reported that in a mid-sized US-based refinery with 
approximately 550 relief devices, 64 of them (12%) did not satisfy the 3% inlet pressure rule. 
c) CCPS (1998) reported that, amongst the 100 worst major accidents that occurred in the process 
industry between 1956 and 1986, twenty-five could be attributed, at least partly, to the inadequate 
design or maintenance of pressure relief systems. 
d) Chien et al. (2009) treated statistically the results from a lubricant plant with 252 spring-loaded 
pressure relief valves. Roughly, 60% of the valves were used in liquid service, while about 4% 
and 36% were used in vapor and two-phase services, respectively. The final sample was 229, 
because some valves had process deposits and mechanical damages and were sticky. The results 
were that 4% of the valves opened at a pressure higher than 20% of the set pressure and 12 % 
opened a pressure less than 95 % of the set pressure. 
 
  




Chapter 3. Development of a new methodology to increase the 





A lot of authors have worked on the concept of safety life cycle. Knegtering (2002) devoted his PhD 
thesis to the safety life cycle management in the process industries, focused on the Safety Instrumented 
Systems (SIS). Riyaz (2005) reported the benefits of the safety life cycle in SISs projects. Gruhn and 
Cheddie (2006) analyzed the evolution of these standards; they reported that the ANSI/ISA S84.01-1996 
was the first standard to introduce the Safety Life Cycle concept. It was defined as a “sequence of 
activities involved in the implementation of the Safety Instrumented Systems from conception to 
decommissioning”.  
IEC 61508-1/7 (1998-2000) gives, in part 4, another definition as “necessary activities involved in the 
implementation of safety-related systems, occurring during a period of time that starts at the concept 
phase of a project and finishes when all of the electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related 
systems, other technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities are no longer 
available for use”. A note is added: “The term “functional safety lifecycle” is strictly more accurate, but 
the adjective “functional” is not considered necessary in this case within the context of this standard”.  
IEC 61508 is a generic standard that outlines key requirements for all phases of the Safety Instrumented 
System Life Cycle. From this standard, various sector specific standards have been developed, such as 
IEC 61511 for the process industry, IEC 61513 for the nuclear power industry, etc. They are commonly 
known as functional safety standards. The main feature that distinguishes them from other related 
standards is that functional safety standards are performance-based, whereas many other standards, e.g. 
API 521, are prescriptive (Gruhn and Cheddie, 2006); instead of simply requiring one pressure relief 
valve to be installed in the prescriptive standards, the functional safety standards provide work process 
procedures  and tools for the engineer to help decide how many safety valves are needed and how the 
valves should be designed, installed, operated and revised. 
IEC 61511-1/3 (2003) or ANSI/ISA-84.00.01-2004 part 1, also give the definition “necessary activities 
involved in the implementation of safety instrumented function(s), occurring during a period of time that 
starts at the concept phase of a project and finishes when all of the safety instrumented functions are no 
longer available for use” 
Each author has used the concept in different variants. For example Riyaz (2005) defines Safety Life 
Cycle as “a good, common sense design process with the same fundamental steps that any good design 
process would follow. First a problem is identified and assessed - then a design is done to solve the 
problem. Finally the design is verified (checked and tested) to make sure that it actually solves the 
original problem that was identified”. Some people complain that performing all of the steps in the Safety 
Life Cycle, will increase overall costs and result in lower productivity. Gruhn (2006) referenced a study 
performed by Levenson in 1995, where it was demonstrated that production increased as safety increased.  
The steps of the new Safety Life Cycle methodology proposed in this thesis have been adopted from IEC 
61511-1 (2003) and can be seen in Figure 3-1.  































Figure 3-1. The main steps of the new methodology based on the Safety Life Cycle analysis. 
3.1 Phase 1. Risk analysis 
Literature survey on problems detected 
As pointed out by Berwanger et al. (2000), the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) methodologies (Hazop, 
What if, etc.) do not identify all overpressure scenarios in the equipment. This conclusion came from the 
fact that essentially all the 250 operating units analyzed by these authors had already undergone hazard 
analyses. They added that most deficiencies are not identified in PHAs because of time constraints and a 
general lack of pressure relief systems expertise in PHA teams. Another point that contributes to this fact 
is that the number of pieces of equipment in each node in the Hazop analysis is usually too big. These 
authors proposed using an equipment-based approach, i.e. using a screening of the 17 possible 
overpressure scenarios listed in API 521 (2014) for each piece of equipment (Berwanger and Kreder, 
1998). 
Marshall et al. (2011) stated that “Contrary to conventional thinking, the PHA process is not an effective 
tool for capturing relief system deficiencies”. They concluded that neither Hazop, What-If/Checklists, 
Fault-Tree, LOPA, etc. are appropriate. On the contrary, these methods take credit for proper relief 
system design as an inherent safeguard in mitigating loss of containment consequences. 
Hellemans (2009) also remarks on this problem, adding that even though most of the plants have been 
designed by reputable engineering firms, the vast majority of deviations are not identified through PHAs  
but either via external audits or when accidents have already occurred. He adds that the problem in 
engineering companies is that the design, instrumentation, process and piping engineers have such a 
variety of components to cover, that there is little specialization in pressure relief systems alone. 
Moreover, he remarked that the standard internal audit may not catch the piece of equipment that does not 
have a valve but should have it. Hellemans also concluded that many specialists in pressure relief systems 




believe that the conventional PHA methods are not always the most effective tools for evaluating pressure 
relief systems.  
Dunjó (2010), in his PhD thesis, wrote about the inefficiencies of the Hazop methodology, among them 
the node-selection methodology. He proposed defining nodes with no more than two major equipment for 
a time concept optimization. In our case, his recommendations would be taking nodes with very little 
equipment, especially with the guidewords “more pressure” and “more temperature”. 
The opinion of this author is that in minor projects performed in already existing process plants and 
according to the risk analysis demanded by Management of Change procedure, a less demanding method 
than Hazop is normally used, for instance What-if. Although the analysis is done by experienced people 
who work and have worked for a long time in the unit, the same problems, as explained by Hazop, could 
occur. 
Wong (2001) adds to the list of 17 scenarios of overpressure the human error. Although human error is 
one of the most important issues in accidents (Anonymous, 2000), this risk factor is not enough 
implemented yet in Hazop studies, as demonstrated by Dunjó (2010). 
Procedure in the new methodology 
The risk assessment will be performed focusing on an “equipment by equipment” approach. In each piece 
of equipment the list of Table 1 of API 521 (2014) will be used as a check list slightly modified. This 
work will be done together with the formal PHA studies together with the review of past accidents and 
incidents with the same substances and processes used, as has been recommended by Directive 
2012/18/EU (article 10, annex II) . A specific template will be used, which can be seen in Figures 3-2 and 
3-3. The explanation of each contingency of Figure 3-2 can bee seen in section 4.1.2.  
 
Contingency Comments Justification 
1 Blocked outlets     
2 Abnormal heat input     
3 Exchanger tube breakage     
4 Auto control failure     
5 Reflux failure     
6 Fire     
7 Cooling water failure     
8 Power failure     
9 Instrument air failure     
10 Inadvertent valve open/close     
11 Mechanical equipment failure     
12 Heat loss (series fractionating columns)     
13 Thermal     
14 Loss of quench/cold feed     
15 Chemical reaction     
16 Steam out     
 
Figure 3-2. Contingency analysis data sheet. 
 





TAG/EQUIP. NUMBER   UNIT /SERVICE: P&ID: PLANT: COST CENTER:
SET PRESS: BARG BASIS:
DISCHARGE DISPOSITION: INLET PRESSURE DROP: BAR
CONSTANT BACKPRESSURE: BARG VARIABLE BACK PRESS.: BARG  Kd =
EQUIPMENT DESIGN CONDITIONS:  (         ) MAWP (      ) Design (      ) Other BUILT-UP BACKPRESSURE: BARG TOTAL BACKPRESSURE: BARG  Kb =
NORMAL OPER. BARG ºC Rupture Disk ,Y/N FIRE SUMMARY WETTED AREA: m² ATTACH SKETCH FOR AREA CALCULATION:
MAX OPER. BARG ºC Derating Factor= INSULATION TYPE THCKNS mm Insul factr, 1=none
DESIGN BARG ºC (Use 0.9 if have rupture disk) Q =   KJ/h
CONN: RATING FACING : PIPE SPEC, IN/OUT: /
      RELIEF 
Causes of Relief     CONDITIONS  SP COMPR LATENT SP HEAT LIQUID VAPOR VAPOR LIQUID TOTAL
       Refer to API RP520, RP521 and ISO 4126 VAPOR LIQUID PRESS TEMP FLUID VAPOR GRAVITY FACTOR HEAT RATIO VISC VISC AREA AREA AREA
 Contingency Comments NA, etc % OV PR kg/h m3/h BARG °C TYPE MOL WT LIQUID Z L,  KJ/kg k cP cP V  mm² L  mm² T  mm²
1.  BLOCKED OUTLETS
2.  ABNORMAL HEAT INPUT
3.  EXCHANGER TUBE BREAKAGE
4.  AUTO CONTROL FAILURE
5.  REFLUX FAILURE
6.  FIRE
7.  COOLING WATER FAILURE
8.  POWER FAILURE
9.  INSTR. AIR FAILURE
10. INADVERTENT VA. OPEN/CLOSE
11. MECH. EQUIP. FAILURE
12. HEAT LOSS (SERIES FRAC.)
13. THERMAL







NOTES:  GENERAL DATA BY: DATE:
 PROCESS DATA BY: DATE:
 VALVE SIZING BY: DATE:
CHECKED/APPROVED BY: DATE:
EXISTING RV DETAILS:  
SIZING CASE SELECTED: RELIEF DEVICE TYPE: /   TOTAL ORIFICE AREA REQD: mm
2
DEVICES SELECTED - QTY: INLET SIZE: mm OUTLET SIZE: mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): mm
2
SET PRES: BARG
QTY: INLET SIZE: mm OUTLET SIZE: mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): mm2 SET PRES: BARG
QTY: INLET SIZE: mm OUTLET SIZE: mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): mm2 SET PRES: BARG
QTY: INLET SIZE: mm OUTLET SIZE: mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): mm2 SET PRES: BARG
EQUIPMENT PROTECTED:
FLUID PHYSICAL PROPERTIES AT RELIEF CONDITIONS:
     RELIEF LOAD
Relieving Loads Summary 
Data Sheet
 
Figure 3-3. Relieving loads summary data sheet. 




Concerning the PHA studies, Hazop methodology integrated with LOPA analysis has been used in this 
thesis, with especial emphasis in the guidewords “more pressure” and “more temperature”.  
Moreover, through the LOPA analysis, each pressure relief valve has been allocated as Independent 
Protection Layer (IPL) with assigned credits depending of its reliability. Figure 3-4 shows the example of 
the valve YS702-01, taken as study case, where it has 4 IPL credits. 
 
Figure 3-4. Hazop integrated with LOPA, where each safety valve shows its allocated Independent   
Protection Layer. Example of YS702-01. 
A proposal has been presented to DIERS to stablish a standard education program for “Expert in pressure 
relief systems”, similar to the program for experts in Safety Instrumented Systems according to IEC 
61508/61511 with the courses  “Certified Functional Safety Expert” and “Certified Functional Safety 
Professional”. 
3.2 Phase 2. Safety requirements specification 
Literature survey on problems detected 
Kreder and Berwanger (1995) pointed out that the steps of the traditional process of specifying a relief 
device are: 
1. Identifying a piece of equipment or piping system that may be exposed to overpressure. 
2. Determining all the possible causes of overpressure for this item. 
3. Quantifying the required relief load for each scenario of overpressure. 
4. Developing a relief strategy to protect the unit. Usually, one relief valve protects the item from 
several causes of overpressure. 
5. Calculating the required size of the relief device. 
6. Identifying any special considerations: need of a bellows valve, two-phase flow, etc. 
7. Specifying the relief device based on the largest size requirement, taking into account any special 
requirements. 
From all this information, usually generated by the engineering firm, the owner and operator of the plant 
received only a datasheet for each relief device. Also the information generated in steps 2 through 6 was 
not transferred to the data sheet. Although it is reasonable to assume that the designer of the original relief 
system did consider various causes of overpressure, the engineers of the plant could not demonstrate that 




all possible causes of overpressure had been addressed. The authors wrote that a typical pressure relief 
valve data sheet in use today, fails to capture about 75% of the design process, and often does not address 
the changes that take place over time in the plant. The authors also recommended the use of an intelligent 
electronic data base rather than an all-paper system. 
Melhem (2010), from ioMosaic, listed the following risks in existing relief systems: 
 Outdated, different formats, and/or non-existent design basis and supporting calculations 
 Most data do not comply with new API 521(2008) documentation suggestions 
 Missing or outdated material and energy balances 
 Missing or outdated isometrics and vessel design data 
 Missing or outdated vent containment design basis 
 Atmospheric relief devices 
 Overloaded flare systems 
 Existing relief calculations ignore chemical reactivity and multiphase flow 
 A large majority of existing systems using pressure relief valves suffer from excessive inlet 
pressure drop and excessive backpressure 
 High pressure systems - cold temperatures downstream of the pressure relief valve 
 Vibration risk. 
The results from this author indicate the same problem as those from Kreder et al., the pressure relief 
valve data sheet does not give the information generated originally by the engineering firm. 
Hellemans (2009) also wrote “Many specialists conclude that the pressure relief system design process 
could be improved. Working closely with a lot of the design firms, I concluded that they merely try to 
comply with the codes at a minimum cost and care very little about Life Cycle Cost of the components”. 
He added that the consequences fall on the end users’ maintenance departments. 
My own experience, having worked in an engineering and construction firm, is that there are so many 
subjective decisions in the calculation of the relieving load of a pressure relief valve, that any 
modification made in the data sheet at the detail engineering phase could mean, for instance, a change in 
the diameter of the nozzle of the equipment protected, increasing the cost of the project and perhaps 
delaying its execution. That is why I had never been allowed to show such calculations to the client. 
Procedure in the new methodology 
A new data sheet has been generated. It has been developed based on the model presented at Annex D of 
API 520 (Part I, 2008); nevertheless, it has been significantly modified in order to incorporate all the 
relevant information required. Figure 3-5 presents the new safety valve requirement specification for the 
pressure relief valve YS 702/01 that corresponds to the valve of the case study 6.4.  
The new data sheet has a stability section with all the necessary parameters, as will be discussed in 
section 4.6. Already in the detail engineering phase it is necessary to assign an inspection period for the 
valve according to company guidelines. A recommended proposal in this work is the proposal of API 581 
(2008) as it is discussed in section 4.11. 
  











01  Ident. No                YS702/01  Special Item No.   
02  Designation Pressure relief valve 
03  Component key No./Var.  Ident. No. Customer   
04  Piping Engineering Prepared:  Basco Date:  June 30, 2014 
05  Location Petrochemical plant  P&I-diagram   
06  Regulations  AD-Merkblatt      API       Unit No.   



















 Lifting lever  Blocking gag  Allowable working pressure 45         bar  
09   Change-over valve with locking device at inlet  Allowable working temperature 120          ºC  
10   Change-over valve with locking device at outlet     


















Inlet ST860E-A  
12   supplement. loaded  gas-tight  Outlet ST261C-E  
13   metallic seat  soft seat  
Facing 
 DIN      ASME B 16.5       
14   open bonnet  closed bonnet  Inlet  Outlet   
15    Proposed material (body)   
16  Process Data 
17  Fluid  
(mixed fluids to be 
determined in weight %) 
Propylene ( liquid )  Operating pressure PA 16.2      bar  
18    Operating temperature tA 42           ºC  
19    Max. total 
back pressure Pa 





























 gas  steam  variable 3.3      bar  
21   liquid  vapour – liquid mixture  Set pressure (Start to lift press.) P     45        bar  
22   vapour  fat containing  Allowable accumulation 10          %  
23   tending to 
conglutinate 
 toxic  Temperature 
on discharge 
Inlet 100        ºC  
24   solids containing  Outlet ºC  
25  Corrosive matter No  Required discharge capacity 10000    kg/h  
26    Isentropic exponent 1.55           -  
27  Critical blow-off condition Fire  Compressibility factor Z=pV/RT 0.7             -  
28    Flow coefficient ψ   











Temperature ºC  Dynamic viscosity   mPas  
31   Inlet  Body  Molecular mass M 42  kg/kmol  
32  Type   Density at set press. and discharge temp. kg/m3  
33     Maximum discharge capacity 15827         kg/h  
34  Completed:   Date:  Modified on Rev.: Date:  






 Stability Calculations Maintenance 
  Inlet pressure drop2      1.4                                     % (<3% SP)  First assigned revision interval 5               years  
  Outlet pressure drop2     7.6                       < 10% conventional 
                                 < 30-50 % bellows 
 Revision of intervals according to:  own guidelines 
 API 581 
 
  Max inlet line length  0.3                                              m  Noise level            142                     dB  
  Acoustic pressure losses              25.7                                   bar  
(Blowdown > ΔP fricc. + ΔP acoustic) 
    
  Vortex shedding inlet line 26                              m     
  Acoustic Induced vibration(AIV )  check  No check     
  Body Bowl Chocking  check  No check     
 
 0 1-2 Basco  7/1/14         Revised as marked 
Rev. Sheet Name Date Name Name Date Status Remark, kind of revision 
   Approved 
Designation Basic document DG DL-Nr. DCC 
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01  Ident. No           YS 702/01  Special Item No.   
02  Construction features  
03 ● Manufacturer LESER ● Type test approval by □ TUV □ UV-Stamp  
04 ● Manufacturer’s type 4564.6052 ● No. of type test approval   





























06 ● Type □ Safety valve  Full lift □ Relief ● Inlet nozzle 1.4581   
07 ● Flow diameter required mm ● Bonnet bolts    
08 ● d0 per valve in service selected 20         mm ● Bonnet nuts    
09 ● Flow Area A0 required 220.55    mm
2 ● Seat, disc 1.4404   
10 ● per valve in service selected 314.1593 mm2 ● Cooling spacer    














DN 25 PN 100 ● Spring, bonnet, yoke 1.4310   
13 ● NPS  Class  ●     
14 ● Facing E DIN  ASME  ● Test of material TRB 801 No. 45  



















□ Bonnet open □ Bonnet closed  
17 ● NPS  Class  ● □ Bonnet gas tight □ Blocking gag  
18 ● Facing C DIN  ASME  ● □ Balanced bellows □ Cooling spacer  
19 ● Thread  Standard  ● □ Lifting lever □ Lift stopper  
20 ● Test pressure Pe = P∙Pa bar ● Special features of 
construction 
Lifting device has to be sealed  
21 ● Reaction force on discharge FR 4082                       N ●   
22 ● Opening pressure 2) 10                        % ●   
23 ● Reseating pressure 2) 10                        % ●   
24 ●   ● Kind of interlocking   
25 ●   ● Weight  20       kg/piece  
26 ● Dimensions S 120     mm X mm S1 mm  No. 
required 
In service  1     Piece Spares Piece  
27 ●  mm S2  mm H  mm  Total quantity  Piece  




1) Marking durable on flange and on name-plate 
2) Referred to set pressure 
All pressure data indicated are gauge pressures 





Certified coefficient of discharge for steam and gases, ∝𝑑,𝐷𝐺  = 0.8 







Project Name Project No. Document No. Sheet /of Rev. 
                                PhD Thesis   2/2 0 




3.3 Phase 3. Design 
Literature survey on problems detected 
In Chapter 2 the results of statistical surveys about deficiencies in existing pressure relief valves due to 
undersizing showed similar results:  13.4 % (Kumana and Aldeeb, 2014), 9% (Berwanger et al., 2000), 
11% (Hellemans, 2009) and 10% (Hellemans, 2009), although the last two results included undersized 
and oversized safety relief valves (note: the 10% is from Hellemans own data). 
The design problems identified by Berwanger et al. are listed below by frequency and in descending 
order: 
 External fire, 41%. Calculations were performed taking into account the equations of the API 521 
for fire, considering the adequacy of the firefighting and drainage systems. The wetted area was 
based on the high liquid level in the vessel up to 7.6 m above grade. An environmental factor of 
1.0 was generally used unless the insulation was fireproof 
 Exchanger tube rupture, 16%. The “two-thirds rule” was applied; nevertheless, tube rupture 
scenarios were identified only for shell and tube exchangers that did not fulfill the rule. The 
calculations were performed considering two sharp-edged orifices. The maximum expected 
pressure upstream of the high pressure side and the relieving pressure of the low pressure side 
were used to calculate the pressure drop across the orifice  
 Blocked outlet, 13%. The quantity of the material to be released was determined at relieving 
conditions based on the capacity of upstream pressure sources or on the heat load of process 
heaters 
 Inlet control valve failure, 13%. Calculations were based on manufacturer’s valve flow 
calculations, assuming a fully open valve. The differential pressure across the control valve was 
the difference between the maximum expected upstream value and the downstream relieving 
pressure. Sometimes, the flow through the control valve was limited by the capacity of upstream 
equipment, such as a pump, or by the piping. The failure of level control valves that control the 
flow of liquid from a higher to a lower pressure system can result in a loss of liquid level and the 
flow of a gas or vapor through the valve. This is known as “gas blow-by”. In this case, the flow 
was the maximum allowed for the control valve. Consideration was also given to the possibility 
for the downstream vessel to fill above the normal level which could result in the vapor flow from 
the control valve entering the liquid space in the downstream vessel and subsequent two-phase 
relief  
 Multiple scenarios, 12%. In this case, the piece of equipment had an undersized relief device for 
more than one potential overpressure scenario 
 Other, 3%. This category includes the other scenarios not presented here but listed in the 16 
overpressure scenarios of API 521 
 Loss of condensation, 2%. This case corresponds to a loss of cooling water, for example in a 
distillation column. Moreover, in a typical design the loss of cooling can also result in a loss of 
reflux after 15 minutes. Because API 521 recommends the comparison of the relieving load 
before and after the loss of reflux, both cases were performed by Berwanger et al. The method 
followed is from Sengupta and Staats (1978).  
According to the results of Berwanger et al. the question that arises is whether the engineers who 
developed the information worked properly. Bravo et al. (1995) pointed out the following pitfalls in doing 
the relief system design: 
 A common mistake is assigning the engineering of relief systems to a junior engineer. Even 
though with the computer software available today it is easy to oversimplify the engineering 
process, experience is critical in the proper selection of the dimensioning scenario 
 Although codes and regulations are available (API 520, API 521, ISO 4126, API 2000, AD 
Merkblatt, etc.), these codes are not precise and good judgment is necessary. As an example, the 
author presents the common mistake of taking credit for the environmental factor of the fire case 
when the insulation is not fireproof certified 




 Consideration of the possibility of runaway reactions when sizing the pressure relief valve. The 
use of Fauske nomograph for design and not for preliminary sizing only, is one of the common 
mistakes that engineers make 
 Considering two or more simultaneous failures  
 Taking credit for the properly work of the instrumentation in an upset condition. Similarly, 
relying on the proper operation of check valves, even if two are installed in series 
 Ignoring the need of a valve in case of thermal expansion of liquids 
 Using incorrect or inaccurate physical-property data, for example, by assuming ideal gas behavior 
for a gas near its critical point. Another example is using the heat of vaporization of 115 kJ/kg for 
liquids near the critical point. A further example is using a heat capacity of 2510 J/kgºC as is 
commonly suggested for organic liquids, and this value can lead to undersized valves. 
Smith and Burgess (2012) wrote about the article of Berwanger et al. (2000) “Since the publication of this 
article, many of these concerns have undergone a more detailed review showing that modifications to the 
facility were not required to address these concerns”. The authors emphasize the use of good judgement 
to see if the relieving scenario has realistic or unrealistic conservative assumptions, as for example: 
 Pumps that can only pump the relief pressure if the upstream system is also upset (however, a 
simultaneous upset would be double jeopardy) 
 Systems where overpressure comes from heat input, but the relief temperature of the process 
fluid exceeds the relief temperature of the utility fluid 
 Control valve failure calculations that are based on the capacity of a control valve instead of on a 
long section of piping. 
Other authors focused on specific pitfalls: 
a) Basco et al. (2012) pointed out that one common mistake is not considering the expansion of the 
liquid inside the vessel in case of fire due to the decrease of density, before boiling starts. In this 
case, the wet area is bigger than the normal maximal level at the beginning of the fire. Or the lack 
of checking with the available methods if there are two-phases at the input of the pressure relief 
valve or not. Another common mistake the authors exposed is the lack of rigorous calculation of 
the latent heat of mixtures, considering the maximal of a function that involves the parameters 
related to the area of the pressure relief valve as presented by Wong (2000).  
b) Shackelford (2003) presented a comparison of the errors of undersizing that the engineers do 
when using the real Cp/Cv value, normally obtained from commercial simulators, together with 
the compressibility factor in the common formulas for calculating the required relieving area in 
the case of gases.  
c) Bradford and Durrett (1984) wrote about common mistakes in using the total gross overhead load 
for sizing the pressure relief valve in case of condensation failure in distillation columns. One of 
the most frequent ones is taking credit for the pinch of temperatures in the reboiler, without 
considering the composition of the feed and the holdup of the bottoms among other parameters. 
  
Procedure in the new methodology 
To tackle these problems, the following information must be generated for each pressure relief valve: 
 A chronological record of all the files including all reviews, evaluations, design modifications, 
etc., which have been performed on the system 
 Data sheets including the justification of the scenarios that have been considered (reference: 
Table 2 of API 521 (2007, 2014) 
 A diagram of the safety valve, equipment protected and connecting pipes, including diameters 
and thickness. Alternatively, the P&ID may be sufficient 
 Relief load analysis (contingency analysis), including  the calculations corresponding to all the 
relief cases assumed for the  valve that are both specific to the unit (blocked outlet, reflux failure, 




rupture of a tube in a heat exchanger, etc.) and cumulative (fire, total/partial power failure, 
cooling water failure, etc.). Commercial simulators or specific software may in certain cases be 
required, such as in the isentropic expansion of supercritical fluids (Ouderkirk, 2002, Aspen-
Hysys v8.6, 2015) or the relief in distillation columns due to cooling failure (Sengupta and 
Staats, 1978) or two-phase flow relieving (Leung, 1996; EN ISO 4126-10, 2010; API 520, 2008; 
Schmidt, 2012; etc.). The simplified process calculations done to demonstrate that a particular 
case is not the governing one for pressure relief valve sizing should also be included 
 Calculation of the required relieving area of the safety valve, including the results of the software 
used: PS PPM software (Siemens), Aspen-Hysys v8.6, Valvestar (LESER), etc. 
 Isometric diagrams of the valve inlet and outlet pipes, showing all details required for a proper 
installation 
 Calculations of the pressure drop in the pipe that connects the protected unit to the safety valve. 
These calculations should identify the size and equivalent lengths or K coefficients used for each 
section of piping and the roughness factor employed.  They should be performed for the 
maximum flow rate that the valve can release, rather than the required flow rate in case of 
gases/vapors 
 Calculation of the pressure drop in the outlet pipe, taking into account the specific 
circumstances: superimposed backpressure, pressure drop in the flare system if fluids are 
discharged to a flare, the influence of two-phase flow (assuming isentropic behavior at the valve, 
especially when relief conditions are close to the critical point), possible sonic velocity at certain 
points (Mach number), etc. Tail pipes must be calculated for maximum flow rates, and headers 
and subheaders for the required flow rate (API 521, 2007).  Pressure drop at the valve outlet 
must be limited to 10% of the set pressure for conventional valves, and 30%-50% for balanced 
valves  
 Calculation of the forces and moments imposed on the valve and piping during the relief, 
especially in the case of discharges to the atmosphere 
 Calculation of the stability of the safety valve. The time required by the pressure wave generated 
by the opening to reach the protected vessel and travel back to the valve should be less than the 
valve opening time. This is still a difficult point (Melhem, 2011). According to Smith et al. 
(2011), the methods proposed by Cremers et al. (2001) and Melhem (2011) are good approaches 
for establishing the maximum value of the characteristic constant K corresponding to the inlet 
pipe. Included in these calculations are the inlet frictional and acoustic pressure losses, the vortex 
shedding criteria and the oversized criteria (Smith  et al., 2011). Recently, the API Simple Force 
Balance method developed by Melhem (2014, 2015) and presented in the API 520 (Part II, 2015) 
is gaining acceptance in the community, nevertheless the necessity of knowing the blowdown 
with precision is required. The dynamic models (Darby et al., 2013, 2014; Melhem, 2014, 2015; 
Hös et al., 2014, 2015) including the system (equipment protected) or not, are actually too much 
complicated without dedicated software and without the characteristic parameters of the valve 
being known, like spring constant, mass of the moving parts, damping factor and geometric 
parameters (Darby et al. 2013, 2014). However, they can be applied to a specific case. An 
example of the typical damage to the disc and the seating surface of a safety valve because of 
chattering is presented in Figure 4.4 
 Calculation of Acoustic Induced Vibration (AIV). The vibration at certain points (connection of 
tail pipes to subheaders or headers) can give rise to releases. The methodology proposed by 
Eisinger (1997) or the Energie Institute (2008) for screening this is often used 
 Noise calculation according to codes (for instance, section 7.3.4.3, API 521, 2007) 
 Calculation of the body bowl chocking pressure, to determine the critical flow in the valve just 
before the outlet nozzle. This must be checked only in conventional valves. D’Alessandro (2011) 
proposed a methodology that assumes isentropic flow from the valve inlet to the outlet nozzle 
and adiabatic flow from the nozzle to the valve outlet. Izuchi (2015) presented a more complex 
procedure but this has been validated by experimental work with relative good results  
 Calculation of the optimal revision time, according to pressurized equipment standards (RD2060, 
2008) or to risk analysis methodologies, such as API 581 (section 7, 2008). 




3.4 Phase 4. Reception, installation and checking 
Literature survey on problems detected 
Concerning the reception deficiencies, once more Hellemans (2009) gives his own data: 29 % of the 750 
complaints during one year were due to transport and handling issues. In Hellemans words “it is 
unimaginable how carelessly safety relief valves are sometimes treated within the industry, and this is 
mostly due to a lack of knowledge”. 
Scully (1981) reported that 2-3% of the valves shipped from the manufacturer had become misaligned 
due to vibration or rough handling during transportation. 
The same graph reported by Hellmans shows that 12 % of the valves were defective due to issues with 
manufacturing. This is why, before installing a pressure relief valve in the plant, it is necessary to always 
test it to confirm its opening pressure setting (Malek, 2006). 
In Chapter 2, the results of statistical surveys about deficiencies in existing pressure relief valves due to 
installation (based on the number of valves, not pieces of equipment), showed a result of 24.9 %  
(Kumana and Aldeeb, 2014), 19% (Berwanger et al., 2000), 11% (Hellemans, 2009) and 33% 
(Hellemans, 2009) (note: the 33% is Hellemans own data based on the 750 complaints mentioned before). 
The design problems identified by Berwanger are listed below by frequency in a descending order: 
 Outlet pressure drop too high, 49%. This concern is due to the limitation imposed on 
conventional pressure relief valves of a maximum built-up back pressure in the outlet of the valve 
of approximately 10%. The pressure drop should be based on the rated valve capacity consistent 
with the inlet piping pressure drop. This pressure drop should be calculated between the exit of 
the valve and the exit of the tail pipe (the atmosphere or the entrance to a main relief header) 
(note: although there is no mention in Berwanger’s paper about the treatment of the balanced and 
pilot operated valves, according to the Kumana and Aldeeb work, which includes the statistics of 
Berwanger et al., the pressure drops higher than 30% for conventional valves and 50% for pilot 
operated valves had also been considered) 
 Inlet pressure drop too high, 33%. Inlet pressure drops were calculated for frictional losses only at 
the rated capacity of the valve  
 Blocked relief pathway, 8%. The isolation valves installed in the inlet pipe should be full bore 
and should have the capacity of being locked open or carsealed open. Deficiencies were identified 
by checking the entire relief pathway for each protected piece of equipment, to ensure the 
existence of an open pathway 
 Set pressure too high, 9%. Deficiencies were identified by comparing the current set or burst 
pressure to the Maximum Allowed Working Pressure of all protected equipment 
 Others, 1%. This category represents all other installation deficiencies related to other installation 
requirements of codes API 520 (Part II, 2015) and ASME Section VIII Div 1. 
Basco et al. (2012) also pointed out the problem that mechanical maintenance people in process plants 
usually associate pressure relief valves with gate valves rather than with control valves. 
Procedure in the new methodology 
The solution to these problems could be a pre-startup safety review which has been proposed, covering 
the recommendations included in API 520 Part II (2015), ASME Code B31.1 Appendix II (2010), ISO 
4126-9 (2008), Hellemans (2009), Malek (2006) as well as the recommendations and information from 
the manufacturers: Leser, Bopp & Reuther, Pentair, Nacional Safety Valves (formerly Válvulas Nacional, 
SA), etc. and following the experience of the author. 
Thus, a dedicated check list has been created according to previous considerations (Annex B). It follows 
the framework of CCPS (Appendix A, 2007).  




The checking process consists of a validation in hardware and documentation for the installation that 
fulfills all the requirements as listed in the Safety Requirements Specification, in short, the pressure relief 
valve data sheet. This part is integrated into the above prestart-up safety review. 
3.5 Phase 5. Operation, maintenance and revision 
Literature survey on problems detected 
The concept of operation could sound strange when applied to a device which is expected never to 
operate. There are lots of pressure relief valves which have never opened, except during a revision in the 
workshop. Thus, the only way to demonstrate that a pressure relief valve can open when an upset occurs 
is through testing it from time to time. 
One of the problems in correct operation is avoiding leakages. Leakages can be discovered after a test on 
the manufacturing site due to damage in the seating face obtained during shipping, to mishandling, to 
contamination or to poor installation (Bright, 1972; Malek, 2006). The most common cause of leakage is 
when there is dirt or scale on the seating face (API 576, 2009). However, some leakage is permitted, 
according to API 527 (2007); for the air test at 90 % of the set pressure and for pressures up to 70 barg, a 
range of 20-40 bubbles per minute is allowed depending on the orifice diameter. Any value higher than 
that is considered a leakage. For water, a maximum of 10 ml/h per inch of nominal inlet diameter is 
accepted. 
Scully (1981) and Nelson (1993) reported that the most common causes of leakage are: 
 Operating pressure too close to the set pressure 
 Corrosion or erosion of the nozzle and disk 
 Solid particles between seat and disk (frequent in pump applications) 
 Unsupported outlet piping 
 Thermal stress on outlet piping 
 Vibration of piping or vessel being protected 
 Valve installed upright 
 Incorrect assembly 
 Incorrect lapping of seats 
 Nature of the process media (f.e. hydrogen) 
 Test errors in the workshop.  
Smith (1995) reported that 14.5 % of a total of 5,073 valves opened at a pressure less than 90% of the set 
pressure. Depending on the difference between operating and set pressure, a lot were leaking. Parry 
(1992) reported that 27 % of a list of failures of valves were due to leakage through the valve seat, a 
surprisingly high figure. 
Concerning the maintenance part of this phase, Hellemans (2009), reported that 8% of the 750 complaints 
were due to maintenance/test problems.  
The usual inspection work consists of:  
a) Pretest - the testing of a pressure relief valve prior to disassembly to determine the opening 
pressure, blowdown and seat tightness. It is very important to collect this data for optimization of 
the revision intervals. After the pre-pop test, an inspection is made to determine if corrosion, 
scaling or unusual conditions are present.  
b) Disassembly - the valve is carefully dismantled following manufacturer’s recommendations. All 
the parts are inspected to decide the extent of repairs required. 
c) Reparation - repair includes cleaning, reconditioning, replacement, lapping and minor machining 
of parts. All components are checked for wear, damage, roughness or corrosion. Parts that are 
damaged beyond tolerance are replaced or reconditioned. If evidence of wear is found on the disk 
or nozzle, their seating surfaces are lapped. 
d) Assembly - once the necessary reparation has been completed, the valve is assembled.  




e) Valve testing - testing is done to set the valve to its nameplate set pressure and blowdown, and to 
check seat tightness. Once the valve is on the test stand, the spring is adjusted for the last time to 
confirm that the valve will relieve at the required cold differential testing pressure. Once the 
valve has popped at the correct pressure, it is checked for seat tightness, i.e. leakage. 
The reliability of pressure relief valves at a given moment can only be proved with a complete test in a 
testing arrangement. The probability of failure on demand of a valve increases with the time between 
consecutive revisions. The pre-test and internal and external inspections provide valuable information for 
modifying the inspection frequency. A literature survey of the recommended periods between revisions is 
presented in the next paragraphs.  
 Revision period: methods based on experience 
Some guides and standards propose revision periods: 
An essential condition has been established that in no case should the interval between pressure relief 
valves exceed the interval between inspections of the pressure vessels involved. 
In Spain, the maximal periods are established by state law and the pressure relief valves are inspected at 
the same time as the elements to which they are fitted. These periods range between 6 and 12 years, 
depending on the vessel class (5 classes) and the level of inspection (3 levels) (RD2060, 2008). A 
pressure relief valve is assimilated to level B of inspection (requires the shutdown of the pressure vessel). 
The UK’s Institute of Petroleum, with the publication IP 12 Model Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum 
Industry-Pressure Vessel Examination 1993 (Hare, 2012), established certain degrees for pressurized 
equipment. Degree 0 implies a revision every 24 months, Degree 1 every 36 months, and Degree 2 every 
72 months. Degree 0 applies to new equipment that shows quick wear and a behavior that is difficult to 
predict. Degrees 1, 2 and 3 are assigned to vessels with more predictable behavior. The maximal period is 
72 months. 
API 510 (2006) indicates that the revision frequency should guarantee the reliability of equipment under 
overpressure. A typical process should not surpass 5 years, unless experience shows that this period can 
be extended. For clean, non-corrosive services, the period can be increased up to 10 years or more if a 
risk analysis is performed (for example, see the complete application of API 581 (2008)). 
The Engineering Equipment Material Users Association of United Kingdom, in its publication No. 188-
Guide for establishing operating period of safety valves (EEMUA, 2009), has proposed an empirical 
methodology based on a previous risk analysis; it classifies the materials as clean, dirty and corrosive, and 
establishes limiting values for deviations in opening pressure. It defines the unacceptable performance as 
when a valve lifts at a pressure greater than 110% of cold set pressure, lower than 90% or does not lift at 
150% of cold set pressure. 
The Safety Assessment Federation, in its Guideline on Periodicity of Examinations (SAFed, 2003), states 
that the revision period for clean fluids should not exceed 26 months. If corrosion or fouling may occur, 
the revision period should not exceed 14 months. 
Woolfolk and Sanders (1987) recommend the following intervals: a) Storage vessels with no heat sources, 
every 24 months. b) Vessels processing corrosive chemicals, every 12 months. 
Bravo et al. (1995) also recommended the following revision frequencies: 
Typical frequency, yr Valve type/service 
1 maximum Conventional valves in dirty or fouling forming services 
Any type of relief valve with significant exposure consequences 
1-2 Corrosive service 
Relief valves protected by rupture disk with knife blade 
2-3 Conventional relief valve on clean service 
Bellows valves on dirty service 




Typical frequency, yr Valve type/service 
Conventional valves on water, condensate, and steam services 
(except as regulated by local or state laws) 
3-5 Relief valves for clean, dry, and noncorrosive gases 
Relief valves protected by rupture disks without knife blade 
 
Nelson (1993) gives the following recommendations as a “starting point for testing frequencies based on 
general service conditions and past experiences with thousands of safety relief valves”: 
Frequency Service 
1-1.5 years Dirty services such as pipe still, crude towers, cat debutanizers with nonbellows valves 
2-3 years Above services equipped with bellows valves 
Nonbellows valves in cleaner process services 
Nonbellows valves combined with rupture discs 
3-4 years Bellows type valves in cleaner process service 
4-5 years Clean services such as air, natural gas, steam and some water services 
 
Hellemans (2009) also reports a procedure taking into account the importance of historical data for each 
individually installed valve. The author uses the Grade 1 to Grade 4; when the valve is installed being 
Grade 1 and it is revised after 1 year. 
Finally, some companies apply an initial revision period of 2 years to all safety valves; this period is then 
suitably modified as a function of inspection results. The revisions involve partial or total programmed 
shutdowns of the plant. 
Revision period: methods based on risk analysis 
Some methods are based on the risk matrix (Hare, 2012) and consider the probability of failure on 
demand of the valve and its consequences. The recommended inspection periods (in months) can be seen 
in the following table:    
Probability of failure 
of the valve 
Consequence 
High Medium Low 
High 24 36 60 
Medium 36 48 72 
Low 48 60 84 
 
To estimate the probability of failure, the valve history, type of fluid, vibrations, etc. must be considered. 
API 576 (2009) gives general qualitative recommendations but no specific intervals. This recommended 
practice adds that the manufacturers can give valuable information, especially in the case of special 
designs. It gives also the possibility of using risk-based techniques which recognize the fact that there are 
many different overpressures scenarios and that some pressure relief valve applications are more critical 
than others (for instance, API 581). 
 API RP 581 (2008) proposes a methodology for optimizing the revision period. It is based on the 
following steps: 
 1. Use of a Weibull distribution to establish the accumulated probability of failure of opening on 
demand. From this, the β (shape factor) and η (characteristic life) factors will be obtained. 
2. An initial value is attributed to η, depending on the type of valve and service (Table 7.5 from API 
581). This value is modified as a function of the data obtained from the pre-tests. 
3. Obtaining the frequencies of failure on demand for each overpressure scenario. If own data are 
lacking, those from Table 7.2 in API 581 can be used. 




4. Finally, the area risk thus obtained is compared with the established values, for example, 4.6 
m
2
/year for Level 2 consequence model and 0.92 m
2
/year for Level 1. In each case, the assessment is 
finished with an ALARP analysis, to obtain the optimum inspection period. 
Some authors have suggested that both procedures can be used additionally (Bond et al., 2011). 
Procedure in the new methodology 
Two methods have been proposed and tested. The first one is a modification of Hellemans procedure, 
allowing the quantification of the deficiency of the safety valve in order to correct the revision period in a 
more objective way (see section 6.9 for an application). The second one is a modification of the API 581 
method, which is described in section 4.11and applied as case study in section 6.8.  
3.6 Phase 6. Management of change 
Literature survey on problems detected 
Westphal and Köper (2003) stated that some deficiencies encountered in the 17% of pressure relief valves 
with problems found were due to changes in process related service conditions, while some others were 
due to piping changes upstream or downstream of the valve. 
Many authors have cited the accident of Flixborough (1974) with 28 fatalities, as the best example of 
what can happen without a Mangement of Change (MOC) procedure implemented in a process plant. The 
concept of management of change comes from 1992, when OSHA promulgated the Process Safety 
Management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals regulation. This PSM rule mandates a process 
hazard analysis, written operating procedures, employee training, pre startup safety reviews, evaluation of 
mechanical integrity of critical equipment and implementation of the management of change procedure, 
before performing certain changes. A change is defined in PSM as any alteration (except for replacement-
in-kind) to process materials, processing conditions, equipment, maintenance materials, procedures, 
utilities, facilities, control systems, etc. In Europe, the Directive 2012/18/EU demands the application of 
the MOC procedure in the safety management system (point IV, annex III). 
According to CCPS (2008), MOC is a process for evaluating and controlling modifications in facility 
design, operation, organization, or activities -prior to implementation- to make certain that no new 
hazards are introduced and that the risk of existing hazards to employees, the public, or the environment 
is not unknowingly increased. 
As explained in Appendix G of the above publication, a lot of problems arose at the beginning of its 
implementation. However, the more forward in the learning curve the companies are, the better results 
they obtain. 
Spearow et al. (2014) reported that there are two main problems when using MOC procedure in a relief 
system; the first one is identifying the impact of a MOC on relief systems being carried out by personnel 
without expertise, and the second one is updating  all the process safety information affected by the 
change. 
These authors give examples of common MOCs that affect relief systems: addition or removal of check 
valves, control valve modifications, change or re-rating the design pressure, new system pressure source 
or alteration of an existing one, relief piping modification, set pressure changes, etc. Concerning the 
complications encountered with relief systems documentation, the authors wrote: “The personnel 
involved do not have proper relief system training, the existing relief system documentation is inadequate 
or non-existent and involved personnel are unaware of the relief systems documentation”. They 
emphasized the need of providing proper training in relief systems to all the people involved in MOC 
processes. 
Procedure in the new methodology 




According to the model of Appendix C of CCPS (2008), the following document has been generated. See 
Figure 3-7. 
 





Figure 3-7. Management of Change procedure. 




3.7 Phase 7. Decommissioning 
Literature survey on problems detected 
Decommissioning in this context, means performing a review to make sure that removing a pressure relief 
valve from an active status will not have a negative impact on the plant or on any other surrounding units. 
No accidents have been reported for this phase. Operating instructions of chemical plants do not allow for 
removing a pressure relief valve for inspection leaving the pressure vessel with the possibility of an 
overpressure. The permit work management of process plants requires that the piece of equipment be 
isolated and purged. 
An exception is the case of pressure vessels protected by a changeover valve. In this case, two valves are 
installed in parallel, each one designed by the required relieving load so that one of them can be removed 
without disturbing the process. However, one must be cautious in using these valves due to their high 
pressure drop.  
Another possibility is the decommissioning of a pressure relief valve by way of its substitution by a High-
Integrity Protection System (HIPS). As referenced in Annex E of API 521 (2008), in the large majority of 
cases a SIL 2 (99% availability) or SIL 3 (99.9% availability) is required for the HIPS. 
Another common situation for removing a pressure relief valve in a process plant is the relief valve being 
installed to avoid thermal expansion in the cold side of a heat exchanger. By leaving, for example, one 
blocked valve carsealed open, decommissioning of the relief valve is possible. 
Procedure in the new methodology 
Prior to decommissioning of any pressure relief valve from active service, a formal analysis of the risk 
will be conducted, together with the required approvals of plant management through the Management of 
Change procedure (Phase 6).    
3.8 Phase 8. Verification 
Literature survey on problems detected 
Grun and Cheddie (2006) referenced a report from the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive in 
which 34 accidents related to control systems (not pressure relief systems) were analyzed. The majority of 
accidents (44%) were due to incorrect and incomplete specifications. Although this value is not related to 
pressure relief systems, it gives an idea of how important the verification process in a project is. 
It is interesting  to cite here what an expert in this field, Hellemans (2009), wrote: “ More than 25 years of 
experience in advising designers, end-users and maintenance people in the selection, handling and 
maintenance of safe safety relief systems, together with independent studies, have shown that more than 
half of the pressure-containing equipment installed in the process industry has a small to serious pressure 
relief system deficiency as compared to widely accepted engineering practices and even legal codes. The 
types of deficiencies are roughly split between absent and/or undersized pressure relief devices, wrongly 
selected valves and improperly installed valves”.  
Verification, in this context, means the process of demonstrating by review, analysis, and/or testing that 
the outputs of each phase of the life cycle analysis satisfy the requirements. A Safety Verification Plan 
manages changes in the Safety Requirements Specification (Phase 2) during project implementation as 
well.  
Procedure in the new methodology 
A checklist will be used in each phase of the safety life cycle. The checklist is an attempt to list as many 
recommendations from procedures, codes, guidelines, etc. with the target that, by following a systematic 
review of an overall relief system project, nothing will be forgotten. 
 




Phase 1. Risk analysis 
Item No. Item Mark a choice Comments 
1.1 Have persons responsible for carrying out the risk analysis 
been identified and informed of their responsibilities? 
Y N N/A  
1.2 Are persons competent to perform the risk analysis? Y N N/A  
1.3 Is personnel competency documented in terms of 
knowledge, experience, and training? 
Y N N/A  
1.4 Has a PHA been performed? Y N N/A  
1.5 Has the PHA followed an approach equipment-based 
considering all the scenarios of the contingency analysis data 
sheet (figure 3-2)? 
Y N N/A  
 
Phase 2. Safety Requirements Specification 
Item No. Item Mark a choice Comments 
2.1 Is there a clear and concise description of the scenarios that 
affect each pressure relief valve, according to the 
contingency analysis data sheet (figure 3-2)? 
Y N N/A  
2.2 Is the relieving loads summary data sheet (figure 3-3) 
completed with the relieving loads (dimensioning and not 
dimensioning) for each safety valve? 
Y N N/A  
2.3 Is the safety valve requirement specification completed 
(figure 3-5), with the information available at that moment, 
for each valve? 
Y N N/A  
 
Phase 3. Design 
Item No. Item Mark a choice Comments 
3.1 Has a file been opened for each pressure relief valve (paper 
based or through dedicated software)? 
Y N N/A  
3.2 Is the following documentation available for each valve? 
- Relief load calculation for each scenario of the relieving   
loads summary data sheet 
- Selection and design (required an rated area) of the safety 
valve 
- Inlet pressure drop 
- Outlet pressure drop 
- Stability calculations 
- Forces and moments imposed to the safety valve 
- Fluid induced vibration (vortex shedding) 
- Acoustic induced vibration  
- Noise 
- Body bowl chocking 
- Assignation of the first revision interval. 
Y N N/A  
 
Phase 4. Reception, installation and checking 
Item No. Item Mark a choice Comments 
4.1 Has the vendor supplied all the information requested in the 
safety valve requirement specification (figure 3-5) including 
the spare parts? 
Y N N/A  
4.2 Has the pre start-up safety review checklist been applied 
(Annex II)? 
Y N N/A  
4.3 Have montage personnel received appropriate training? Y N N/A  
4.4 Have adequate precautions been taken for storage of items 
before installation? 
Y N N/A  
4.5 Is there documentation showing the following? 
-Identification of each safety valve in field and in the Piping 
and Instrument Diagram 
-Confirmation that the reception of the valve has been 
Y N N/A  




Item No. Item Mark a choice Comments 
successfully completed, including set pressure test 
-Authorized signatures indicating the safety valve was 
successfully installed. 
-Training of operations personnel successfully carried out 
before start-up. 
 
Phase 5. Operation, maintenance and revision 
Item No. Item Mark a choice Comments 
5.1 Have operators received training in order to detect leakages 
in the safety valves? 
Y N N/A  
5.2 Has an initial revision interval been assigned to each new 
pressure relief valve?  
Y N N/A  
5.3 For already installed safety valves, is there a quantitative 
procedure of interval revision, depending on the results of 
the inspection and the pretest (like API 581) or more 
empirical methods? 
Y N N/A  
5.4 Is there a tracking procedure for dismantling the safety 
valve, revision in the workshop and mounting it again, in 
order to avoid exchange of valves? 
Y N N/A  
5.5 In the case that the pretest has given opening pressures 
higher than 10 % of the set pressure, has the Management of 
Change procedure immediately been applied? 
Y N N/A  
 
Phase 6. Management of change 
Item No. Item Mark a choice Comments 
6.1 Has the Management of Change procedure (figure 3-7) been 
used and recorded? 
Y N N/A  
6.2 Has the process safety engineer followed the execution of 
the Management of Change recommendations and closed it 
when finished? 
Y N N/A  
 
Phase 7. Decommissioning 
Item No. Item Mark a choice Comments 
7.1 Has the Management of Change procedure always been 
applied when a pressure relief valve has been eliminated? 
Y N N/A  
7.2 Are there procedures to maintain the safety of the process 
during decommissioning? 
Y N N/A  
7.3 Are there procedures that define the level of authorization 
required for decommissioning? 
Y N N/A  
 
Phase 8. Verification 
Item No. Item Mark a choice Comments 
8.1 Has a pressure relief valve verification plan been created, 
following the recommendations of this section and including 
responsibilities and signature of the authorized personnel?   
Y N N/A  
 
Phase 9. Documentation and technical audits 
Item No. Item Mark a choice Comments 
9.1 Has each pressure relief valve got a dedicated file (paper 
based or specific software) with all the information listed in 
section 3-9? 
Y N N/A  
9.2 Have all the findings of the last relief system audit already 
been solved?  
Y N N/A  




3.9 Phase 9. Documentation and technical audits 
Literature survey on problems detected 
One of the four conclusions of Berwanger et al. (2000) report was that “Current information management 
techniques have not worked”. They concluded that companies had focused on the pressure relief valve 
data sheet as the basis for all the required documentation for the relief system, a purpose for which they 
had never been intended. 
Westphal and Köper (2003), also pointed out that one problem in their work of revision of 4000 valves 
was, particularly for old plants, that the design and the exact reasons for its need had not been adequately 
documented.  
Marshall et al. (2011), described that the results of the 2007 and 2009 OSHA’s National Emphasis 
Program specific to refineries and chemical plants, respectively, demonstrated that a large number of 
citations involved missing, inaccurate and incomplete process information as well as outdated relief 
system studies. 
Melhem (2010) remarked on the “Outdated, different formats, and/or non-existent design basis and 
supporting calculations” in his presentation in DIERS. This author also stated that “Relief system design 
is 30% calculation and 70% data life cycle management”, and introduced the features that the 
management of these data should include: Reliability, Availability, Auditability, and Maintainability 
(RAAM)
TM
. Conditions that its own company software product ioXpress
TM
 fulfills. 
In order to keep all the relief system data updated, it is necessary to have regular audits. In fact, this is one 
of the recommendations in OSHA,s Process Safety Management Programs. These audits are a method of 
certifying that a plant is well protected against overpressure by existing pressure relief devices. Equally 
important, these evaluations identify deficiencies and propose required changes; with them, the company 
can meet the requirements of codes.  
Concerning the audits, Marshall et al. (2011), recommended the Three-Tier auditing approach: 
Tier I. These are audits performed each month, for example with the local process safety engineer. They 
consist in reviewing the MOC workflow, as well as the design basis for randomly selected pressure relief 
valves. 
Tier II. These audits use relief systems specialists from other plants or engineering consultants with 
expertise in relief system design. They should be performed at least annually. 
Tier III. These audits use relief systems specialists at the corporate level or engineering consultants 
experts in this area. They should be conducted at least every three years. 
Wong (1998) insisted on the fact that the most important issue for a successful audit is the competence 
and experience of the audit team and the exact definition of the scope of the audit before performing it. 
Procedure in the new methodology 
API 521 (2014) and Prophet (2015) give recommendations on the required documentation for pressure 
relief system design, although stating that they are not mandatory. 
In this work, the documentation has been collected according to the following schema. 
A. Relief System Design Documentation 
1) Guideline for the engineering of pressure relief systems. This guideline will give specific 
procedures for the following issues, not explicitly stated in API 521-2014: 
 Method for identification and definition of credible causes of overpressure 
 Guidance for evaluating control valve bypasses 




 Credit for operator intervention, e.g. to stop a liquid overfilling situation 
 Credit for check valves and sizing procedures for backflow through pumps 
 Credit for vessel insulation and adequate drainage for the fire case 
 Determination of physical properties (e.g. heat of vaporization of mixtures) 
 Fire sizing for air coolers 
 Required pump impeller size to use in blocked discharge scenario 
 Control valve trim size 
 Credit for sealed or locked open isolation valves in the pressure-relief path 
 Guidance related to double jeopardy 
 Credit for protective instrumentation 
 Guidance on heat exchanger internal failure scenarios 
 The use of rated flow vs. required flow for inlet pressure drop of modulating valves 
 The use of 3% requirement for inlet pressure loss vs. use of blowdown minus 2% for new 
and old installations 
 The correct usage of a two-phase discharge coefficient 
 How to estimate two-phase density where slip is involved 
 The use of fire dynamic simulation considering the decreased wetted area with time 
 The total use of vessel surface area in case of fire for two-phase flow 
 Treatment of fire exposure of gas filled vessels. 
2) A chronological record of the file including all reviews, evaluations, design modifications, etc. 
which have been performed on the pressure relief valve. 
3) A sketch of the pressure relief device and the system in which it is installed. This sketch should 
show all equipment protected by the pressure relief valve and the corresponding design 
conditions for the equipment. The P&ID could also be used. 
4) Contingency analysis summary, with specific data sheet (see 4.1). 
5) Relief load analysis and sizing calculations with specific data sheet (see 4.2). 
6) Safety Requirements Specification (specification sheet) for the valve and sizing computations. 
7) Isometrics of the inlet and outlet piping (always as-built isometrics). 
8) Calculations performed to size the pressure relief valve inlet and outlet piping.  
9) Forces and moments imposed on the valve. 
10) Stability calculations to avoid chattering. 
11) Calculations to check for Acoustic Induced Vibration (AIV). 
12) Calculations of noise. 
13) Checking of the Body Bowl Chocking. 
14) Assignation of the revision interval. 
15) Collection of all manufacturers data for spare parts purchasing, maintenance instructions, 
Purchase Order Requisition, etc. 
B. Flare Header Design 
1) Guideline for the engineering of flare header design.  
 For each flare header scenario, a description of the initiating event and the intermediate 
consequences that lead to relief flow is needed. For example, for total power failure the 
cascade effects should be described 
 The use of rated vs. required flow for calculating the backpressure and the sub-
header/flare header pressure drops 
 Documentation of the basis used to define the flare system configuration for the network-
flow simulation model 
 Schematic diagram of the flare system showing a pressure profile for each flare header 
scenario analyzed. The pressure profile will show calculated backpressure for each relief 
source discharging in the given scenario 
 Electronic copies of input files used for the network simulation 
 PRV size-selection datasheets showing valve manufacturer (for existing valves), type of 
valve, set pressure, size and inlet and outlet flange ratings 




 List of disposal system loads including source name, temperature, molecular weight, 
composition and flow rate. 
 List of all credit taken to reduce or eliminate disposal system peak loads, including 
instrumentation. 
 List of instrumentation assumed not to work for each relieving scenario and the basis for 
selection of failure combinations 
 Backpressure limit for each source and basis for limit (e.g. downstream piping design 
pressure). 
The audit schema will follow the structure shown in the following table. 
Pre-audit activities 
-by plant management 
Detailed audit activities 
-by audit team 
Post-audit activities 
Management defines the units for 
auditing and its schedule. 
Management selects audit team (internal 
or external). 
Management defines audit subject and 
priorities. 
Define audit scope: 
1. Design basis, codes, 
regulations. 
2. Responsibilities for field 
verification and inspection of 
existing PRV system. 
Define audit activities: 
1. Data gathering, generating. 
2. Review previous audit reports 
and incident history. 
3. Study the existing PRV 
maintenance log. 
4. Overpressure cases analysis 
and PRV selection. 
5. Evaluating the existing PRV 
system. 
6. Report findings. 
7. Conclusions, 




1. Report of overpressure case 
studies. 
2. Proposal of implementation 
program. 
3. Basic required maintenance 
schedule. 
Develop a feasible action plan: 
1. Resolve the differences 
between audit team and 
management. 
2. Propose a feasible action plan. 
3. Define a practical item 
schedule. 
4. Elect a monitoring team. 
Follow-up until the next schedule audit. 
 
3.10 Commercial software available. Critical review 
Kreder and Berwanger (1995) wrote “It is difficult not to visualize a day when essentially all process 
safety information will be maintained in an intelligent electronic database”. Certainly, the introduction of 
the hardware and software applications in companies has grown exponentially and will continue.  
Melhem (2010), according to his classification of the relief systems data lifecycle (see section 3.9), 
classified the relief system calculation and documentation software tool as follows: 
Relief systems data lifecycle solution Reliability Availability Auditability Maintainability 
Home grown tools such as spreadsheets and simple 
applications 
Med Med Low Low 
Commercial applications mostly geared at calculations High Med Low Low 
Commercial database systems incorporating simple 
computational tools 
Low Med Med Med 
Commercial data management systems linked to external 
computational tools 
High Med Med Med 
Knowledge management systems with integrated 
computational tools  
High High High Med 
Knowledge management systems with integrated 
computational tools and workflow 
High High High High 
 
All these possibilities can be found in different companies. The choice depends, among other factors, on 
the number of pressure relief valves in the site. A large refinery can have more than 1,000 relief devices; a 
medium petrochemical company can have 200-400 relief devices.  




The software codes available for relief system calculations and documentation are: 
Superchems
TM
   
This software comes from ioMosaic Company. IoMosaic was founded by a pioneer in process safety, 
Arthur D. Little. Superchems is an umbrella-software for a lot of process safety issues, but it has specific 
modules for pressure relief valves, having also pioneered the possibility of calculating the dynamic 
stability of pressure relief valves. Today, this company is managed by Dr. Melhem, one of the most 
recognized worldwide experts in relief systems. The relief system documentation is managed with the 
module ioXpress.  
PS PPM
TM 
 This software was developed by the formerly company Berwanger Inc. Today is part of the Siemens AG.  
The Process Safety Pressure Protection Manager (PS PPM) was built as a relational database architecture 
for integration with other engineering and plant information. This software has been used in this thesis in 
the calculation of the latent heat of mixtures for the scenario of fire, relieving loads in case of heat 
exchanger tube rupture, and inlet pressure drops. However, it does not incorporate the DIN norm for 
diameters of the piping and fittings; this makes the work harder, because one must find the schedule from 
the ASME B31.3 norm that matches the real inside diameter.  
iPRSM
TM 
This software is offered by Farris Engineering Services. It is a web-enabled pressure relief systems 
management software, i.e. data accessibility from any web connection. This software has a lot of 
calculation possibilities and integrates with documentation as well. 
PSVPlus
TM 
This software was developed by Softbits Consultants Ltd from the UK. In 2012, this software was 
acquired by Aspen Technology. PSVPlus allows the preparation of the specification sheets of the safety 
valves performing the calculations of the relieving load and the orifice of the valve as well.  
Aspen-Hysys
TM 
The version 8.6 of the Aspen-Hysys incorporates new possibilities for sizing pressure relief valves, 
including supercritical fluids with the Ouderkirk (2002) method among other features. It allows 




Aspen Flare System Analyzer
TM 
This software (formerly Flarenet) belongs to Aspen Technology. It performs the calculations of the total 
backpressures of the relief devices in a rigorous way. It has been used in this thesis to check the 
backpressures of the valves, together with an own developed spreadsheet. 
Valvestar
TM 
Valvestar is a free software to design Leser Valves. The version 7.1.4 has the possibility of designing for 
two-phase flow according the Omega method from API 520. It suffers from lack of flexibility when there 
is a restriction lift in the valve. 
PRV2SIZE
TM 
This software was generated by Pentair (the formerly Crosby and Anderson-Greenwood belong to this 
group). It has all the data of Crosby and Anderson-Greenwood valves. 















The existing criteria concerning the diverse aspects of the design of pressure relief valves (relief load, 
type of flow, type of valve, stability, etc.) are commented here, and the most convenient ones are selected 
for the calculations associated with the new proposed methodology. 
4.1 Relief load analysis (contingency analysis) 
A contingency analysis consists of the calculations, analysis and reasoning, which are performed to 
identify potential relief cases and determine the required relief loads for each case. The relief load 
calculations may consist of any or all of the following aspects: 
a) Detailed process calculations and analysis done to fully develop required loads for sizing cases, 
or to analyze those cases which could not be eliminated as potential sizing ones by simpler 
analysis methods. 
b) Simplified process calculations performed to demonstrate that a particular case is not the 
governing one for pressure relief valve sizing. 
c) Qualitative analysis or reasoning demonstrating that a specific potential case is either not a valid 
case or that it is not a governing one. 
d) Identification of specific operating procedures or equipment limitations agreed to in determining 
pressure relief system size. 
Before explaining the framework developed to manage the contingency analysis, it is appropriate to 
describe the Basic Design Philosophy. 
4.1.1 Basic design philosophy 
 Because of the design margins inherent in the sizing and specification of process equipment, the 
process plants are often capable of operating at feed rates significantly above their original 
nameplate capacity. The guidelines used in this thesis for  establishing equipment capacities are 
the following ones: 
o The relief requirements of distillation columns have been at 85% of theoretical tray 
flooding or at the limiting reboiler or condenser duty, if the latter is a more severe 
constraint 
o The centrifugal pumps have been evaluated using both installed and maximum impeller 
sizes. Anyway, if the maximum impeller resulted in a size increase for the required 
pressure relief valve, the decision has been studied on a case by case basis, for instance, 
establishing administrative controls avoiding the change of the impeller 
o The evaluation of the compressors has been made at the maximum molecular weight of 
the fluid, within the power capabilities of the motor. The compressor efficiencies are high 
estimates, not guaranteed manufacturers’ efficiencies 
o For heat exchangers the maximum duties have been calculated under clean, unfouled 
conditions. However, duties for condensers and other heat removal equipment have been 
calculated for the fouled condition when applying credit to a particular scenario. 
 The Double Jeopardy concept is very important and its application is “no double jeopardy in 
overpressure assessment” (Wong, 1999). Causes of overpressure, including external fire, have 
been  considered as unrelated if no process, mechanical, or electrical linkages existed among 
them, or if the length of time between possible successive events was sufficient to regard them as 
unrelated 





 The case of total power failure also means cooling water failure because there are no turbine-
driven cooling water pumps. In this way, no credit has been given to the automatic start-up of 
parallel cooling water pumps, air compressors, etc. which are not already operating 
 The variations in composition of the fluid relieved during the relieving event have also been 
considered. For instance, in a blocked in fire scenario in which the vessel contains a wide boiling 
liquid mixture, the initial relief vapors will consist primarily of the lower boiling components, but 
as material is removed, the molecular weight and temperature will increase, while the latent heat 
decreases. Another case that affects the equilibrium is when very large differences between 
normal and relieving pressures occur. In both examples, a sensitivity analysis is required to 
determine the worst case set of conditions for pressure relief valve sizing 
 Every block valve has been considered subject to inadvertent opening or closure at any time. The 
only exceptions were the locked-open and locked-closed valves, which have been assumed to 
remain in the locked position 
 Check valves have been considered to fail in the full open position due to mechanical debris or 
chemical materials preventing the valve from reseating on flow reversal. However, double check 
valves of different designs in a series may reduce flow reversal if installed in clean vapor upflow 
service. Nevertheless, the reduction in flow for double check valves cannot exceed half of the 
reverse flow if no check valves are present 
 When bypass valves are provided for control valves, the potential for inadvertent operation of 
both valves must be considered. Only if the bypass valve is used exclusively for non-standard 
operation may it be excluded from relief load calculations. The bypass valve must be smaller 
(less than 25% of the control valve) (Cheremisinoff, 1998). Operational procedures must clearly 
indicate its use and ensure that the valve is never open during normal operation 
 As the response of control systems is uncertain, no credit has been given to the favorable 
response of automatic controls. In any relieving situation the control valves which are not under 
consideration as the cause of overpressure, and whose regular automatic action would tend to 
reduce the relief load, remain in the position required for normal process operation. It has been 
accepted to give credit for continued flow through these valves, corrected to relieving conditions, 
but only to the extent permitted by their normal operating position. The downstream system must 
also be capable of handling any increase in flow 
 API 521 (2014) allows for using the operator intervention procedure to avoid a relief incident if 
an operator actuates to cut feed, reduce the input, etc. Some authors pointed out that 30 minutes is 
an adequate time between operator notification through control room alarm, for example, and the 
time to reach the pressure relief valve set point. However, Wong (1999) warned about the 
underestimation of human error and, generally no credit should be given. In this thesis no credit 
has been given to operator intervention 
 The administrative procedures are accepted by the codes (API 521, 2014); however, assuming 
that the possibility of human error cannot be completely eliminated, they should not be used in 
place of a pressure relief valve. An example is taking credit for the “car seals open, CSO” and 
“car seals locked, CSL” valves. Here, credit has been taken under the condition that 
administrative controls are in place. 
Figure 4-1shows the contingency analysis data sheet used in this work and Figure 4-2 shows the relieving 
















Contingency Comments Justification 
1 Blocked outlets  Not applicable 
If a valve is blocked downstream W700, the instruments PZ70220 
and PZ70221 will shutdown P700A/B 
2 Abnormal heat input  Not applicable   
3 Exchanger tube breakage  Not applicable 
Propylene circuit working pressure (40 barg) is higher than cooling 
water working pressure (4barg). If an exchanger tube breakage 
occurs propylene will go into cooling water system and detected by 
means of hydrocarbon analyzers in cooling towers 
4 Auto control failure  Not applicable   
5 Reflux failure  Not applicable   
6 Fire  See attachments   
7 Cooling water failure  See attachments   
8 Power failure  Not applicable Shutdown of P700A/B. No consequences 
9 Instrument air failure  Not applicable 
Instrument air failure closes inlet valve from K702A/B (H70102 and 
H70104) and opens the by-pass valve FVK70201. Overpressure in 
this case is not possible because no ingress of material is produced 
10 Inadvertent VA open/close  Not applicable 
The situation that manual by-pass valve on W700 is opened and no 
propylene is cooled is similar to cooling water failure scenario  
11 Mech. Equip. Failure  Not applicable Design pressure = 45 barg. PZ70220/PZ70221 set pressure at 45 barg 
12 Heat loss (series frac.)  Not applicable   
13 Thermal  See attachments 
Thermal expansion will be considered taking into account a ΔT = 25 
ºC starting at 20 barg. (ΔT between night and day) 
14 Loss of quench/cold feed  Not applicable   
15 Chemical reaction  Not applicable   
16 Steam out  Not applicable   
 
Figure 4-1. Contingency analysis data sheet for YS702/01. 






TAG/EQUIP. NUMBER SV 702/01   UNIT /SERVICE: Propylene purification unit P&ID: PLANT: COST CENTER:
SET PRESS: 45 BARG BASIS: List basis for set pressure
DISCHARGE DISPOSITION: Flare INLET PRESSURE DROP: 1,4% SP
CONSTANT BACKPRESSURE: 0,150 BARG VARIABLE BACK PRESS.: 0 BARG  Kd = 0,800
EQUIPMENT DESIGN CONDITIONS:  (         ) MAWP (     X    ) Design (       ) Other BUILT-UP BACKPRESSURE: 3,29 BARG TOTAL BACKPRESSURE: 3,435 BARG  Kb = 1,00
NORMAL OPER. 16,2 BARG 42 ºC Rupture Disk ,Y/N No FIRE SUMMARY WETTED AREA: 14,41 m² ATTACH SKETCH FOR AREA CALCULATION:
MAX OPER. 45 BARG 100 ºC Derating Factor= 1,0 INSULATION No TYPE - THCKNS - mm Insul factr, 1=none F =1.0 (4)
DESIGN 45 BARG 100 ºC (Use 0.9 if have rupture disk) Q =  kw (Note : see back up material)
CONN: RATING FACING : PN100 F.E /PN40 F.C PIPE SPEC, IN/OUT: St860E-A / St261C-E
      RELIEF (2)
Causes of Relief     CONDITIONS  SP COMPR LATENT SP HEAT LIQUID VAPOR VAPOR LIQUID TOTAL
       Refer to API RP520, & RP521 and corporate Relief Manual VAPOR LIQUID PRESS TEMP FLUID VAPOR GRAVITY FACTOR HEAT RATIO VISC VISC AREA AREA AREA
 Contingency Comments NA, etc % OV PR kg/h m3/h BARG °C TYPE MOL WT LIQUID Z L,  KJ/kg k cP cP V  mm² L  mm² T  mm²
1.  BLOCKED OUTLETS
2.  ABNORMAL HEAT INPUT
3.  EXCHANGER TUBE BREAKAGE
4.  AUTO CONTROL FAILURE
5.  REFLUX FAILURE
6.  FIRE 10 10.000 49,5 100 Vapor 42,00 0,70 0,080 221 (3)
7.  COOLING WATER FAILURE 10,2 49,5 45-92 Liquid 42,00 0,327 38,3 (5)
8.  POWER FAILURE
9.  INSTR. AIR FAILURE
10. INADVERTENT VA. OPEN/CLOSE
11. MECH. EQUIP. FAILURE
12. HEAT LOSS (SERIES FRAC.)
13. THERMAL 10 Negligible 49,5 27 Liquid 42,00 0,500







NOTES: -1 SEE RELIEF DEVICE DATA SHEET FOR ACTUAL ORIFICE, COLD DIFF TEST PRESSURE AND OTHER SPECIFICATIONS  GENERAL DATA BY: DATE:
-2 RELIEF CONDITIONS ARE AT SET PRESSURE + OVER PRESSURE.  PROCESS DATA BY: DATE:
-3 See rigorous calculation with the Ouderkirk method (back up material)  VALVE SIZING BY: DATE:
-4 Insulation was not considered in the Fire Case calculation CHECKED/APPROVED BY: DATE:
-5 Calculation performed by Direct Integration (API 520 Part I-2008, procedure C.2,1) (Back up material)
EXISTING RV DETAILS:  LESER 4564.6052
SIZING CASE SELECTED: FIRE RELIEF DEVICE TYPE: /   TOTAL ORIFICE AREA REQD: 221 mm
2
DEVICES SELECTED - QTY: 1 INLET SIZE: 25,0 mm OUTLET SIZE: 50,0 mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): 314,160 mm
2
SET PRES: 45 BARG
QTY: INLET SIZE: mm OUTLET SIZE: mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): mm2 SET PRES: BARG
QTY: INLET SIZE: mm OUTLET SIZE: mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): mm2 SET PRES: BARG
QTY: INLET SIZE: mm OUTLET SIZE: mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): mm2 SET PRES: BARG
EQUIPMENT PROTECTED:
1.386,4
FLUID PHYSICAL PROPERTIES AT RELIEF CONDITIONS:




















Figure 4-2. Relieving loads summary data sheet for YS702/01.





API 521 (2014) gives an explanation of what is included in each contingency. Wong (2001) explained 
each scenario supplying more detailed information than API.  
4.1.2 Specific design basis 
The specific design basis used for each contingency in this thesis is detailed in the next paragraphs. 
1) Blocked outlets  
The most obvious overpressure situation is the case of a vessel with blocked outlets, in which 
fluid source pressure exceeds design pressure. The source pressure may be the operating pressure 
in another vessel, it may be generated by a pump or compressor, or it may be an energy input, 
generating a relief requirement via thermal expansion. 
Generally, the pressure relief valve must release all fluid entering the vessel under relief 
conditions. If not all exits are blocked, credit may be taken for flow through the unblocked 
outlets, with the pressure relief valve handling the surplus. If the outlets contain control valves, it 
is assumed that they remain in the position required for normal process operations. It is 
acceptable to take credit for continued flow through these valves -corrected to relieving 
conditions- but only to the extent permitted by their normal operating position. The downstream 
system must also be capable of handling any increase in flow. 
If a vessel has a vapor space with at least 15 minutes residence time above the high level alarm, 
liquid relief for blocked outlets scenario has not been considered. This is the case with the bottom 
liquid in distillation columns. On the other hand, if vapor accumulation appears immediately as 
increasing pressure; once the set pressure is reached, all net vapor inlets must be relieved. 
 
2) Abnormal heat input 
Abnormal heat input is a special case of control valve failure involving the flow of fuel or heating 
medium to process heat transfer equipment. The limitations on heat input are either those 
imposed by the maximum heat transfer capabilities of the equipment involved, or the hydraulic 
capacity of the system supplying the fuel or heating medium. 
For reboilers, the behavior of the condensate system may regulate the possible maximum duty. If 
the condensate system has less capacity than the steam supply system, reboiler flooding can 
result, which would reduce reboiler duty. In this thesis no credit has been given to this possibility, 
because it is believed that the operator can bypass the steam trap when the flooding is detected. 
 
3) Exchanger tube breakage 
This case corresponds to the flow across a broken tube, which cannot be absorbed by the low 
pressure side. 
 
4) Auto control failure 
Control valves are subjected to inadvertent full opening or closing during normal operation, 
regardless of the failure position of the valve on the loss of air signal or the loss of instrument 
power. Operator error or a partial failure in a control loop may cause a control valve to fully open 
even if it has a fail closed action. When bypass valves are provided for control valves, the 
possibility of inadvertent operation of both valves has been considered.  
In some cases, failure of a control valve to a full-open or full-closed condition results in an 
unreasonably sized pressure relief valve. In these cases, the installation of limit stops to restrict 
the capacity or to limit the minimum flow of the control valve may be considered. Some basic 
requirements relative to limit stops are: 
 Before limit stops are considered, reduction of valve capacity should be examined. The 
trim can be changed to reduce capacity  
 When installed, limit stops should be nonadjustable and permanently installed. They 
should either be installed in the valve trim or inside the valve actuator 
 Administrative procedures must be implemented to prevent removal of the limit stops or 
modification of the control valve capacity without first evaluating the effect of the change 
on pressure relief valve requirements. 





Often the relief load resulting from an inadvertent control valve opening can be reduced by 
installing a restriction orifice or a section of small diameter in the piping which supplies material 
to the system. As with limit stops, any restriction orifices installed to reduce relief loads must 
have proper administrative procedures to ensure that the orifices are always present and are not 
modified without the effect on the pressure relief valves being evaluated. 
5) Reflux failure 
With few exceptions, overhead cooling and/or reflux failure is a major relief case, if not the 
controlling case. This “loss of reflux” may be caused by either a loss of coolant, a pump failure, 
or a control valve failure. Depending on the specific system configuration, each of those causes 
could produce different relieving flows, because of variations in secondary effects and available 
credits. Completion of the corresponding upset heat balance will determine the unbalanced heat 
flow on which the relief load is based. If the failure is such that the reflux drum and condenser are 
assumed to be flooded, the net vapor product, if any, will be unable to reach its normal exit and 
will have to be relieved by the valve.  
Reduction or elimination of reflux failure relief is possible if there is clearly sufficient surge 
capacity in the reflux drum to cover the duration of the upset. The following criteria have been 
applied here based on the Cheremisinoff analysis (1998): 
 If the failure is due to loss of coolant and the reflux drum has at least 15 minutes surge 
time below low liquid level (based on total outflow), credit may be taken for the 
continued flow of reflux to the column in reducing the calculated relief load 
 If the reflux failure is due to malfunction of a pump or control valve, credit may be taken 
for continued heat removal via the condenser, provided the reflux drum has at least 15  
minutes surge time above high liquid level based on total liquid inflow. If some liquid 
outflow continues, e.g., if product flow is maintained, this determination should be based 
on net inflow. 
 
6) Fire 
Fire represents an unexpected energy input into a system, which results in overpressure either by 
thermal expansion or vaporization of the contained fluid. The definition of the basic fire case 
assumes that the equipment is exposed while fully blocked, with normal maximal liquid contents 
intact. In the static, non-flowing fire situation, all heat input goes to the generation of relief vapor 
once the content has been heated sufficiently to reach the relieving pressure. 
Fire occurring during normal operation should also be considered. In this dynamic case, the 
flowing fluid often absorbs the sensible heat pickup without resultant overpressures. 
   
7) Cooling water failure 
Loss of cooling water causes an energy imbalance, which can produce major relief loads. A 
relieving situation may not result if only sensible cooling is lost, although downstream equipment 
could be subjected to overpressure through unexpected flashing. If condensation is lost, however, 
the excess vapor will generally have to be relieved. Note also that any condition which leads to 
loss of circulation on the hot side of the exchanger, such as condenser flooding, is also equivalent 
to a total loss of cooling. 
 
8) Power failure 
In case of power failure the following equipment can be potentially affected: motors, pumps for 
circulating cooling water, reflux pump in distillation columns, air-cooled heat exchangers, 
cooling towers, instrument air, instrumentation, motor operated valves, etc. 
API 521 (2008) discusses total and partial power failure, noting that credit for automatic start-up 
of parallel cooling water pumps, air compressors, etc., which are not already operating, should 
not be taken. 
The interdependence of utility systems must be considered. In case of power failure, a plant 
which has two motor-driven and two turbine-driven cooling water pumps in service would also 
undergo a 50% loss of cooling water. 
 





9) Instrument air failure 
Instrument air failure may be caused by power failure or mechanical equipment failure, and can 
affect all the control valves of the plant. Usually the design of the plant allows 15 minutes of air 
reserve in case of an upset in the air compressor. Instrument air failure causes that control valves 
assume their fail safe position (fail-open, fail-closed or fail-last position). As pointed out by 
Wong (1999), the air fail position should not be taken as overpressure relief protection. 
Be aware that this case is not the same as auto control failure as explained before. Auto control 
failure affects only one control valve (fails fully open or fully closed). 
 
10) Inadvertent valve open/close 
Every block valve is considered to be subject to inadvertent opening or closure at any time. The 
only exceptions to these requirements are locked-open or locked-closed valves, which are 
assumed to remain in the locked position. 
Check valves may fail in the fully open position due to mechanical debris or chemical materials 
preventing the check from reseating on flow reversal. Tight shutoff can never be guaranteed. 
However, double check valves of different designs in a series may reduce flow reversal if 
installed in clean vapor upflow service. API 521 (2008) allows the reduction in flow for double 
check valves as the flow through a single orifice with a diameter equal to one-tenth of the largest 
valve’s nominal flow diameter. 
 
11) Mechanical equipment failure 
Dynamic mechanical equipment consists of centrifugal pumps, centrifugal compressors, 
reciprocating pumps, reciprocating compressors, screw compressors, roots blowers, steam 
turbines, etc. All this equipment is frequently a source of overpressure, and it is necessary to 
understand their performance characteristics in order to predict the resultant relief load. 
Static mechanical equipment consists of heat exchangers, pressure vessels, piping, etc. 
 
12) Heat loss (series fractionating columns) 
When multiple distillation columns are disposed in series, it is possible that an upstream failure 
be the cause of relief by altering the composition of process streams. For example, if reboiler heat 
were lost in an upstream column, which thus prevents the removal of light ends from the feed to a 
second column, the latter could be overpressurized by an inability to condense all the light 
material it was receiving. 
For relief purposes, the first approximation would be to consider all material lighter than the 
normal feed as non-condensable, which must be vented or relieved. If a more detailed analysis is 
desired, the condenser performance may be reevaluated based on the revised composition at the 
relieving pressure.  
 
13) Thermal 
When a liquid filled system is blocked in, any heat input will result in overpressure due to 
thermal expansion (sometimes called hydraulic expansion). If the heat source is capable of 
vaporizing the trapped fluid, overpressure can result whether or not the system runs liquid full. 
The heat source may be process heat input, steam coils or tracing, solar radiation, radiant heat 
from nearby hot equipment or exposure to an external fire.  
 
14) Loss of quench/cold feed 
Loss of quench is analogous to loss of reflux, except that quench usually refers to a stream from 
an external source which is used in a tower for direct contact vapor cooling. The steady state 
relief in this case would be the hot incoming vapors. However, the short-term peak load must 
include any vaporization of liquid from the column trays, if this is possible. 
The loss of cold feed in distillation columns can be a major case where a significant portion of the 
reboiler heat goes to sensible heating of the bottoms product. As with all cases involving 
disruptions to the column energy balance, the relief load will be determined by completing the 
upset heat balance, with all net heat input available for generating relief vapor. 
 





15) Chemical reaction 
In the case of exothermic chemical reactions, the temperature could rise very quickly, especially 
if the reaction is a runaway one; the high volumes of gases produced can cause the internal 
pressure of the vessel to reach the set point of the valve. Pressure relief valves may not provide 
any protection due to their relatively slow response time. In this case, vapor depressurizing 
systems, rupture discs or emergency vents are better (Wong, 2001). 
 
16) Steam out 
In case of loss of steam the following equipment may be affected: turbine drivers for pumps, 
compressors, blowers, reboilers, ejectors, etc. 
 
4.2 Relief load calculation including vapor/liquid disengagement study 
The following subchapters will describe in a detailed way the procedures followed in this research work 
for the calculation of the most important parameter in the sizing of a pressure relief valve: the required 
relief load.   
4.2.1 External fire 
There are a lot of references as API 521 (2008, 2014), Wong (1999, 2000), Katkar (2010), Rahimi 
Mofrad and Norouzi (2007), Hauser et al. (2001) and Cheremisinoff (1998) among others, discussing the 
basic nature of fire as it applies to pressure relief systems in pressure vessels and processing equipment. 
For low pressure, atmospheric and refrigerated storage tanks designed with standards like API 650 (2012) 
or DIN 4119 (1979, 1980), API 2000 (2009) applies. However, this case is not treated here. Fire is treated 
as a heat source which causes the temperature of the fluid contained in the vessel to increase. In most 
cases where the vessel contains a liquid, external fires causes the liquid to boil. However, not all process 
fluids behave in this way, and the actual fluid characteristics also need to be taken into account and will 
be analyzed here.  
The specific basic assumptions taken in this thesis for sizing a fire pressure relief system are: 
a) The process is assumed to be shut down and isolated from other vessels or sources of process 
fluid or from other potential paths of relief. 
b) Liquid inventories are assumed to be at their normal maximum values. Thus, high liquid levels 
will be used for computing the wetted area. 
c) Small diameter pipes are not included. Large diameter pipes (>DN500) are included in computing 
the wet surface area. 
d) Heat input values are computed from empirical equations developed from the results of actual fire 
tests. API 521 (2007, 2014) equations for processing units have been used. Other equations 
developed for storage tanks coming from Compressed Gas Association or NPFA have not been 
used. Crozier (1985) gives a good summary of the various equations available. 
e) Except for a few unusual applications, the time element of fire relief is not recognized. That is, 
the time required to heat the contents of a vessel to relieving conditions is not considered in sizing 
the pressure relief system. 
The heat flux equations used here are: 
For a pool fire heat input with adequate drainage and prompt firefighting: 
𝑄 = 43200 ∙ 𝐹 ∙ 𝐴𝑤
0.82                                                                                                                                              (4.1) 
For a pool fire heat input without adequate drainage and prompt firefighting: 
𝑄 = 70900 ∙ 𝐹 ∙ 𝐴𝑤
0.82                                                                                                                                              (4.2)         
where 





Q is the total heat absorption by the external wetted surface, W; F is an environmental factor for 
fireproofing (F=1 for no fireproofing); Aw is the total wetted surface, m
2
. 
This is an empirical method. The analytical one appears in the new edition of API 521 (2014) and is 
recommended for special cases and fires outside the scope of this empirical method. This analytical 
method has been reviewed recently by Zamejk (2014).  
The 43200 factor includes credits for conditions normally encountered in refinery process units, which 
are: 
a) The grading and drainage systems for most process units are sloped, so that flammable liquid will 
not pool directly under process vessels. 
b) It can be expected that adequate firefighting activity will start very quickly after a fire starts. 
c) It is very difficult to have a fire totally engulfing a process vessel, even under test conditions with 
a fairly small vessel. Drainage systems normally present in petrochemical units can be expected 
to make a fire large enough to engulf a vessel impossible to sustain. 
Here, only this factor has been used. 
Because API equation is derived from experimental data from tests performed in the 1940’s including 
partially full vessels, the effect of any heat transfer through the vapor space of the vessel area is already 
taken into account. 
API 521 recommends that only the first 7.6 m of height of a process vessel be considered as being 
“exposable” to fire. This measurement should be from grade, or a solid deck or a platform where a pool 
fire could occur. 
The wetted area used here for different process equipment is as follows: 
a) For vessels which are partly liquid full, such as flash drums, separators, reflux accumulators, 
reboilers, etc. the external area of vessel below the lower of the vessel high liquid level mark or 
7.6 m above grade or major platform or deck; in cases where there is no high liquid level 
specified for the vessel, the highest of the top range of any level transmitter, gauge glass, 
indicator, level switch or controller installed on the vessel has been used. 
b) For distillation columns, the liquid level is computed taking into account that all the liquid on the 
trays is allowed to drain into the column bottom, with the column bottom initially at its high 
liquid level mark. The wetted area is the vessel area up to the calculated liquid level or 7.6 m 
above grade. Here, the estimation of clear liquid holdup in each tray is 7.5 cm height and the 
downcomers are full of liquid and occupy 10% of the column cross sectional area. For packed 
columns, 10% of the packed volume as liquid holdup is used. 
c) The wetted area can also be calculated based on the adjusted liquid level due to liquid swell. This 
approach, discussed by Egan (2011), has not been adopted here. 
The environmental factor “F” is introduced in the fire equation to account for such factors as vessel 
insulation or special firefighting provisions which may be present. API 521 (2014) does not allow any 
credit for other mitigation systems as water spray. Credit is taken for F depending on the ability of the 
insulation to withstand both the temperature of the fire and the mechanical forces of firewater for a 
minimum time of 20 min to 1 h (Wong, 2000).  
Here no credit has been given to insulation, because it is usually mineral wool but not held with stainless 
steel wire and not protected with stainless steel sheathing. In the process plants studied, the banding is 
always aluminum which melts at 660ºC. Thus, the value F = 1 has been applied. 
In many process units it is likely that a single fire can affect more than one vessel. API 521 (2014) 
recommends an area of 2500 to 5000 ft
2
. In this work an area of 5000 ft
2
 has been used which 
corresponds a circle of 12.2 m of radius considering that an adequate drainage for spills exists. 





In vessels partly full of liquid in which at the relieving pressure the fluid is below the critical pressure, a 
boiling process can occur depending on the duration of the fire and the boiling temperature. 




                                                                                                                                                                        (4.3) 
where  
W is the relief load, kg/s; Q is the total heat absorbed from the fire, kW; λ is the fluid latent heat of 
vaporization, kJ/kg. 
The following considerations apply in using this expression: 
a) The latent heat should be evaluated at the fully accumulated increasing relieving pressure.  
b) For multicomponent mixtures, the effective latent heat should be obtained in a rigorous way.  
c) If the calculated latent heat is less than 115 kJ/kg, consider the use of the methods for 
supercritical fluids. 
There are some methods available in the literature for calculating in a rigorous way the latent heat of 
multicomponent mixtures. Wong (2000) gives a method that requires a process simulator to calculate the 
physical properties depending on the percentage of vaporization, and recommends an interval between 5 
and 30% mole with 2 mole % intervals. Rahimi Mofrad and Norouzi (2007) also give an example of the 
so called “dynamic approach” and “semi-dynamic approach” calculations. PS PPM software (Siemens) 
has also an option to calculate it with this dynamic approach. Katkar (2010) indicates that a conservative 
approach is the determination of the relief load assuming that the vessel is filled with a single component 
of the mixture each time, and selecting the maximum relief area among them.  
Wong (1999) discusses thoroughly the case of a vapor filled vessel exposed to fire and points out that the 
safety valve will not protect the vessel, concluding that a gas filled vessel cannot be protected by a safety 
valve alone. The same indication is found in API 521 (section 5.15.4.1, 2007). Other proposed protections 
are: 
- cooling the equipment surface by a water deluge system 
- providing  automatic vapor depressurizing systems 
- installing external fire-roofing insulation 
- using reliable fire-monitoring systems and a rapid-action fire-fighting team. 
The equation used has been taken from API 521 (2007): 




1.1506  𝐴                                                                                                            (4.4) 
where 
W is the relief flow, lb/h; A is the exposed surface area of the vessel, ft
2
; P1 is the reliving pressure, psia; 
M is the molecular weight of vapor; Tw is the vessel wall temperature, ºR (recommended as 1560 ºR for 
carbon steel); T1 is the relieving temperature, determined by the following equation: 






                                                                                                                                                       (4.5) 
where 
Pn is the normal operating pressure, psia; Tn is the normal operating temperature, ºR; zn is the 
compressibility factor at normal operating conditions; z1 is the compressibility factor at relieving 
conditions. 





As pointed out in API 521, this simplified equation often predicts very conservative relief loads because 
of the assumptions involved in its derivation, which are: 
- the vessel is uninsulated 
- the vapor in the vessel is an ideal gas 
- the time required to heat up the vessel and its contents is ignored 
- the temperature of the vapor in the vessel is constant  
- vessel failure will not occur. 
Fluids which may exceed their critical point during the pressure rise to relieving conditions in a fire, 
require special consideration in computing the relief load. Fluids near or above their critical pressures 
have zero or very low latent heats and behave somewhat like vapors. The first rigorous method of 
calculation is that of Francis and Shackelton (1985). This method basically requires that the energy 
coming into the vessel from the fire be balanced by the energy leaving the vessel with the relief stream at 
a constant relieving pressure. In this analysis, the mass, temperature and density of the fluid in the vessel 
vary with time. Here, an improved method based on the Francis work and proposed by Ouderkirk (2002) 
has been used (see section 6.3). 
Concerning the scenario of fire applied to liquid filled systems, the following phenomena should be taken 
into account: 
- Initially there is no vapor space. Before boiling of the contents, hydraulic expansion will occur as 
the vessel heats up. 
- Once boiling begins there is little or no vapor/liquid disengaging area. Depending upon the 
physical configuration, the relief stream may be vapor, liquid or two phase flow. 
- A number of vessels, particularly heat exchangers, may be connected in series or parallel, and 
may have to be treated as a unit (Wong, 1992b). 
Unfortunately, the duration of fire has not been discussed much in relation to the contingency in the 
diverse standards. But there is the possibility that the fighting team can extinguish the fire before the 
inside fluid reaches the relief valve set pressure. Wong (1999) points out that the duration should be no 
more than 20 minutes. In this way, the author recommends that if the liquid inventory of the vessel will 
be vaporized in less than 20 minutes the low liquid inventory vessel should be treated as a gas filled 
vessel. Rahimi Mofrad and Norouzi (2007) give a decision flowchart to determine the calculation of the 
relieving load for the fire case considering wetted or unwetted surface.  
Here, the time required for vaporizing all the liquid in a vessel has been calculated as being the time to 
heat the liquid to the boiling point plus the time to vaporize the inventory (Wong, 1999; Rahimi Mofrad 
and Norouzi, part 1, 2007): 
𝑡 = 𝑡1 + 𝑡2 =
𝑉𝐿𝜌𝑐𝑝(𝑇𝑏𝑝 − 𝑇𝑛)
𝑄
 60 + 
𝑉𝐿𝜌𝜆
𝑄
 60                                                                                               (4.6) 
where  
𝑡 time, minutes; VL initial liquid volume in the vessel, ft
3
; 𝜌 liquid density, lb/ft3; cp specific heat of liquid, 
Btu/lbºF; Tbp average boiling point of liquid inventory at the relieving pressure, ºF; Tn normal liquid 
operating temperature, ºF; λ latent heat of vaporization of the liquid, Btu/lb; Q total heat absorption across 
wetted surface area, Btu/h.  
If the total calculated time 𝑡 is less than 20 minutes, a gas filled vessel scenario has to be considered. If 
the time 𝑡 is more than 20 minutes, liquid filled vessel has to be considered.  
Another consideration to take into account in equipment containing low liquid inventory is determining 
the final pressure in the vessel when the last drop of liquid is vaporized. Wong (1999) gives an 
approximate approach by considering the temperature inside the vessel at its boiling point; then the moles 
of vapor and liquid are calculated assuming an ideal gas and the final pressure in the vessel with the total 





moles in the gas phase is compared to the set pressure. If the calculated pressure is less than the set 
pressure, a gas filled vessel must be assumed. 
4.2.2 Liquid filled systems 
Liquid filled systems have their own characteristics and these are different from vapor systems. The 
differences are: 
a) Liquid systems have very little capacitance, so system response to overpressure is very rapid and 
much more prone to instability. 
b) Liquid relief valves have their own characteristics, which are very different from valves in vapor 
services. 
c) Liquid relief systems present greater difficulties in disposing of relief streams. 
The blocked discharge of centrifugal pump systems is one of the most frequent cases of overpressure. 
Here the evaluation of pressure relief systems for equipment which is pressurized by a centrifugal pump, 
has been based on these criteria: 
a) Maximal shut-off head is evaluated for installed and potential maximum impeller sizes and 
maximum continuous speed (for turbines or frequency driven motors). 
b) Blocked conditions should be evaluated at the maximal normal operating suction pressure. This 
pressure should be taken to be 90% of the pressure relief device set pressure of the source vessel 
plus the liquid head imposed by the liquid in the suction vessel at high liquid level. If no exact 
operating limits are known, this approach represents a practical upper operating limit. 
c) Blocked conditions should be evaluated at maximal suction pressure and normal flow rates. In 
this case the source vessel operates at its full accumulated relieving pressure, plus static head 
equivalent to high liquid level. In evaluating potential relief requirements, the downstream system 
is not blocked and is assumed to be able to pass normal flow, handled by the control valve. Any 
excess flow generated under these conditions may have to be handled by a pressure relief valve. 
The calculation procedure is described in Shell Guideline (Shell, 2004). 
Simultaneous blocked discharge and maximal suction pressure due to unrelated events is considered to be 
double jeopardy. An exception is the case of a blocked control valve of the reflux in a distillation column, 
which causes a suction overpressure in the accumulator, because these are coincident events. 
Thermal relief is another frequent case of overpressure in liquid filled systems. In this case, the 
overpressure is due to the hydraulic expansion of the process liquid when the system is blocked in and 
exposed to an outside heat source. Some typical examples are: 
a) The cold side of an exchanger is blocked in while the hot side continues flowing. 
b) Liquid filled piping or vessels are blocked in and are subsequently heated by heat coils or tracing. 
c) Liquid filled piping or vessels are blocked in at near ambient temperature and are heated by solar 
radiation. 
The calculation procedure used in this thesis for liquid expansion is based on the equations of the 
paragraph 5.14.3 of API 521 (2007). 
 In case of piping or vessels exposed to solar radiation, the maximum heat flux of 1.15 kW/m
2
 has been 
applied here not only to the upper half of the external pipe surface, but to all the external area as a 
conservative basis. 
Concerning the pressure relief valve sizing in liquid filled fire services, the following criteria has been 
adopted as recommended by API 521 (2014): 
a) The pressure relief valve is sized for the larger of the hydraulic expansion case preceding boiling 
or during the boiling process. 





b) If the pressure relief valve is located where the vapor produced by boiling cannot immediately 
reach the valve, it is sized for a liquid flowrate equal to the generated vapor which displaces it 
(liquid equivalent volume flow). 
4.2.3 Distillation equipment 
Evaluation of the potential relief loads which may occur in distillation columns is a very complex task. 
The relief causes fall into three main categories: 
1) Operational failures: loss of feed, loss of reflux, loss of intermediate reflux, loss of quench, utility 
failure (power, steam, instrument air, cooling water), control failure, abnormal heat input, 
absorbent medium failure, blocked outlet. 
2) Compositional changes: loss of heat (upstream), accumulation of non-condensables. 
3) Other conditions: fire, heat exchanger tube breakage, thermal instability of bottom material, 
reaction (contamination). 
Generally, the operational failures represent the most severe upsets to normal column operation and will 
govern pressure relief valve sizing. 
The different methods available for designing the pressure relief valve which protects a distillation 
column and its related equipment are: 
a) Gross overhead vapor: related to the maximum vapor rate that can support the top of the 
distillation column. Although it seems a conservative method, Bradford and Durrett (1984) 
indicated that it could undersize the valves. 
b) Flash drum approach: used for the condenser failure scenario, because the column loses its liquid 
inventory and approaches the point where it would simply act as a flash drum. The feed stream is 
flashed at relieving pressure with additional heat coming from the reboiler. 
c) Absorber operation: model developed for the scenario of loss of reflux; Rahimi Mofrad (2008b) 
explains this method but it requires a process simulator. 
d) Unbalance heat load method: developed by Sengupta and Staats (1978) to be used with the 
enthalpy diagrams, and updated by Nezami (2008) considering the availability of commercial 
simulators; this method is largely accepted today in most new relieving calculations (Xie et al., 
2013). 
e) Dynamic simulation: this method is the best available, but it requires construction equipment 
details, hydraulic information of the column and ancillary equipment, and control system details. 
A lot of authors prefer this method in revamping or debottlenecking projects, but not in the design 
phase of a project because of the work load required (Rahimi Mofrad, 2008b; Nezami, 2008; 
Arbo et al., 2008; Depew and Dessing, 1999). Another concern is the validation of the model vs. 
the dynamic behavior of the real plant from an upset as plant data is required. Xie et al. (2013) 
pointed out that the optimum relief load for flare networks is a combination of the unbalanced 
heat load method and dynamic simulation. 
The unbalanced heat load method has been used in this work (see section 6.5). The following basic 
assumptions are implicit in this method: 
1) The column equilibrium temperatures are adjusted by estimating new bubble points at relieving 
pressure, assuming that liquid compositions and tray pressure drop are unchanged. The vapor 
relief temperature corresponds to the bubble point temperature at the accumulated relief pressure 
for the equilibrium stage nearest to the pressure relief valve (usually the top tray). 
2) Unless significantly affected by system hydraulics at relief pressure, all feeds, stripping media 
and reflux streams will continue at normal flow rates with the exception that loss is under 
consideration in the relieving case.  
3) All streams leaving and entering the column are at vapor/liquid equilibrium at relieving pressure, 
with the exception of the feeds. 
4) Vapors may not accumulate in the column during relief, after the column reaches the relieving 
pressure.  





5) Liquids can accumulate in the column, i.e. levels rise or fall, and can absorb heat whether or not 
they leave the system.  
6) In calculating the upset heat balance, credit may be taken for product sensible heat absorption 
from the feed temperature after it enters the column at relief condition to the normal outlet 
temperature. 
7) Unbalanced heat resulting from an operating failure will be relieved by vaporizing top tray liquid, 
at a temperature and latent heat corresponding to relief conditions. It is assumed that there is an 
ample supply of top tray liquid during the short time period over which peak relief rates occur.  
8) Liquid entrainment from the top tray is not included in the scope of the relief load. However, if 
the column is well above flood point liquid entrainment should be considered. 
9) The vaporized part of a feed has to be considered as a contribution to relief rate once flashed 
isentropically at relief conditions. 
10) Credit may be taken for pinch temperatures in the reboiler, if and only if light material cannot 
reach the reboiler under normal operation. Because of many mistakes as pointed out by Bradford 
and Durrett (1984), if any doubt exists, no credit should be taken. 
11) The safety margins used in the distillation tower design have to be considered, i.e. the ultimate 
capacity of the column has to be considered (85% of the theoretical tray flooding or at the 
limiting reboiler duty in unfouled conditions and condensers at fouled conditions). 
The relief rate can be calculated by (Melhem, 2007): 
𝑊𝑅 =
∑𝑄𝐼 − ∑𝑄𝑂 + ∑𝑊𝐹𝐻𝐹 −∑𝑊𝑃𝐻𝑃 −𝑊𝐵𝐻𝐵 − (∑𝑊𝐹 − ∑𝑊𝑃 −𝑊𝐵)(𝐻𝑅 − 𝐿𝑅)
𝐿𝑅
                      (4.7) 
where 
WB bottoms accumulation rate, lb/hr; HB entalphy of bottoms accumulation, Btu/lb; HR enthalpy of the 
relief vapors, Btu/lb; LR latent heat of vaporization of the relief vapors, Btu/lb; ΣQI summation of all heat 
inputs, Btu/hr;  ΣQO summation of all heat removed, Btu/hr; ΣWFHF summation of products of each feed 
rate (lb/hr) times its enthalpy (Btu/lb), Btu/hr; ΣWPHP summation of products of each product rate (lb/hr) 
times its enthalpy (Btu/lb), Btu/hr. 
Concerning the calculation of LR, it is straightforward when there is a pure component, but in the case of 
a multicomponent mixture there is no true latent heat. Wong (1999) pointed out that the orifice area is at 
maximum value when the following function is at its maximum:  




                                                                                                                                                (4.8) 
where  
T relieving fluid temperature K; Z relieving fluid compressibility factor; M relieving fluid molecular 
weight g/mol; λ latent heat of vaporization, kJ/kg 
To determine the effective latent heat, differential isenthalpic flashes of the bubble point liquid are 
performed at various vapor fractions over the entire boiling range. This procedure has been explained by 
Rahimi Mofrad and Norouzi (2007) and has been followed here: 
a) Beginning with the liquid mixture at its bubble point, a simulation has been run (Aspen Hysys) 
which vaporizes 0.1% of the liquid. Then the liquid is cooled to its original temperature to offset 
its sensible heating. The effective latent heat is obtained by dividing the net rate of heat input by 
the vapor generation rate. 
b) Taking the original liquid mixture, an isenthalpic flash is performed such that 5% is vaporized 
then the liquid is cooled again as above. This procedure is continued with 5% steps over the 
entire boiling range of the mixture. A plot is made of both the latent heat and the function  
𝑓(𝑇, 𝑍,𝑀, 𝜆) versus percent vaporized. 





4.2.4 Heat exchanger tube rupture 
Heat exchanger tube rupture is one of the possibilities that can overpressurize a system. However, minor 
leakages are not considered significant in terms of overpressure potential, but in cases involving a 
complete break, or separation of a tube from a tubesheet, they must be evaluated unless the design values 
of low pressure and high pressure sides of the exchanger meet the 10/13 rule for an exchanger designed 
by ASME Code VIII-I (2013). API 521 (2014) does provide some criteria for evaluating tube breakage, 
including some recommendations for the determination of the required size, by steady-state and by 
dynamic analysis. Recently, the Energy Institute (2015) has published a new edition of a specific 
guideline dedicated to this topic, which has had very good acceptance by the engineering community 
since the first edition in year 2000. 
Considerable theoretical work has been done to predict the behavior of liquid filled systems in response to 
tube breakage (Perez Muñoz et al., 2011; Ennis et al., 2011; Urdaneta, Oude, 2015). These analyses have 
been based upon theoretical, instantaneous, complete ruptures of exchanger tubes and use of dynamic 
models based upon liquid transient equations.  The conclusions are that the relief devices must open very 
fast. Pressure relief valves are not good candidates for such a fast increase of pressure and rupture discs 
also have limitations according to manufacturers (Schmidt, 2010). 
Anyway, in industrial practice the following criteria are accepted: 
a) The theoretical model of an instantaneous, full area, rupture of a tube has not been demonstrated 
in practice. 
b) The response times required for pressure relief devices to protect against an instantaneous 
rupture, is often less than 10 milliseconds by fully opening, have not been demonstrated as 
routinely achievable by such industrial devices. Rupture discs are sometimes presumed to have 
this capability, but there is no experimental data to back this up with the exception of Energy 
Institute (2015) experiments. Most rupture disc manufacturers will not guarantee such a quick 
response time. 
c) Many companies consider that the most prudent design practice for tube breakage is to perform 
all analyses of tube failures using steady state, volumetric displacement techniques (Wong, 
1992a, 1992b). 
d) Experience has demonstrated that a tube breakage needs 0.2 to 0.5 seconds to occur (as opposed 
to instantaneously), which results in little or no transient peak pressure. 
Tube failure is a viable contingency if the hydrostatic test pressure of the low pressure side is exceeded by 
the design pressure of the high pressure side. Because, according to ASME, the hydrotest pressure is 1.3 x 




the design pressure, the higher of these two values (𝜎25º is the allowable stress of the material at 25ºC and 
𝜎𝑇 is the allowable stress at the design temperature). 
When calculating the flow across a broken tube, the following assumptions are made: 
a) Tube breakage is regarded as a sharp break in a single tube, with the high-pressure fluid flowing 
through both sides of the break. 
b) The fluid flowing through the broken tube suffers an isenthalpic expansion 
c) For calculation purposes, each side of the break behaves as a sharp-edged orifice having the 
cross-sectional area of one tube. 
d) The treatment is identical for flow into or out of the broken tube, i.e., either the shell or tube side 
may be the high-pressure side. 
e) The driving force for flow is the difference between the maximum normal operating pressure of 
the high pressure side and the accumulated relieving pressure of the low pressure side (Wong, 
1992b). Some authors use the set pressure in the low pressure side (Schmidt, 2010). 
For vapor flow, the equation used based on an orifice coefficient of 0.6 and the total flow through both 
sides of the break is considered (API 521, 2007) to be: 













                                                                                                                (4.9) 
where  
W vapor flow rate, lb/h; d inside diameter of tube , in; k specific heat ratio for vapor; P1 high pressure 
side operating pressure, psia; 𝜌 vapor density at high pressure side operating conditions , lb/ft3. 
For liquid flow through both sides of the break, assuming a coefficient of discharge of 0.6: 
𝑄 = 35.9 ∙ 𝑑2 ∙ √
∆𝑃
𝑆𝐺
                                                                                                                                              (4.10) 
where  
Q liquid flow rate, gpm; d inside diameter of tube, in; ΔP normal high pressure side operating pressure 
minus allowable low pressure side accumulated overpressure, psi; SG liquid specific gravity at flowing 
conditions. 
If multiple-phase flow is present or can result (flashing) from the pressure loss across the tube break, 
models for treating this are presented by Leung (1996), CCPS (1998) and Schmidt (2010) among others. 
The models can incorporate thermodynamic nonequilibrium (boiling delay) and/or the mechanical 
nonequilibrium (slip between phases). There are two possible locations for a tube break to occur: at the 
tubesheet or along the tube length. The location of the break will dictate the type of flow model that 
should be used. The concern is whether or not there is sufficient path length for equilibrium to be 
established between the phases. Here, it has been assumed that the break occurs along the tube length and, 
consequently, equilibrium between the phases is assumed (see section 6.6 for a comparison of the results 
using different models).   
Concerning the capacity credits for the low pressure side, the influx of material from the high pressure 
side is assumed to back out the normal flow entering the low-pressure side. If the low pressure side is in a 
parallel network, such as in a cooling water system, the normal supply to adjacent exchangers on the 
subheader, both upstream and downstream, may also stop (Wong, 1992b). The calculation procedure 
presented by Wong has been used here. 
4.2.5 Vapor/liquid disengagement  
Considerable research related to the behavior of pressure relief systems in two-phase, reacting or flashing 
services has been done by the AIChE’s Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems (DIERS) (Fisher 
et al., 1992) 
Multiphase flow in the inlet of the pressure relief valve may occur when relieving: 
- a two phase stream 
- liquids that may flash 
- reactive systems 
- supercritical fluids 
- a vessel with high liquid level 
- a vessel with internals or solids beds that obstruct disengagement 
- foamy, bubbly or viscous liquids. 
For some of these systems, the pressure relief valve inlet quality may be obvious. For others, it will be 
necessary to predict vapor-liquid disengagement characteristics in the vessel to be protected. Often, the 
inlet quality varies with time and requires a dynamic analysis. 
There are varying degrees of vapor-liquid disengagement. Complete disengagement for a top-mounted 
relief device is characterized by all vapor venting. Zero disengagement is characterized by homogeneous 





vessel venting. When homogeneous venting is assumed, the inlet quality is equal to the vapor fraction of 
the bulk fluid within the vessel. Between these two extremes are the partial disengagement models, churn-
turbulent and bubbly. The churn turbulent model assumes greater disengagement than the bubbly one. 
The governing equations and associated charts for this model are exposed in DIERS project manual 
among others (Fisher et al., 1992; ISO 4126-10, 2010; Fisher and Forrest, 1995). Christ et al. (2011), in a 
very interesting contribution, give some recommendations for the case of external heating. They point out 
that ISO 4126-10 is less conservative than DIERS. Egan (2011), after reviewing the literature and 
comparing the results for runaway reactions and external fire for some case studies, concludes that in 
most cases the thermal expansion from storage to the relief case is decisive for predicting the 
disengagement. Wong (1997) pointed out the traditional practice in the engineering community of 
ignoring the vapor/liquid disengagement phenomenon in designing liquid blockage in flash drums. 
Raman (2015) in a very interesting article suggests a practical procedure to model the sizing of pressure 
relief valves installed below a liquid level. 
Summarizing, the most conservative model for top-mounted vent sizing is the homogeneous one, 
followed by bubbly, churn-turbulent and, lastly, all vapor. 
In the methodology proposed here, the first criterion is screening the foamy or non-foamy behavior of the 
liquid that results in the possibility of producing multiphase flow during pressure relief. The conservative 
approach recommended by Katkar (2010) has been used. It is expected that a liquid is foamy if: 
-its viscosity is greater than 100 cP 
-liquid contains surfactants 
-liquid is dirty and contains solids 
-multicomponent liquid with wide range of boiling points 
-chemical reacting liquids 
-there is more than one liquid phase. 
Another screening for multiphase flow during pressure relief is based on the initial fill level. If the liquid 
level when the relieving process begins is higher than the limit level, a mixed phase relief has to be 
considered. A conservative approach for this limit level is considering two-phase relief when the initial 
liquid level (before valve opens) is above 20% for foamy liquids and above 80% for non-foamy liquids. 







                                                                                                                                          (4.11) 






                                                                                                                                                 (4.12) 
where  
h free board height, m; W relief rate, kg/h; ρv density of gas, kg/m
3
; σ surface tension N/m; g gravitational 
acceleration 9,81 m/s
2
; ρL density of liquid, kg/m
3
; Ue Kutateladze entrainment velocity, m/s. 
4.3 Selection and design (required area) of the pressure relief valve 
API 520 (Part I, 2014) gives a classification of pressure relief valves in two categories (spring-loaded: 
conventional, liquid service; and pilot operated) and a detailed list of recommendations for their selection 
according to the fluid, the total backpressure, etc.  
The design of pressure relief valves requires three components (Darby, 2005): 
a) Flow model. The isentropic model has demonstrated to be the most adequate: 












                                                                                                                                    (4.13) 
where  
G0 is the theoretical mass flux through an isentropic nozzle; P0 is the pressure at the entrance to the valve; 
Pn is the pressure at the nozzle exit; ρ is the fluid (or mixture) density at pressure P; ρn is the fluid density 
at pressure Pn, the nozzle exit or throat; Kd is the dimensionless discharge coefficient that accounts for the 
difference between the predicted ideal mass flux and the actual. 
b) Fluid property data or model (density versus pressure). The accuracy of the calculation depends on the 
accuracy of ρ vs. P information over the isentropic path from P0 to Pn. 
c) Test data to adjust for deviation from isentropic nozzle flow (the discharge coefficient Kd):  







                                                                                                                               (4.14) 
where Gn is the actual mass flux through nozzle = 𝐾𝑑𝐺0 
For liquids assuming a constant density, the equation reduces to 
𝐺0 = √2𝜌(𝑃0 − 𝑃𝑛)                                                                                                                                               (4.15) 
The equation is valid for fully turbulent flow (Re > 100,000). For high viscosity liquids the equation has to 
be multiplied by a correction factor available in API 520. 
For ideal gases and choked flow, the equation reduces to 






                                                                                                                               (4.16) 
where k is the isentropic exponent for a gas. 
When the gas (or mixture) behaves as non ideal, for instance when the compressibility factor  (Z) is out of 
the range 0.8 < Z < 1.1 which corresponds to high pressures or critical-point regions, an equation of state 
is required to evaluate by an  isentropic flash the variation of the density with the pressure. However, Kim 
et al. (2011) and Shackelford (2003) gave an equation which uses a “non-ideal k value” that reduces 
considerably the calculations. Anyway, a process simulator is required as well. 
However, industry has looked for simple sizing formulas. Table 4-1 presents the main sizing expressions 
covered by some codes. Copigneaux (1980) compared different Codes and Standards from US, France, 
Germany, United Kingdom and Russia and found that they use implicitly the same formula.  
Table 4-1. Summary of sizing formulas in relevant codes. 
MEDIUM Units ASME VIII/API 520 (1) ISO 4126-1(2) AD 2000-A2(3) 




















































































1. A orifice area, G specific gravity, Q volumetric flow, W mass flow, Z compressibility factor, T relieving temperature, 
M molecular weight, F2 coefficient of subcritical flow, Kb capacity correction factor due to back pressure (gas, vapor, 
steam), Kc = 1 (safety valve without rupture disc) and 0.9 ( safety valve with rupture disc), Kd discharge coefficient, KN 
correction factor for Napier equation, KSH superheat steam correction factor, Kv correction factor due to viscosity, Kw 








2. A orifice area, Qm mass flow, Z compressibility factor, T0 relieving temperature, v specific volume, Kb theoretical 
capacity correction factor for subcritical flow, Kdr certified derated coefficient of discharge, Kv viscosity correction 







3. A0 orifice area, qm mass flow, T relieving temperature, Z compressibility factor, p0 relieving pressure, pb back pressure, 
𝛼𝑤certified discharge coefficient, Ψ outflow function (gas flow), x pressure medium coefficient (gas flows). 
The ASME Code covers the certification of safety valves for the flow of saturated steam, water, air and 
natural gas (Section VIII UG-131). However, API 520 is a recommended practice for standardizing the 
pre-selection of pressure relief valves for gases, vapors, liquids and two-phase flow in the design phase of 
the plant. API 520 uses the same formulas as the ASME Code but extends them with correction factors, 
like back pressure and viscosity, to make them applicable to many practical applications. In API 520 the 
pre-selection of the valve requires the determination of an “effective relief area” and an “effective 
coefficient of discharge”, which are nominal values and therefore independent from the selection of either 
the design or the manufacturer. The effective relief areas are those listed in API 526 (2009) in increasing 
order from letter D to T.  
Once the valve orifice is selected, it must be demonstrated that the certified capacity meets or exceeds 
that of preliminary sizing. For this calculation the “actual discharge coefficient “and the “actual discharge 
area” from the manufacturers catalog must be used. 
The discharge coefficients, Kd, Kdr, and αw take into account the deviation of the pressure relief valve 
from an ideal nozzle (isentropic). Thus, these values are the quotient of the actual measured flow divided 
by the theoretical flow in an ideal nozzle. Codes like ASME, ISO 4126 or AD 2000-A2 require actual 
flow tests to establish the flow efficiency of manufacturers valves. ISO 4126-1 requires 9 tests (three 
valves of three different sizes), which results are averaged if none of these 9 discharge coefficients vary 
more than plus or minus 5% of the average coefficient. An additional requirement is to reduce the flow 
tested discharge coefficient by 10%. This reduced coefficient provides an additional safety factor when 
calculating the required area of the valve. Thus Kdr (r of rated) means that the factor Kd has been 
multiplied by 0.9 
Here the following design basis has been used: 
4.3.1 Gases/Vapors 
The pressure relief valves of the plants studied were designed by the AD 2000-A2 code. The majority of 
the valves are from two manufacturers: Leser and Sempell. The Leser valves were designed by Valvestar 
Software. This software follows the Leser Engineering Book. The Sempell valves were designed 
following the Sempell Catalogue (Sempell KS27585E). 
Some codes recommend not to use in the design phase compressibility factors below 0.8 or greater than 
1.1 (API 520, 2007), or less than 0.7 and greater than 1.4 (Wong, 2000), because the results are not 
adequate at very high pressure conditions or critical-point regions. Here credit has been given for the 
exact value of Z, calculated by software (Aspen- Hysys) and checked by specific compressibility charts 
when available (Ingersoll-Rand, 1981). 





The ratio of ideal specific heats at inlet relieving temperature (API 520, Part I, 2014) or isentropic 
exponent of the medium in the pressure chamber (AD 2000-A2) was calculated by API Technical Data 
Book (1997) and Aspen Hysys. 
According to API 520 (Part I, 2007, 2014) if the compressibility factor of the fluid is greater than 0.8, 
then the ideal gas ratio of specific heats may be used to determine the expansion coefficient. If the 
compressibility factor is less than 0.8, then the expansion coefficient should be based on the isentropic 
expansion coefficient. However, recently Smith and Burgess (2015) suggested that, when the fluid critical 
volume is 2 or lower, a direct integration method is required to accurately estimate relief-device 
capacities. If the critical volume is greater than 2 and the compressibility factor is less than 0.8, then using 
the nozzle equation with the isentropic expansion coefficient factor is acceptable (see comparison of 
different methods in section 6.2). 
Following the excellent work of Shackelford (2003) and Kim et al. (2011), it is possible to design in the 
region  Z < 0.8, without using the tedious homogeneous direct integration method described in Annex B 
API 520 (Part I, 2008). The best results are obtained when the inlet compressibility factor and the actual 
isentropic expansion coefficient for the fluid are at relieving conditions. This isentropic coefficient is 
calculated through an equation of state that describes the pressure-volume relationship along an isentropic 
expansion path. Peng-Robinson and Lee Kesler equations have been used. 
Both authors and API 520 remark that the use of the real gas specific heat ratio at relieving conditions 
with the real compressibility factor should be avoided, because it can result in a significantly undersized 
relief valve. 
To limit the discharge capacity of a pressure relief valve, a restricted lift is used. A restricted lift is used 
when: 
a) The safety valve is oversized (gas and two-phase flow). 
b) The inlet pressure drop is larger than 3% of set pressure or the built-up back pressure is too large 
because of excessive flow (gas, liquids and two-phase flow). 
Leser catalog (the technical handbook) gives figures for obtaining the corrected value of Kdr/αw due to lift 
restriction. AD 2000-A2 allows a lift restriction of below 30% of the maximum lift as long as it is more 
than 1 mm. 
The discharge coefficient has to be corrected in case of higher back pressures, i.e. higher than 15% for 
conventional valves: Leser catalog has been used. 
4.3.2 Steam 
The pressure medium coefficient x, is calculated through AD 2000-A2: 
𝑥 = 0,6211 ∙
√𝑝0∙𝜈
𝛹
   in  h mm2 bar/kg 
where  
p0 is the absolute pressure in pressure chamber, bara; ν is the specific volume of medium in pressure 
chamber m
3
/kg; Ψ is the outflow function. 
4.3.3 Liquids 
The equation for liquids applies when there is no change of phase (no flashing) when flowing through the 
valve. Although AD2000-A2 (2006) gives no correction factor for the viscosity of liquids, the sizing 
procedure shown in ISO 4126-1 is used. ISO 4126-1 and API 520 Part I give the viscosity correction 
factor for Newtonian liquids as a chart. The calculation of the required area of the valve is an iterative 
process beginning with the correction factor Kv =1 and calculating the Reynolds number with the selected 
(standard) area. The method is valid for Re > 34. Darby and Molavi (1997) developed a correction factor 





that covers a greater range of Reynolds numbers. When using these formulas for non-newtonian liquids, 
the pressure relief valves are oversized according to Moncalvo and Friedel (2009). 
4.3.4 Two phase-flow 
An impressive quantity of literature has been produced in the last twenty years related to the release of 
fluid in pressure vessels that produces in the inlet of the pressure relief valve, a flashing, a condensing  or 
a non-condensing flow (frozen). Flashing is the most frequent occurring process and happens when the 
entering fluid consists of a saturated liquid or a subcooled liquid that reaches the saturation point in the 
nozzle, or a two-phase vapor liquid mixture. Another case is the retrograde condensation that occurs when 
a supercritical fluid enters the valve and condenses at the exit of the nozzle, when the pressure decreases. 
One of the most used nozzle models is the Homogeneous-Equilibrium Model. It is based on assuming 
that the fluid through the valve is a well mixed gas/vapor liquid that can be taken as a one phase, with 
properties which are a suitable combination of each one. Moreover, it is assumed that the two phases are 
in mechanical (no slip between phases) and thermodynamic (no delay in vaporization) equilibrium. The 
thermodynamic path through the valve is assumed to be isentropic, although in reality, it is a mixture 
between adiabatic and isentropic. 
A literature survey on the methods available for designing pressure relief valves for two-phase flow has 
been made (Guinea, 2015); the results are presented in table 4-2. 
Table 4-2. Literature survey on methodologies for pressure relief valves with two-phase flow. 
Author/source Characteristics Advantages Disadvantages References 
API 520-1993 
VdTÜV 100/2  
 
Addition of the area 
required for the vapor 
and the liquid 
Easy calculations It has been proven that 
can undersize 
(API 520 -1993) 
(VdTÜV-Merkblatt 
Sicherheitsventile 
100/2 – 1973) 
(Bozóki, 1996) 
(Wagner, 1999) 
Melhem Generalized charts Easy  calculations Only available for few 
substances 
Melhem 2003 Flow 
maps for common 
chemicals 




Need to evaluate fluid 
properties at only one 
point of the isentropic 
transform 
a)The linearized 
equation of state 
(Clasius-Clapeyron) 
may not give exact 
two-phase density 
values 
b) The method is 
unreliable near the 
critical point or in case 
of retrograde 
condensation 
c) Slip and non-
equilibrium effects are 
not accounted for 
d) Aplication only if 
Tred < 0.9 or Pred < 0.5 
e) A modification of 
the basic model is 
required for slightly 
subcooled liquids 
(Leung, 1996) 
API 520-2000 (HEM 
model) 
API 520-2008 
Omega method with 





thermodynamic nor  
mechanical 
nonequilibrium is 
taken into account 
The same as Leung 
model  
a)Neither  





b) For flashing 
mixtures with a boiling 
range > 150ºC two 
isentropic points are 
(API 520 Part I, 
Appendix D, 2000) 
(API 520 Part I, Annex 
C, 2008) 










Very precise results 
are obtained 
Several equations have 
to be solved 
simultaneously and 
detailed property data 








model is the Omega 
method improved with 
boiling delay of the 
liquid and slip between 
phases.  
The ISO 4126-10 is 
the Diener/Schmidt 
model without slip. 
Requires physical 
properties only at the 
inlet conditions of the 
valve. 
The ISO 4126-10 
includes the extension 









Omega method taking 




Schmidt  extended the 
model for subcooling 
entering liquid 
Requires physical 
properties only at the 
inlet conditions of the 
valve 
The calculation of the 
critical pressure is an 
iterative process 








A universal equation  
The method is simple 
and flexible  









method for nozzles > 
10 cm 
a) It is applicable for 
all fluids (gas, vapor, 
liquids and two-phase 
flow) 
b) The procedure is 
independent of if the 
entering fluid is cold 
liquid, subcooled 
flashing liquid, 
condensing vapor or a 
two phase mixture 
a) Requires multiple 
data points (Pressure, 
density, quality) over 
an isentropic range of 




physical property data 
are required to obtain 
good results 
c) Nonequilibrium 
effects are not taken 
into account 
d) Can produce 
excessive conservative 
results when the fluid 
is in two-phase frozen 
flow (no flashing) or 
nozzle < 10 cm and 





(HNDI) for nozzles < 
10 cm 
The same as HDI The same as HDI 
except c) 






Calculation of the 
discharge coefficient, 
which depends on the 
geometry of the valve 
Darby recommends 
using the discharge 
coefficient for gases if 
the flow is chocked. 
Leung uses the liquid 
coefficient and the ISO 
uses the liquid and gas 
coefficients from the 
manufacturer  









For valves with an 
inlet diameter ≥ 4 
inches use the omega 
method.  
The calculation 
requires all system 
(valve and piping) to 
be considered. The 
(Melhem, 2004) 





Author/source Characteristics Advantages Disadvantages References 
In case that the inlet 
diameter ≤ 4 inches 
use a homogeneous 
nonequilibrium model 
or Darby model with 
slip. 
author recommends a 
rupture disc for high 
viscosity flows. 
 
Several authors have compared the different methods described in Table 4-2. Schmidt (Schmidt and 
Egan, 2009; Schmidt, 2013) compared the homogeneous equilibrium model (omega methods) with 
different nonequilibrium models, i.e. those which have taken into account the boiling delay and/or the slip 
between phases, with more than 3000 points of experimental data. The best model is the Diener/Schmidt 
homogeneous non equilibrium, but these authors pointed out that near the critical point, the precision of 
data is very important and the direct integration method of Darby is recommended. Darby (2000, 2002, 
2005, Darby et al., spring 2001) also made a comparison between different models for industrial products: 
ethylene, chlorine and ammonia; the results were that all the equilibrium models and the HNE model 
(Fauske, 1999) for nozzle lengths greater than 6 inches gave comparable results for conditions not near 
the critical point. Nevertheless, in the vicinity of the critical point area, Darby does not recommend 
omega and HNE methods. Another comparison made by Darby et al. (2001) recommends the HNE 
method (Fauske, 1999) if the slip is included over the TPHEM (Simpson, 1991) method and emphasizes 
the importance of knowing the physical state of the fluid entering the valve. Sorvari (2008) compared the 
methods of Leung (1996), API 520 (Part I, 2000), ISO 4126-10 and the Direct Integration method. His 
comparison showed that the Direct Integration method with a non-equilibrium factor related to vapor 
mass fraction and nozzle length (Darby, 2002) was the best one. Concerning the discharge coefficient 
Boccardi et al. (2005, 2008) found that, for two phase flow, the discharge coefficient is higher than for 
vapour only flow. 
Other analytical integral methods have been proposed. Kim et al. (2013) proposed a universal mass-flux 
equation for sizing pressure relief valves for liquid flow, vapor flow and two-phase flow for critical and 
subcritical conditions; it is based on the work of Simpson (1991). 
Siegal et al. (2013) recommended the Direct Integration method of Darby in all cases. They argue that 
with the availability of commercial simulators there are no concerns when doing the isentropic flashes 
through Aspen Hysys, for instance, and extrapolating the results to a spreadsheet which performs the 
integration with the Trapezoidal Rule, as recommended by API 520 (Part I, 2008). According to these 
authors, only in the case of two-phase frozen flow (no flashing) or if the valve has a short nozzle ( < 10 
cm) with flashing flow, does the method not give precise results and must be avoided. They pointed out 
that the use of a slip factor can solve the problem but there are no guidelines available for calculating this 
factor.  
Here the Direct Integration method of Darby has been used in all cases of supercritical fluid with 
retrograde condensation, together with Ouderkirk (2002) and Self and Do (2010) procedures. 
Concerning the discharge coefficient for two-phases, the values recommended by API 520 (Part I, 2008) 
have been used in this work as a conservative basis. Leung (2004) gives a procedure in which the 
discharge coefficient in two phase compressible flow is related through the omega parameter to the liquid 
coefficient. Darby (2004) proposes a method which is independent of the model used to size the valve. He 
recommends taking the certified liquid coefficient when the flow in the valve is not chocked, and using 
the value of the gas discharge coefficient when the flow is chocked using the Direct Integration Method. 
ISO 4126-10 (2010) also gives a method which introduces a weight factor based on the volume fraction 
of the gas phase between the experimental liquid and gas coefficient. 
4.3.5 Supercritical flow with retrograde condensation 
A pressure relief valve protecting a vessel can, in case of an external fire, release a supercritical fluid if 
the relieving pressure of the valve is higher than the critical point. No boiling process occurs in this case. 





Fluids near or above their critical pressures have zero latent heat and behave somewhat like vapors.  
Through an open literature review, the following methods are available: 
a) Treating the vessel as unwetted and using  an empirical formula of API 521(2008). 
b) Using the value of 115 kJ/kg as a latent heat for hydrocarbons near the critical point. 
c) Using the method of Francis and Shackelton (1985). This method requires that the energy coming 
into the vessel from the fire be balanced by the energy leaving the vessel with the released stream 
at a constant vessel pressure. The method considers the heat absorbed by the vessel and the fluid 
and heat transfer from the vessel to the fluid by natural convection. 
d) Using the method of Ouderkirk (2002). 
e) Using the method of Doane ( 2010). 
f) Using the method of Self and Do (2010). This method can be used for both vapors and liquids if 
no phase change occurs. In this approach, the relieving rates are calculated with a time basis (15 
seconds in the example). Nezami and Price (2012) worked with this procedure in some case 
studies using both temperature and the time increments. This method was adopted in the last 
edition of API 520 (Part I, 2014) 
Grolmes (2013), in a detailed study, demonstrated that the method of Ouderkirk was better than Doane’s. 
The Ouderkirk and API 520 methods have been used here together with a commercial simulator (Aspen-
Hysys) to obtain the isenthalpic/isentropic data.   
4.3.6 Liquid thermal expansion 
Liquid filled systems must be protected against overpressure due to the hydraulic expansion of the fluid, 
when the system is blocked in and exposed to an outside heat source, for instance when: 
- the cold side of an exchanger is blocked in while the hot side continues to flow. 
- liquid filling piping or vessels are blocked in and heated by heat coils or tracing. 
- liquid filled piping or vessels are blocked in at a near ambient temperature and heated by solar    
radiation. 




                                                                                                                                                          (4.17) 
where  
q is the volume flow rate at the flowing temperature, m
3
/s; 𝛼𝑣 is the cubic expansion coefficient for the 
liquid at the expected temperature, 1/ºC; ∅ is the total heat transfer rate, expressed in watts; 𝑑 is the 
relative density referred to water at 15,6 ºC; 𝑐 is the specific heat capacity of the trapped fluid,  J/kgK 
If large duties are involved, it is recommended that a less conservative approach be considered, 
particularly with respect to the rate of heat input. Valdes and Svoboda (1985) indicated that the API 
method gives very conservative results in the case of heat exchangers. They recommended the formula 
for the case of blocked in piping. These authors proposed a method called “balanced-enthalpy method”, 
which takes into account the variation of the duty in different segments of the heat exchanger as a 
function of time. 
4.4 Inlet pressure drop 
A safety valve can, under certain conditions, respond in an unstable manner. The flow rate changes as the 
pressure at the inlet and or outlet varies during the overpressure scenario. A safety valve may experience 
three types of dynamic response to different flow rates: cycling, fluttering and chattering.  
Cycling refers to a valve that opens and closes multiple times during a relief at a frequency lower than 1 
Hz and occurs normally when the system upstream does not generate enough relieving load and the safety 
valve has overcapacity. Fluttering refers to a high-frequency self-excited periodic oscillation of the valve 





at a frequency higher than 10 Hz that does not result in the valve completely closing off, i.e. the seat does 
not contact the disc. Chattering is the rapid cycling, higher than 1 Hz, of a valve opening and closing 
which may lead to a loss of containment because of the mechanical failure of the relief valve or related 
piping. Flutter and cycling are not considered significant safety hazards concerning the mechanical 
integrity part, but chattering causes relieving flow reduction because of insufficient valve opening. 
API 520 (part II, 2011, 2015) and AD-Merkblatt-A2 (2006) limit the non-recoverable pressure losses at 
the inlet to 3% of the set pressure. This is to ensure that the pressure in the protected vessel will not 
increase above what is allowed by pressure vessel codes and to confirm that the valve will not chatter. 
This 3% rule assumes that the blowdown of the safety valve is higher than 5 % of the set pressure 
allowing a minimum of 2% of safety margin. 
The origin of this 3% inlet line loss appears first in 1948, when the University of Michigan was 
commissioned by industry to address relief valve instability. They set an arbitrary guideline for maximal 
inlet line losses at 3% of relief valve set pressure based on relief valve blowdown which was at that time 
4%. Blowdown for a relief valve is the difference in the set or lift pressure and the reseating pressure 
expressed as a percentage of set pressure. The attached diagram (Figure 4-3) for vapor relief in a vapor 
certified valve shows blowdown pictorially: 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Blowdown in a gas/vapor characteristic pressure relief valve (adapted from API 520, Part I, 2014) 
API 520 Part II included the 3% rule in 1963; mention of this rule was part of the non-mandatory 
appendix M for ASME Section VIII beginning in 1986 for vapor services only. 
ISO 4126-9 adds a new condition to the 3 % rule. The inlet pressure drop should not exceed one third of 
the blowdown. The lower value has to be taken (this new condition assumes that the standard blowdown 
is 10%). 
The calculation of inlet and outlet line losses for a relief valve may appear to be a simple exercise; 
however, several assumption errors have been noted in the bibliography (Berwanger et al., 2000; Bravo et 
al., 1995). Vapor release calculations through a vapor certified relief valve are to be analyzed for inlet and 
outlet line losses based on the relief valve’s rated capacity at 10% overpressure (code allowed 
accumulation) of the valve. Overpressure is pressure above the set pressure of the valve; accumulation is 
pressure above the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP). Overpressure equals accumulation 
only when the safety valve is set at MAWP. From the diagram above, full lift typically occurs at 5-7% 
overpressure in the valve. 
However, in those cases where the required relief rate is < 50% of the safety valve’s rated capacity at 
10% overpressure and is > 25% of the rated capacity, a deviation from the codes has been allowed in this 
work i.e. using 50% of the valve’s rated capacity for inlet and outlet analysis. The justification for this 
deviation is based on the behavior of the pop action vapor certified valve shown above. A vapor certified 





valve pops to ~ 50% open and can operate there in a stable manner.  At a required relief load < 25% of 
the valve’s capacity, the valve will reseat. 
There are two valves which do not require inlet pressure drop calculations: thermal relief valves exposed 
to ambient temperature (solar radiation) and remotely sensed pilot-operated relief valves. 
The calculation of the inlet pressure drop (frictional) has been done here using the following steps: 
4.4.1 Compressible gases/vapors 
Even though there are some simplified methods for doing this calculation (i.e. Cox method (Cox and 
Weirick, 1980); ISO 4126-9 Annex C; Westman, 1997a; AD-Merkblätt-A2 paragraph 6.2 and API 521 
(API 521, 2008, 2014)), there are also rigorous procedures considering isothermal and adiabatic flow for 
one and two phases, i.e. Aspen-Hysys, PS PPM, Flowmaster, etc. 
Anyway, the main issue is finding the rigorous values of resistance coefficients of fittings. Here the 
values of Crane (1999) have been used. 
The roughness of the inner wall of the pipe is very important in situations where the inlet pressure drop is 
almost 3%. The choice of one roughness or another can decide if a safety valve fulfills the 3% rule or not. 
Here a roughness of 0.3 mm has been adopted, which corresponds to a lightly corroded pipe (VDI Heat 
Atlas, 2010). 
The calculation of the inlet pressure drop was performed with an own developed spreadsheet, applying 





















                                                                                                  (4.18) 
the Mach number being calculated with: 









                                                                                                                  (4.19)  
As the PS PPM program was available, the critical cases, i.e. the cases with a frictional pressure drop at 
the inlet near 3% of the set pressure or higher, were also recalculated with the program. The problem is 
that PS PPM does not account for piping with DIN diameters, but only with ANSI ones. This forces the 
process safety engineer to look for a schedule which match the real inside diameter of the piping and 
fitting.  
4.4.2 Liquids and two-phase flow 
For liquids, the equations of Crane (1999) have also been used. The same problems related to resistance 
coefficients of fittings and PS PPM program apply. 
For two-phase flow the homogeneous equilibrium model of Leung, described in API 521 (2008, 2014) 
and available in the dedicated software PS PPM, has been used. 
4.5 Outlet pressure drop 
Pressure relief streams must be disposed of in a safe, economic and environmentally acceptable manner. 
The alternatives are (Shell, 2004; Cheremisinoff, 1998; section 7.3, API 521, 2008; Casal et al., 1999): 
 Discharge to atmosphere, grade or open drainage. This option is usually applied for steam, water, 
air and nitrogen, among others 
 Discharge to sewer. Used for liquid discharges: the sewer system must have capacity to contain 
the volume of the released discharge 
 Discharge to a process vessel. This method returns the released fluid back into a process system 
operating at lower pressure than the system from which it is released 





 Discharge to a closed system. This system may treat or cool the release stream and either recover 
some or all of the material or route it to a remote location, where it can be safely disposed of. 
This type of system can be a liquid blowdown one, a flare or a vapor recovery system. 
Due to the fact that the products of the petrochemical plants studied are mainly hydrogen, ethylene, 
propylene, propane and n-heptane, in this case the best option is a flare system. A flare system consists of 
a suitably designed combustion assembly, liquid knock-out and the piping networks which connect them 
to the pressure relief valves. 
The design of flare systems consists of the following major activities (API 521, 2007, 2014): 
a) Identification and quantification of the maximum loads which may enter the system. 
 This activity requires assessment of the causes of release into a flare system and determination of 
which flows are likely to occur simultaneously. Typical emergency situations to be considered 
are (Cheremisinoff, 1998): 
 Single elements failures (called individual loads), such as instrument device failure, 
mechanical device failure, etc. 
 Area covered by fire (defined in this thesis as a circle with a diameter of 30 m) 
 Operation of emergency depressurizing systems, for instance the plant reactors 
 Plant wide utility failures (called cumulative loads): total power failure, cooling water 
failure, instrument air failure, etc. 
b) Sizing the flare header piping.  
This is typically an iterative process based on flow requirements, hydraulic back pressure 
requirements and economics.  
c) Mechanical design of flare header piping and supports. 
The piping must be supported to resist forces of potential liquid slugs and thermal stresses caused 
by flow of hot or cold fluids. Low points and traps should be avoided to prevent collection of 
liquid or slug formation. 
d) Sizing of liquid knock-out and removal systems ahead of the flare. 
The liquid separator vessel in a flare system prevents liquid from reaching the flare itself. Flare 
separator vessels must be sized to be large enough to collect all of the liquid which might be 
released to a flare during an emergency, and still have sufficient vapor space to allow incoming 
vapor and liquid to disengage.  
e) Sizing and selection of the flare itself. 
This work is done by qualified flare manufacturers. 
Here, due to the fact that the flare system was already built, the procedure for calculating the total 
backpressure of the safety valves relieving to the flare was the major concern. A rigorous procedure is 
required to calculate this backpressure, taking into account the possibility of two phase flow at the exit of 
the pressure relief valves, due to propylene liquid flashing and retrograde condensation as well. 
An extensive literature survey was performed both for one phase flow, mainly vapor, and two phase flow. 
4.5.1 Vapor phase pressure drop in flare networks 
The following procedures are available in open literature: 
a) API 521 (API, 2007, 2014) gives an equation for compressible and isothermal flow based on the 
work of Mak (1978). This author pointed out that the assumption of isothermal flow conditions is 
not a concern, because the real flow in relief systems usually takes place somewhat between 
adiabatic and isothermal. Mak found that for critical and subcritical flows, the isothermal flow 
equation gives more pressure drop than adiabatic flow and concluded that for K’s greater than 10, 
the difference is less than 4% in both subcritical and critical flows. Mukherjee (2008) uses this 
method in a worked example, calculating the built-up back pressures of a flare network. 
API 521 also gives an alternative method based on the work of Lapple. It requires a stepwise 
calculation because the compressibility factor has to be taken at flow conditions, although a 





simplification using an average compressibility factor is proposed. This method, however, 
assumes that there are no enlargements or contractions.  
b) AD Merkblatt-A2 (2006) gives a formula and graphs for compressible flow but in terms of the 
maximum permissible coefficient of resistance (K), accepting maximal backpressures of 15% for 
conventional valves and 30% for balanced valves. A method is proposed as well for calculating 
the back pressure for a specific K, in an iterative procedure.    
c) ISO 4126-9 Annex D (2008) gives in five graphs the maximal K values for built-up 
backpressures of 10%, 15%, 20%, 30% and 40%, assuming adiabatic compressible pipe flow of 
an ideal gas with constant specific heat ratio; this method is based in the work of Lapple. 
d) Other authors have made comparisons between different methods. Bonilla (1978) compared 
adiabatic and isothermal flow. He concluded that both isothermal and adiabatic flow equations 
give safe design but this does not happen with low temperature gas flow. Kern (1975) presented a 
worked example of the rupture of a tube of a heat exchanger to show the calculations of adiabatic 
and isothermal flow, and concluded that in this example, with the L/D ratio of 390, the difference 
between the two flows was negligible, i.e. 0.2%.  Westman (1997b, 1998) presented an adiabatic 
model for design of relief header systems based on the work of Lapple. He recommended the use 
of a computer to solve simultaneously all the equations derived for the ideal adiabatic flow. More 
recently, Kumar (2002) made a comparison for critical flow taking into account adiabatic flow 
with the Crane (1999) graphical approach for compressible flow, after modeling the equations 
through a spreadsheet. The results are similar, although the author pointed out that “reading a plot 
is an imprecise exercise”.  Walters (2000) presented complex equations for the case when the 
compressibility of the gas cannot be ignored, and pointed out that the error when treating a pipe 
as adiabatic when there is heat transfer, can be sizable. 
e) Interesting commercial software codes for flare systems are: Aspen Tech’s Flare System 
Analyzer (Aspen, 2011) and SimSci-Esscor Visual Flow (SimSci’s, 2014) and for pressure drop 
calculations: Aspen Plus, Aspen Hysys, Superchems, Flowmaster, Honeywell Unisim Process 
Pipeline Modeler, Hydrosystem, PS Pressure Protection Manager, etc. 
4.5.2 Two-phase pressure drop in flare networks 
If the flare network includes two-phase flow, the pressure drop calculation is more complex. Special 
emphasis has been applied to the research of the best method, as this is the type of flow found in the case 
studies of this thesis. 
A lot of petrochemical and engineering companies used over the last 30-40 years the method of Dukler’s 
homogeneous flow, which can either be used for hand calculations with a pocket calculator, or with a 
scientific programming language and a personal computer. Dukler’s method begins by checking the flow 
pattern for horizontal flow (through the Baker’s two-phase flow map for horizontal pipes) and for vertical 
upward flow (through the Oshinowo-Charles two phase flow map for such a flow), in order to avoid slug 
and mist flow. The acceleration losses were calculated only if a) ΔP > 10% of the known inlet absolute 
pressure,  b) mixed phase velocity Vl + Vg  > 30.5 m/s, and c) there was substantial flashing in the line. 
These conditions are commonly found in relief networks and this term ought to be always calculated.  
It is commonly accepted that Duckler’s procedure has an estimated accuracy of 20% for systems other 
than steam-water. For steam-water systems the Martinelli-Nelson pressure drop correlation (a 
modification of the Lockhart-Martinelli method) has an accuracy of 30%. These accuracy figures give an 
idea of the difficulty in finding a universal and exact method for two-phase pressure drop calculations. As 
a matter of fact, Barua et al. (1992) pointed out that in flare networks designs more than 50% of the 
pressure drop resulting from acceleration is not uncommon. 
As stated by Brosius and Dial (1997), many of the pressure drop calculation methods for two-phase flow 
that have been developed over the past several years have their roots in the production and pipeline 
industries, where the most significant problem is the best calculation of liquid holdup; additionally, the 
fluid velocities are normally low to reduce compression and pumping costs. In these cases, the 
acceleration losses are almost always considered to be negligible, friction and elevation changes being the 
major components of the total pressure drop. However, when modeling relief systems, the fluid may 
reach very high velocities, sometimes higher than 0.5 Mach. At these velocities the liquid is often 





entrained in the vapor phase; thus, the overall fluid may be considered as an homogeneous mixture of 
both phases moving down the pipe. 
When selecting a pressure drop method for use in modeling relief systems, the model must focus on the 
friction and acceleration terms, as opposed to the normal considerations of liquid holdup found in most 
multiphase flow correlations. 
In piping systems, critical flow will occur at a point where there is an expansion or enlargement of the 
cross-section, such as a change in pipe diameter or the entrance of a feeder pipe into the main header. 
Once the line is operating in critical flow, the pressure must be increased dramatically for any additional 
flow to be discharged through the line. 
It has to be noted that one of the key factors for critical flow in multiphase fluids is that, for certain ranges 
of liquid fraction, the velocity at which the flow will become critical can be substantially lower than the 
sonic condition for the gas phase alone. 
Key design factors when considering critical flow are noise and vibration. A known expert in this field, 
Shackelford (2013), wrote “I have seen a few situations in which the momentum forces straighten elbows 
or cause pipe to jump off the rack”. 
A Siemens research (Köper and Volbrecht, 2011) emphasizes that the selection of the fluid properties 
model has a big influence on the overall accuracy of the relief system model. Incorrect density or 
viscosity calculations can lead to extreme errors in the overall pressure drop. For instance, fluids that 
exhibit the behavior of retrograde condensation may move in and out of the two-phase region within the 
boundaries of the relief system. It is known that in lines that operate at or near critical flow, the addition 
of a small amount of liquid will significantly reduce the flow capacity of the line. Köper and Volbrecht 
work was performed in order to find the best correlation, taking into account the different models 
available in the commercial simulator Aspen Plus v7.1. Its pipe block is based on the well-known HTFS: 
the cases and results were checked with the experimental data from Prof. Friedel, from the Hamburg-
Harburg University. The results were: 
a) For horizontal flow, the best models are HTFS (optimistic) and Beggs-Brill (conservative). 
Beggs-Brill gives a correct physical description of the influence of surface roughness. 
b) For vertical flow HTFS and Beggs-Brill were also the best ones (not recommended: Slack, 
Orkiszewski and Angel-Welchon-Ros). 
Unfortunately, this research group did not compare Aspen Plus with other software codes such as: Aspen 
Hysys, Superchems, Flowmaster, Honeywell UniSim Process Pipeline Modeler, Hydrosystem, PS 
Pressure Protection Manager, etc. 
API 521 (2014), part 5 “Disposal Systems”, gives general recommendations for two-phase flow in the 
inlet and outlet piping of pressure relieving devices. One is the use of Beggs-Brill model, but with an 
adjustment in the acceleration term, due to the velocity frequently found in flare headers. The other one is 
the “homogeneous equilibrium method” of Leung (1987, 1996); critical flow conditions are typically 
handled by assuming homogeneous flow and by applying basic thermodynamic relationships. An 
example of using this model is presented in the Leung paper (1996). 
CCPS (1998) also gives free software for two-phase flow, i.e. TPHEM. Comparisons of case studies were 
made by Adair and Fisher (1999) with reasonably good results. 
The conclusions of this research are: 
1) In terms of a practical approach, it is better to prevent (or significantly reduce the likelihood of) 
the release of liquids or two-phase fluids into the flare header. Any situation involving two-phase 
flows in flare networks, particularly at high velocities and high liquid fractions, are problematic. 
The multiphase pressure drop calculations generally used are mostly empirical and have a strong 
dependence on the flow regime map, and the flow regime tends to be not only dependent on 
velocity and liquid fraction, but also on previous flow regime (hysteresis). 





2) Commercial two-phase flow simulation programs generally use an equation of state to predict 
vapor/liquid equilibrium, and afterwards apply a two-phase pressure drop equation with an 
adjustment in the acceleration term, due to the high velocity, to calculate the line pressure drop. 
3) There is no universal model available for allowing an exact calculation of two-phase pressure 
drop for the pressure relief valve inlet pipe or outlet pipe to the tip of the flare. This is because the 
high velocity and/or critical flow is combined with the whole quality range from 0 to 1, in all 
possible flow directions (horizontal and vertical pipes)  and all flow regimes (from bubble to mist 
pattern) (Westphal, 2013). That is why API 521 recommends the Leung’s “homogeneous 
equilibrium model”. 
4) There are still four big areas that have not been solved in the two-phase pressure drop 
calculations: a) pipe wall roughness influence; b) pipe fitting losses calculations (90º elbows, 
tees, etc.); c) thermodynamical non-equilibrium flow calculation and two-phase critical flow, and 
d) pipe networks with flow separation in T-junctions (Wallenhofer and  Muschelknautz, 2010). 
5) The recommended method is the Beggs-Brill one if a commercial simulator is available. Without 
this option, the Leung’s homogeneous equilibrium method can be solved by hand if the 
thermodynamic properties are available. 
 
4.6 Stability calculations: engineering analysis 
Relief valve instability results from a combination of static non-recoverable inlet line frictional losses and 
acoustic wave phenomena. The static piece of this equation has been present in standards API 520, Part II 
and ASME, Appendix M, since 1963 and 1986 respectively. Only recently has the more complex 
phenomenon of acoustic wave interaction been studied.  
Instability can be sorted into three discrete behaviors: chattering, fluttering and rapid cycling. Chattering 
is the most important one, because it can cause severe damage to upstream equipment, especially for 
liquid flow. It can damage valve components due to strong forces, for example in large valves and/or with 
high set pressures as well. It can also cause loss of containment leading to fire, explosion and/or toxicity 
risks. Figure 4-4 shows an example of a safety valve having suffered chattering. 
          
Figure 4-4. Typical damage in the disc and the seating surface of a safety valve because of chattering. 
Melhem (2013) considered chattering, fluttering and cycling probability as follows: 
a) Chattering is most probably in vapor/gas service, especially for large valves and/or for valves in 
high pressure service. 
b) Chattering is least likely in flashing two-phase flow and liquid flow. 
c) Fluttering will always occur in liquid service with pop action valves (fast opening). 
d) Cycling is most likely to occur in flashing two-phase flow. 
He also points out that the piping damage is more probably in liquid services during chatter or flutter.  
According to the work of Smith et al. (2011), API 520 (part II, 2015) and Melhem (2014), among others, 
related to causes that produce chattering, the following scenarios have to be checked: 





Excessive inlet valve pressure loss (well in excess of blowdown): when a pressure relief valve opens, the 
pressure acting on the disc of the valve will be decreased due to the pressure drop generated by piping and 
fittings. If this pressure drop is large enough, the valve inlet pressure may fall below the reseating 
pressure, forcing the valve to close and reopen immediately since the static pressure will be above the set 
pressure.  
Historically, the concept of limiting the inlet pressure drop was established in the API 520 Part I of the 
1963 edition based on the report generated by Professor Katz and colleagues of the University of 
Michigan in 1948. They set an arbitrary guideline for maximum inlet line losses at 3% of the set pressure 
based on relief valve blowdown at that time of 4%. For the first time, in the 1994 edition of API 520 Part 
II appeared the concept of “Engineering Analysis” allowing an inlet pressure drop greater than 3%. 
Nevertheless, no indications are given about how to perform it. ASME Section VIII Appendix M (non-
mandatory) introduced the 3% rule in 1986. 
In Europe, before the European Code Directive was issued (PED 97/23/EC), each country had its local 
code: BS (United Kingdom), ISPESL (Italy), TÜV (Germany), Stoomwezen (The Netherlands), UDT 
(Poland), AFNOR (France), etc. Some of these codes had subcodes limiting the inlet pressure drop; for 
example, AD Merkblatt-A2 (Germany) limited the non-recoverable pressure losses in the inlet to 3% of 
the set pressure. However, the precondition established by the german code was that the blowdown had to 
be higher than 5% of the set pressure allowing a minimum of 2% of safety margin. 
With the PED 97/23/EC obligatory in Europe since 2002, the ISO 4126-9 was adopted with an additional 
condition to the 3% rule: the inlet pressure drop should not exceed 1/3 of the blowdown. The lower value 
has to be taken (this new condition assumes that the standard blowdown is 10%) and added “in all cases, 
the difference between blowdown and pressure drop to the valve inlet shall be at least 2% of the set 
pressure”. However, there is not a concept similar to that of “Engineering Analysis” in the ISO 4126-9.  
A new procedure has been developed here to perform an “Engineering Analysis” to pressure relief valves 
with an inlet pressure drop greater than 3%. It has been described in detail in section 6.7. 
Excessive build-up back pressure: when a conventional pressure relief valve opens, the discharged fluid 
generates a built-up back pressure in the outlet piping and, as a result, a force acts on the valve disc 
tending to close it. If this return force is large enough, it may force the valve to close completely, only to 
reopen immediately when the flow has stopped. This is a common phenomenon of instability. 
To prevent this instability, historical design practice for conventional PRV discharge has been limiting the 
built-up back pressure to the valve’s allowable overpressure: 10-15% for conventional safety valves. To 
solve this problem, a balanced valve is often used which allows a built-up back pressure of 30-50% of the 
set pressure. 
Acoustic interaction (pressure surge rule): this phenomenon has been thoroughly studied by Friedel and 
coworkers (Frommann and Friedel, 1998, 2000; Cremers et al., 2001; Cremers and Friedel, 2003) among 
others. 
The problem arises when the pressure of the vapor/gas in a vessel increases due an upset which generates 
the rapid opening (popping) of the safety valve and a longitudinal decompression wave travelling towards 
the vessel nozzle. Thus, the initially resting fluid accelerates against the wave expansion direction by the 
pressure gradient, i.e. towards the valve; because of this, the pressure in the valve inlet decreases due to 
wall friction and the expansion wave generated. This produces a deceleration of the open movement of 
the disc of the safety valve. If this pressure is higher than the blowdown (reseating pressure difference), 
the valve disc movement would be stopped or reversed. If stopped, a compression wave is in turn 
generated and emitted, similar to the expansion wave produced in the opening. In the meantime, the initial 
expansion wave is either partly reflected at changes in the pipe area of the inlet line and/or finally at the 
vessel nozzle, acting as an infinite cross section enlargement leading to a compression wave. The 
superimposition of the returning reflected wave and this new wave produces an oscillating pressure at the 
valve inlet. If the pressure rise at the valve inlet is sufficiently large, the valve opens again and another 





expansion wave starts travelling towards the vessel. This variation in disc motion direction can repeat at 
short time intervals because the acoustic pressure waves are recoverable, producing chattering.  
The so called Pressure Surge Criterion/Rule, initially developed by Föllmer (1992), takes into account the 
concept that, in order to avoid chattering, the returning pressure wave should contact the disc of the valve 




                                                                                                                                                                   (4.20) 
where  
L is the inlet line acoustic length, m; c is the speed of sound in the fluid, m/s; t0 is the opening time for the 
PRV, s. 
The calculation of 𝑡0, opening time of the valve, can be done according the method of Cremers et al. 
(2001) or as in Grolmes (2011). Here the model of Cremers has been used because of its simplicity, as the 
Grolmes model requires disk area, nozzle area, spring constant, weight in motion of the valve (disk mass 
and spring mass), etc. These parameters are not usually provided by the manufacturer and are difficult to 
estimate. A comparison of both methods has been made by Melhem (2014), showing a relatively good 
agreement. 



























                                                                     (4.21) 
Through a bibliographical review, Smith et al. (2011) pointed out that the initial valve lift is in the range 
40% - 100% of its full lift. The fixed value of 60 % has been adopted here for the stability calculation at 
the initial open for the gas/vapor relieving. 
Another required parameter is the speed of sound in the fluid c; considering a perfect gas its value is: 
𝑐 = 223 √
𝑘𝑇
𝑀𝑊
                                                                                                                                                      (4.22) 
where k is the isentropic expansion factor (Cp/Cv for an ideal gas), dimensionless; T is the temperature of 
the gas, ºR; MW is the molecular weight of the gas; c is the speed of sound, ft/s.  
This expression has been used here. A more precise expression would be: 





                                                                                                                                                          (4.23) 
For liquids, the value of c is: 





                                                                                                                                                            (4.24) 
𝐾𝑠 being the isentropic bulk modulus of elasticity for the fluid and 𝑆 the specific gravity of the fluid at 
relieving conditions. This value has been calculated when required through Aspen-Hysys. 





Nevertheless, there is some uncertainty in the speed of sound when it is calculated in liquids and two-
phase flow. The piping flexibility can lower the value of the speed of sound, and adding for instance a 0.1 
% by volume of gas in a liquid can lower the speed of sound by a factor of two.  
Combining equations 4.20 and 4.22 
𝐿 < 111.5 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛√
𝑘𝑇
𝑀𝑊
                                                                                                                                        (4.25) 
Smith et al. (2011) rearranged the original equation developed by Frommann and Friedel (1998) for the 
maximal length of the inlet pipe; they assumed a sudden reduction of the pressure as a consequence of a 
generated expansion wave of 20% of the set pressure (as assumed previously by Föllmer for gases) and 






(𝑃𝑠 − 𝑃𝐵)𝑡0                                                                                                                                 (4.26) 
 
Smith et al. (2011) rearranged another expression of the same authors for the maximal length, assuming 








) (𝑃𝑠 − 𝑃𝐵) 𝑡0                                                                                                        (4.27) 
Cremers et al. (2001, 2003) proposed another model by introducing the backpressure in calculations. This 
method has not been used here because, after a comparative analysis, we found that it is too much 
conservative.   
Another constraint for the length of the inlet piping comes from the work of Singh (1982, 1983). In order 
to avoid chattering or fluttering, the following equation related to total pressure losses in the inlet pipe has 
to be fulfilled:  
𝑃𝑠 − 𝑃𝑅𝐶 > ∆𝑃𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = ∆𝑃𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 + ∆𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐                                                                                             (4.28) 













                                                                                                    (4.29) 
This expression can be applied only if the reflected wave reaches the valve before it is fully open. Singh 
developed formulas for the case in which the valve fully opens before the reflected wave reaches it. 
Melhem (2014) used the equations proposed by Singh in his model; however, Singh multiplies the 
frictional pressure drop for incompressible flow by a factor that decreases the pressure drop due to the 
reflection wave (Darby, personal communication, 2014). 
Recently, Melhem (2014, 2015) has introduced a simple force balance on the disk to avoid chattering. 
This equation can be used for relatively simple geometries; it requires an estimate of opening/closing time 
of the valve and blowdown. This “Simple force balance” methodology has been adopted by the last 
edition of API 520 (part II, 2015). The main problem for the practicing process safety engineer is to know 
the exact value of the blowdown. 
For conventional safety valves: 
𝑃𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 − ∆𝑃𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒 − ∆𝑃𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒 − ∆𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 > 𝑃𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒                                                                              (4.30) 





 For balanced valves (assuming that the bellows protect only 90% of de disk surface): 
𝑃𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 − ∆𝑃𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒 − ∆𝑃𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒 − ∆𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 ∙ 0.1 >  𝑃𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒                                                                    (4.31) 
This expression has been used here in the checking for chattering for critical safety valves. 
For liquids the same phenomena explained for gases/vapor applies, with the difference that chattering 
occurs only due to the oscillations in pressure (incompressible fluid) caused by the decompression/ 
compression wave. 
Smith et al. (2011) presented for this case the expression:   





                                                                                                                                              (4.32) 
 where 𝐾𝑠 is the isentropic bulk modulus of elasticity. 
Nevertheless, the following equations have to be followed as well: 




 (𝑉0 − 𝑉𝐹)                                                                                                                              (4.34) 
As with gases, these equations have to be verified for opening, full flow and closing conditions. 
Flow induced vibration  
Baldwin and Simmons (1986) found that flow-induced vibration was the cause of chattering, premature 
pop off or vibrating of safety valves, causing fret, gall o fatigue in its internal parts. The mechanism is 
related to high velocity flow past a cavity, in the same way that the stub of a closed safety valve creates 
vortices which can couple with an acoustic resonance of the stub.  
These authors point out that small vortex pulsations can be amplified up to the order of 1400 kPa peaks. 
Such pulsations add peak pressures to the disc of the valve that exceed the valve set pressure and tend to 
lift the valve (Figure 4-5 shows the mechanism of flow induced vibration). 
 
Figure 4-5. Flow induced vibration in a pressure relief valve (gas phase) (taken from Melhem, 2012). 




                                                                                                                                                                (4.35) 
where 𝐿𝑖 is the length of the stub (inlet pipe), ft; 𝑑𝑖is the inlet diameter, inches; 𝑐 is the speed of sound, 
ft/s, and U is the process fluid velocity as it passes the PSV nozzle, ft/s. 
Retrograde condensation at inlet: in the case that the fluid to be relieved in a process upset is at 
supercritical condition and the pressure increases up to the set pressure of the valve, the inlet pressure of 





the valve can decrease -as has been explained before- and retrograde condensation can occur. This 
condensation could originate a volumetric contraction that might force the valve to close. Once the valve 
closed, the condensate would flash and the cycle would repeat. This phenomenon can cause chattering. 
No cases have been found in this study. Figure 4-6 presents an example of retrograde condensation 
represented in a Mollier diagram.  
 
Figure 4-6. Retrograde condensation process (taken from Egan, 2011). 
Improper valve selection: safety valve selection trim is a very important factor in designing relief 
systems, in order to avoid possible instability problems. 
There are three trims: vapor certified, liquid certified and trims that are dual certified either in ASME 
Code or in PED Code. 
It is known that gas and vapors have different relief characteristics. Until 1985, the ASME code allowed 
an overpressure of 25% for liquid applications and manufacturers provided the same trim for both gases 
and liquids resulting in an opening/closing curve as represented in Figure 4-7. 
 
Figure 4-7. Characteristic curve of a relieving liquid in a gas/liquid trim before 1985 (see how the allowable 
overpressure was 25% and the blowdown was not defined) (taken from Hellemans, 2009). 
However, since 1985 ASME has also required a maximum overpressure of 10 % on liquid valves. 
Actually most manufacturers have valves that fit for gases/vapors and liquids. 
The problem concerning chattering is related essentially to the case when a valve with a gas trim releases 
a liquid (Figure 4-8). 






Figure 4-8. Characteristic of a valve gas trim releasing liquid (taken from Hellemans, 2009). 
Liquid relief through a vapor certified valve should be analyzed for flows that imply 10% overpressure on 
the valve. Such relief does not achieve stability up to 10% overpressure and the valve does not achieve 
full lift up to 25% overpressure (see Figure 4-9). Operation below 10% overpressure has been 
demonstrated to be unstable. Liquid relief through vapor certified valves experiences little to no 
blowdown, and these scenarios have been noted as the cause for many of the incidents attributed to relief 
valve instability within the industry. 
 
Figure 4-9. Characteristic of a liquid relief through a vapor certified valve. 
Relief valves that must provide relief protection for both a vapor and liquid scenario should be selected 
with both in mind. The relief valve should be a dual certified valve for both services.  
Liquid releases through liquid trim or dual certified relief valves have to be evaluated for inlet and outlet 
line losses at the required flow, due to the modulating action of this types of valve. Liquid trim relief 
valves entered into the industry in the 1980’s to address the special characteristics of incompressible flow. 
They have little to no pop action, modulate flow through and up to full lift of the valve, and have an 
extended blowdown to account for the effects of liquid hammer (see Figure 4-10) 






Figure 4-10. Characteristic of a liquid trim releasing liquid for valves after 1985. 
Oversized pressure safety valve: safety valves relieving gas/vapor with a flowrate less than 25% of rated 
flow, are candidate to chattering. This fact comes from the characteristics of each safety valve. API 520 
(part I, 2008) presents the typical behavior of a safety valve relieving gas (see Figure 4-11): 
 
 
Figure 4-11. Behavior of a gas valve when the required flow is less than 25% of its rated capacity. 
As shown in the figure, the valve closes at 20-25 % of its rated capacity; thus, another condition for 
stability in vapor filled systems is:  
𝑊𝑃𝑆𝑉 > 4𝑊𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑                                                                                                                                                (4.36) 
In order to chatter, an oversized valve for gas/vapor service must have a system capable of increasing the 
pressure in a cycle time of 1 second or less. Assuming a safety factor of 500%, that means a system 
cycling time of 5 seconds instead of one second:  
𝑊𝑃𝑆𝑉 > 0.2 ∙  𝑉𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚(𝜌𝑠𝑒𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡) + 𝑊𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑                                                                                        (4.37) 
where 
WPSV is the rated mass flow rate, lb/s; VSystem is the volume protected, ft
3
; ρset is the density at the set 
pressure; ρshut is the density at set minus blowdown pressure and Wrequired is the required mass flow rate, 
lb/s.  
Outlet area/orifice area ratio: according to API 526 (2009), the ratio output area/orifice area for 4P6 and 
6R8 are 4.3 and 3.0, respectively. Due to these small ratios, the build-up back pressure for conventional 
valves is higher than in other smaller safety valves, giving the same problem of chattering as “Excessive 





built-up back pressure” presented before. The problem arises because once the valve open, the build-up 
back pressure resulting from discharge flow results in a force upon the valve disc, forcing the valve to 
close if the force is sufficiently large, and it will reopen again when the discharge flow has stopped. 
Instability comes with the repetition of this cycle. 
4.7 Forces and moments imposed on the pressure relief valve 
Reaction forces are generated when a safety valve actuates. When it opens, the reaction forces at the relief 
valve exit act in a direction opposite to the direction of the discharging flow. To prevent damage to items 
connected to the relief valve such as pipes and equipment nozzles, it is necessary to calculate these forces 
(thrust). Knowing their magnitude, appropriate restraints can be installed to avoid accidents. 
4.7.1 Discharge to atmosphere 
API 520 (part II, 2015) gives mathematical expressions for discharge to atmosphere in case of 
compressible fluids at critical flow at the exit of the tail pipe. The safety valve discharges to the 
atmosphere through an elbow and a vertical discharge pipe, without any compensation of flow reaction 
forces (see Figure 4-11). The reaction force (F) includes the simultaneous effects of both momentum and 







                                                                                                                       (4.38) 
where 
F reaction force at the point of discharge to the atmosphere, N; W flow of any gas or vapor, kg/s; k ratio 
of specific heats (Cp/Cv) at the outlet conditions; T stagnation temperature at the pipe outlet, K; M 
molecular weight of the process fluid; A area of the outlet at the point of discharge, mm
2
; P static pressure 
within the outlet pipe immediately before terminal expansion to atmosphere, kPag.  
 
Figure 4-12. Typical pressure relief valve installation with vent pipe (taken from API 520-II-2011). 
Other available equations for simplified layouts are the annex E of ISO 4126-9 (2009), AD Merkblatt-A2 
(2006), CCPS (1998) and Fisher et al. (1992). D’Alessandro (2006) proposes as well equations and charts 
for the case of not chocked flow. 





Muschelnautz and Wellendorfer (2003) developed a model for calculating the reaction forces during the 
transient phases of opening and closing a safety valve. The Appendix II of ASME Code B31.1 presents a 
calculation method for dynamic loads. 
4.7.2 Discharge to flare network 
Pressure relief valves which relieve into a flare network usually do not transfer large forces and bending 
moments to the valve, because changes in pressure and velocity within the closed system components are 
small. Because there is no simplified analytical techniques to solve this problem, complex calculations 
including time history analisis to obtain the reaction forces an moments, are required (API 520 Part II, 
2015). 
White et al. (2012) proposed a screening procedure to determine which system requires a detailed 
analysis of dynamic loads, with CAESAR II as an example of dedicated software. The restrictive 
hypotheses for their procedure have been adopted here: 
a) All pressure relief valves discharging to flare are adequately supported for an individual release. 
b) All liquid and two-phase relief contingencies require detailed analysis. 
c) Pressure relief valves sized for external fire scenario only will not require reaction forces 
evaluation. The effect of the fire due to thermal expansion of the valve and the attached piping is 
higher than the stresses caused by the flow rate. 
d) Pressure relief valves sized and installed for liquid hydraulic expansion only, will not require any 
reaction force evaluation. 
4.8 Acoustic induced vibration 
The phenomenon of Acoustic Induced Vibration (AIV) is caused by fluid turbulence, and is further 
enhanced by a flow restriction device such as a safety valve. Problems have been encountered with 
gaseous systems, since sound energy propagates most easily in compressible media. Liquid relieving 
systems tend to dampen vibrations and, as a result, have not had any failures to date (Melhem, 2012). The 
sound Power Level (PWL) quantifies the amount of acoustic energy emitted immediately downstream of 
the restriction and is calculated using process data such as flowrate, temperature, molecular weight and 
the pressure ratios across the valve. This energy is usually in the form of a standing wave, which causes 
vibrations when discontinuities in the piping system are encountered. The piping system response to these 
vibrations depends on the mechanical natural frequency of the system, which is a function of the material 
properties, pipe size, support fixity, etc. If the frequency of the vibrations in the system approaches the 
natural frequency, a resonant condition will cause severe amplification of the vibration. This vibration 
produces a cycling effect that may result in a fatigue failure. The areas most susceptible to it are branch 
connections, welded support attachments and other areas of stress intensification (geometric 
discontinuities). Acceptable PWL’s have been documented based on industry-wide failure data and 
operating experience. Design of a piping system within these acceptable limits will greatly reduce the risk 
of a fatigue failure from AIV. 
Reviews of the state of the art have been made by Melhem (2012) and Swindell (2013). Melhem reported 
that “According to the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 21% of all piping failures offshore are 
caused by fatigue/vibration” 
Swindell shows an example of a failure occurred during blowdown after a few minutes (see Figure 4-13). 






Figure 4-13. A failure occurred during blowdown (taken from Swindell, 2013). 
The methods available to screening an Acoustic Induced Vibration problem are: 
a) Experience based: D method (Carucci and Mueller, 1982) and D/t method (Eisinger,1997). The 
method of Eisinger has been adopted by the NORSOK standard (NORSOK, 2006). 
b) Experience based: Mach number method. A common criteria used in the process industry is based 
on limiting the Mach number: 0.3 < Mach < 0.9, and limiting the kinetic energy of a gas: 
𝜌 ∙ 𝑢2  < 1 ∙ 105  
𝐾𝑔
𝑚𝑠2





ρ is the density in kg/m
3
 and 𝑢 is the velocity of the fluid m/s. 
c) The Energy Institute method (2008). 
d) Detailed structural dynamic methods. 
Here the method of Eisinger (1997) has been used in critical safety valves relieving to the flare network. 
The mathematical expression used is: 










] + 126.1                                                                                     (4.39) 
𝑃𝑊𝐿𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 173.6 − 0.125
𝐷𝑖
𝑡
                                                                                                                   (4.40) 
where 
PWL is the sound power level in dB (with reference 10
-12
 W); P1 is the upstream pressure of the safety 
valve at relieving conditions, barg; ΔP is the reduction in pressure, bar; T1 is the upstream pressure, K; W 
is the gas flow, kg/s; W is the molecular weight, kg/kmol; Di is the internal diameter of the exit pipe, mm; 
t is the pipe wall thickness, mm. 
4.9 Noise 
As fluid passes through the safety valve and tail and pipe header, significant noise could be generated and 
transmitted along the system: one of the common safety requirements is to limit this noise level to 115 
dBA (noise level with A-weighted) during intermittent emergency relief scenarios. 
ISO 4126-9 Annex F (2008) gives a procedure for calculating the noise level of safety valve discharging 
to atmosphere. The sound power level of the safety valve, PWL, expressed in dB, can be estimated with the 
following equation: 
𝑃𝑊𝐿 = 20 log10(10
−3𝑑𝐴) − 10 log10 𝜈 + 80 log10 𝑢 − 53                                                                         (4.41) 
where 





dA is the internal diameter of outlet pipe, mm; ν is the specific volume  of the stream at relieving pressure 
and temperature, m
3
/kg; 𝑢 is the velocity of fluid in outlet pipe, m/s. 
The sound pressure level, PSLr , expressed in dB, at a distance r from the point of discharge to the 
atmosphere can be estimated with the following equation: 
𝑃𝑆𝐿𝑟 = 𝑃𝑊𝐿 − 10 log10 2𝜋𝑟
2                                                                                                                              (4.42) 
where r is the distance from noise source, m. 
API 521 (2007) gives an expression for calculating the noise: 
𝐿30(100) = 𝐿 + 10 log10(0.5𝑞𝑚 ∙ 𝑐
2)                                                                                                                (4.43) 
where 
L30(100)  is the noise level at 30 m from the point of discharge to the atmosphere, dB; L is the noise level, 
dB; qm mass flow through the valve, kg/s; c is the speed of sound in the gas at the valve, m/s.  
API 521 gives a diagram (see Figure 4-14) showing L as a function of pressure ratio (absolute static 
pressure upstream from the safety valve divided by the absolute pressure downstream of the valve while 
relieving). In this work, the noise emission has been calculated by both methods in the critical safety 
relief valves. 
 
Figure 4-14. Sound pressure level at 30 m from the source (taken from API 581, 2007). 
 
4.10 Body bowl choking 
Body bowl choking occurs when the pressure in the body of an unbalanced safety valve causes a critical 
flow condition (sonic velocity) at the valve outlet (D’Alessandro, 2011) 
In this case, the pressure in the valve body rises independently of the back-pressure at the safety valve 
outlet piping. This pressure rise in the valve body could result in insufficient opening and/or unstable 
motion for the conventional spring loaded pressure relief valve, in which the pressure rise in the valve 
body directly affects the valve disc motion. This phenomenon occurs in larger safety valves (8T10, for 
example) and higher set pressures. 
For stable operation, the stagnation pressure (relieving pressure) should be less than the value given by 













                                                                                                                   (4.44) 









                                                                                                                                                            (4.45) 
where 
An throat area, mm
2




 P0 relieving pressure, bara; Ps set pressure, bara; Pc 
superimposed backpressure, bara; k heat capacity ratio for ideal gas.  
Izuchi (2015) proposes a new model based on the parameter “PRV relief valve body pressure to set 
pressure ratio”. It is calculated as the pressure difference between those in the PRV body and the PRV 
outlet divided by the set pressure. The author gives two calculation methods for this parameter and 
compares them with experimental results, with good results. Izuchi concluded that a conventional spring 
loaded PRV becomes unstable if the calculated parameter becomes equal to or larger than 15%.  
4.11 Assignation of the first turnaround interval 
API 581 (chapter 7, 2008), is the risk-based inspection method chosen in this thesis, for calculating the 
first revision time of pressure relief valves. A study was performed applying this procedure to all the 
safety valves of the critical equipment of the three petrochemical plants studied (Albornà, 2014). 
API 581 studies two scenarios in case of pressure relief valves: failure on demand and leakage. In the 
failure on demand case, which means that the valve does not open when required causing the rupture of 
the protected equipment, the consequences are much more severe than in leakage. For this reason, the 
scenario of leakage has been not analyzed here. The process of applying API 581 is resumed in Figure 4-
15.  
 
Figure 4-15. Block Diagram of API 581 application process. 
The risk assessment process consists of obtaining a quantitative risk level, according to the following 
expression (Casal, 2008): 





(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−1) ∙ 𝐶𝐴(𝑚2)                                                                                                       (4.46) 
(Note: Strictly speaking the equation should have frequency in place of probability of failure because the 
basis is one year. However, the name probability of failure will be used to follow API 581) 
where  







 is the probability of failure, which depends on: generic failure factor, damage factor and 
management system factor; CA is the consequence of failure, which depends on: storage and flash 
conditions, release rate and type, event tree and consequence area. 
Figure 4-16 presents a block diagram of the steps required to calculate the risk.  
 
Figure 4-16. Risk calculation process for pressure relief valves according to API 581 (2008). 
The approach followed in this thesis is the more rigorously level 2 consequence analysis, according to the 
API 581 (2008) classification. 
4.11.1 Probability of failure 
The steps followed in obtaining the parameters of figure 4-15, are summarized as follows: 
1. Select an inspection interval, tinsp. The inspection interval is given by the periods established for 
the current inspection code used at the company (see section 4.11). 
2. Determine the default values for the Weibull parameters, β and ηdef using Tables 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 
(part 1, API 581). 
3. Determine the adjustment factor, Fc:   
Fc = 0.75 for conventional valves discharging to closed system or flare       
Fc = 1 for all other cases.           








− 1.3)                                                                                                                   (4.47)
         
To perform this step, an estimate of the maximal overpressure reached in the protected equipment 
in case the relief valve does not open is required. Table 7.3 (part 1, API 581) can be used. 
5. Determine the environmental adjustment factor, Fenv, using Table 7.6 (part 1, API 581). 
6. Calculate the modified characteristic life, ηmod, using the following equation and the factors 
obtained from steps 3, 4, and 5: 
 
𝜂𝑚𝑜𝑑 = 𝐹𝑐 · 𝐹𝑜𝑝 · 𝐹𝑒𝑛𝑣 · 𝜂𝑑𝑒𝑓                                                                                                                 (4.48)
          
7. Assemble the pressure relief valve inspection history. Grade each record using the inspection 
effectiveness table 7.7 (part 1, API 581). Record the results of each inspection record; pass/fail 
and no leak/leak and determine the confidence factors, CFi, as applicable, for each inspection 
history based on the results of the test. Determine the time duration, tdur,i, of each inspection cycle. 
Confidence factors may be seen in table 7.8 (part 1, API 581). 
8. Update the modified characteristic life, ηmod, determined in step 6, as follows: 
a.  Calculate the prior probability of failure using the following equation. The time period for 
use in this equation is the time duration of the inspection cycle, tdur,i, as determined in step 7. 
Note that for the first inspection record, the modified characteristic life, ηmod, is used. 













]                                                                                                   (4.49) 
         




= 1 − 𝑃𝑓,𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
𝑝𝑟𝑑
                                                                                                                     (4.50)
          
c. Determine the conditional probability of failure and the conditional probability of pass using 




= (1 − 𝐶𝐹𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑝,𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
𝑝𝑟𝑑
                                                                                                      (4.51) 
         
𝑃𝑓,𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑
𝑝𝑟𝑑
= 𝐶𝐹𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙 · 𝑃𝑓,𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
𝑝𝑟𝑑
+ (1 − 𝐶𝐹𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑝,𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
𝑝𝑟𝑑
                                                                    (4.52)
     
d. Calculate the weighted probability of failure, Pf,wgt
prd
, using the appropriate equation from 
table 7.9 (part 1, API 581). 
e. Determine the updated characteristic life, ηupd, using the following equation and the weighted 











                                                                                                                   (4.53) 
          
9. For each overpressure demand case, determine the initiating event frequency, EFj, using table 7.2 
(part 1, API 581). 
10. Determine the demand rate reduction factor, DRRFj, which accounts for any layers of protection 
in the process that may reduce the probability of overpressuring the protected piece of equipment. 
Use table 7.2 (part 1, API 581). 
11. For each overpressure demand case, determine the demand rate placed in the safety valve, DRj 
,using the following equation:  
 
𝐷𝑅𝑗 = 𝐸𝐹𝑗 · 𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐹𝑗  
           
12. Determine the MAWP of the protected equipment.  
13. If an RBI study has been completed for the protected equipment, calculate its damage adjusted 
probability of failure, Pf. Since the damage factor for the protected equipment is a function of 
time, the damage factor must be determined at the PRD inspection interval, tinsp, specified in step 
1.  
14. Calculate the probability of failure of the protected equipment at the elevated overpressure, Pf,j 
using the following equation. Use the overpressure determined in step 4, the MAWP of the 
protected equipment and the probability of failure determined in step 13: 
 






− 1)                                                                                                    (4.54) 
         
15. Calculate the probability of failure, Pf,j
prd




= 𝑃𝑓𝑜𝑑,𝑗 · 𝐷𝑅𝑗 · 𝑃𝑓,𝑗                                                                                                                       (4.55)
         
4.11.2 Consequence of failure 
Although the procedure explained here corresponds to an analysis done for small, medium and large hole 
sizes, in the case study selected to follow the new methodology (see section 6.8) only the rupture case has 
been considered (conservative basis).  





Fluid composition and properties 
The determination of fluid composition and properties is differentiated in two parts: at storage conditions 
and at flash conditions. The properties at storage conditions have been collected from the specification 
sheets and the process flow diagram of the analyzed installation. To ensure the feasibility of such 
properties, they have been verified by using the proper Mollier diagrams in case of pure substances and/or 
Aspen-Hysys. The properties at flash conditions are obtained realizing an isentropic flash calculation 
from storage pressure to atmospheric pressure. Aspen Hysys with Peng Robinson as EOS has been used. 
 
Release hole size selection 
Hole sizes have been taken from table 5.4M (part 3, API 581). 
Release phase and rate calculation 
Release phase is referred to the phase immediately downstream of the release point. When release phase 
is identified, the proper equation to calculate the release rate through the hole may be selected, and then, 
release rate may be obtained. Release rate also depends on the hole size selected. The procedure followed 
is described next. 






                                                                                                                    (4.56) 
          
Determine the release phase: 
a. If Psats ≥ Ps > P  release phase is vapor. 
b. If Ps ≥ Psats > Patm  release phase is two-phase. 
c. If Ps ≥ Patm > Psats  release phase is liquid. 





                                                                                                                                            (4.57) 
           
3. For each release holes size, calculate the release rate, Wn: 
a. For liquids: 






                                                                        (4.58)
      
b. For vapor: 














                                                                    (4.59)
     
 






















)                           (4.60) 






                                                                                            (4.61) 
c. For two-phase release the same equation as defined for liquids is used. 
Estimate the fluid inventory 
Fluid inventory (or holdup) is the amount of mass contained in the equipment.  
    
Release type 
Release type may be modeled in two ways: 
i. Instantaneous release: this occurs so rapidly that the fluid disperses as a single large cloud or pool. 





ii. Continuous release: this occurs over a longer period of time (>180 seconds) allowing the fluid to 
disperse in the shape of an elongated ellipse (depending of course on weather conditions). 
The calculation procedure followed is as follows: 




                                                                                                                                               (4.62) 
2. For each release holes size, determine if the release type is continuous or instantaneous using 
the following criteria: 
 
a. If the release holes size is 6.35 mm or less, then the release type is continuous. 
b. If tn ≤ 180 s or the release mass is greater than 4536 kg, then the release is 
instantaneous; otherwise, the release is continuous. 
 
Estimate the impact of detection and isolation systems in release magnitude 
Detection, isolation and mitigation systems are designed to reduce the effects of a release of hazardous 
materials. Some of them reduce the release duration and some other the consequences. A release 
correction factor (factdi) is obtained after analyzing the impact of such systems: 
1. Determine the detection and isolation systems present in the unit. 
2. Using table 5.5 (part 3, API 581) select the appropriate classification (A, B, C) for the 
detection system. 
3. Using Table 5.5 (part 3, API 581) select the appropriate classification (A, B, C) for the 
isolation system. 
4. Using Table 5.6 (part 3, API 581) and the classifications determined in steps 2 and 3, 
determine the release reduction factor, factdi. 
5. Using Table 5.7 (part 3, API 581) and the classifications determined before, determine the 
total leak durations for each of the selected release hole sizes, ldmax,n. 
Determine the release rate and mass for consequence analysis 
Depending on the type of release, the release rate will have different values: 
1. For each release holes size, calculate the adjusted release rate, raten, where the theoretical release 
rate is Wn, from step 3 of the release phase and rate calculation: 
 
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛 = 𝑊𝑛 · (1 − 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑑𝑖)                                                                                                                   (4.63) 
 
2. For each release hole size, calculate the leak duration, ldn, of the release. Note that the leak 
duration cannot exceed the maximum duration, ldmax: 
 
𝑙𝑑𝑛 = min [{
𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑛
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛
} , {60 · 𝑙𝑑𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑛}]                                                                                       (4.64) 
 
3. When a release is a two-phase one, there is an amount of liquid entrained in the jet (vapor) 
portion of the release (aerosol). The remaining liquid portion of the release is the rainout. 
Determine the rainout mass fraction from the released fluid:  
 
𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 = 1 − 2 · 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑠ℎ  for fracfsh < 0.5                                                                                      (4.65) 
 
𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 = 0.0  for fracfsh ≥ 0.5                                                                                                             (4.66) 
 
4. For each release hole size selected, calculate the release rate of liquid that settles to the ground for 






= 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛 · 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜                                                                                                                        (4.67) 
 





5. For each hole size selected, calculate the release rate of vapor including entrained liquid 






= 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛 · (1 − 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜)                                                                                                               (4.68) 
 





                                                                                                              (4.69) 
Vapor sources from boiling or non-boiling pools: 
 
If Tb < Tg, where Tg is the ground temperature, then liquid pool case must be considered. The 
assumptions made are the following ones: 
 The liquid contained in the pool is assumed as the product contained in the equipment.  
 The whole liquid contained in the pool is vaporized. 
 The evaporation rate, Vp,n, is assumed as 1 m
3
/s.  
 The time required to evaporate, tp,n, the whole liquid is tp,n = volume/evaporation rate. 










0.75                                                                                                                             (4.70)  
 
Determining flammable and explosive consequences 
Flammable and explosive consequences are based on the event tree analysis. This analysis determines the 
probabilities of various outcomes as a result of release of hazardous fluids to the atmosphere. These 
probabilities are then used to weight the overall consequences of release. 
 
The first step is to calculate the outcome probabilities using experimental expressions. All possible 
outcomes are: vapor cloud explosions, flash fire, jet fire, fireball, pool fire and safe dispersion. Depending 
on the release phase and type, some of the outcome may not be considered. For example, it is not possible 
to have pool fire if release phase is vapor.  
 
After the outcome probabilities are obtained, outcome consequence area is calculated. When outcome 
probability and consequence area are obtained, average weighted consequence area for flammable and 
explosive consequences is calculated. 
 
A full description of this calculation step is as follows: 
 
1. Determine the mass fraction of the release rate that contains a flammable component, mfracflam. 
For instance, as propylene is flammable, mfrac
flam 
= 1.  
2. For each hole size, calculate the flammable release rate, raten
flam
. Also calculate the liquid portion, 
ratel,n
flam
, and the vapor portion, ratev,n
flam




= 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛 · 𝑚𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐












· 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑠ℎ                                                                                                           (4.73) 
 





3. For each hole size, select the appropriate event tree using figures 6.3 and 6.4 (part 3, API 581) 
and the phase of the fluid after flashing the atmosphere. 
4. For each holes size, including the rupture case, calculate the probability of ignition of the release. 
a. Determine the probability of ignition at ambient temperature for the liquid portion of the 
release, poil,n
amb
 with the figure 6.5 (part 3, API 581).  
b. Determine the probability of ignition at ambient temperature for the vapor portion of the 
release, poiv,n
amb
 with the figure 6.6 (part 3, API 581).      
c. Determine the maximum probability of ignition for the liquid, poil
ait
, and the vapor, poiv
ait
 
at the Auto Ignition Temperature (AIT): 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 1.0                                                                                                                               (4.74) 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑣
𝑎𝑖𝑡 = max [0.7, 0.7 + 0.2 · (
170−𝑀𝑊
170−2
)]                                                                         (4.75)
       















)                                                      (4.77) 
e. For two phase releases, calculate the probability of ignition, poi2,n, at normal storage 
temperatures: 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑖2.𝑛 = 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙,𝑛 · 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑠ℎ + 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑣,𝑛 · (1 − 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑠ℎ)                                                         (4.78) 
 
5. For each hole size, determine the probability of immediate ignition given ignition. 
a. Obtain the probabilities of immediate ignition at ambient conditions for the liquid portion 




 from table 6.3 (part 3, API 
581) based on whether there is instantaneous or continuous liquid or vapor release.  
b. Calculate the probability of immediate ignition given ignition at storage condition for the 








) · (𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑙,𝑛






) · (𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑣,𝑛




 is obtained from the referenced table. 
c. For two-phase releases, calculate the probability of immediate ignition given ignition, 
poii2,n, at normal storage temperatures and the flash fraction, fracfsh: 
 
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑖2,𝑛 = 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑠ℎ · 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑙,𝑛 + (1 − 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑠ℎ) · 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑣,𝑛                                                     (4.81) 
 
6. Determine the probability of VCE given a delayed ignition. 
a. Determine the probability of VCE given delayed ignition, pvcedi from table 6.3 (part 3, 
API 581) as a function of the release type and phase for release. The probability of a 
VCE given delayed ignition for a liquid release is pvcedil,n; for a vapor it is pvcediv,n.  
b. For two phase releases, calculate the probability of VCE, given delayed ignition, 
pvcedi2,n. 
𝑝𝑣𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖2,𝑛 = 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑠ℎ · 𝑝𝑣𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑙,𝑛 + (1 − 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑠ℎ) · 𝑝𝑣𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑣,𝑛                                    (4.82) 
 
7. Determine the probability of flash fire given delayed ignition. 





a. Determine the probability of flash fire given delayed, pffdi from Table 6.3 (part 3, API 
581) as a function of the release type and phase of release. 
b. For two phase releases, calculate the probability of flash fire given delayed ignition 
pffdi2,n: 
 
𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑖2,𝑛 = 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑠ℎ · 𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑙,𝑛 + (1 − 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑠ℎ) · 𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑣,𝑛                                         (4.83)
     
8. Determine the probability of a fireball given an immediate release, pfbii: 
𝑝𝑓𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 1.0  for instantaneous vapor or two-phase releases.     
𝑝𝑓𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 0.0  for all other cases. 
         
9. Select the appropriate event tree.  
The event trees selected can be seen in figures 6.3 (part 3, API 581) for small, medium and large 
hole sizes, and figure 6.4 of the same reference for the rupture case. 
 
10. For each hole size, determine the probability of each of the possible event outcomes on the event 
tree selected in step 9.  
 
11. For each hole size, calculate the component damage consequence area, CAcmd,n
vce
, and the 
personnel injury consequence area, CAinj,n
vce
, of a vapor cloud explosion. 
 
12. For each of the hole sizes, calculate the component damage consequence area, CAcmd,n
flash
, and the 
personnel injury consequence area, CAinj,n
flash
, of a flash fire.  
13. For the rupture case only, calculate the component damage consequence area, CAcmd,n
flam
 and the 
personnel injury consequence area, CAinj,n
fball
, of a fireball. For example, in case of fireball the 
following procedure has to be followed: 




𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑚 · 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑛                                                                                   (4.84) 
 
b. Calculate the maximum diameter, Dmaxfb, and the center height, Hfb, of the fireball using 
the following equations, respectively: 
 
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑓𝑏 = 𝐶22 · 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑏
0.333                                                                                                    (4.85) 
 
𝐻𝑓𝑏 = 0.75 · 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑓𝑏                                                                                                              (4.86) 
 
c. Calculate the duration of the fireball, tfb, using the following equations based on the mass 
of the fireball: 
 
𝑡𝑓𝑏 = 𝐶23 · 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑏
0.333   for massfb ≤ 29937 kg                                                   (4.87) 
 
𝑡𝑓𝑏 = 𝐶24 · 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑏
0.167   for massfb > 29937 kg                                                   (4.88) 
 








   with  𝛽𝑓𝑏 = 𝐶25 · 𝑃𝐵
0.32                                                  (4.89) 
 
e. For the component damage consequence area, in this thesis a radiation limit of 37.8 
kW/m
2 
has been used and for personnel injury 12.6 kW/m
2 
was used. These radiation 




 , from the fireball 
using the following 4-step iterative procedure: 






i. Guess at an acceptable distance from the fireball, xsfball. 
ii. Calculate the atmospheric transmissivity, τatm, and the spherical view factor, 
Fsph, using the following equations (both of these parameters are functions of the 




𝜏𝑎𝑡𝑚 = 0.819 · (𝑃𝑤 · 𝑥𝑠𝑛)


















                                                                       (4.92) 
 
iii. Calculate the received thermal heat flux, Ithfball, at the distance chosen and 
compare it to the acceptable radiation limit (37.8 kW/m2 for component damage 
and 12.6 kW/m2 for personnel injury): 
  
𝐼𝑡ℎ𝑓𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝜏𝑎𝑡𝑚 · 𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑑
𝑓𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙 · 𝐹𝑠𝑝ℎ                                                                      (4.93) 
 
iv. Adjust the distance, xsfball, accordingly, and repeat the above steps until the 
calculated received thermal heat flux equals the allowable limit. 
 
f. Calculate the component damage consequence area, CAcmd
fball
, and the personnel injury 
consequence area, CAinj
fball








  and  𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑛𝑗
𝑓𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙




                                              (4.93) 
 
Finally, the risk for each contingency of the event tree is calculated and compared to the acceptable risk 
level specified. In this thesis, the normally accepted value for petrochemical plants and level 2 
consequence analysis of 4.6 m
2
/year, has been taken. 
 
Case study 6.8 shows the application of this methodology to the pressure relief valve YS702/01. 










5.1 Design basis of the relief system 
The petrochemical plants studied in this thesis were built in 1978 (Plant I), 1992 (Plant II) and 2001 
(Plant III). Plants I and II are of midsized capacity and plant III has a wordwide scale capacity 
comparable to plants constructed today. The engineering and construction companies, which performed 
the detail engineering of the plants, are reputable worldwide. 
Because the plants handle light hydrocarbons, a flare is necessary (Casal et al., 1999). For plant I, a flare 
was built with enough overcapacity to handle the loads of plants I and II. For plant III, a new flare was 
built that could handle the capacity of all three plants and the old flare was shutdown. A summary of the 
design parameters of the flare system is given in Table 5-1. In all cases, the dimensioning scenario is fire 
in the plants, or in plants I and II because they are together or in plant III, but not simultaneously. 
Table 5-1. Characteristic data of the flare loads for plants I, II and III. 
Gas composition Plants I and II, wt% Plant III, wt% Plants I, II and III, wt% 
Propylene 94.5 68.4 74.9 
Propane 5.2 7.8 7.2 
Ethylene -- 22.7 17.0 
Ethane remainder 0.7 remainder 
Heptane remainder remainder remainder 
Hydrogen remainder remainder remainder 
 





80 t/h smokeless 
160 t/h non smokeless 
 
In the case of fire, it is always assumed that the reactors relieve instantaneously. This is the first 
mitigation action for large pressure vessels with high pressure gas inside (Johnson, 2007). This load is 
added to the load coming from the affected zone where the fire is produced. 
The guidelines adopted for the design of the relief system were: AD Merkblatt-A2 and A4, together with 
API 520 and API 521. For plants I and II, the manufacturer of the pressure relief valves was Sempell 
(now Pentair) and for Plant III, it was Leser. 
The Sempell valve type of choice was: VSE0 for thermal expansion (60%); VSE2 (26%) for gases/vapors 
and liquids; VSR2 (10%) for gases/vapors and liquids but with the possibility of adjusting the blowdown 
and the rest (4%) VSE4 type for very low set pressures (0.4 barg) and VSE5 with bellows for high total 
backpressures. A summary of the models and the application characteristics is given in Figure 5-1. 
 






Figure 5-1. Models of Sempell safety valves installed in plant I and II (taken from catalogue KS27585E). 
The manufacturer, Sempell, does not give the characteristic operating curves of the valves. However, the 
following information about overpressures and blowdown are available in its catalog. See the following 
table: 
Valve type Gases and vapors 
Overpressure, % of SP Blowdown, % of SP 
VSE +5 -10 
VSR +3 -8 
VSR1 with SN144* +3 -6 





Valve type Gases and vapors 
Overpressure, % of SP Blowdown, % of SP 
 Liquids 
VSR with SN123* +10 -10 
VSE with SN123* +10 -20 
* SN144 means a valve with balanced piston (equivalent to bellows) and SN123 is a seating for liquids especial design. 
The manufacturer, Leser, gives information about the operating characteristics of safety valves. This 
information is very useful in determining stability criteria for safety valves, as has been seen in section 
6.7. A summary of the installed Leser valves and their characteristics is presented in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2. Operating characteristics of the Laser valves used in plant III. 
 Full lift safety valves Safety relief valves Relief valves 
Opening 
characteristics  
After responding within an 
overpressure of 5%, full lift 
safety valves open by a pop 
action up to the restricted lift. 
The portion of the lift before the 
valve opens suddenly must not 
exceed 20% of the total lift. 
After responding within a 
maximum overpressure of 
10%, these safety valves 
achieve the lift required for the 
mass flow to be discharged.  
They open almost 
continuously as a function of 
the overpressure. They do not 
open with pop-action and 
without any further increase 
in pressure over a range of 
more than 10% of the lift. 
After responding within a 
maximum overpressure of 
10%, these safety valves 
achieve the lift required for 
the mass flow to be 
discharged. 
Use Where large mass flow of 
gases/vapors is required. It 
reaches the full lift inclusive 
with small overpressure. 
Are ideal for liquids, their wide 
proportional range leads to 
continuous action and 
depressurerizing of pressure 
peaks, without the immediate 
discharge of such a large 
quantity as a full lift safety 
valve. 
Are used wherever only small 
mass flows are generally to be 
expected, for example, 
thermal expansion of liquids. 
Leser types 441, 442, 455, 456, 457 and 458 431, 433, 543 and 544 427, 429, 532 and 534 
Blowdown (for SP > 3 
barg) 
Compressible fluids: 10% 
Incompressible fluids: 20% 
Function 
   
 
Another characteristic of this relief system is the intensive use of changeover valves. The advantage of 
these valves is that there is the possibility of the removal of one of the two for inspection at the 
maintenance workshop without interruption of plant operation. The disadvantage is that they introduce an 
element with a high pressure drop in the inlet pipe that normally makes difficult the fulfilling of the 3% 
rule. The type of changeover valve installed is showed in Figures 5-2 and 6-11. 





     
Figure 5-2. Type of Leser changeover valve installed in plant III (taken from Leser catalog 487/01/E, 2009). 
5.2 Scope of the work. Data source 
This first step in applying the new methodology to the three plants was the checking of all the information 
available on the relief system. The results were: 
 Only a specification sheet was available for all the valves of plants I and III. For plant II a list of 
valves with their main characteristics was also available  
 A database was available in the inspection department containing the technical parameters of the 
valve (manufacturer, type, set pressure, orifice diameters, construction materials, size, type of 
flanges, and the results of the periodical revision in the workshop) 
 For plant III, the calculations, done by Leser, of the required area of the valve from an already 
specified relieving load were available, but not for plants I and II 
 No calculations were available at all to justify the relieving load 
 The following parameters were not available for the three plants: inlet pressure drop, outlet 
pressure drop, stability, reactions and forces and, of course there were no values for the new ones: 
body bowl choking, acoustic induced vibration, flow induced vibration, noise, etc. 
The information available was the normal information that the plant operators have, as has been pointed 
out by companies which performed relief systems audits (Berwanger et al., 2000; Westphal and Köper, 
2003) 
In order to introduce the new methodology the following work was carried out (see table 5-3): 
Table 5-3. Scope of the work performed to implant the new methodology.  













For each pressure equipment of the plants 
the template of figure 3-1 was applied.  
Contingency analysis with the 

















Integrated Hazop analysis and LOPA of 
the plants 
Allocation of the safety valves 
with IPL credits and checking the 
necessity of the safety valves with 
especial emphasis on the 














Calculation of the equivalent lengths of 
the discharge pipe according to the 
existing isometrics. 
Calculation of built-up backpressures for 
6 cumulative cases: 3 for plant III and 3 
Built-up back pressures for all the 
safety valves, which discharge to 
the flare. 





Task Done by Time Work performed Results 
discharge to 
flare 
for plant I and II. 




API 581 to find 
the optimal 
revision 









Gathering all the information about the 
revision periods of the critical safety 
valves. 
Preforming API 581 analysis level 2 with 
the target to increase the revision periods. 
Economic analysis. 
According to the API the revision 
periods could be increased. 
However the methodology has not 











Calculation of the required and maximal 
loads for each scenario. 
Checking the calculated required loads 
with the ones from the original datasheets. 
Analysis of the deficiencies in order to get 
statistical data. 
Relieving loads summary data 









Gathering isometrics of the inlet piping. 
Performing inlet pressure drop. 
Statistical analysis and proposed 
mitigation measures. 
 
List of valves which do not fulfill 




cases with inlet 








Development of a new methodology for 
performing the engineering analysis 
according to the latest state of art 
knowledge. 
Performing the engineering analysis for 
valves which 3% < ΔPinlet < 5%. 












Prepop analysis of the critical pressure 
relief valves. 
Statistical analysis of the results. 
Recommendations for new 
revision periods. 
 
The list of pressure relief valves of the plants with the work performed is shown in Annex C. 
5.3 Actions taken and difficulties encountered in implementing the new 
methodology. 
To better show the action taken and the difficulties encountered when trying to implement it, a table has 
been prepared following the phases of the new methodology, Table 5.4. 
Table 5-4. Work performed and difficulties encountered in implementing the new methodology.  
Phase Actions performed Difficulties encountered Comments 
Risk analysis Following the Hazop revision 
policy of the company, every 
5 years the Hazop has to be 
revised. This was conducted 
in November 2011 until 
August 2012, with especial 
emphasis on the 
recommended guide works 
“more pressure” and “more 
temperature” and including 
an integrated LOPA analysis. 
Moreover, the nodes were 
selected taking into account 
the recommended 
procedures. 
None The Hazop team leader was a 
very experienced engineer 
from an external process 
safety company. This was the 
key factor of the success of 
the PHA. Another good point 
was selecting a scriber with 
high knowledge of the 
Primatech software (from 
PHAworks).  
Safety valve requirements 
specification 
The new safety requirements 
specification (figure 3-5) has 
been used for the valves of 
plants I and II. For the valves 
of plant III the original data 
sheet was supplemented with 
Lack of information from the 
valves built in 1980s. It was 
necessary to contact the 
manufacturer Sempell to get 
information. 
Sometimes the information 
Some people found this new 
safety valve requirement 
specification as “more 
paperwork”. 





Phase Actions performed Difficulties encountered Comments 
the necessary information to 
get an equivalent document. 
was gathered during the 
inspection in the workshop in 
a turnaround. 
Convincing the maintenance 
engineer of the importance of 
having a dedicated 
specification for each valve 
and that it is not a 
“paperwork exercise”.  
Design The relief valves of the three 
plants have been revised 
according to the new design 
methodology as explained in 
section 3.3 including the 
recommended documentation 
(section 3-9). Annex C shows 
the list of valves. This work 
has been done by the thesis 
author during 2012-2015 
with very few breaks. 
Some case studies were 
intensively worked with the 
latest knowledge. 
Although the required 
relieving load was available 
for the dimensioning case; 
there were no calculations to 
demonstrate it.  
It has not been possible, until 
now, to apply the new 
methodology to changing the 
revision periods of the valves 
based on a quantitative 
approach (see section 4-11). 
It is a corporative decision of 
the company.  
From the study cases worked 
(chapter 6) recommendations 
for the different calculations 
procedures are presented. 
Prepop test has been included 
as a standard procedure for 
all critical safety valves. 
Reception, installation and 
checking 
The MOC requires a pre-
startup safety review. The 
checklist of Annex B has to 
be followed. 
Information given about how 
to handle the safety valves 
was given to contractor 
personnel. Moreover, during 
a turnaround the inspection 
engineer supervises the 
dismantling, inspection and 
montage of the valves. 
Difficulties of changing 
people’s attitudes. Majority 
believe that a safety valve is 
like a gate valve. 
 
Operation, maintenance and 
revision 
Training has been given to 
plant operators about how to 
detect a leakage of a safety 
valve. 
The inspection engineer has 
to control the exact 
fulfillment of the inspection 
test template in the workshop 
(see section 6-9) according to 
the new procedure. 
A meeting with the plant staff 
is required if the prepop test 
shows that the valve opens 
higher than 10% of SP. 
  
Management of change 
(MOC) 
The template (figure 3-7) has 
been implemented as 
standard for each 
modification. See the “relief 
system design” in the 
template. 
None The implementation of the 
MOC is a very good tool for 
the process safety of the 
plants. 
Decommissioning The procedure to treat it is 
included in MOC. 
None  
Verification The checklist of section 3.8 is 
integrated in the engineering 
procedures of the plants. It 
will be followed in a 
revamping or in a new plant 
construction. 
None  
Documentation and technical 
audits 
 Dedicated file (paper and 
electronic database) has been 
Engineering management had 
difficulties in understanding 
Dedicated software like PS 
PPM could be implemented 





Phase Actions performed Difficulties encountered Comments 
created for each PRV. The 
documentation will be 
audited in 2016. 
that this procedure is not a 
“paper for the audit” 
exercise. 
in the future. 
5.4 Deficiencies encountered in the design phase. Statistical analysis 
The data set used to perform a statistical analysis was taken from three existing petrochemical plants. The 
characteristic of the sample is presented in table 5-5. The complete list of the pressure relief devices is 
showed in Annex C. 
Table 5-5. Charateristics of the pressure relief device sample. 
 Plant I and II Plant III TOTAL 
Total number of pressure relief devices 226 317 543 
Rupture discs 0 13 13 
Overpressure-vacuum valves 7 15 22 
Explosion relief panel 0 1 1 
Others 2 2 4 
Total number of pressure relief valves 217 286 503 
Safety valves excluded from analysis 77 107 184 
Safety valves considered in the analysis 140 179 319 
 
The reason for excluding 184 pressure relief valves is due to the fact that they belong to dynamic 
equipment and the safety valve is part of the package unit, for example, the internal safety valve of 
reciprocating or diaphragm pumps or reciprocating or screw compressors, etc. Another example is the 
internal safety valve in the pressure reduction system of pressurized bottles of nitrogen, CO, etc. 
Concerning the frequency of a dimensioning scenario, Table 5-6 shows the results:  
Table 5-6. Statistic of the dimensioning scenario for the valves. 
Dimensioning scenario Plant I and II Plant III TOTAL % 
Thermal expansion 65 104 169 53 
Fire 28 37 65 20 
Auto control failure 20 16 36 11 
Blocked outlets 20 10 30 9 
Chemical reaction 4 4 8 3 
Exchanger tube breakage  2 3 5 2 
Abnormal heat input 0 3 3 1 
Mechanical equipment failure 1 2 3 1 
Reflux failure 0 0 0 0 
Cooling water failure 0 0 0 0 
Power failure 0 0 0 0 
Instrument air failure 0 0 0 0 
Inadvertent VA open/close 0 0 0 0 
Heat loss (series frac.) 0 0 0 0 
Loss of quench/cold feed 0 0 0 0 
Steam out 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 140 179 319 100 
 
The findings related to incorrectly installed relief valves has been classified following Kumana and 
Aldeeb (2014) and are presented in Table 5-7. 
Table 5-7. Finding categories of the pressure relief valves analyzed. 










Equipment without protection 0 0 0 458 (1) 0 
Safety valve undersized 2 2 4 319 1 















Inlet pressure drop > 3% 7 15 22 150 (2) 15 
Outlet pressure drop > 15 % 20 6 26 150 (2) 17 
Outlet pressure drop > 30 %, balanced 0 0 0 150 (2) 0 
Set pressure above the design pressure 0 1 1 319 0 
Installation (reduced bore valves on inlet, outlet pocketing 
concerns, administrative deficiencies, etc.) 
4 1 5 319 1.5 
Missing data 0 2 2 319 0.5 
Oversized 1 1 2 319 0.5 
TOTAL 34 28 62 319 19.5 
(1) This figure is the number of pressure equipment. 
(2) Excluding the thermal expansion valves. 
The comparison of the ratio pressure equipment versus number of pressure relief devices is presented in 
Table 5-8. 
Table 5-8. Comparison of ratios: pressure equipment vs pressure relief devices.  
 Plant I + II + III Kumana et al. Berwanger et al. 
(1) Number of pressure relief devices 543 80,372 14,873 
(2) Number of pressure equipment 458 174,943 24,303 
Ratio (1)/(2)  1.2 0.5 0.6 
Comments The specific design of 
the plants studied 
requires more 
changeover valves than a 
typical process plant. 
Here there are 5 PRDs 
for each 10 pressure 
equipment 
Here compressors are 
included and pumps 




The comparison of the results of this study with that of Berwanger et al. (2000), Kumana and Aldeeb 
(2014) and Köper and Westphal (2000) is showed in Table 5-9. 
Table 5-9. Comparison of the results of this study vs other reports. 
Deficiency This study, % Kumana report,% Berwanger report,% Köper report,% 
Equipment without protection 0 13.4 15.1 (1)  
Safety valve undersized (3) 1.0 13.4 14.1 (2)  
Inlet pressure drop (3) 15.0 15.6 8.2  18.0 
Outlet pressure drop (3)  17.0 3.1 (4) 12.3 22.0 
Installation (3) 1.5 24.9 0.2  
Set pressure above design 
pressure (3) 
0 10.5 2.0  
(1) Expresed as number of equipment unprotected/total number of equipment excluding pumps. 
(2) Corrected from the original report taking into account the total number of PRDs 
(3) Kumana and Berwanger reports used pressure relief device basis. In this study and in Köper report the basis is pressure relief valves. The 
differences should be minimal. 
(4) Backpressures calculated for individual discharge scenarios only. The figure is not representative.                                                                                                                  
 
 Results 
a) Deficiencies were revealed in 19.5% of the 319 pressure relief valves studied. This figure is 
similar that of Köper and Westphal (2003) report: 17%, but less than the Kumana report: 47%. 
b) The case of fire is the dimensioning scenario for 20% of the valves. Köper and Westphal report 
pointed out a value of 16% but Short (2006) gives a value of 50%.  
c) The result of the inlet pressure drop deficiencies obtained in this study is 15.0 % matching almost 
exactly with the values of Kumana and Köper 15.6%.  





d) The outlet pressure drop percentage obtained: 17% is comparable with that of Berwanger and 
Köper: 12.3% and 22% respectively. 
e) The set pressure above design pressure is normally not an issue as demonstrated by the results 
obtained in this study and that of Berwanger. 
f) The thermal expansion scenario is the most usual, as demonstrated in this study: 50% very similar 
with Köper: 44%.  
g) The chemical reaction scenario is the dimensioning one for the 3% of the valves and matches 
exactly with the result of Köper: 3% as well.  
The author has found the following design patterns that the original engineering company followed, 
which could explain the deviations with other statistical sources: 
 The calculation of the required load for the case of fire near the critical point has been 
performed taking 115 kJ/kg as latent heat, as recommended by API 521 (2008) 
 Although in most cases the relieving condition of light hydrocarbons mixtures (ethylene, 
propylene, etc) have a compressibility factor < 0.8, the required area calculation of the valve has 
been performed with the ideal specific heat ratio, Cp/Cv, which could give undersized valves. 
However, because the valves were chosen with a greater area than required, this deficiency has 
had no relevance  
 The relieving load of thermal expansion valves for piping was dimensioned in a standard way, 
i.e. taking 500 kg/h or 1000 kg/h of relieving liquid depending on the length. The rigorous 
calculations performed by the author considering the real length of the piping, a solar radiation 
of 1.15 kW/m
2
 and sizing in a rigorous way, the two-phase flow through the valve in case of 
light hydrocarbons, demonstrated that the original engineering approach was very conservative 
because the valve was installed with an area of 10 times or bigger  
 Fire scenario is not applied to piping as stated in the paragraph 5.14.4, API 521 (2008) 
 Intensive use of a restriction orifice downstream of a pressure control valve to limit the relieving 
load of the pressure relief valve 
 No consideration of the expansion phenomenon in case of fire for the liquid in a vessel, before 
the boiling point is reached. Consequently the wet area is less than in reality. Nevertheless, this 
was not an issue because the valves were oversized 
 The required area calculations of the relief valves for thermal expansion of liquids which flash 
through it, were sized considering no flashing. Again, no problem arose because of oversized 
valves 
 The relieving load for a fire scenario of a vessel full of gas/vapor has been calculated by the 
empirical formula 4.4, which has been demonstrated in section 6-4 that could undersize valves. 
However, again, no problems were found 
 The exchanger tube breakage scenario is rarely applied because the design basis kept the same 
design pressure for tubes and shell parts independent of the operation pressures. 
5.5 Evaluation of the deficiencies and mitigation actions 
The deficiencies encountered were resolved as soon as they were evaluated in accordance with the 
Management of Change procedure. 
Concerning the outlet pressure drop deficiency, the following items were affected: 
Item No. Outlet pressure drop, 
%SP 
Mitigation action Recalculated outlet pressure 
drop, %SP 
Y13A 20.2 Y15C/D out of service 10.2 
Y13B 20.2 Y15C/D out of service 10.2 
Y14A 20.5 Y15C/D out of service 10.4 
Y14B 20.5 Y15C/D out of service 10.4 
Y15A 23.5 Y15C/D out of service 17.2 
Y15B 23.5 Y15C/D out of service 17.2 
Y15C 25.4 Out of service -- 
Y15D 25.4 Out of service -- 
Y103 27.2 Y104/105 out of service -- 





Item No. Outlet pressure drop, 
%SP 
Mitigation action Recalculated outlet pressure 
drop, %SP 
Y104 25.8 Out of service -- 
Y105 25.8 Out of service -- 
Y1123 31.5 Administrative changes -- 
Y1124 31.5 Administrative changes -- 
Y1312 16.9 None 16.9 
Y3034 28.0 Modulating action 12.9 
Y3925 51.6 Modulating action 13.1 
Y6510A 28.9 Restriction lift 15.2 
Y6510B 28.9 Restriction lift 15.2 
Y72B 56.4 Smaller valve -- 
YS702/10 37.8 Increased diameter 18.0 
YS720/1 33.4 New valve installed with 
bellows 
10.0 
YS861/1 15.3 None 15.3 
YS861/4 16.7 Increased diameter 12.0 
YS861/5 16.3 Modified layout 11.4 
YS861/8 15.0 None 15.0 
 
Concerning the inlet pressure drop deficiency, the following mitigation actions have been taken: 
Item No. Inlet pressure drop, %SP Mitigation action 
Y13A 15.9 Increasing diameter 
Y13B 15.9 Increasing diameter 
Y14A 6.9 Increasing diameter 
Y14B 6.9 Increasing diameter 
Y106 5.6 Engineering analysis 
Y107 5.6 Engineering analysis 
Y3925 4.6 Engineering analysis 
YS399/2 5.0 Engineering analysis 
YS405/5 12.7 Increasing diameter 
YS420/1 3.0 None 
YS491/4 5.0 Engineering analysis 
YS700/1 4.2 Engineering analysis 
YS700/2 4.2 Engineering analysis 
YS701/1 3.1 Engineering analysis 
YS701/2 3.1 Engineering analysis 
YS701/3 3.1 Engineering analysis 
YS701/4 3.1 Engineering analysis 
YS702/15 6.5 Modification inlet piping 
YS720/1 16.5 Modification inlet piping 
YS860/1 5.8 Modification inlet piping 
YS861/4 3.7 Engineering analysis 
YS861/5 11.9 Modification inlet piping 
 
 










This chapter will present nine case studies, which represent the most complicated scenarios for 
calculating the required relief loads, required areas of the valves, inspection interval optimization and 
results of a turnaround. Moreover each case study shows a comparison between the different models 
available in the open literature to perform the calculations. Recommendations for the correct use of each 
model/procedure are also given. It is believed they would be interesting for any and every process safety 
engineer.  
 
6.1 Total backpressure calculations in the flare network of existing plants 
As explained in section 4.5 the outlet pressure drop calculation of the safety valves is required in order to 
design them and to check for stability problems as well. In this work the three existing petrochemical 
plants discharge to one flare.  
However, the total backpressures of the valves were not available. Thus, in order to check the design of 
each valve which relieves to the flare network, the back pressures had to be calculated. 
The existing engineering documentation of the plants reported that the dimensioning case for the flare 
was fire. Total power failure and cooling water failure were checked by the author as well and, it was 
confirmed that they are not the dimensioning case. 
According to API 521 (2014) the first step is checking if the fire scenario is a plausible one. Fire 
contingency can be omitted in the following circumstances: 
 When equipment is not located in or adjacent to areas containing flammable chemicals 
 When equipment is located above a certain level from the grade or platform where potential 
accumulation of flammable liquid may occur. According to API 521 this level is 7.6 m 
 When heat input from fire is insufficient to vaporize the liquid in the equipment within the 
reasonable amount of time required for corrective action to be taken by operators. Usually this 
time is 20 minutes (Mofrad and Norouzi, 2007) 
 When equipment can be emptied safely if such fire occurs. 
All these assumptions have been accepted here with the exception of the 20 minutes for corrective 
operation as explained below. This time is considered too optimistic. 
Assumptions taken in this work for the fire relief case calculations 
 Each piece of equipment engulfed in the fire is assumed to be isolated, which means that all heat 
and material inputs and outputs are assumed to have stopped. This assumption is based on the 
general plant operational practice to shut down the plant whenever fire is detected. 
 
 Potential external fire is assumed to occur in only one particular fire zone. This fire zone is 
assumed to be a circle with a diameter of 30 m as a conservative basis. 
 
 





 All of the relief valves in one particular fire zone are assumed to relieve at the same time and at 
their maximum relieving flowrates (not required flowrates). 
 
 The amount of heat absorbed by equipment exposed to fire will depend on many factors, such as 
type of fuel, equipment shape and size, fire proofing and so on, but heat input is determined by 
correlations of API 521(2014) (not NFPA 30). 
 
 Since depressurizing systems and operating procedures can fail in the event of a fire, no credit for 
such systems is considered during sizing the relief device for fire contingency. 
 
 Similarly, an effective water deluge system depends on many factors, such as freezing weather, 
high winds, clogged systems, reliable water supply and  equipment surface conditions. Hence, no 
credit is recommended by API 521 for environmental factors used in the equations to determine 
the heat load due to fire. 
 
 Credit for insulation can only be taken if the insulation is a fire-proofing insulation that meets 
specific criteria (Parry, 1992). In this work no credit has been taken for the insulation of the 
plants, i.e. always F=1. 
 
 The normal liquid level has not been used to calculate heat input for vessels and equipment that 
have an automatic level controller as recommended for  API 521 (2014). Following good 
engineering practice the normal high liquid level is used in this work. 
 
 Although adding 10% or 15% to the wetted area to take into account the annexed piping of the 
vessels is done by some designers, this approach was not considered in this work. Only if the pipe 
had a diameter greater than DN500 was it considered.  
 
 To determine vapor generation, only that portion of the vessel that is wetted by its internal liquid 
and is equal to or less than 7.6 m above the flame source has been considered. 
 
 The vessel heads protected by support skirts (i.e. bottoms from distillation columns) have been 
included in determining the wetted area. 
 
 Equipment containing liquids or gases will behave differently under the effect of fire. Equipment 
containing liquids with a “reasonable” boiling point has the benefit of a good heat-transfer rate 
between the equipment walls and the contained liquid, resulting in a slow temperature rise at the 
walls. On the other hand, for the equipment containing gases, vapors or supercritical fluids, there 
will be a poor heat-transfer rate between the equipment walls and the contained fluid, which 
results in a very rapid temperature rise of equipment walls. Therefore, separate procedures have 
been followed to determine the  fire case relief loads for these different situations. 
 
 Concerning the duration of the fire except for a few unusual applications, the time element of fire 
relief is not recognized. That is, the time required to heat the contents of a vessel to relieving 
conditions is not considered in sizing the pressure relief system. All fire heat input is therefore 
assumed to be available for vaporizing or heating vessel contents. In this thesis there are the 
following unusual applications: A vessel full of liquid propylene has a relieving pressure higher 
than its critical pressure (45.6 barg). As the fire starts the temperature of the liquid increases and 
an isochoric transformation occurs until the liquid reaches the set pressure of the safety valve. 
From this point, liquid is relieved through the valve with an isentropic flash giving two phases at 
the outlet. If fire continues, the liquid changes to gas phase (supercritical fluid) when the 
temperature reaches 92.4 ºC (critical temperature of propylene) without boiling. From this 
moment the situation is a vessel with gas and it is known that the time can be 15-20 minutes 
before the rupture (API 521, 2008). Moreover, through the valve occurs a retrograde 
condensation, i.e. in the inlet of the valve there is a supercritical fluid and at the exit there are two 





phases until approximately 270 ºF is reached. With higher temperatures there is no retrograde 
condensation. In this case, the exit temperature is < 0 ºF depending on the total backpressure. It is 
necessary to write that each phase requires different approaches for relieving load calculations: a) 
in the first there is a thermal expansion of the liquid propylene with flashing through the valve. 
The relieving load can be calculated with the relieving formulas of API 521 (paragraph 5.14.3, 
2008), on a timely basis, because the thermal-expansion coefficient changes until the critical 
temperature is reached. In this work the values of this coefficient were calculated up to 73.37 ºC 
by the Yaws correlation (Yaws, 1995) as it is the maximal temperature allowed for the 
correlation. The difficulty of getting the value of this coefficient from 73.37 ºC to 92.4 ºC was 
solved using the NIST databook (http://webbook.nist.gov/chemistry/fluid/) together with the 
approximation of API 521 (paragraph 5.14.4, 2008). In the second part of the process only 
supercritical fluid is relieved, in this case the equations of  API 521 (2008)  for vapor filled 
vessels exposed to fire were used together with other more exact methods (Ouderkirk, 2002; API 
521 (paragraph 4.4.13.2.4.4, 2014)). 
 
 There are some cases where it is necessary to determine if a vessel should be considered wetted 
or unwetted. Different authors (Wong, 1999 and Mofrad and Norouzi, 2007) considered that 20 
minutes is the fire team response time. After these 20 minutes from the start of the fire, the 
vessel’s exposed surface is cooled by the fire team and the relief requirements approaches zero. 
They wrote that this is a good practice especially for local fires. As stated before no consideration 
has been made here for this concept, because this assumption demands an exceptionally trained 
team of operators and firefighters. 
   
 Before determining the final relief rate, the designer has the important task of determining the 
latent heat of vaporization of the contained liquid. In this work most cases are a simple liquid 
component. Only a few cases have been calculated through a semidynamic model as explained in 
PS PPM software or in Mofrad publication (Mofrad and Norouzi, 2007) for the determination at 
different times of the latent heat of liquid mixtures. 
 
 In case of relieving conditions near the critical region, the latent heat of vaporization approaches 
zero as sensible heat dominates. For such conditions API 521(2008) suggests using a minimum 
latent heat value of 115 kJ/kg as an approximation. In this work this approach has not been used. 
  
 The heat transfer between equipment walls and the contained fluid is very poor when the 
contained fluid is a gas, vapor or supercritical fluid. This results in a very rapid temperature rise 
in the equipment walls causing equipment failure due to heat stress even before the internal 
pressure reaches the set pressure of the safety valve. These vessels have to be protected by: 
a) Cooling the equipment surface with a water deluge system 
b) Providing automatic vapor depressuring systems 
c) Locating equipment to either eliminate or reduce the effects of fire 
d) Installing external fire-proofing insulation 
e) Using reliable fire-monitoring systems and a rapid-action fire-fighting team. 
 
 For the equipment containing a low liquid inventory, that is to say, equipment in which all the 
contained liquid could vaporize within 20 minutes, if the vessel pressure when the last drop of 
liquid vaporizes is less than the valve set pressure, then the relief load to be considered is based 
on the procedure for gas filled equipment. However, if the vessel pressure when the last drop of 
liquid vaporizes is more than relief valve set pressure, the relief load to be considered was the 
maximum of relief load calculated based on considering liquid filled or gas filled vessel. 
 
 One of the significant problems in designing the relief systems is knowing exactly if there is a 
single phase (vapor or liquid) or a mixed phase flow in the inlet and outlet of the safety valve. 
Generally a mixed phase flow requires a larger relief area than vapor or liquid phase flow. 





However, it has been found that relief can be two-phase relief depending upon the nature of liquid 
and the initial fill level (see section 4.2). 
Calculation of the required area of the pressure relief valves  
The procedure followed in this work to calculate the required area was: 
 The required relief area of safety valves for gas and liquid phases only were calculated according 
to manufacturer’s information as explained in section 4.3. For the newest plant (Plant III) almost 
all the valves are LESER, also the software VALVESTAR 7.2.1 has been used together with the 
Engineering Book available at their web: www.leser.de. For the two older plants (Plants I and II) 
all the safety valves are Sempell. The Sempell Catalogue KS 27585 E “Safety Relief valves with 
DIN- and ANSI- Flanges” has been used. 
   
 The calculation of two phase flow has been done using some of the following methods: 
a) API 520 Part I Annex C, 2014 
b) TPHEM modified (private software based on Simpson procedure (Simpson,1991)) 
c) Leung method (Leung, 1996) 
d) Direct integration method (Darby, 2002 and API 520 Part I, 2014) 
e) ISO 4126-10 (2010)  
f) HNE-DS (Diener and Schmidt, 2004; Schmidt, 2013) 
g) Ouderkirk method (Ouderkirk, 2002) 
h) PS PPM software (method based on CCPS, 1998). 
  
 The vapor release calculations  through a vapor certified relief valve has been analyzed for inlet 
and outlet line losses based on the pressure relief valve’s rated capacity at 10% overpressure 
(code allowed accumulation) of the valve. This is a very important concept because a few years 
ago the required rate was used. 
 
 In this thesis, good engineering practice of relief system engineering was used: where the 
required vapor relief rate is < 50% of the relief valve’s rated capacity at 10% overpressure and is 
< 25% of the rated capacity, a deviation of the above procedure has been allowed, using to use 
50% of the valve’s rated capacity for inlet and outlet line analysis if and only if the characteristic 
of the valve is as shown in figure 4-3. 
 
Design basis for the calculation of total back pressures of the flare network 
The design basis used here to calculate the built-up backpressure of each pressure relief valve has been:  
 Required flow vs. rated flow: according to the API 521 (table 12, 2007) the design basis for tail 
pipes of a spring-operated relief valves is the rated capacity and the required relieving rate for the 
main header. 
 
 Calculation of the backpressures in the safety valves: cases where the backpressure is greater than 
the limits specified by the valve manufacturer may result in chattering. The installation of bellows 
relief valves was explicitly explained as the solution to the problem of excessive backpressure 
(see section 4.6). In a conventional spring loaded pressure relief valve, the maximum allowable 
back pressure is typically limited to 10% of the valve set pressure. In this thesis up to 17 % of set 
pressure has been allowed for LESER valves according to the manufacturer. For the balanced 
valves (with bellows), the maximum allowable back pressure without derating of the valve’s 
capacity has been limited to 30% of the valve set pressure. 
 
 It is common to perform a flare newtwork study by evaluating only the cumulative cases that 
overpressure the system (total power failure, cooling water failure, fire, etc.). While this 





consideration is correct for the header and sub-header sizing, this evaluation may undersize the 
individual PRV tail piping. The evaluation of PRVs relieving independently will give the most 
conservative size of the valve outlet piping especially if there is a maximal Mach number limit 
(Zamora, Streblow, 2015). API 521 (2014) also gives the following recommendation “If the user 
has established a velocity criterion for tail pipes, the maximum velocity in a tail pipe should be 
calculated with the single source (the relief or depressurization device) as the only source 
discharging into the disposal system” 
 
 Forces and moments imposed on the safety valve including thermal effects: as it was pointed out 
in section 4.7, API 521 (2008) recommends the calculation of the allowable forces and moments 
which may be imposed on the pressure relief device. This should include allowable forces and 
moments for both flowing and non-flowing conditions, where applicable. This data must be 
obtained from the device manufacturer. The same standard requires calculations of non-flowing 
piping loads on the pressure relief device. This includes both dead loads and loads imposed by 
thermal effects. In this work only a very few cases of vapor flowing to atmosphere have been 
calculated. The valves relieving to flare have not been checked as this work had been done by the 
engineering and construction company. 
 
 Calculations of Acoustic Induced Vibration (AIV): as stated in section 4.8 a pressure relief valve 
relieving to a flare network would cause high frequency acoustic excitation to downstream piping 
which is potentially damaging to it. If the Sound Power Level generated by the safety valve is 
below 155 dB, the piping downstream of the safety valve is considered safe from AIV fatigue 
failure. 
 
 Mach number: the Mach number for the pressure relief valve tail pipe is commonly limited to 0.7 
for the maximum flow. For the collection header the Mach number is limited to 0.5 for the 
maximum flow as well, although it may be better to use 0.3 (NORSOK, 2006). In this thesis, 
there are some cases with Mach = 1 in plants I and II, i.e. there is critical flow at this point, in 
accordance with the statistical results of Riha and Streblow (2015), which found 15% of the 
valves with chocked flow present in piping. 
  
 Momentum (density · velocity2): as explained in section 4.5 for tail pipes, maximum momentum 
may be limited to 150,000 Pa, whilst for collection headers, it should be limited to 100,000 Pa. In 
any case, one has to check that the piping supports and the vibration analysis are correct as well. 
 
 Noise level: fluid passing through the safety valve and tail and pipe header can generate 
significant noise and it can be transmitted along the tail pipe and header. One of the common 
safety requirements is to limit the noise level to 115 dBA (Noise level with A-weighted) during 
intermittent emergency relief scenario. Here, some cases have been evaluated. 
 
 Two-phase flow pattern: the consideration of isentropic transformation through the safety valve 
in this thesis gives two-phase flow at the outlet with temperatures near the minimum-design metal 
temperature (MDMT) which may result in brittle fracture.  In any case the piping specification 
for flare systems accounts for this issue (design temperature -50 ºC). There are also some cases 
with retrograde condensation.  
            On a conservative basis, the calculations are made taking into account not only isothermal 
pressure-drop equations but also isenthalpic transformations with specific software (Aspen Flare 
System Analyzer v7.3)  
            The adopted roughness of the pipe in this case study is ε = 0.07 mm, which corresponds to a not 
corroded pipe. However, in some cases where it was estimated a light corrosion might exist due 
to the characteristic of the released substances, a roughness factor of 0.3 mm has been used. 
 
 Polymerization, hydrate and/or ice formation: a MOC analysis was conducted (see section 3.6) to 
check for the possible formation of ice in some points where steam is discharged together 





(cumulative cases) with light hydrocarbons when there is the possibility of ice formation and 
plugging/blocking the relief tail pipe.  
Results 
Zapico (2013) carried out an extensive study to find the dimensioning scenario for the existing flare. For 
the case of fire in the plants, he used a circle of 30 m of diameter (conservative) and looked for the 
maximal relieving load taking into account the equipment included in the circle. Six cases were identified 
by the author: 
1. Fire in distillation area Plant III. Elevation 0 m 
2. Fire in reaction area Plant III. Elevation 0 m 
3. Fire in reaction area Plant III. Elevation 9.5 m 
4. Fire in purification area Plants I&II. Elevation 0 m 
5. Fire in reaction area Plants I&II. Elevation 7.0 m 
6. Fire in distillation area Plants I&II. Elevation 0 m  
The results of this study showed that case 1 (Fire in distillation area Plant III. Elevation 0 m) is the 
dimensioning one for the flare and will be given, as an example, in this section. 
In all cases, it has been considered that when a fire starts, the reactors are depressured immediately by 
operations personnel. This consideration was adopted in the original specification of the flare and it has 
been maintained as it is recommended by paragraph 5.20 “Vapour depressuring” of API 521 (2008). 
Table 6-1 shows the relieving loads for the case 1, resulting: 
Maximum required load: 145500 kg/h 
Maximum relief load: 271369 kg/h 
Molecular weight: 42.3 kg/kmol 
Temperature: 78 ºC 
Figure 6-1 presents a flowsheet of the flare network including the total backpressures as a percentage of 
the set pressures. Tables 6-2a, 6-2b and 6-2c show the results of the total backpressure of the affected 
safety valves. Table 6-3 presents the pressure drop in the inlet of the safety valves. Tables 6-4a, 6-4b and 
6-4c give the resistance coefficients for pipe and fittings in the discharge lines. Table 6.5 shows the same 
resistance coefficients for the inlet piping. Figure 6-2 represents the flowsheet used with the software 
Aspen Tech’s Flare System Analyzer (Aspen, 2011).   
 





Table 6-1. Plant III flare design basis. 
 




























V or L 
YS 860/08 K862 40 15000 356.3 17241 409.5 42.1 90 V 
YS861/01 B860 31 21000 498.8 21421 508.8 42.1 76 V 
YS861/04 K860 15.5 15000 340.1 42274  (4) 958.6 44.1 52 V 
YS861/05 B864 15.5 4000 95.0 10183  (4) 241.9 42.1 44 V 
YS861/08 W860 31 9000 213.8 13474 320.0 42.1 77 V 
YS860/12 W866 40 6000 142.5 44147 1048.6 42.1 87 V 
YS860/01 B862 40 15500 372.1 62629  (4) 1503.7 41.65 (2) 89 V 
YS865/02.1.2   7500   (1)    42.1 66 V 
YS865/01   3000   (1)    42.1 66 V 
YS865/05   1000   (1)    42.1 66 V 
YS865/03   500     (1)    42.1 66 V 
YS865/04   2000   (1)    42.1 66 V 
Vent (F40115) R400 30 30000 712.6 30000 712.6 42.1 80 V 
Vent (F41115) R410 30 30000 712.6 30000 712.6 42.1 80 V 
          
TOTAL   145500 (3) 3443.8 271369 6416.3 42.3 78  
NOTES 
1. This relief load is not considered in the fire case. The refrigeration unit is not exposed to fire. 
2. Homogeneous case. It is the dimensioning case for the flare. 
3. Without considering the refrigeration unit XV 860. The ∆P in the bottom of flare is 697 mbar (flare manufacturer Information). 
4. The ∆p in the input and output of the safety valve are calculated at 50% of maximum load.  
  







Figure 6-1. Flare network flowsheet including calculated total backpressures for case 1. 
 





Table 6-2a. Results of the total backpressure of the safety valves. 
 
CASE 1: FIRE IN DISTILLATION  AREA ELEVATION 0.0 m OF PLANT III 
PRESSURE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE FLARE:  697 mbar @ 145.5 t/h 
     F-40115   F-41115 
Section 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 4-7 7-8 8-9 
Nominal Diameter, mm 500 600 600 400 200 600 400 200 
Inside Diameter, mm 495.4 597.4 597.4 396.4 211.1 597.4 396.4 211.1 
Load, kg/h 145,500 145,500 145,500 30,000 30,000 115,500 30,000 30,000 
Temperature, ºC 77.6 77.6 77.6 80.0 80.0 77.0 80.0 80.0 
Viscosity, cP 0.0100 0.0101 0.0101 0.0102 0.0102 0.01002 0.0107 0.0107 
Molecular Weight, kg/kmol 42.44 42.44 42.44 42.10 42.10 42.53 42.10 42.10 
Downstream pressure, bar g 0.697 0.810 0.877 0.960 0.984 0.960 0.970 0.992 
Mach Number 0.320 0.206 0.199 0.090 0.313 0.151 0.089 0.311 
Reynolds  Number x 10
6
 10.34 8.574 8.573 2.631 4.941 6.826 2.497 4.684 
Friction Factor (Moody) 0.0129 0.0125 0.0125 0.0138 0.0155 0.0126 0.0139 0.0154 
Upstream pressure, bar g 0.810 0.877 0.960 0.984 1.144 0.970 0.992 1.196 
ΔP (bar) 0.113 0.067 0.083 0.024 0.160 0.010 0.022 0.204 









Table 6-2b. Results of the total backpressure of the safety valves. 
 
CASE 1: FIRE IN DISTILLATION  AREA ELEVATION 0.0 m OF PLANT  III 
PRESSURE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE FLARE:  697 mbar @ 145.5 t/h 
    YS 861/05  YS 861/01  YS 861/04 
Section 7-10 10-11 11-12 12-16 12-13 13-17 13-14 14-18 
Nominal Diameter, mm 600 300 200 100 200 150 200 200 
Inside Diameter, mm 597.4 315.9 211.1 107.1 211.1 160.3 211.1 211.1 
Load, kg/h 85,500 85,500 49,000 10,183 45,000 21,421 24,000 42,274 
Temperature, ºC 76.0 76.0 66.2 44.0 68.2 76.0 61.4 52.0 
Viscosity, cP 0.0100 0.0100 0.0096 0.0091 0.0097 0.0101 0.00932 0.00887 
Molecular Weight, kg/kmol 42.68 42.68 43.25 42.1 42.77 42.1 43.35 44.1 
Downstream pressure, bar g 0.970 0.974 1.409 1.478 1.478 1.571 1.571 1.585 
Mach Number 0.111 0.395 0.406 0.311 0.366 0.297 0.184 0.315 
Reynolds Number x 10
6
 5.081 9.608 8.532 3.684 7.801 4.695 4.313 7.980 
Friction Factor  (Moody) 0.0127 0.0142 0.0153 0.0179 0.0154 0.0163 0.0154 0.0154 
Upstream pressure, bar g 0.974 1.409 1.478 2.504 1.571 4.734 1.585 2.588 
ΔP (bar) 0.004 0.435 0.069 1.027 0.093 3.163 0.014 1.003 










Table 6-2c. Results of the total backpressure of the safety valves. 
 
CASE 1: FIRE IN DISTILLATION  AREA ELEVATION 0.0 m OF PLANT III 
PRESSURE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE FLARE:  697 mbar @ 145.5 t/h 
 
  YS 861/08  YS 860/01  YS 860/12  YS 860/08 
Section 14-15 15-19 11-20 20-23 20-21 21-24 21-22 22-25 
Nominal Diameter, mm 200 100 250 150 250 250 250 150 
Inside Diameter, mm 211.1 107.1 265.0 160.3 265.0 265.0 265.0 160.3 
Load, kg/h 9,000 13,474 36,500 62,629 21,000 44,147 15,000 17,241 
Temperature, ºC 77.0 77.0 89.1 89.0 89.1 87.0 90.0 90.0 
Viscosity, cP 0.0101 0.0101 0.0104 0.0104 0.0104 0.0104 0.0105 0.0105 
Molecular Weight, kg/kmol 42.1 42.1 41.9 41.65 42.1 42.1 42.1 42.1 
Downstream pressure, bar g 1.585 1.588 1.409 1.532 1.535 1.536 1.536 1.539 
Mach Number 0.072 0.416 0.202 0.903 0.110 0.231 0.079 0.247 
Reynolds  Number x 10
6
 1.494 4.408 4.667 13.23 2.684 5.675 1.913 3.634 
Friction Factor (Moody) 0.0157 0.0179 0.0148 0.0162 0.0149 0.0147 0.0151 0.0164 
Upstream pressure, bar g 1.588 4.660 1.532 6.916 1.536 4.263 1.539 3.841 
ΔP (bar) 0.003 3.072 0.123 5.384 0.005 2.727 0.003 2.301 











Table 6-3. ΔP in the input of the safety valves. 
 
CASE 1: FIRE IN DISTILLATION  AREA ELEVATION 0.0 m OF PLANT  III 
 
 
SAFETY  VALVE YS 861/05 YS 861/01 YS 861/04 YS 861/08 YS 860/01 YS 860/12 YS 860/08 
Set Pressure, bar g 15.5 31.0 15.5 31.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 
Nominal Diameter, mm 40 40 80 50 50 80 80 
Inside Diameter, mm 43.1 43.1 82.5 54.5 54.5 81.7 83.1 
Load, kg/h 10,183 21,421 42,274 13,474 62,629 44,147 17,241 
Temperature, ºC 44.0 76.0 52.0 77.0 89.0 87.0 90.0 
Molecular Weight, kg/kmol 42.1 42.1 44.1 42.1 41.65 42.1 42.1 
Viscosity, cP 0.01 0.0126 0.01 0.0126 0.0146 0.01 0.0153 
Relieving Pressure, bar a 18.06 35.11 18.06 35.11 45.01 45.01 45.01 
Mach Number 0.233 0.2327 0.270 0.092 0.296 0.098 0.036 
Reynolds  Number x 10
6
 8.356 13.95 18.12 6.940 26.95 19.11 4.796 
Friction Factor  (Moody) 0.022 0.022 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.019 
Pressure at the exit of equipment, bara 19.81 35.38 18.98 35.59 47.11 45.71 45.62 
ΔP (bar) 1.75 0.27 0.92 0.48 2.10 0.70 0.61 
% 11.3 0.88 5.91 1.55 5.24 1.75 1.52 
  





Table 6-4a. Resistance coefficients K of pipe and fittings. 
CASE 1: FIRE IN DISTILLATION AREA ELEVATION 0.0 m OF PLANT  III (DISCHARGE PIPING) 
     F-40115   F-41115 
Section 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 4-7 7-8 8-9 
Nominal diameter, mm 500 600 600 400 200 600 400 200 
Inside Diameter, mm 495.4 597.4 597.4 396.4 211.1 597.4 396.4 211.1 
Pipe length, m and K 0.19   5·10
-3 
14.9     0.31 18.2     0.38 19.6     0.68 3.97     0.29 8.91     0.19 23.4     0.82 4.2       0.30 
 90º elbows, nº and K 1         0.144 2          0.29 4          0.58 3          0.47 1          0.20 -                 - 3          0.47 1          0.20 
45º elbows, nº and K -                 - 3          0.58 -                 - 1          0.21 1          0.22 -                 - 1          0.21 3          0.67 
Straight T , nº and K -                 - -                 - 1          0.24 3          0.78 -                 - 1          0.24 2          0.52 -                 - 
Branch T, nº and K -                 - -                 - -                 - 1          0.78 1          0.84 -                 - 1          0.78 1          0.84 
Enlargements, nº and K -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - 
Contractions, nº and K 1           0.07 -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - 
Change-over valve, DN and K -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - 
Equipment entrance, K 1           1.00 -                 - 1          1.00 -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - 
Equipment exit, K -                 - 1          0.50 -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - -                 - 










Table 6-4b. Resistance coefficients K of pipe and fittings. 
CASE 1: FIRE IN DISTILLATION AREA ELEVATION 0.0 m OF PLANT III (DISCHARGE PIPING) 
    YS 861/05  YS 861/01  YS 861/04 
Section 7-10 10-11 11-12 12-16 12-13 13-17 13-14 14-18 
Nominal Diameter, mm 600 300 200 100 200 150 200 200 
Inside Diameter, mm 597.4 315.9 211.1 107.1 211.1 160.3 211.1 211.1 
Pipe length, m and K 4.22     0.09 14.0     0.63 0.48     0.03 9.3       1.55 2.96     0.22 14.1     1.44 0.32     0.02 12.5     0.91 
90º elbows, nº and K -                - 1          0.18 -                - 2          0.48 -                - 5          1.05 -                - 5          0.98 
45º elbows, nº and K -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - 2          0.48 -                - 1          0.22 
Straight T, nº and K 1          0.24 3          0.78 1          0.05 -               - 1          0.28 -                - 1          0.28 -                - 
Branch T, nº and K -                - 1          0.78 -                - 2          2.04 -                - 1          0.90 -                - 1          0.84 
Enlargements, nº and K -                - 1          0.35 1          0.21 1          5.51 -                - 1          39.4 -                - 1          5.69 
Contractions, nº and K -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - 
Change-over valve, DN and K -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - 
Equipment entrance, K -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - 
Equipment exit, K -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - -                - 
Sum of K 0.33 2.72 0.29 9.58 0.50 43.3 0.30 8.64 
 
 







Table 6-4c. Resistance coefficients K of pipe and fittings. 
CASE 1: FIRE IN DISTILLATION  AREA ELEVATION 0.0 m OF PLANT III (DISCHARGE PIPING) 
  YS 861/08  YS 860/01  YS 860/12  YS 860/08 
Section 14-15 15-19 11-20 20-23 20-21 21-24 21-22 22-25 
Nominal Diameter, mm 200 100 250 150 250 250 250 150 
Inside Diameter, mm 211.1 107.1 265 160.3 265 265 265 160.3 
Pipe lenght, m and K 2.17   0.16 3.73   0.62 5.29   0.29 12.5   1.27 0.17   0.01
 
7.83   0.43 1.96   0.11 3.96   0.40 
90º elbow, nº and K -              - 1        0.24 1        0.20 5        1.05 -              - 3        0.59 -               - 3        0.63 
 45º elbow, nº and K -              - 1        0.27 -               - -               - -              - -               - -               - -               - 
Straight T, nº and K 1        0.28 -               - 4        1.12 -               - 1        0.28 -               - 1        0.28 1        0.30 
Branch T, nº and K -              - 1        1.02 1        0.84 1        0.90 -              - 1        0.84 -               - 1        0.90 
Enlargements, nº and K -              - 1        18.0 -               - 1        5.18 -              - 1        58.4 -               - 1        39.4 
Contrations, nº and K -              - -               - -               - -               - -              - -               - -               - -               - 
Change-over valve, DN and K -              - -               - -               - -               - -              - -               - -               - -               - 
Equipment entrance, K -              - -               - -               - -               - -              - -               - -               - -               - 
Equipment exit, K -              - -               - -               - -               - -              - -               - -               - -               - 
Summe of K 0.44 20.2 2.45 8.40 0.29 60.3 0.39 41.6 
 








Table 6-5. Resistance coefficients K of pipe and fittings. 
CASE 1: FIRE IN DISTILLATION AREA ELEVATION 0.0 m OF PLANT III (INLET PIPING) 
 
SAFETY VALVE YS 861/05 YS 861/01 YS 861/04 YS 861/08 YS 860/01 YS 860/12 YS 860/08 
Nominal Diameter, mm 40 40 80 50 50 80 80 
Inside Diameter, mm 43.1 43.1 82.5 54.5 54.5 81.7 83.1 
Pipe lenght, m and K 2.58        1.29 -                    - 43.1        0.12 0.5          0.09 0.32        0.12 7.81        1.04 24.6        5.60 
90º elbow, nº and K 3             0.59 -                    - 5             0.01
 
1           1·10
-4 
-                    - 2             0.33 7             1.76
 
45º elbow, nº and K -                    - -                    - 1           2·10
-3 
-                    - -                    - -                   - 1             0.29 
Straight T, nº and K 1             0.42 -                    - -                    - -                    - 1             0.38
 
-                   - 3             1.08
 
Branch T, nº and K 1             1.26 -                    - 1             1.08
 
1             1.14
 
-                    - 1             1.08
 
1             1.08
 
Enlargements, nº and K -                    - -                    - -                    - -                    - -                    - -                   - -                   - 
Contractions, nº and K -                    - 1             0.08 1             0.18
 
1             2.01
 
-                    - 1             0.58
 
1             11.1
 
Change-over valve, DN and K -                    - -                    - -                    - -                    - -                    - -                   - -                   - 
Equipment entrance, K -                    - -                    - -                    - -                    - -                    - -                   - -                   - 
Equipment input, K 1        3.8·10
-4 
1             0.20 1           5·10
-3 
1           5·10
-4 
1             0.50
 
1             0.17
 
1             0.50 
Summe of K 3.55 0.28 1.33 3.24 1.00 3.21 21.4 







Figure 6-2. Flowsheet used with the software Aspen Tech’s Flare System Analyzer for case 1. 





The results of the different total backpressures for the pressure relief valves affected for the 
Case 1, are showed in Table 6-6. 
Table 6-6. Results of total backpressures of the PRV’s Case 1 (% with respect to gauge set 
pressure) (Zapico, 2013). 


















YS 860/01 17.3 17.6 17.3 17.3 14.7 
YS 860/08 9.6 10.8 9.8 10.5 7.9 
YS 860/12 10.7 11.4 10.8 11.0 8.0 
YS 861/01 15.3 16.7 15.6 16.5 11.4 
YS 861/04 16.7 19.8 16.8 19.5 13.5 
YS 861/05 16.3 17.7 16.3 17.4 11.9 
YS 861/08 15.0 17 15.2 16.7 14.6 
Notes: 
1- The equations 26 and 27 of API 521(2008) have been used. Roughness 0.07 mm 
2- The Aspen Flare System Analyzer v7.3 - aspenONE  was used. Roughness 0.07 mm 
3- The equations of Annex E of API 520-2008 have been used. Roughness 0.07 mm 
4- Peng Robinson as EOS was used. Roughness 0.07 mm 
5- In this case AFSA is allowed to perform heat transfer calculations to ambient. Peng 
Robinson as EOS was used and Beggs Brill for the pressure drop. Atmospheric temperature 
25 ºC and wind velocity 5m/s. Roughness 0.07 mm 
Considerations: 
a) The generally accepted idea that the isothermal flow is conservative with respect to 
pressure drop does not follow this example. The reason for this, as already pointed out 
by Bonilla (Bonilla, 1978), is because of the lower temperature reached by the fluid at 
the exit of the valve in comparison with the isothermal flow, that considers no 
temperature changes through the pressure relief valve. Some tail pipes have product at -
30ºC. 
b) The API 521 (2007) model for isothermal flow was implemented through an 
independently developed spreadsheet and the properties were previously calculated 
through API Technical Data Book and the NIST webbook 
(http://webbook.nist.gov/chemistry/fluid/). 
c) Results are greater with the Aspen software probably due to the improved physical 
properties.  
d) The difference between the adiabatic and isothermal results is not significant. 
e) A practical problem with the Aspen software was that the DIN piping diameter had to 
match the inlet diameter of the ANSI norm (Schedule Number) because the software 
does not allow working in DIN dimensions. The diameters were elected through a 
schedule number always taking a diameter equal or smaller as a conservative basis. 
f) Only the valve YS 861/04 not follows the 17 % maximum backpressure rule and has to 
be modified. 
6.2 Comparison of different methods for the design of PRVs with Z < 0.8 or 
Z > 1.1  
In this work, many cases exist in which the relieving fluid is a vapor or gas with a 
compressibility factor less than 0.8. In this case, API 520 (Part I, 2008, 2014) recommends a 
rigorous calculation using the direct integration method. 





In reviewing the literature for this situation, some models are available for the engineer to 
perform the design of pressure relief valves. A case study is chosen consisting of the fire 
scenario for a vertical condenser protected by the pressure relief valve YS 414/1-2. Figure 6-3 
shows a scheme of the valve situation and Figure 6-4 is a picture of the valve. 
                  
Fig 6-3. Scheme of the installation of YS 414/1-2.    Fig 6-4. Picture of YS 414/1-2 and equipment. 
Design basis 
Set pressure = 40 barg; PR = 45.013 bara; TR = 88.85 ºC; Relieving load: 30000 kg/h; 𝛼𝑑,𝐷𝐺 =
0.56; 𝛼𝑑,𝐹 = 0.42; Initial temperature = 60 ºC; Initial pressure = 29 barg. 
The range of boiling temperatures of the mixture at 45.013 bara is between 88.3ºC and 89.5 ºC 
according to the Aspen Hysys V7.3 with Peng Robinson as EOS simulation results. Taking a 
temperature of 89.5 ºC, the isentropic flashes have been performed. The initial point is (gas 
phase): 
(PR = 45.013 bara and TR = 89.5 ºC) with a composition (mass fraction): ethane 0.0019, 
propylene 0.9693, propane 0.0279, heptane 0.0003, methane 0.0002; hydrogen 0.0004; and the 
thermodynamic properties: 
Entropy = 61.59 kJ/kmol ºC; Density = 156.6 kg/m
3
; Z = 0.400; Cp/Cv ideal = 1.014; Cp/Cv 
real = 8.534; Viscosity = 0.01788 Cp; Molecular Weight = 41.87 kg/kmol; Molar volume = 
0.2675 m
3
/kmol; Critical temperature = 91.72 ºC; Critical pressure = 47.21 bara; Critical 
volume = 0.2009 m
3
/kmol. 
Case 1. Direct integration 





















                                                                                                                       
A step of 4% of PR has been taken as in the API 520 example. Thus, 
Pressure 
Pa 








4501000 89.5 156.6 -- -- -- 
4321000 87.2 147.5 -1183.8 -1183.8 7177 

















3961000 82.4 129.8 -1341.8 -3784.3 11292 
3781000 79.9 121.4 -1433.1 -5217.4 12401 
3601000 77.3 113.3 -1533.9 -6751.3 13166 
3421000 74.6 105.5 -1645.3 -8396.6 13672 
3241000 71.8 97.96 -1769.4 -10166.0 13968 
3061000 69.9 90.73 -1907.9 -12073.9 14099 
2881000 65.8 83.79 -2062.8 -14136.7 14089 
2701000 62.6 77.14 -2237.0 -16373.7 13959 
2521000 59.2 70.75 -2434.2 -18807.9 13722 
2341000 55.6 64.61 -2659.6 -21467.5 13388 
2161000 51.9 58.70 -2919.5 -24386.9 12964 
1981000 47.9 53.00 -3222.9 -27609.8 12454 
1801000 43.6 47.51 -3934.4 -31544.2 11933 
 
The maximal mass flux is obtained at 30.61 bara and 69.9 ºC. 
According to equation C.10 of API 520 (2014): 
𝐴 =
277.8 ∙ 𝑊
𝐾𝑑 ∙ 𝐾𝑏 ∙ 𝐾𝑐 ∙ 𝐾𝑣 ∙ 𝐺
                                                                                                                         
where 
A required effective discharge area, mm
2
; W mass flow rate, kg/h; Kd discharge coefficient; Kb 
= 1 (no balanced valve); Kc  = 1 (no rupture disc installed);  Kv = 1 viscosity correction factor 
and Kd = 0.56 from LESER datasheet (lift restricted to 8 mm), which corresponds to the gas 




 = 1055 mm2 
Case 2. Calculation using the isentropic expansion factor 
Smith and Burgess (2015) presented a method that will be followed here because of its 












Although Smith does not recommend using an isentropic expansion factor for the case VR ≤ 2, it 
will be used here for comparison. 












                                                                                                                                            









                                                                                                                                  
According to the previous calculation by the direct integration method, the choking pressure is 
30.61 bara. Thus  
𝜌@ 45.01 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎 = 156.6
𝑘𝑔
𝑚3
  ν = 0.006385 m
3
/kg 





𝜌@ 30.61 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎 = 90.73
𝑘𝑔
𝑚3







































= 1059 𝑚𝑚2 
Case 3. Calculation using ideal gas specific heat ratio 
In this case the Cp/Cv ideal at the relieving temperature is 1.014 and the compressibility factor 


























= 921 𝑚𝑚2 
The chocked pressure is: 












= 27.16 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎 
Case 4. Calculation using real gas specific heat ratio 
Using the equation of Kim e al. (2011) with the design basis:  Cp/Cv real = 8.534 and Z = 1 












= 7.67 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎 


























= 816 𝑚𝑚2 
 
Case 5. Calculation using ideal gas specific heat ratio and Z = 1 
In this case Cp/Cv ideal at TR is 1.014 and Z = 1 and  𝜓𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.431 as in case 3 
The required area according to the AD Merkblatt-A2 (2006) is 











= 1455 𝑚𝑚2 
In Table 6-7 a summary of results is presented: 
Table 6-7. Comparison of sizing methods when the compressibility factor Z < 0.8 





















1.2 (1) 85.0 -- 0.400 859 No 
1. Direct 
integration 
-- 89.5 -- -- 1055 -- 
2. Using the 
isentropic 
expansion factor 
-- 89.5 0.706 0.400 1059 -- 
3.Using  ideal 
gas specific heat 
ratio at relieving 
conditions 
1.014 89.5 -- 0.400 921 No 
4.Using real gas  
specific heat 
ratio 
-- 89.5 8.534 (2) 1.0 816 No 
5.Using ideal 
gas specific heat 
at relieving 
conditions and Z 
= 1 
1.014 89.5 -- 1.0 1455 Yes 
                             Notes: 
(1) It is not clear how this value was obtained by the Engineering Company. It was 
common practice before using process simulators to take the predominant component 
in a stream and find the ideal gas specific heat ratio at standard conditions for that 
component (so, using table 7 of API 520, part I, 2014 would have yielded 1.15 for 
propylene, rounded to 1.2).  
(2) The isentropic expansion coefficient in this case was estimated to be the real gas 
specific heat ratio. 
Considerations 
 Accepting that the exact method is the direct integration one, the required area (1055 
mm
2
) is higher than the original value calculated by the original company (859 mm
2
). 
Therefore the valve is undersized 
 As pointed out by Shackelford (2003), Kim et al. (2011), Singh (2011) and Smith and 
Burgess (2015), the use of the isentropic expansion factor matches the results of the 
more tedious direct integration method. In this case study, the agreement is very good: 
1055 mm
2
 vs. 1059 mm
2
. This result contradicts the recommendation of Smith and 
Burgess (2015) of avoiding the isentropic expansion factor when the reduced volume is 
less than 2. In this case it was 1.33 
 The use of the ideal gas specific heat ratio and a compressibility factor equal to 1 is 
likely to produce a conservative result. However, in no case should the real gas specific 
heat ratio be used as the isentropic expansion factor, because this can lead to significant 
underprediction of the required discharge area 
 The use of the ideal gas specific heat ratio and the actual compressibility factor can 
underpredict the required area for conditions below the critical point, as already 
reported by Shackelford (2003). This case corresponds to the original engineering 
company calculation, which reported a required area of 859 mm
2
, undersizing the 
pressure relief valve YS 414/1-2 for this scenario. However, the installed area is 1256 







, higher than the 1055 mm
2
 required. Also, no mitigation actions are required for 
this case. 
6.3 Comparison of different methods for the design of pressure relief 
valves with two-phase flow  
A case study will be performed for the pressure relief valve YS860/10 which protects a heat 
exchanger in case of tube rupture. The required two-phase relief load has been calculated in 
section 6.6. At the inlet of the tube side there is a two-phase mixture of hydrocarbons that is 
cooled from 41.9 ºC to 18 ºC. At the inlet of the shell side there is propylene liquid at -9 ºC 
which is evaporated keeping a constant level in the shell with a level control which acts on the 
control valve at the inlet. On the dome of the shell there is an extra volume (horizontal vessel) to 
avoid any entrainment of propylene liquid flowing to the compressor suction.   
A scheme of the installation showing the position of YS 860/10 on the shell of the heat 








Figure 6-3. Scheme of YS 860/10 installation. 
Design basis 
All physical and thermodynamic properties are obtained through the Aspen Hysys v7.3 with 
Peng Robinson as EOS. 
The relieving properties of the two phase hydrocarbon mixture at the inlet of the safety valve 
are: 
Set pressure (SP): 25 barg; Relieving pressure (PR): 25 · 1.1 + 1.013 = 28.513 bara; Total back 
pressure (Pb): 1 barg (estimated); Wv = 6674 kg/h; WL = 19728 kg/h; TR = 33 ºC = 306.15 K; 
Quality (mass fraction of vapor): 0.2528; Entropy of the inlet mixture: 2.008 kJ/kgºC and k = 
1.125 (ideal at 33 ºC). 
According to the manufacturer of the valve, the model Leser 4564.6062 has a certified 
coefficient of discharge for gas of 0.8 and for liquid 0.54. 




Inlet mixture Inlet vapor Inlet liquid 
Ethylene 0.2155 0.3546 0.1684 
Ethane 0.0314 0.0436 0.0273 
Propylene 0.7084 0.5661 0.7565 
LC 
W867 
- 9 ºC 
3.42 barg 
Líquid 
SP = 25barg 
41.9 ºC 
Líquid + vapor 
35.8 barg 








Inlet mixture Inlet vapor Inlet liquid 
Propane 0.0418 0.0312 0.0454 
n-heptane 0.0015 0.0001 0.0020 
Methane 0.0003 0.0007 0.0001 
Hydrogen 0.0011 0.0037 0.0002 
 
Calculation of the required area (API 520, part I, 1993) 
It was only in March 1993 that API published the first procedure for calculating the required 
area of a pressure relief valve for two-phase flow. API wrote “This is a reasonable and 
conservative method”. The method consists of adding the required areas of the vapor and the 
liquid at the exit of the valve but at the inlet conditions. In summary, the procedure is: 
a) Determine the quantity of liquid that flashes by isenthalpic expansion from relieving 
condition to the critical downstream pressure for the flashed vapor or the back pressure, 
whichever is greater. 
b) Calculate the orifice area to pass the flashed vapor. 
c) Calculate the orifice area to pass the flashed liquid. The pressure drop is the inlet 
relieving pressure minus the backpressure. However, Wong (1992) wrote that it should 
be not the backpressure, but the critical pressure which is to be subtracted. Here the API 
criteria has been followed. 
d) Add the individual areas. 
Thus, 












= 16.52 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎 
𝑃𝑏 = 1 + 1.013 = 2.013 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎 < 16.52 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎  critical flow  
Performing an isenthalpic flash from 28.513 bara and 33 ºC to 16.52 bara: 
28.513 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎
33 ℃







𝑃 = 16.52 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎; 𝑇 = 13.8 ℃;𝑍 = 0.804




𝑃 = 16.52 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎; 𝑇 = 13.8 ℃;  𝜌 = 497 𝑘𝑔/𝑚3
 
 
Using the procedure provided in AD Merkblatt-A2 (2006) for single phases 
Vapor phase  
Wv = 0.3928 · 26400 = 10370 kg/h 
































0.448 ∙ 0.8 ∙ 28.513
√
(273.15 + 13.8) ∙ 0.804
33.75
 
𝐴0 = 475 𝑚𝑚
2 
Liquid phase 






0.54 ∙ √11.99 ∙ 497
= 239 𝑚𝑚2 
𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 = 475 𝑚𝑚
2 + 239 𝑚𝑚2 = 714 𝑚𝑚2 
Calculation of the required area (VdTÜV, 1973) 
According to the German publication VdTÜV- Merkblatt Sicherheitsventile 100/2 January 1973 
edition, the same procedure applies but multiplied by a factor of 1.2 
Thus,  
𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 = 1.2 ∙  714 = 857 𝑚𝑚
2 
Calculation of the required area (API 520, part I, 2008) 
Using the procedure described in paragraph C2.2 of API 520 (part I, 2008) known as “2 point-




− 1)                                                                                                                                        
Where 𝜈9 is the specific volume evaluated at 90% of the PRV inlet pressure P0 in m
3
/kg and 𝜈0 
is the specific volume of the two phase system at the PRV inlet in m
3
/kg. 
Performing an isenthalpic flash with Aspen Hysys v7.3 with Peng Robisnson as EOS from 
28.513 bara and 33 ºC to 25.66 bara, on get: 
𝜈9 = 0.007887 𝑚
3/𝑘𝑔 and 𝜈0 = 0.006528 𝑚




− 1) = 9(
0.007887
0.006528
− 1) = 1.874 
The critical pressure ratio ηc is calculated by 
𝜂𝑐
2 + (𝜔2 − 2𝜔)(1 − 𝜂𝑐)
2 + 2𝜔2 ln 𝜂𝑐 + 2𝜔
2(1 − 𝜂𝑐) = 0                                                        
𝜂𝑐
2 + (1.8742 − 2 ∙ 1.874)(1 − 𝜂𝑐)
2 + 21.8742 ln 𝜂𝑐 + 21.874
2(1 − 𝜂𝑐) = 0 
By trial and error 
𝜂𝑐 = 0.685 
Thus 𝑃𝑐 = 𝜂𝑐 ∙ 𝑃0 = 0.685 ∙ 28.513 = 19.53 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎 





𝑃𝑎 = 1 + 1.013 = 2.013 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎 
19.53 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎 > 2.013 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎  critical flow 













0.85 ∙ 1 ∙ 1 ∙ 1 ∙ 10458
= 825 𝑚𝑚2 
A = 825 mm
2
 
Calculation of the required area (ISO 4126-10, 2010) with boiling delay 
The procedure of ISO 4126-10 will be followed using the same nomenclature as the original 
source. The critical pressure of the mixture is 56.53 bara and the critical temperature is 72.5 ºC, 
according to the results of Aspen Hysys v7.3 with Peng Robinson as EOS. 








= 0.5 < 0.5  check (limit) 
The Pred is in the limit, however, as pointed out by Schmidt (Schmidt, Egan, 2009) the 
permissible range is wider as currently accepted by the omega models. 












                                                                                 
Giving values using the results of previous isenthalpic flash simulation:  
?̇?0 = 0.2528; νg,0 = 0.0192 m
3
/kg; k0 = 1.125 (ideal); ν0 = ?̇?0 ∙ 𝜈𝑔,0 + (1 − ?̇?0) ∙ 𝜈𝑙,0 = 0.2528 · 
0.0192 + 0.7472 · 0.00224 = 0.00653 m
3
/kg; Cpl,0 = 3372 J/kg K; P0 = 2851300 Pa; T0 = 306 K; 
νl,0 = 0.002237 m
3













= 0.661 + 0.649 
= 1.31 
Because  𝜔𝑒𝑞 = 1.31, the critical pressure ratio ηcrit has to be calculated by trial and error 
0 =  𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡
2 + (𝜔2 − 2𝜔) ∙ (1 − 𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡)
2 + 2𝜔2 ln 𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡+2𝜔
2(1 − 𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡) 
0 =  𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡
2 + (1.312 − 2 ∙ 1.31) ∙ (1 − 𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡)
2 + 2 ∙ 1.312 ln 𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡+2·1.31
2(1 − 𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡) 







 = 0.115 





𝜂𝑏  < 𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡  therefore the flow is choked 
The boiling delay factor is 








                                                                        









The compressibility coefficient is ω = 1.31 · 0.6677 = 0.875 
To calculate the discharge coefficient the method needs the void fraction in the valve seat area 
𝜀𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡. 










0.64 − 1) + 1]
= 0.770 
𝐾𝑑𝑟,2𝑝ℎ = 𝐾𝑑𝑟,𝑔 ∙ 𝜀𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡 + (1 − 𝜀𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡) ∙ 𝐾𝑑𝑟,𝑙 = 0.8 ∙ 0.77 + 0.23 ∙ 0.54 = 0.740 














) − (0.875 − 1)(1 − 0.640)
0.875 (
1
0.640 − 1) + 1
= 0.442 
The mass flux is calculated by 
?̇?𝑆𝑉 = 𝐾𝑑𝑟,2𝑝ℎ ∙ 𝐶 ∙ √
2 ∙ 𝑃0
𝜈0
















= 760 𝑚𝑚2 
Calculation of the required area (ISO 4126-10, 2010) without boiling delay 
According to the ISO norm, the boiling delay factor N is recommended in case of saturated 
liquid or low quality mixtures. In this case the quality is 25.28 % and the liquid is saturated, but 
in reality it is a mixture in equilibrium. Also, the required area could be calculated with N = 1 as 
a conservative estimate as well 
Thus, 𝜔 = 1.31  and  ηcrit = 0.640 










0.64 − 1) + 1]
= 0.803 
𝐾𝑑𝑟,2𝑝ℎ = 𝐾𝑑𝑟,𝑔 ∙ 𝜀𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡 + (1 − 𝜀𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡) ∙ 𝐾𝑑𝑟,𝑙 = 0.8 ∙ 0.803 + 0.197 ∙ 0.54 = 0.749 






















− 1) + 1
 
𝐶 = 0.396 
?̇?𝑆𝑉 = 𝐾𝑑𝑟,2𝑝ℎ ∙ 𝐶 ∙ √
2 ∙ 𝑃0
𝜈0















= 837 𝑚𝑚2 
Calculation of the required area (Simpson Method) 
Simpson (1991) presented a generalized equation that requires an integration along an isentropic 
path from the inlet pressure toward the downstream pressure until a maximum mass velocity is 
found. Some simplifications are taken to facilitate the integration. The Simpson model with 
small variations is available on a compact disc that accompanies the CCPS Guideline book 
“Pressure relief and effluent handling systems” (CCPS, 1998). The program is TPHEM. This 
program has been converted to an excel spreadsheet because it was available for DOS operating 
systems only.  The spreadsheet gave the following results working with the 2-point option 
model: 
Considering an isenthalpic flash  
Performing an isenthalpic flash with Aspen Hysys v7.3 from the relieving pressure to 80% of 
this pressure as recommended by CCPS: 0.80 · 28.513 = 22.810 bara with Peng Robinson as 
EOS: 
𝑃𝑅 = 28.513 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎
𝑇𝑅 = 33 ℃
𝜌𝑉 = 3.248 
𝑙𝑏
𝑓𝑡3














𝑃 = 22.810 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎
𝑇 = 25 ℃
𝜌𝑉 = 2.548 
𝑙𝑏
𝑓𝑡3





The discharge coefficient adopted is 0.84 as recommended by CCPS (1998) in a similar 
example. 
Area required = 814 mm
2 
Considering an isentropic flash  
Again the two reference points would be the relieving pressure and 80% of this pressure but in 
this case considering an isentropic flash, performed with the same process simulator and the 
same parameters as before: 
𝑃𝑅 = 28.513 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎
𝑇𝑅 = 33 ℃
𝜌𝑉 = 3.248 
𝑙𝑏
𝑓𝑡3














𝑃 = 22.810 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎
𝑇 = 25 ℃
𝜌𝑉 = 2.539 
𝑙𝑏
𝑓𝑡3










Area required = 792 mm
2 
Calculation of the required area (Direct Integration method) 
The procedure explained in API 520 (part I, 2008) paragraph C.2.2 Annex C, will be used. 





















                                                                                                                       
The isentropic flashes have been performed taking steps of 4% of the relieving pressure, i.e. 
1.140 bar as it is used in the API example. Again Peng Robinson as EOS is used in the Aspen 













2851000 33.00 153.2 0 0 0 
2737000 31.47 144.1 -766.9 -766.9 5643 
2623000 29.87 135.3 -816.0 -1582.9 7613 
2509000 28.21 126.8 -869.9 -2452.8 8881 
2395000 26.48 118.6 -929.1 -3381.9 9754 
2281000 24.66 110.7 -994.3 -4376.2 10356 
2167000 22.76 103.1 -1066.4 -5442.6 10757 
2053000 20.78 95.77 -1146.5 -6589.1 10994 
1939000 18.69 88.70 -1235.9 -7825.1 11096 
1825000 16.50 81.90 -1336.4 -9161.5 11086 
1711000 14.19 75.34 -1450.0 -10611.5 10975 
1597000 11.75 69.02 -1579.4 -12190.9 10777 
 
The maximum mass flow (critical flow) occurs at 19.39 bara and 18.7 ºC 






0.8 ∙ 1 ∙ 1 ∙ 1 ∙ 11096
= 826 𝑚𝑚2 
Note that the length between the inlet of the valve and the seating surface is 150 mm for a Leser 
model 4564.6062 valve (DN50xDN80). Because 150 mm > 100 mm, the thermodynamic 
equilibrium is reached and it is not necessary to apply the Homogeneous Non-equilibrium 
Direct Integration Method as proposed by Darby et al. (2002). Moreover, as stated by the same 
author (Darby, 2004) the recommended value for the discharge coefficient for two phase choked 
flow is the manufacturer value for the gas/vapor. In this case Kd = 0.8. 
Summary of results for the required area 
In Table 6-8 the results of the required area for tube rupture scenario of YS 860/10 are 
presented: 
Table 6-8. Required area for YS 860/10 in case of tube rupture with two-phase flow.  





Installed area 1256.6 152 





API 520-1993 714 86 
VdTÜV-1973 857 104 
API 520-2008 (2 point-ω-method) 825 100 
ISO 4126-10 (No boiling delay) 837 101 
ISO 4126-10 (With boiling delay) 760 92 
Simpson method (isenthalpic) 814 99 
Simpson method (isentropic) 792 96 
Direct integration 826 100 
 
Considerations 
 The discharge coefficients for each model have been taken as recommended by the 
bibliographical source, i.e. no changes between models and discharge coefficients have 
been performed 
 Accepting the value of the required area calculated by the Direct Integration method of 
826 mm
2
 as the most exact, it is concluded that the method of API 520-2008 (2 point-ω-
method) gives the best results and requires only two points of the isentropic path 
 Only the methods of  VdTÜV-1973 and ISO 4126-10 (no boiling delay) overpredict the 
required area and are conservative, the other methods API 520-1993, ISO 4126-10 (with 
boiling delay), Simpson (isenthalpic) and Simpson (isentropic) underpredict the 
required area 
 It seems that the API 520 (2008) and the ISO 4126-10 (No boiling delay) give the best 
results and in the case of ISO only the relieving data is required, i.e. no 
isenthalpic/isentropic calculations. 
 As stated by some sources (API 520, ISO 4126-10, etc.),  the isenthalpic calculation is 
more conservative than the isentropic 
 In any case the safety valve has an oversizing of 152 %.That means a safety side design. 
6.4 Relieving of supercritical fluids with retrograde condensation 
In the three petrochemical plants studied here, there are some cases in which the relieving fluid 
is propylene at supercritical condition, which suffers condensation at the outlet of the valve. 
This case has been elected as a suitable case study due to its complexity. The pressure relief 
valve YS702/01 is a representative item of this phenomenon. Moreover, a comparison between 
different methods, both rigorous and simplified, will be performed. The theoretical framework 
of the process has been already explained in section 4-3. 
Design basis 
The pressure relief valve YS702-1 protects the shell of a heat exchanger which cools a 
propylene stream through cooling water in the tubes. There is no phase change in both sides of 
the heat exchanger. The scenario analyzed is external fire. Figure 6-4 gives a simplified diagram 
of the installation and Figure 6-5 is a picture of the heat exchanger and the pressure relief valve. 





          
Figure 6-4. Scheme of YS702/01 installation                Figure 6-5. Picture of YS702/01 and equipment 
 
 From the specification sheet of YS702/01: 
Set pressure: 45 barg; Relieving pressure: 1.1 x 45 + 1.013 = 50.513 bara = 732.6 psia; 
Overpressure: 10%; Insulation: No; Manufacturer/Model: LESER/4564.6052 without bellows; 
Area of the valve: 314.16 mm
2
;αd,DG = 0.8 certified and αd,F = 0.6 certified. 
Propylene critical pressure: 46.646 bara      (source: http://webbook.nist.gov/chemistry/fluid/) 
Propylene critical temperature: 92.42 ºC       (source: http://webbook.nist.gov/chemistry/fluid/) 
The shell side is full of propylene liquid at 16.2 barg and 42 ºC when the fire begins. As stated 
in API 521 (2014) the heat exchanger remains blocked during the fire contingency. The heat 
exchanger is installed at less than 7.6 m from the ground of the plant. 
The process that the blocked propylene suffers when the fire starts is represented by the Mollier 
diagram showed in Figure 6-6. 






Figure 6-6. Relieving path followed by YS702-1(supercritical fluid with retrograde condensation). 
Step 1. The liquid blocked in the shell of the heat exchanger at 16.2 barg and 42 ºC (the density 
of 472.67 kg/m
3
 remains constant) has an isochoric transformation until it reaches the set 
pressure (45 barg) (curve 1 of the diagram). At this point,  YS702/01 begins to open and 
depending on the relieving load the pressure increases up to the relieving pressure (50.5 barg), 
which corresponds to a relieving temperature of 45.5 ºC. 
Step 2. The relieving of the subcooled liquid propylene through the valve suffers an isentropic 
transformation and flashing flow is produced at the outlet. (curve 2 of the diagram). The 
temperature of the liquid propylene increases until it reaches its critical temperature, i.e. 92.42 
ºC and transforms to its gas phase without boiling. 
Step 3. The relieving of the supercritical propylene gives two-phase flow at the outlet. (curve 3 
of the diagram). This phenomenon is called retrograde condensation. The cricondentherm 
concept (Dole et al., 2014), is the maximum temperature above which liquid cannot be formed, 
regardless of pressure. In our case this is 132 ºC at a minimum discharge pressure of 1.4 bara 
(estimated).  
Step 4. From 132 ºC no retrograde condensation occurs and the gas relieves until the vessel 
ruptures. (curve 4 of the diagram). 
Calculation of the wetted area 
Shell of the exchanger: 𝜋𝐷𝐿 =  𝜋 ∙ 0.508 ∙ 3 = 4.79 𝑚2  
Inlet piping to the exchanger, 25 m of pipe DN 80 (OD = 88.9 mm): 𝜋𝐷𝐿 =  𝜋 ∙ 0.0889 ∙ 25 =
6.98 𝑚2 
Outlet piping from the exchanger, 5 m of pipe DN 150 (OD = 168.3 mm):  𝜋𝐷𝐿 =  𝜋 ∙ 0.1683 ∙
5 = 2.64 𝑚2 
Total wetted area = 4.79 + 6.98 + 2.64 = 14.41 m
2
 (Note: In order to get more exact values of 











Because of the characteristics of the installation, concerning the firefighting possibilities and 
drainage design, the following equation for the heat absorbed will be used, as explained in 
section 3.3 
𝑄 = 43200 ∙ 𝐹 ∙  𝐴𝑤
0.82 = 43200 ∙ 1 ∙ 14.410.82 = 385113 𝑊  
Now, following Rahimi Mofrad and Norouzi (2007) a screening of the design basis (wetted or 
unwetted) is performed. 




                                                                                                                      
where  
 𝜌𝐿 liquid density; 𝑉𝐿 liquid volume; 𝐶𝑃𝐿liquid specific heat capacity; 𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 is 92.42 ºC in this 
case, 𝑇0 operation temperature, Q total heat absorption across the wetted surface area. 
The result, 2.0 minutes, is discussed at the end of this section. 
Assuming an effective fire team response time of 20 minutes (section 4.3) from the beginning of 
the fire, 18 minutes is left for the exchanger wall being exposed to fire. As stated before, it is 
supposed that the relief requirement approaches zero after 20 minutes, because the surface of 
the vessel is cooled by the fire team. (Note: Only in this case study the 20 minutes fire duration 
concept has been applied). 
Step 1. Calculation of the relieving load 
According to the API 521 (paragraph 5.14.3, 2008)  
𝑞 =
𝛼𝑣 ∙ ∅
1000 ∙ 𝑑 ∙ 𝑐
                                                                                                                                     







→                   {
𝑃 = 50.513 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎 (𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒)
𝑇 = 45.5 ℃
}  
According to Yaws (1995)  













The specific gravity of propylene at 45.5 ºC = 0.481 (http://webbook.nist.gov/chemistry/fluid/) 




1000 ∙ 𝑑 ∙ 𝑐
=
0.0045 ∙ 385113




















Calculation of the required area 
According to API 520 (table C.1, Annex C, part I, 2008) in case of a subcooled liquid the 
procedures C.2.1 or C.2.3 can be used. 





















                                                                                                                       
Data from isentropic flashes from 50.513 bara to 1.013 bara ΔP = 49.5 bar is required 
Taking steps of 4% as in the example in API 520: 49.5 ∙ 0.04 = 1.98 𝑏𝑎𝑟 = 198000 𝑃𝑎 


















5051300 45.5 484.40 24.89 0 0 0 0 
4853300 45.3 483.95 24.89 0 -408.9 -408.9 13840 
4655300 45.0 483.50 24.89 0 -409.3 -818.2 19559 
4457300 44.8 483.05 24.89 0 -409.7 -1227.9 23938 
4259300 44.6 482.59 24.89 0 -410.1 -1638.0 27622 
4061300 44.4 482.14 24.89 0 -410.5 -2048.5 30860 
3863300 44.1 481.69 24.89 0 -410.9 -2459.4 33783 
3665300 43.9 481.24 24.89 0 -411.2 -2870.6 36464 
3467300 43.6 480.80 24.89 0 -411.6 -3282.2 38955 
3269300 43.4 480.35 24.89 0 -412.0 -3694.2 41289 
3071300 43.1 479.90 24.89 0 -412.4 -4106.6 43492 
2873300 42.9 479.46 24.89 0 -412.8 -4519.4 45583 
2675300 42.7 479.02 24.89 0 -413.1 -4932.6 47577 
2477300 42.4 478.58 24.89 0 -413.5 -5346.1 49487 
2279300 42.2 478.15 24.89 0 -413.9 -5760.0 51320 
2081300 41.9 477.71 24.89 0 -414.0 -6174.0 53084 
1883300 41.6 477.28 24.89 0 -414.7 -6588.7 54788 
1685300 41.0 455.79 24.89 0.004 -424.4 -7013.1 53980 
1487300 35.6 278.22 24.89 0.053 -539.5 -7552.6 34194 
1289300 29.6 183.37 24.89 0.099 -857.9 -8410.5 23782 
1091300 22.9 124.63 24.89 0.145    
893300 15.3 84.86 24.89 0.191    
695300 6.3 56.31 24.89 0.237    
 
The required area can be calculated according the equation C.9 of API 520 (2008) 
𝐴 =
277.8 ∙ 𝑊
𝐾𝑑 ∙ 𝐾𝑏 ∙ 𝐾𝑐 ∙ 𝐾𝑣 ∙ 𝐺
                                                                                                                         
where  
A required effective discharge area, mm
2
; W mass flow rate, kg/h; Kd= 0.65 because of 
subcooled liquid; Kb = 1 no balanced valve; Kc = 1 no rupture disc installed; Kv = 1 viscosity 
correction factor. 








0.65 ∙ 1 ∙ 1 ∙ 1 ∙ 54788
= 17.6 𝑚𝑚2 
Using the procedure C.2.3 (Omega method)  




− 1)                                                                                                                                   
where 
𝜌𝑙𝑜 liquid density at the inlet of the valve, kg/m
3
; 𝜌9 density at 90% of the vapor pressure at the 
inlet relieving temperature. 
Thus,  
Vapor pressure at 45.5 ºC = 18.673 bara (saturated) 
90% of 18.673 bara = 16.806 bara 









→             {
16.806 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎








− 1) = 9 (
484
453
− 1) = 0.616 






1 + 2 ∙ 0.616
 = 0.552 
Comparing 𝑃𝑠: 𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑃0 
18.673 bara : 0.552 · 50.513 bara → 18.673 bara < 27.883 bara → the fluid is in the high 
subcooling region 
Determination if the flow is critical/subcritical.  
Ps versus Pa will be compared 
Ps = 18.673 bara 







= 0.054 →  Critical flow 
For the high subcooling region, the mass flux is (equation C.4.4 of API 520 (2008)): 





𝐺 = 1.414 (𝜌𝑙𝑜(𝑃0 − 𝑃𝑠))
0.5










                                                                                                                            
where 
Q = 4690 l/h = 78.2 l/min; 𝜌𝑙𝑜= 484 kg/m
3
;Kd = 0.65 (subcooled liquid); Kb = 1 (no bellows); Kv 




0.65 ∙ 1 ∙ 1 ∙ 55508
= 17.5 𝑚𝑚2 
Using the procedure HNE-DS modified by Schmidt (2007) 
Schmidt (2007) has extended the original range of the application of the HNE-DS method 
including subcooled liquid. The same nomenclature will be followed here as in the original 
article. 








The condition for PR is not fulfilled. However, the procedure will be followed taking the results 
with caution. 
Input data: P0 = 50.513 bara; T0 = 45.5 ºC = 318.65 K; q = 4.69 m
3
/h = 2256 kg/h and x0 = 0 
(inlet mass flow quality) 
Other conditions: Psat (T0) = 18.6 bara; ΔHν0 at Psat = 290 kJ/kg; Cpl0 at P0 = 2979 J/kgºK; νl0 at 




 = 0.002148 m
3
/kg; νg0 at Psat = 0.02442 m
3
/kg; Pb = 1 bara. (Data from 
webbook.nist.gov) 
Certified derated discharge coefficients: Kdg = 0.8 and Kdl = 0.6 (from Leser data sheet) 












Calculation of maximal flow coefficient and critical pressure ratio: 







= 0.10889  and  j = 0,1,…,9 
η0 = 1- interval·j = 1-0.10889·0 = 1; η1 = 1-0.10889·1 = 0.8911; η2 = 0.7822; η3 = 0.6733…η9 = 
0.0199 and 














  for j = 0  































∙ 𝑁0 = 4.845 ∙ 𝑁0   and 
𝐶𝑗 =
√(1 − 𝜂𝑠) + [𝜔𝑗 ∙ 𝜂𝑠 ∙ ln (
𝜂𝑠
𝜂𝑗




− 1) + 1
 
𝐶0 =
√(1 − 0.368) + [𝜔0 ∙ 0.368 ∙ ln (
0.368
𝜂0




− 1) + 1
 
Thus 
η Nj ωj Cj 
η0 = 1 -- -- -- 
η1 = 0.8911 -- -- -- 
η2 = 0.7822 -- -- -- 
η3 = 0.6733 -- -- -- 
η4 = 0.5644 -- -- -- 
η5 = 0.4555 -- -- -- 
η6 = 0.3466 0.0015 0.0073 0.808 
0.34 0.00246 0.01192 0.812 
0.33 0.00441 0.02136 0.817 
0.32 0.00694 0.03361 0.821 
0.31 0.01012 0.04904 0.823 
0.30 0.01385 0.06711 0.824 
0.29 0.01832 0.08877 0.823 
0.28 0.02353 0.11403 0.820 
η7 = 0.2377 0.0554 0.2684 0.765 
η8 = 0.1288 0.2732 1.3236 0.298 
η9 = 0.0199 0.1.7587 8.5209 0.018 
 
According to the results the maximum value of Cj is 0.824, and ηmax = 0.30 pressure ratio; Nmax 
= 0.01385 boiling delay factor; ωmax = 0.06711 compressibility coefficient.  
The two-phase discharge coefficient 









0.30 − 1) + 1]
= 0.13 
And the derated two-phase discharge coefficient of the safety valve is: 
𝐾𝑑2𝑝ℎ = 𝐾𝑑𝑔 ∙ 𝜀 + (1 − 𝜀) ∙ 𝐾𝑑𝑙 = 0.8 ∙ 0.13 + 0.87 ∙ 0.6 = 0.626 





𝑚𝑠𝑣 = 𝐾𝑑2𝑝ℎ ∙ 𝐶 ∙ √
2𝑃0
𝜈0

















= 0.0000177 𝑚2 = 17.7 𝑚𝑚2 
Step 2. Calculation of the relieving load 
At the critical temperature point, the relieving conditions are: 





→                      {
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑅𝑉
1.013 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑎 (𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑)
 
Following the same procedure as in step 1 
According to the Yaws (1995), the expansion coefficient 𝛼𝑣 will be calculated by: 






The experimental value at 25 ºC according the paper is 




Because the maximal value that can be used in the equation presented by Yaws for the 
propylene is 346,52 K = 73.37 ºC too far from the critical temperature, a value of 90 ºC will be 
used as an approximation 









Using the NIST webbook (http://webbook.nist.gov/chemistry/fluid/): 
Specific gravity propylene at 92.42 ºC = 0.327; Cp propylene at 92.42 ºC = 1.7009 kcal/kg K = 




1000 ∙ 𝑑 ∙ 𝑐
=
0.044 ∙ 385113















Calculation of the required area 
According to API 520 (table C.1, Annex C, 2008) in case of saturated liquid the procedures 
C.2.1 or C.2.3 can be used. 
Using the procedure C.2.1 Direct Integration 
Performing an isentropic flash like in step 1, and using the same decrements in pressure on get: 
Pressure Temperature Density Entropy Mass Integrand Summation Mass flux 





Pascals ºC kg/m3 kJ/kmolºC quality m2/s2 m2/s2 kg/s m2 
5051300 92.4 297.3 47.53 0 0 0 0 
4853300 91.3 293.6 47.53 0 -670.2 -670.2 10749 
4655300 90.1 291.8 47.53 0 -676.5 -1346.7 15144 
4457300 88.8 291.5 47.53 0 -678.9 -2025.6 18554 
4259300 87.2 286.4 47.53 0.035 -685.2 -2710.8 21088 
4061300 84.6 257.7 47.53 0.16 -727.8 -3438.6 21370 
3863300 81.8 231.5 47.53 0.24 -809.5 -4248.0 21338 
3665300 78.9 207.7 47.53 0.30 -901.6 -5149.6 21078 
3467300 76.0 186.2 47.53 0.34 -1005.3 -6154.9 20659 
3269300 72.9 166.6 47.53 0.38    
3071300 69.6 148.7 47.53 0.41    
2873300 66.2 132.7 47.53 0.43    
2675300 62.6 118.2 47.53 0.46    
2477300 58.8 105.0 47.53 0.48    
2279300 54.8 92.8 47.53 0.50    
2081300 50.5 81.7 47.53 0.52    
1883300 45.9 71.3 47.53 0.54    
1685300 41.0 61.7 47.53 0.56    
1487300 35.6 52.8 47.53 0.575    
1289300 29.6 44.4 47.53 0.59    
1091300 22.9 36.6 47.53 0.61    
893300 15.3 29.3 47.53 0.62    
695300 6.3 22.3 47.53 0.64    
 
The required relieving area can be calculated according to equation C.9 of API 520 (2008) 
𝐴 =
277.8 ∙ 𝑊
𝐾𝑑 ∙ 𝐾𝑏 ∙ 𝐾𝑐 ∙ 𝐾𝑣 ∙ 𝐺
                                                                                                                         
where  
A required effective discharge area, mm
2
; W mass flow rate, kg/h; Kd = 0.85 because of 





0.85 ∙ 1 ∙ 1 ∙ 1 ∙ 21370
= 133.8 𝑚𝑚2 
It is questionable if Kd is 0.85 because of saturated liquid, is as a matter of fact a supercritical 
fluid and the proposed value of 0.975 could be used according to Annex B of API 521-2008 and 
is the value used by Ouderkirk (2002). However, as a conservative basis the value of 0.85, has 
been adopted in this work. 
Step 3. Calculation of the relieving load 
From 92,42 ºC till 132 ºC there is retrograde condensation. As stated in section 4.3 the 
Ouderkirk method will be followed. 
Relieving load calculation and required area according to Ouderkirk method 
The first part of the method deals with the search for the maximal volumetric flow and mass 
flow relieved at the relieving pressure of 50.513 bara. 
The following design basis will be followed: 
a) Increase of temperature will be ΔT = 5 ºC from the critical temperature.  





b) Between the maximal volumetric flow and the maximal mass flow, the ΔT will be 
decreased to 1ºC 
c) The thermodynamic properties are obtained from Aspen-Hysys v7.6 and Peng Robinson 
as EOS 












































50.513 92.42 1.8549 485.10 0.0030548 0.008701 2.848 
50.513 97.42 2.0580 559.96 0.0047462 0.013894 2.927 
50.513 102.42 2.2122 617.43 0.0068196 0.014466 2.121 
50.513 107.42 2.2835 644.38 0.0078319 0.014010 1.789 
50.513 112.42 2.3379 665.20 0.0085893 0.013502 1.572 
50.513 117.42 2.3845 683.28 0.0092232 0.013049 1.414 
50.513 122.42 2.4265 699.76 0.0097816 0.012614 1.289 
50.513 127.42 2.4653 715.22 0.010288 0.012227 1.195 
50.513 132.42 2.5019 729.96 0.010756 0.011870 1.103 
50.513 137.42 2.5367 744.17 0.011194 0.011564 1.033 
50.513 142.42 2.5701 757.99 0.011609 0.011251 0.969 
50.513 147.42 2.6025 771.51 0.012004 --- --- 
 
From the table the temperature for the maximal mass flow is 97.42 ºC and the temperature for 
the maximal volumetric flow is 102.42 ºC. New calculations will be made to get more precision. 















50.513 94.42 1.9018 502.27 0.0033138 0.007274 2.195 
50.513 95.42 1.9365 515.04 0.003555 0.008960 2.520 
50.513 96.42 1.9893 534.54 0.0040087 0.011173 2.787 
50.513 97.42 2.0580 559.96 0.0047462 0.013040 2.747 
50.513 98.42 2.1103 579.37 0.0054034 0.013996 2.590 
50.513 99.42 2.1454 592.44 0.0058784 0.014394 2.4486 
50.513 100.42 2.1719 602.31 0.0062473 0.014554 2.3296 
50.513 101.42 2.1936 610.42 0.0065538 0.014602 2.228 
50.513 102.42 2.2122 617.43 0.0068196 0.014586 2.139 
50.513 103.42 2.2289 623.69 0.0070567 --- --- 
 
The results show that the maximal mass flow happens at 96.42 ºC and the maximal volumetric 
flow happens at 101.42 ºC. 
The second part of the method deals with the calculation of the required area. The following 
design basis will be followed: 
a) The maximal area would be between 96.42 ºC and 101.42 ºC.  
b) Isentropic flashes with Aspen Hysys v7.6 with Peng Robinson as EOS will be used. 
c) For the sake of simplicity only 4 points will be selected in the interval, with a ΔT of 2 












1 50.513 96.42 1.98 1.259 400.5 





2 50.513 98.42 1.98 1.355 436.4 
3 50.513 100.42 1.98 1.409 456.3 
 50.513 102.42 1.98 1.445 469.9 
 
d) According to Ouderkirk (2002), the mass flux G, will be calculated by: 
𝐺 =
√2(𝐻0 −𝐻𝑏)  ∙ 101.96 ∙ 9.81
𝑉𝑏
                                                                                    
where  
G is the mass flux, kg/m
2
s; H0 is the enthalpy at initial point, kJ/kg; Hb is the enthalpy at 



















96.42 50.513 0.004340 H0 = 400.5 --- 
94.41 48.533 0.004442 399.7 9001 
92.24 46.553 0.004558 398.8 12788 
89.80 44.573 0.004854 397.8 15133 
87.23 42.593 0.005252 396.8 16373 
84.57 40.613 0.005701 395.7 17179 
81.81 38.633 0.006203 394.5 17653 
78.95 36.653 0.006766 393.2 17851 
75.97 34.673 0.007396 391.8 17828 
72.86 32.693 0.008110 390.3 17167 
 











98.42 50.513 0.005455 H0 = 436.4 --- 
95.74 48.533 0.005646 435.3 8304 
92.85 46.553 0.005858 434.1 11573 
89.80 44.573 0.006120 432.9 13665 
87.23 42.593 0.006566 431.7 14760 
84.57 40.613 0.007062 430.3 15634 
81.81 38.633 0.007616 428.9 16075 
78.95 36.653 0.008230 427.3 16385 
75.97 34.673 0.008913 425.6 16482 
72.86 32.693 0.009690 423.7 16441 
69.61 30.713 0.010560 421.7 16230 
 











100.42 50.513 0.006184 H0 = 456.3 --- 
97.54 48.533 0.006427 455.0 7930 
94.48 46.553 0.006698 453.7 10762 
91.21 44.573 0.007003 452.4 12606 
87.81 42.593 0.007353 451.0 13996 
84.57 40.613 0.007819 449.5 14909 
81.81 38.633 0.008396 447.9 15431 
78.95 36.653 0.009033 446.1 15806 
75.97 34.673 0.009756 444.3 15873 
72.86 32.693 0.010557 442.2 15900 
69.62 30.713 0.011466 440.1 15692 















66.21 28.733 0.012497 437.7 15427 
 











102.42 50.513 0.006702 469.9 --- 
99.50 48.533 0.0069735 468.5 7585 
96.40 46.553 0.007283 467.1 10271 
93.12 44.573 0.007628 465.7 12010 
89.65 42.593 0.008013 464.1 13435 
85.99 40.613 0.008453 462.5 14386 
82.11 38.633 0.008952 460.8 15064 
78.95 36.653 0.009588 458.9 15463 
75.97 34.673 0.010323 457.0 15554 
72.86 32.693 0.011151 454.8 15578 
69.61 30.713 0.012084 452.5 15431 
66.21 28.733 0.013142 450.0 15174 
 
For the 4 points with the higher mass flux, the required area will be calculated according to: 
𝐴 =
?̇?
𝐺𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑 ∙ 𝐾𝑏 ∙ 𝐾𝑐 ∙ 𝐾𝑑 ∙ 𝐾𝑣
 ∙ 106                                                                                               
where  
A required area mm
2
; ?̇? mass flow, kg/s; 𝐺𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑is the choked mass flux, kg/m
2
s; Kb = 1  
assuming  a backpressure < 10% of the set pressure; Kc = 1 no rupture disc; Kv = 1 no viscosity 
correction; Kd = 0.8 (from LESER manufacturer, assuming vapor)  



















50.513 96.42 1.9893 534.54 0.0040087 0.011173 2.787 17851 195 
50.513 98.42 2.1103 579.37 0.0054034 0.013996 2.590 16482 196 
50.513 100.42 2.1719 602.31 0.0062473 0.014554 2.3296 15900 183 
50.513 102.42 2.2122 617.43 0.0068196 0.014586 2.139 15578 172 
 
The results from the Ouderkirk methods are: 
Relieving pressure: 50.513 bara; Relieving temperature: 98.4 ºC; Choked temperature: 76 ºC; 
Choked mass flux: 16482 kg/m
2
s and 
Area required: 196 mm
2 
The graphic representation of the Ouderkirk results is showed in Fig 6-7, where it can be 
appreciated that the maximum required orifice area stands between the maximum mass relief 
rate and the maximum volumetric relief rate, according the case studies of other authors 
(Nezami and Price, 2012; Self and Do, 2010) 






Figure 6-7. Graphical representation of Ouderkirk (2002) results for YS702/01 
Calculation of the time elapsed since the onset of the fire 
The volume of propylene is 












3 = 0.407 𝑚3 where 120 is 













5 = 0.226 𝑚3 
Total volume of propylene = 0.633 m
3 
Heat absorbed = 385113 W = 331143 kcal/h 
1
st
 Step: Liquid phase 




= 67.2 ℃ 
CP at 67.2 ºC = 0.86 kcal/kg ºC (API, Technical Data Book) 
ρ at 67.2 ºC = 410 kg/m
3
 (API, Technical Data Book) 




 = 260 kg of propylene 






 = 0.0340 ℎ = 2.04 𝑚𝑖𝑛.  
2
nd
 Step: Supercritical phase 




 ;      𝑚 =
0.633𝑚3
?̅?









































0.0 92.42 485.10 0.0030548 --- 
0.52 97.42 559.96 0.0047462 162 
0.79 102.42 617.43 0.0068196 109 
0.89 107.42 644.38 0.0078319 86 
0.96 112.42 665.20 0.0085893 77 
1.02 117.42 683.28 0.0092232 71 
1.07 122.42 699.76 0.0097816 67 
1.11 127.42 715.22 0.010288 63 
1.15 132.42 729.96 0.010756 60 
1.19 137.42 744.17 0.011194 58 
1.22 142.42 757.99 0.011609 55 
1.25 147.42 771.51 0.012004 54 
 
As a conclusion the time required for the propylene to increase in temperature from 42 ºC to 
147 ºC is 2.04 + 1.24 = 3.28 minutes 
Comparison of Ouderkirk results with the method of gas expansion of API 521 (equation 12, 
2008)  




1.1506  𝐴                                                                                 
where  
M = Molecular weight of propylene; P1 = 50.513 bara = 732.6 psia; Tw = 1560 ºR for carbon 
steel; T1 = 98.4 ºC = 669 ºR and A = 14.4 m
2




𝑞𝑚,𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓 = 0.1406√42.08 ∙ 732.6 ∙
(1560 − 669)1.25
6691.1506







Now, using the Valvestar software from Leser with 
𝐶𝑝
𝐶𝑣
 = 1.14, the required area is 139 mm2 
The result shows that the API equation is not always conservative. This result contradicts the 
results of the example developed by Doane (2010) where the author found that the difference 
between the required area calculated by the above equation is almost 3 times greater than with 
his rigorous model. 
Self and Do (2010) presented a model for supercritical fluids, that can be used for all the steps 
mentioned before, if there is no phase change. This method has been adopted in the latest 
edition of API 520 (part I, 2015) and presumably gives the most exact values. A process 
simulator is required. The results are presented in table 6-8 but the calculations are in annex D.   
Step 4. Calculation of the relieving load 
In step 4, the temperature is higher than 132 ºC and there is no retrograde condensation. No 
representative case. 
The results are summarized in the Table 6-8. 









Original design  (engineering company) 50.513 100 10000 220.6 















Taking λ = 115 kJ/kg  (API 521-2008) 50.513 100 12055 266 
Step 1 (liquid thermal expansion)  + 
Direct Integration (DI) 
50.513 45.5 2256 17.6 
Step 1 (liquid thermal expansion)  + 
Leung - Omega 
50.513 45.5 2256 17.5 
Step 1 (liquid thermal expansion) 
HNE-DS revised for subcooling 
(Schmidt, 2007) 
50.513 45.5 2256 17.7 
Step 2 Critical temperature 
Supercritical fluid expansión + DI 
50.513 92.42 8752 133.8 
Step 3 Supercritical fluid expansion + 
DI 
50.513 101.7 4656 97.1 
Step 3 Supercritical fluid expansion  +  
Leung - Omega 
50.513 101.7 4656 91.5 
Ouderkirk (2002) method  50.513 98.4 9324 196 
Self and Do (2010) method  50.513 98.8 8080 172.1 
Gas expansion with empirical equation 
12 of API 521 (2008) + Valvestar for 
gas (ignoring retrograde condensation) 
50.513 100 4695 139 
 
Considerations 
 Once the fire has started, the critical temperature is reached very fast, i.e. 2.0 minutes. 
No boiling occurs during this time. The required relieving areas during this period are 
smaller than in the supercritical phase 
 The Self and Do (2010) method is tedious in comparison with the others but is the most 
exact. A process simulator is required to perform multiples isentropic flashes at each 
relieving temperature elected and, the direct integration method of Darby (2002) is used 
at each point. In this case, any boiling delay factor has not been taken into account 
because the nozzle of the valve YS702-1 is greater than 10 cm (Darby, 2002). The 
Ouderkirk method also gives excellent results and matches the results of the first 
authors. In both cases, the effective coefficient of discharge Kd is fixed by the author as 
0.975 which corresponds to the value used by Ouderkirk in his method. The frequently 
used empirical formula in industry for supercritical gases (equation 12 of API 521, 
2008) did not give conservative results as it is demonstrated: 139 mm
2
 vs. 172.1 mm
2
. 
This result contradicts Doane’s (2010) results when he pointed out that the empirical 
formula in his case study, gives an area 300% greater than the area calculated by his 
proposed rigorous model 
 The engineering company gave conservative values for the relieving load and calculated 
the required area, ignoring retrograde condensation, with the AD Merkblatt-A2 for 
gases. And after that the elected area was 314.16 mm
2
 that means a safety factor of 
314.16/172.1  82% 
 It is demonstrated that the first phase of the relieving process before the critical 
temperature is reached is not relevant for the dimensioning of the valve  
 The extensively used formula of taking a latent heat of 115 kJ/kg in the critical region, 
gave a very conservative result. This widely accepted solution in the industry has had a 
boomerang effect because the oversizing of the valves can produce stability problems as 
is explained in this thesis (see section 4.6).  
 In the Self and Do method it is very important the selection of the time step elected for 
the calculations. In this case, 15 s were taken and the result was 172.1 mm
2
. In case of 
30 s, the required area would be 155 mm
2
.  
 Of course, there are other factors, which have big influence in the final results 
independently of the method selected, e.g. properties of the fluid near the 
thermodynamic critical point, exposed surface area, fuel composition, radiation and 





convective heat transfers, environmental conditions, etc. that have to be considered as 
well. 
 
6.5 Calculation of relieving loads in distillation columns 
In section 4.2 a critical literature review of the calculation methods for the required load in 
distillation columns in case of an overpressure has been given. A case study has been selected in 
this thesis to show the complexity of the calculation process if a rigorous model is chosen, for 
example, the unbalance heat load method (Sengupta and Staats, 1978; Houston, 2014). The 
safety valve YS6510A/B protects a propane-propylene splitter (see figure 6-21) for different 
contingencies. Here, the dimensioning case will be evaluated: cooling water failure. 
The procedure requires a process simulator, because the first step is doing a heat and mass 
balance of the column before the upset occurs. Figure 6-8 shows the flow diagram of the 
column represented as an Aspen Hysys screen. 
 
Figure 6-8. Flow diagram of the propane-propylene splitter according to Aspen Hysys v7.3. 
Cooling water failure means the loss of condensation of the head vapors of the splitter. In this 
case the reflux drum liquid level drops causing the level control of the liquid distillate to close. 
Reflux continues at a constant rate due to the flow control valve until there is no more liquid in 
the drum. The feed continues at a constant rate since its pressure, upstream of the control valve, 
is higher than the relief pressure. On flow control, the steam control valve opens wide due to the 
increase of temperature of the bottoms of the column and the reboiler chest pressure equalizes 
with the steam header pressure (a zero pressure drop is assumed across the control valve). 
The basic assumptions that must be made to enable determining the required relief load are 
exposed in section 4.2. The detailed procedure disclosed by Nezami (2008) has been followed. 
Aspen Hysys v7.3 with Peng Robinson as EOS has been used. 
In table 6-9 the properties of the feed and products are identified. 
 
 





Table 6-9 System properties for YS6510A/B. 
Column parameters Value 
Operating pressure (top), barg 15.7 
Safety valve set pressure, barg 20 
Relieving pressure, bara 23.013 
Normal condenser duty, kJ/h 4956000 
Condenser duty at relief, kJ/h 0 
Normal reboiler duty, kJ/h 4515000 
Reboiler duty at relief, kJ/h 6104000 
Top tray latent heat at relieving conditions, kJ/kg 321.1 
  
Feed properties  
Feed normal flow rate, kg/h 1235 
Feed rate at relieving conditions, kg/h 1235 
Specific enthalpy at normal conditions, kJ/kg 320.0 
Specific enthalpy at relief conditions, kJ/kg 320.0 
Bubble point specific enthalpy at relief, kJ/kg -85.3 
  





Normal flow rate, kg/h 38 1126 71 
Flowrate at relieving conditions, kg/h 45 0 71 
Specific enthalpy at normal conditions, kJ/kg 211.9 74.57 -1958 
Specific enthalpy at relief conditions 283.8 121.5 -1893 
Phase vapor liquid liquid 
Bubble point specific enthalpy at relief, kJ/kg -563.2   
 
In table 6-10 a liquid product adjusted rates and enthalpies has been performed. 






(1)Product normal flowrates, kg/h  38 1126 71 1235 
(2)Feed vapor phase flowrate at relieving, kg/h 1235 0 0 1235 
(3)Adjusted rates (1) – (2) -1197 1126 71 0 
(4)Bubble point specific enthalpies at relief, kJ/kg (4) -563.2 121.5 -1893  
(5)Total enthalpies of products (3) x (4), kJ/h 674150 136809 -134403 676556 
 
Load calculations 











The feed streams vapor contribution is calculated as: 
𝑄𝐹𝑉 = ∑(𝐻𝐹𝑉𝐷𝑖 − 𝐻𝐹𝑉𝐵𝑖)𝐹𝐹𝑉 𝑖 = [320 − (−85.3)] ∙ 1235 = 500545 
𝑘𝐽
ℎ












Vapor product credits 
𝑄𝑃𝑉 = ∑(𝐻𝑃𝑉𝐷𝑗 − 𝐻𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑗)𝐹𝑃𝑉𝑗 = [283.8 − (−563.2)] ∙ 45 = 38115
𝑘𝐽
ℎ
   























Liquids enthalpy imbalance 




The liquid product specific enthalpies and adjusted rates as well as the sum of the product total 

















It is remarked that with no liquid distillate product, the light component (propene) could get to 
the column bottom; that is why no credit has been given to the reboiler temperature pinch. 
Another point is that the vapor distillate pressure control valve keeps its position by relieving 
and the flow has been corrected taking this approximation: the flow rate through the control 
valve is proportional to √inlet pressure. 
If the gross overhead method were used and taking into account that this value is usually 
increased 20% due to the safety factor in designing the condenser, the required relieving load 
for the splitter in cooling water failure would be:  
Gross overhead vapor of the splitter: 13790 kg/h  





 As pointed out by Bradford and Durrett (1984) the gross overhead vapor method could 
undersize safety valves, as happens here: 16548 kg/h vs. 18343 kg/h. Also the 
unbalance heat load method is recommended.   
 However, with the unbalance heat load method a process simulator is required and 
depending on the products and columns configuration, convergence problems could 
appear. 
6.6 Tube rupture in heat exchangers 
There are some cases in this work where the possibility of tube breakage in heat exchangers has 
to be considered because the mechanical design does not follow the 10/13 rule (see section 3.3). 
The case study presented here refers to the pressure relief valve YS860/10 which protects a heat 
exchanger in case of tube rupture. The figure 6-3 (section 6.3) offers a scheme for the 
installation and, figure 6-9 offers pictures of the safety valve and the protected equipment. 





    
Figure 6-9. Pictures of YS860/10 and protected equipment. 
The contingency analysis datasheet and the relieving loads summary data sheet of YS860/10 are 
presented in Figures 6-10 and 6-11 respectively. 
 
Contingency Comments Justification 
1 Blocked outlets  Not applicable 
Confined chilling propylene refrigerant between valves is heated up by 
carrier gas stream from V490. Calculate increase of pressure in W867 
considering normal operating level of 60%. 
Blocked outlets at XV860 compressor discharge side is protected by 
pressure switches P86414, P86416, P86417. 
2 Abnormal heat input  Not applicable 
Confined chilling propylene refrigerant between valves is heated up by 
carrier gas stream from V490. Calculate increase of pressure in W867 
considering normal operating level of 60%. 
3 Exchanger tube breakage  See attachments 
Tube breakage in W867 (normal operation): carrier gas circuit working 
pressure (30barg) is higher than chilling propylene working pressure (3.4 
barg). If a tube breaks, carrtier gas will ingress into chilling circuit. Shell 
side is protected by YS860/10. 
Tube breakage in W(867) (shutdown): Propylene circuit pressure at 
atmospheric conditions is the same as propylene of the chilling unit.  
4 Auto control failure  Not applicable 
Inlet liquid refrigerant valve L86008 opens 100%: Level W867 increases 
up to switch value of L86008, item L86021, which automatically closes 
inlet valve LV86008. 
5 Reflux failure  Not applicable   
6 Fire  See attachments W867 is located at elevation +9.00. Thus fire scenario is not applicable.  
7 Cooling water failure  Not applicable 
Cooling water failure at XV860 compressor discharge side is protected by 
pressure switches P86414, P86416, P86417. 
8 Power failure  Not applicable Shutdown of carrier gas compressor V490. No feeding stream. 
9 Instrument air failure  Not applicable  L86008 and P86012 fail closed  
10 Inadvertent VA open/close  Not applicable  See blocked outlet 
11 Mechanical equip. failure  Not applicable  W867 design pressure = 25 barg. YS860/10 set pressure 25 barg. 
12 Heat loss (series frac.)  Not applicable   
13 Thermal  See atachments 
Calculate thermal expansion by sun radiation of confined propylene 
between valves (80% level) 
14 Loss of quench/cold feed  Not applicable   
15 Chemical reaction  Not applicable   
16 Steam out  Not applicable   
 
Figure 6-10. Contingency analysis data sheet of YS860/10





TAG/EQUIP. NUMBER SV 860/10   UNIT /SERVICE: Propylene recovery P&ID: PLANT: COST CENTER:
SET PRESS: 25 BARG BASIS: List basis for set pressure
DISCHARGE DISPOSITION: Flare INLET PRESSURE DROP: 1,08% SP
CONSTANT BACKPRESSURE: 0,150 BARG VARIABLE BACK PRESS.: xx BARG  Kd = 0,80
EQUIPMENT DESIGN CONDITIONS:  (         ) MAWP (    X    ) Design (      ) Other BUILT-UP BACKPRESSURE: xx BARG TOTAL BACKPRESSURE: <10%SP BARG  Kb = 1,00
NORMAL OPER. 3,40 BARG -9 ºC Rupture Disk ,Y/N No FIRE SUMMARY WETTED AREA: m² ATTACH SKETCH FOR AREA CALCULATION:
MAX OPER. 25 BARG 150 ºC Derating Factor= 1,0 INSULATION No TYPE - THCKNS - mm Insul factr, 1=none
DESIGN 25 BARG 150 ºC (Use 0.9 if have rupture disk) Q =   KJ/h
CONN: RATING FACING : PN63 F.E /PN16 F.C PIPE SPEC, IN/OUT: RA548E / St261C-E
      RELIEF (2)
Causes of Relief     CONDITIONS  SP COMPR LATENT SP HEAT LIQUID VAPOR VAPOR LIQUID TOTAL
       Refer to API RP520, & RP521 and corporate Relief Manual VAPOR LIQUID PRESS TEMP FLUID VAPOR GRAVITY FACTOR HEAT RATIO VISC VISC AREA AREA AREA
 Contingency Comments NA, etc % OV PR kg/h m3/h BARG °C TYPE MOL WT LIQUID Z L,  KJ/kg k cP cP V  mm² L  mm² T  mm²
1.  BLOCKED OUTLETS
2.  ABNORMAL HEAT INPUT 10,0 31.000 27,5 61,0 Propylene 42,0 0,700 1205,048
3.  EXCHANGER TUBE BREAKAGE 10,0 6.670 19.730,0 27,5 33,0 Propylene VAPOR 33,2 0,450 0,710 0,052 0,0115 680,00
4.  AUTO CONTROL FAILURE LIQUID 38,4
5.  REFLUX FAILURE
6.  FIRE
7.  COOLING WATER FAILURE
8.  POWER FAILURE
9.  INSTR. AIR FAILURE
10. INADVERTENT VA. OPEN/CLOSE
11. MECH. EQUIP. FAILURE
12. HEAT LOSS (SERIES FRAC.)
13. THERMAL







NOTES: -1 SEE RELIEF DEVICE DATA SHEET FOR ACTUAL ORIFICE, COLD DIFF TEST PRESSURE AND OTHER SPECIFICATIONS  GENERAL DATA BY: DATE:
-2 RELIEF CONDITIONS ARE AT SET PRESSURE + OVER PRESSURE.  PROCESS DATA BY: DATE:
-3 FIGURES FROM UHDE DATASHEET. IT HAS BEEN NOT POSSIBLE TO FIND ITS ORIGIN.  VALVE SIZING BY: DATE:
-4 CALCULATION ACCORDING TO ISO 4126-10. CHECKED/APPROVED BY: DATE:
EXISTING RV DETAILS:  LESER 4564.6062
SIZING CASE SELECTED: ORIGINAL FROM UHDE RELIEF DEVICE TYPE: /   TOTAL ORIFICE AREA REQD: 1205,048 mm
2
DEVICES SELECTED - QTY: 1 INLET SIZE: 50,0 mm OUTLET SIZE: 80,0 mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): 1256,637 mm
2
SET PRES: 25 BARG
QTY: INLET SIZE: mm OUTLET SIZE: mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): mm2 SET PRES: BARG
QTY: INLET SIZE: mm OUTLET SIZE: mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): mm2 SET PRES: BARG
QTY: INLET SIZE: mm OUTLET SIZE: mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): mm2 SET PRES: BARG
EQUIPMENT PROTECTED:
xx
FLUID PHYSICAL PROPERTIES AT RELIEF CONDITIONS:




















Figure 6-11. Relief loads summary data sheet for YS860/10.






A two-phase light hydrocarbon mixture with propylene as the major component at 41.9 ºC and 
35.8 barg enters through the tubes and exits from the heat exchanger W867 at 18ºC. In the shell 
there is a vaporization process of chilling liquid propylene which belongs to the cooling unit of 
the plant. The chilling propylene enters at -9ºC and 3.42 barg and exits at the same pressure and 
temperature in vapor phase. The liquid level in the shell is controlled through a control valve in 
the inlet. The heat exchanger has a separator mounted above the shell to facilitate the 
liquid/vapor disengagement and to prevent the entrainment of liquid droplets (see figure 6-3). 
In case of tube rupture the high pressure liquid/vapor mixture of the tubes will enter the shell 
and could pressurize the shell side up to 35.8 barg, but the design pressure of the downstream 
system of the shell is 25 barg. That is why the pressure relief valve YS860/10 has a set pressure 
of 25 barg. 
The design pressure of the tube side of the heat exchanger is 40 barg and the hydrostatic test 
pressure of the shell side is 1.3 x 25 barg = 32.5 barg. The factor 1.3 comes from the Spanish 
“Reglamento de Aparatos a presion, RD1244/1979” in force in the year 2001 in Spain, when the 
heat exchanger was manufactured.  
Thus as 40 barg > 32.5 barg the tube rupture scenario has to be considered. 
Calculation hypothesis: 
a) Tube failure is a sharp break in one tube and occurs at the back side of the tubesheet.  
b) The high-pressure fluid flows both through the tube stub remaining in the tubesheet and 
through the other longer section of tube. 
c) API 521 (paragraph 4.4.14.2.2, 2014) accepts the simplifying assumption of two 
orifices, since this produces a larger relief flow rate than the approach of a long open 
tube and tube stub. That means the rupture opening equals twice the cross-sectional area 
of one tube. 
d) The fluid flowing through a sharp-edged orifice experiences an isenthalpic expansion. 
e) The fluid from the break flows to the relief valve after initial low side mixing with the 
liquid boiling propylene. 
f) In this case the low pressure side is not capable of absorbing the high pressure side flow 
across a tube rupture due to the specific design of the cooling system. 
Flashing results 
An isenthalpic flashing was done by Aspen Hysys v7.6 (Peng Robinson EOS used) and the 
results are presented in table 6.9. 
Table 6-9. Physical properties in the heat exchanger before and after the tube rupture. 
Physical Properties Inlet liquid/vapor Outlet vapor Outlet liquid 
Pressure, barg 35.8 27.5 27.5 
Temperature, ºC 41.9 33 33 
% w/w vapor 15.1 25.28 
Density, kg/m3 236 52.04 447 
Cp/Cv ideal  1.125  
Flow Composition    
Ethylene, kg/h 933.23 388.29 544.94 
Ethane, kg/h 136.12 47.74 88.38 
Propylene, kg/h 3068.35 619.86 2448.49 
Propane, kg/h 181.03 34.16 146.87 
Heptane, kg/h 6.68 0.06 6.62 
Methane, kg/h 1.28 0.82 0.46 
Hydrogen, kg/h 4.78 4.07 0.71 
TOTAL 4331.47 1095.00 3236.47 






Calculation of relieving load (Wong Method) 
The method of Wong (1992) will be followed keeping the same nomenclature of the original 
article. 
Check for critical flow condition: 












= 21.33 bara 
Comparing the critical flow pressure and the relieving pressure: 21.33 bara vs. 28.513 bara 
respectively; it is demonstrated that the relieving load is controlled by the relieving pressure of 
the valve, i.e. this is a case of subcritical flow. 
Vapor ratio of the two-phase fluid crossing the tube rupture: 
According to Aspen Hysys results: 25.28 % 
Required relieving capacity for the vapor (The original equation of Wong’s article has been 
modified taking into account that C is 0.74 for tube-into-shell flow and 0.6 for shell-into-tube 
flow (Aspen Hysys v8.6). Thus, here C = 0.74)  
𝑊𝑉 = 1781.7 𝐴𝑉 (1 − 0.317
𝑑𝑃
𝑃1
) (𝑑𝑃 ∙ 𝜌𝑉)
0.5  
where 
dP = 35.8 barg – 27.5 barg = 8.3 bar = 120.4 psi; P1 = 35.8 barg = 533.9 psia; ρv = 52.04 kg/m
3
 
= 3.25 lb/ft3. 
Giving values    
 𝑊𝑉 = 1781.7 𝐴𝑉 (1 − 0.317
120.4
533.9
) (120.4 ∙ 3.25)0.5  = 32725 𝐴𝑉  
Required relieving capacity for the liquid, considering C = 0.74  
𝑊𝐿 = 1781.7 𝐴𝐿(𝑑𝑃 ∙ 𝜌𝐿)
0.5 
ρL = 447 kg/m3 = 27.9 lb/ft3 
Giving values   𝑊𝐿 = 1781.7 𝐴𝐿(120.4 ∙ 27.9)
0.5 = 103264 𝐴𝐿   
The total area of the exchanger tube with OD = 25 mm, ID = 21 mm = 0.827 in 













𝑊𝑉 = 32725 𝐴𝑉
𝑊𝐿 = 103264 𝐴𝐿





















𝐴𝑉 = 0.5545 𝑖𝑛
2
𝐴𝐿 = 0.5195 𝑖𝑛
2
 
Calculation of relieving load (ISO 4126-10) 





The procedure given in ISO 4126-10 (2010) will be followed with the same nomenclature. 
The first step is checking for the applicability of the method. According to ISO 4126-10 the 
method is applicable if fulfills  
𝑃𝑅 ≤ 0.5  and  𝑇𝑅 ≤ 0.9 
In this case the values of the critical pressure and critical temperature of the hydrocarbon 
mixture are obtained by Aspen Hysys v7.3 with Peng Robinson EOS. The results are: 𝑃𝐶 =















Strictly speaking the method is out of the recommended range of application but following 
Schmidt (Schmidt and Egan, 2009) this range can be enlarged if the operating conditions are far 
from the critical region or it can be demonstrated that the property data is maintained 
substantially constant between the inlet and the nozzle of the valve and the heat of vaporization 
is not very small. Both last conditions have been confirmed in this case. 













were (the values were obtained by Aspen Hysys as it was explained in the Wang procedure) 
?̇?0  = 0.1508  mass fraction of vapor at the inlet of the tube; 𝜈𝑔,0 = 0.0145 
𝑚3
𝑘𝑔
 specific volume 
of gas; K = 1.109 isentropic expansion (ideal); 𝜈0 = 0.0042 
𝑚3
𝑘𝑔
specific volume of the mixture; 
𝐶𝑝𝑙,0 = 3856 
𝐽 𝑘𝑔
𝐾
 heat capacity of the liquid;  𝑝0 = 3681300 Pa (abs); 𝑇0 = 315.05 K; 
𝜈𝑙,0 = 0.0024 
𝑚3
𝑘𝑔
 specific volume of liquid and  ∆𝐻𝜈,0 = 320700 
𝐽
𝑘𝑔















The critical pressure ratio must be calculated by the equation 
0 = 𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡
2 + (𝜔2 − 2𝜔)(1 − 𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡)
2 + 2 ∙ 𝜔2 ∙ ln 𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 2 ∙ 𝜔
2(1 − 𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡) 
By trial and error 
𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 0.6916 
The boiling delay is 1.0 because Schmidt (2010) recommends this value for pipes 













𝜂𝑏 = 0.775 > 0.6916 = 𝜂𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡   no critical flow 






















And by the mass flux 
?̇?𝑆𝑉 = 𝐾𝑑𝑟,2𝑝ℎ ∙ 𝐶 ∙ √
2 ∙ 𝑝0
𝜈0







The value of 𝐾𝑑𝑟,2𝑝ℎ = 0.9 comes from the recommendation of Leung (1996) in a similar 
example. The ISO 4126-10 gives a generalized value of 0.85 for two-phase flow at the inlet. 







= 0.0006927 𝑚2 
The flow through the tubes is 







From this quantity 8037 kg/h are vapor and 23753 kg/h are liquid.  
Calculation of relieving load (Schmidt) 
Schmidt (2010) in a chapter of the VDI Heat Atlas dedicated to heat exchangers tube breakage 
presents the HNE-DS model. The difference with the ISO 4126-10 is the possibility of taking 
into account the thermodynamic nonequilibrium (boiling delay) and the mechanical 
nonequilibrium (slip between phases). This model allows for the possibility of simulating the 
tube rupture at the tubesheet and the consideration of boiling delay if the thickness of the 
tubesheet is ≤ 10 cm. Thus the relieving load will be calculated independently for the two parts 
of the ruptured tube. 
Relieving through the short nozzle of the tubesheet 
The boiling delay factor is 









The value of the exponent 3/5 comes from the table 1 of Schmidt and Diener (2005). Thus 
giving values 














𝜔 = 1.985 ∙ 0.528 = 1.048 


















− 1) + 1
 
  𝐶 = 0.4155 
Thus 
?̇?𝑆𝑉 = 𝐾𝑑𝑟,2𝑝ℎ ∙ 𝐶√
2 ∙ 𝑝0
𝜈0













= 0.0003464 𝑚2 
And finally 







Relieving through the long tube of the tubesheet 
In this case as it is recommended by Schmidt (2010): 𝑎 = 0  𝑁 = 1 thus 







The pressure drop in the pipe has been ignored (conservative basis) 
Thus finally the flow to be relieved is 
Short nozzle (tubesheet): 19523 kg/h 
Long tube: 15897 kg/h 
Total: 34420 kg/h 
Calculation of relieving load (Leung) 
The same nomenclature of the original paper of Leung (1996) will be followed. The first step is 

























From Fig 3 𝐺0

























𝑃𝐶 = 0.7 ∙ 36.813 = 25.77 bara 








The G0 corrected by Fig 4   0.475 
Finally 









Case a) tubesheet 















𝑓 is the Fanning factor and according to Leung a value of 0.005 for two-phase flow is proposed. 
L is the length of the tubes of the heat exchanger. In this case a U tube has 7 m approximately. 




𝑊 = 𝐺𝑜𝑐 (
𝐺𝑐
𝐺𝑜𝑐







From Fig 9   
𝑃2𝑐
𝑃0
 = 0.36    𝑃2𝑐 = 0.36 ∙ 36.813 = 13.3 bara 
13.3 bara < 28.513 bara   No critical flow ! 






= 0.35     
𝐺
𝐺𝑐
= 0.80   thus 







The summary of relieving loads is 
Short nozzle (tubesheet): 15783 kg/h 
Long tube: 7529 kg/h 
Total: 23312 Kg/h 
 
 





Calculation of relieving load (TPHEM modified) 
The TPHEM modified is an independently developed software based on the CCPS (1998). It 
follows the methodology of Simpson (1991). 
The program has been run with the following calculation hypothesis: 
a) Two points model has been adopted. The first point is the pressure relieving point and 
the second one corresponds to 70% of the first one because it is already known that the 
critical pressure is near this pressure. Even though the original CCPS book recommends 
80%. 
b) The obtained values of the program have been corrected because no critical flow is 
present. 
c) The value of Kd has been fixed at 0.84 as recommended by the program instructions. 
For instance the ISO 4126-10 recommended 0.85 for two-phase flow. 
d) Isenthalpic flashes have been performed with Aspen Hysys v7.3 with Peng Robinson 
EOS. They are conservative with respect to isentropic and in this case we are not in the 
critical region. 
Summary of the results of TPHEM modified: 
Model Application Gchocke, lb/ft2s G @ 413.55 psia Wrelief, lb/h 
Slip Equilibrium 
Model, SEM 
Tube 3661.8 3525 39741 
Homogeneous Non  
Equilibrium Model, 
HNEM 
Tubesheet < 10 cm 3479.9 3319 37419 
 
Thus the quantity to be relieved is 39741 + 37419 = 77160 lb/h = 35000 kg/h 
Calculation of relieving load (PS PPM software, Siemens) 
This program has a wide acceptance in the industry and it is based on different models of the 
CCPS Book (1998). Three points are required for the option of a two-phase flow at the inlet of 
the valve/tube. The points should be: the relieving point, the critical point (estimated) and the 
downstream point, i.e. 35.8 barg, 24.75 barg and 27.5 barg in this case. 
Previously isenthalpic flashes with Aspen Hysys v7.3 and Peng Robinson as EOS were 
obtained. 
Other parameters: ε (roughness) = 0.00152 mm; orifice discharge coefficient = 0.6; ID tube = 21 
mm, tube length = 7 m; nozzle discharge coefficient = 0.85 
Summary of results 
PS PPM model Flow, kg/h Total, kg/h 
Nozzle/tube Tube (7 m):  10676 
Nozzle (tubesheet):   17789 
28465 
2 orifice 20736/each 41472 
Orifice/tube Orifice:     20736 
Tube:        10676 
31412 
2 nozzle 17789/each 35578 
 
In table 6-10 the summary of the results is presented. 
 
 





Table 6-10. Results of the relieving load in case of tube breakage for YS860/10. 










Phase vapor only. Kd: 0.8 31000 Kg/ hr of 
light hydrocarbon 
vapor. 
It is not clear if this 
scenario was studied. In 
any case it was usual for 
the engineering company 
taking a very conservative 
scenario including not 
related events.  
Wong (1992) Two sharp edged 
orifices and isenthalpic 
expansion. No taking 
into account the 
tubesheet and tube part. 
Critical flow calculated 
for the gas only. Crane 
formulas for pressure 
drop are used.  
C = 0.6 (shell-
into-tube flow). 
C = 0.74 (tube-
into-shell flow) 
32564 kg/h of a 
mixture 
vapor/liquid with 
a quality of 
25.28%. No 
choked flow. 
Although the method is 
easy to implement, the 
concept of adding the areas 
after treating the vapor and 
the liquid separately lacks 
consistency.   
ISO 4126-10 
(2010) 
Based on the 
Homogeneous 
Equilibrium Model 
developed by Leung and 
coworkers. Improved 
because of boiling delay 
factor possibility. 
Requires tedious 
iterations in the case of 
subcooled liquid. 
The value of Kd 
in the case of 
tube rupture is 
not addressed. It 
has been taken 
as 0.9 based on 
the Leung 
example No 1 
(1996). 
31790 kg/h of a 
mixture with a 
quality of 25.28% 
(isenthalpic 
flash). No boiling 
delay, a=0  
N=1 
As in all the methods 
explored, this one has no 
precise instructions for the 
calculation of the 
discharge coefficient in 
tube rupture. 
Schmidt (2010) Similar to ISO 4126-10 
In this case, the 
tubesheet was treated as 
a nozzle with boiling 
delay and with the 
exponent a= 3/5 and the 
other part as a tube with 
a=0  N=1 
The value of Kd 
in case of tube 
rupture is not 
addressed. It has 
been taken as 0.9 
based on the 
Leung example 
No. 1 
35420 kg/h of a 





the tube part is 
ignored. 
No instructions about the 
calculation of the 
discharge coefficient. 
Leung (1996) Homogeneous 
Equilibrium Model is 
thoroughly developed 
and charts for a pencil-
and-paper approach are 
presented. The tubesheet 
is treated as a nozzle and 
the pipe is treated with 
its equivalent length 
including fitting. 
Leung uses in 
the example 1, 
pp 38,  a 
discharge 
coefficient for 
the nozzle of 0.9 
but gives no 
justification 
why.  
23312 kg/h of a 
mixture with a 
quality of 25.28% 
The Leung method is a 
very rigorous method and 
includes not only the 
tubesheet as a nozzle, but 
the pipe part of the rupture. 
However no instructions 
about the calculation of the 




Model based in the 
papers of Simpson 
considering isentropic 
transformation and 
performing an integral. 
Only 2 or three 
isentropic points are 
required. 
Treatment of the 
The coefficients 
elected in the 
examples are 
very correct for 
the cases 
studied. 
35000 kg/h of a 
mixture with a 
quality of 25.28% 
Recommended Method. 
But using the discharge 
coefficients of the 
examples. 











tubesheet as a nozzle 
with the Homogeneous 
Non-Equilibrum Model 
(HNEM) and Slip 
Equilibrium Model 
(SEM) for the tube side. 
PS PPM 
(Siemens)  
Methods based on the 
CCPS Book Guidelines 
for pressure relief and 
effluent handling 
systems, 1998 
Treatment of the 
tubesheet as a 




28465 Kg /h of a 
mixture with a 
quality of  
25.28% 
Recommended method 
(conservative side) but 




 The Schmidt and the TPHEM methods, which model the tubesheet as a nozzle and the 
tube part as an orifice with thermodynamic and mechanical equilibrium, showed higher 
relieving loads. Both methods are recommended when an exact value of the required 
load is necessary 
 The analysis of different options of modeling the tube breakage performed with PS 
PPM software confirms that the option 2 orifices gives the greater required load, as it is 
pointed out by API 521 (2014).This option is followed by the engineering community 
in the design phase because it is conservative 
 The method of Leung allows a paper and pencil approach and can be solved quickly 
with a spreadsheet  
 The Wong method was the standard in the petrochemical industry in the last century. As 
shown here, it is a relatively conservative method based on the model of two sharp 
edged orifices.   
6.7 Application of the engineering analysis methodology according to API 
520 Part II-2015 
As explained in section 4.6 the Engineering Analysis concept appeared in the 1994 version of 
API 520 Part II for pressure relief valves with an inlet pressure drop greater than 3%. However, 
no guidance was given on how to perform this analysis. 
Only in 2015, the 6
th
 Edition of API 520 Part II, are some recommendations given about the 
topics the users may consider for their engineering analysis and adds “Because the relationship 
between inlet pressure loss and PRV chatter is not definitively understood, detailed 
requirements for an engineering analysis are the responsibility of the user”.  
The recommendations of API have been adapted to form an original screening process 
developed for this thesis. The process consists of answering the questions of table 6-11.  
Table 6-11. Screening test to detect chattering possibilities. 




According to the inspection records is there any evidence of past 
chattering? 
No  
Is the pressure relief valve well installed according to API 520, ISO 
4126-9, etc.? 
Yes Consider the 
manufacturers 
recommendations as 






Is the inlet piping and fittings at least as large as the PRV inlet? Yes  
Is there at least a 2% Set Pressure (SP) margin between PRV blowdown 
and the inlet pressure loss? 
Yes  
Does excessive built-up backpressure occur according to the specific 
PRV? 
No Conventional 10% of 
SP 
Balanced 30-50% of 
SP. 
Is the time that the decompression wave goes back to the protected 
equipment and returns to the valve, less than the time required for the full 
opening of the valve? 
Yes  
Does the PRV fulfill API 520 II-2015 Simple Force Balance? Yes  
Is the risk of relieving of the existing pressure relief valve quantified? Yes 
(acceptable) 
Reference is made to 
the relieving to flare or 
atmosphere. 
Is a risk analysis done comparing an unsuccessful mechanical change in 
the field with the risk of chattering? 
Yes 
(acceptable) 
Consider the risk of 
removal an existing 
inlet piping and 
installation of a new 
one, for example. 
 
If only one question does not conform to those in the table, chattering has to be considered and 
mitigation measures have to be implemented. 
The typical mitigation actions for the case that a pressure relief valve has an inlet pressure drop 
greater than 3% and failed the engineering analysis, are: 
- Increasing the diameter of the inlet pipe of the valve. 
- Reduction of the distance between pressure relief valve and protected equipment. 
- Restriction of the lift of the pressure relief valve considering the required flow. 
- Changing the valve for another with the same size but with less area. 
- Changing to remote sensing pop-action pilot PRV. 
- Installation of a vibration damper. 
- Others. 
A case study will be presented applying the screening process developed for this thesis. It 
corresponds to the valve YS700/01-02 with an inlet pressure drop of 4.18% of the set pressure 
(not fulfill the 3% rule). 
A scheme for the installation of the valve is presented in figure 6-12 and a picture of the valve 
and the protected equipment is presented in figure 6-13. 
                              
Figure 6-12. Scheme of YS700/01-02 installation.  Figure 6-13. Picture of YS700/01-02 and protected 
equipment. 





YS700/01-02 protects the liquid propylene dryer from two relieving scenarios: fire and thermal 
expansion according to the contingency analysis done. See figure 6-15.The dryer is full of 
propylene liquid at 23 ºC and 16 bara in operating conditions, which corresponds to a lightly 
subcooled propylene. 
Contingency Comments Justification 
1 Blocked outlets  Not applicable 
Pumps P12A/B/C are protected against overpressure by SV399/01 and 
SV399/02 at 23.5 barg set pressure and SV151.2 at 30 barg set pressure. 
2 Abnormal heat input  Not aplicable 
Heat provided by internals regeneration with hot nitrogen is protected by 
SV700/03. 
3 Exchanger tube breakage  Not applicable   
4 Auto control failure  Not applicable   
5 Reflux failure  Not applicable   
6 Fire See attachments   
7 Cooling water failure  Not applicable No cooling water system in place.  
8 Power failure  Not applicable   
9 Instrument air failure  Not applicable 
Instrument air failure closes inlet valve PV70001 and closes outlet valves 
H70102 (to K702A) and H20104 (to K702B).  
10 Inadvertent VA open/close  Not applicable 
Nitrogen 35 barg inlet is blocked by a spectacle blind. It is not possible to 
enter N2 by human error. 
11 Mechanical equip. failure  Not applicable   
12 Heat loss (series frac.)  Not applicable   
13 Thermal  Applicable Calculate wit a ΔT = 25 ºC (difference between night and day) 
14 Loss of quench/cold feed  Not applicable   
15 Chemical reaction  Not applicable 
Reaction heat produced by internal catalyst could lead to an increase of 
temperature. Temperature inside column is redundant measured (T70006 
and T70007). High temperature closes inlet valve PV70001. 
16 Steam out  Not applicable   
 
Figure 6-14. Results of the contingency analysis for YS700/01-02. 
The relieving loads for each scenario have been calculated and are presented in figure 6-15.





TAG/EQUIP. NUMBER SV 700/01 & 02   UNIT /SERVICE: Propylene purification unit P&ID: PLANT: COST CENTER:
SET PRESS: 38 BARG BASIS: Relief system update
DISCHARGE DISPOSITION: Flare INLET PRESSURE DROP: 4,2% SP 
CONSTANT BACKPRESSURE: 0,150 BARG VARIABLE BACK PRESS.: BARG  Kd = 0,28 (3)
EQUIPMENT DESIGN CONDITIONS:  (         ) MAWP (   X    ) Design (         ) Other BUILT-UP BACKPRESSURE: 2,98 BARG TOTAL BACKPRESSURE: 3,13 PSIG  Kb = 1
NORMAL OPER. 30 BARG 20 ºC Rupture Disk ,Y/N No FIRE SUMMARY WETTED AREA: 21 m² ATTACH SKETCH FOR AREA CALCULATION:
See backup 
material
MAX OPER. 40 BARG 120 ºC Derating Factor= 1,0 INSULATION Yes TYPE Rockwool THCKNS 70 mm Insul factr, 1=none F =1.0 (4)
DESIGN 40 BARG 120 ºC (Use 0.9 if have rupture disk) Q =   KJ/h (See backup material)
CONN: RATING FACING : PN63 F.E /PN16 F.C PIPE SPEC, IN/OUT: St860E-A / St261C-E
      RELIEF (2)
Causes of Relief     CONDITIONS  SP COMPR LATENT SP HEAT LIQUID VAPOR VAPOR LIQUID TOTAL
       Refer to API RP520, & RP521 and corporate Relief Manual VAPOR LIQUID PRESS TEMP FLUID VAPOR GRAVITY FACTOR HEAT RATIO VISC VISC AREA AREA AREA
 Contingency Comments NA, etc % OV PR kg/h kg/h BARG °C TYPE MOL WT LIQUID Z L,  KJ/kg k cP cP V  mm² L  mm² T  mm²
1.  BLOCKED OUTLETS
2.  ABNORMAL HEAT INPUT
3.  EXCHANGER TUBE BREAKAGE
4.  AUTO CONTROL FAILURE
5.  REFLUX FAILURE
6.  FIRE 10 15.000 41,8 86 vapor 42,00 0,50 125 1,230 0,012 349 (7)
7.  COOLING WATER FAILURE
8.  POWER FAILURE
9.  INSTR. AIR FAILURE
10. INADVERTENT VA. OPEN/CLOSE
11. MECH. EQUIP. FAILURE
12. HEAT LOSS (SERIES FRAC.)
13. THERMAL 10,0 243 (6) 41,8 70,0 Liquid 42,00 4,1 (5)







NOTES: -1 SEE RELIEF DEVICE DATA SHEET FOR ACTUAL ORIFICE, COLD DIFF TEST PRESSURE AND OTHER SPECIFICATIONS  GENERAL DATA BY: DATE:
-2 RELIEF CONDITIONS ARE AT SET PRESSURE + OVER PRESSURE.  PROCESS DATA BY: DATE:
-3 The lift is restricted to 4,5 mm. That is why Kd=0,28  VALVE SIZING BY: DATE:
-4 Although there is 70 mm insulation, it is not considered-> conservative design. CHECKED/APPROVED BY: DATE:
-5 Calculation performed acc. C2.3 Annex C, API 520-I-2008
-6 Relief load due to solar radiation 1,15 kw/m2
-7 This value is obtained ignoring retrograde condensation. However using method C2.2. of API 520-I-2008 the required area=385 mm2
-8 An engineering analysis according to API 520-II-2014 due to unstability was performed
EXISTING RV DETAILS:  LESER 4564.6062
SIZING CASE SELECTED: Fire RELIEF DEVICE TYPE: PSV /   TOTAL ORIFICE AREA REQD: 349,000 mm
2
DEVICES SELECTED - QTY: 2 INLET SIZE: 50,0 mm OUTLET SIZE: 80,0 mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): 1256,637 mm
2
SET PRES: 38 BARG
QTY: INLET SIZE: mm OUTLET SIZE: mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): mm2 SET PRES: BARG
QTY: INLET SIZE: mm OUTLET SIZE: mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): mm2 SET PRES: BARG
QTY: INLET SIZE: mm OUTLET SIZE: mm ORIFICE/AREA (1): mm2 SET PRES: BARG
EQUIPMENT PROTECTED:
523,8
FLUID PHYSICAL PROPERTIES AT RELIEF CONDITIONS:



















Figure 6-15. Relieving loads for each scenario of YS700/01-02.





The design conditions for the pressure relief valve according to the original specification sheet 
are: 
Scenario: fire, Relieving fluid: propylene gas; Set pressure: 38 barg; Relieving pressure: 42.8 
bara; Relieving temperature: 82.5 ºC; Relieving load: 15,000 kg/h; Overpressure: 10%; 
Molecular weight: 42 kg/kmol; Z (compressibility factor) = 0.5; Cp/Cv = 1.23. 
However, the relieving load, in case of fire, depends on the moment of the process. Once the 
fire begins, the phenomenon that happens is: 
 Isochoric transformation (thermal expansion) of the trapped liquid propylene from 23 
ºC and 16 bara (normal operating conditions) to 42.8 bara (relieving pressure). 
 When the valve opens, it relieves propylene liquid which vaporizes following an 
isentropic transformation until the total backpressure is 4.14 bara (this total 
backpressure was calculated according to the methodology of section 6.1). 
 When the liquid reaches 88 ºC, it begins to boil with formation of bubbles at the wall 
and the valve releases two-phase flow at the inlet and at the outlet, and only after the 
disengagement of the vapor/liquid phases, begins the release of vapor. 
 After the boiling phase an expansion of the gas begins with the possibility of retrograde 
condensation. 
The relieving process can be represented by the following Mollier Diagram, figure 6-16. 
Although it is a dynamic process some singular points are representative of the phenomenon 
and have been represented on it. 
 
Figure 6-16. Representation of the relieving process of YS700/01-02 in case of fire. 
1
st
 Point (42.8 bara & 27ºC), thermal expansion 
The 1
st
 point of the diagram arises from an isochoric transformation from the operating 
conditions (23 ºC and 16 bara) and the result is 42.8 bara and 27 ºC. The relieving load can be 





calculated according to API 521 (paragraph 4.4.12.3, 2014). It is considered the hydraulic 
expansion of the liquid propylene. 
𝑞 =
𝛼𝑣 ∙ ∅
1000 ∙ 𝑑 ∙ 𝑐
=
0.00358 ∙ 523835









𝑞 is the volume flow rate, m3/s;  𝛼𝑣 is the cubic expansion coefficient, 1/ºC; ∅ is the total heat 
transfer rate, watts; 𝑑 is the specific gravity; 𝑐 is the specific heat capacity, J/kg K. 
The cubic expansion coefficient for propylene liquid is calculated with the Yaws (1995) 
correlation. Thus, 





= 0.00358 1/℃ 
Propylene specific gravity @ 27 ºC is 0.500 and its specific heat capacity is 2889 J/kg K (API 
Technical Data Book, 1997) 
The heat transfer rate has been calculated as (Refer to point 4 to find the wetted area): 
 𝑄 = 43200 ∙ 𝐹 ∙ 𝐴𝑤





 Point (42.8 bara & 56 ºC), thermal expansion 
The 2
nd
 point has been selected as the middle point between 27 ºC and the boiling point at 
relieving conditions (86ºC), thus, 56 ºC. 
𝑞 =
𝛼𝑣 ∙ ∅
1000 ∙ 𝑑 ∙ 𝑐
=
0.00542 ∙ 523835








Using the Yaws correlation for the cubic expansion coefficient 





= 0.00542 1/℃ 
And the following parameters are obtained from the API Technical Data Book, (1997): 







 Point (42.8 bara & 86ºC-bubble point), thermal expansion 
𝑞 =
𝛼𝑣 ∙ ∅
1000 ∙ 𝑑 ∙ 𝑐
=
0.0197 ∙ 523835








Using the Yaws correlation for the cubic expansion coefficient 





= 0.0197 1/℃ 
The maximal temperature to be used in the equation is 73 ºC according to Yaws (1995). Due to 
the lack of experimental data, an extrapolation of the Yaws equation has been performed. 





The following physical properties are obtained from the API Technical Data Book (1997): 






 Point (42.8 bara & 86 ºC), boiling phase with vapor/liquid disengagement 
There is a period of time when the first bubbles of vapor arise during which it is necessary to 
relieve the mixtures of both phases simultaneously, either as flashing, bubble, slug, froth or mist 
flow until sufficient vapor space is generated inside the vessel to allow phase separation. API 
521 (2014) points out that this period is usually neglected during sizing and selecting of the 
pressure relief device, with the exception of foamy fluids, reactive systems and narrow flow 
passages (for example, vessel jackets).  
Thus, in this case the relieving load at full disengagement during the boiling phase is: 
Fluid: propylene; Set pressure: 38 barg; Overpressure: 10%; Relieving pressure: 42.8 bara; 
Relieving temperature: 86 ºC, Latent heat at 86 ºC: 125 kJ/kg (API Technical Data Book, 1997) 
𝑊𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎(𝐴𝑤) =  𝜋𝐷𝐿 + 1.2𝜋
𝐷2
4
 =  𝜋 ∙ 1.5 ∙ 4 + 1.2 ∙ 𝜋 ∙
1.52
4
= 20.97 𝑚2 
𝑄 = 43200 ∙ 𝐹 ∙ 𝐴𝑤














The original specification sheet from the Engineering and Construction company which made 
the detail engineering gives the value of 15000 kg/h. These results match. 
Notes 
-No credit is given for the insulation because it is not fireproofing. Thus, F (environmental 
factor) = 1.0 
-All the vessel is exposed to fire because it is within 7.6 m of the ground. 
-The wetted area of the attached piping is not considered. 
-The upper head of the vessel is not considered because there is no contact with the flames. 
5
th
 Point (42.8 bara & 95ºC), supercritical propylene with retrograde condensation 
Once the boiling period is finished, a process begins consisting of the expansion of a vapor 
because of heating due to external fire. One particular and interesting point is the case in which 
there is supercritical propylene at the input of the valve and two phases at the outlet, due to 
retrograde condensation. For instance, the point 42.8 bara and 95 ºC, fulfils this conditions (see 
figure 6-14). The relieving load has been calculated with the methods in section 6.4, but will not 
be presented here as it has no relevance for the engineering analysis. 
6
th
 Point (42.8 bara & 137ºC), supercritical propylene without retrograde condensation 
The relieving load has to be calculated with the methods presented in section 6.2 because the 
compressibility factor, Z = 0.73, is out of the range 0.8 < Z < 1.1, but again, as before, it has no 
relevance for the engineering analysis. 
Inlet pressure drop calculation 
A scheme of the inlet piping of YS700/01-02 showing the configuration of the changeover 
valve and the nominal diameters of each section is presented in figure 6-17. 





                                                            
Figure 6-17. Left side: scheme of the inlet piping configuration of YS700/01-02. Right side: 
isometric of the inlet pipe of the same valve. 
Design data: Set pressure: 38 barg, Relieving pressure: 42.813 bara; Relieving temperature: 86 
ºC; Z = 0.5 (from Ingersoll-Rand, 1981); Gas viscosity = 0.0000103 kg/ms (from API Technical 
Data Book, 1997), Maximal flow = 21007 kg/h (from Leser datasheet).  
Calculation hypothesis 
 The inlet pressure drop will be calculated from the exit of K700 up to the inlet flange of 
the safety valve 
 The reference diameter is DN 50 (inlet of the safety valve), which corresponds to an 





















0.37 m pipe ID 157.1 mm 0.073 0.0145 0.0011 
Reduced T (Branch T + sudden contraction) 0.75 (T ID 157.1 mm) 





4.2 m pipe ID 54.5 mm 2.3890 1 2.3890 
7 elbows 90º 0.28/each 1 1.960 
1 expansion 50x80 (54.5x 81.7 mm) θ = 30º 0.6726 1 0.6726 








1 reduction 80x50 (81.7 x 54.5 mm) θ = 30º 0.199 1 0.199 
TOTAL K   6.136 
 
Calculation of the Reynolds Number 











































0.0545 ∙ 20.74 ∙ 120.5
0.0000103
= 13.2 ∙ 106 






= 0.0055  𝑓 = 0.031 (from Crane, 1999) 

















The Mach No. in the inlet of the safety valve DN50 is 








































𝑃1 = 1.0371 ∙ 42.813 = 44.401 bara 






 ∙ 100 = 4.18% 
4.18 % > 3 %  Does not follow the 3% rule !!! 
Total backpressure calculation 
The safety valve YS 700/01-02 relieves to the flare network. The backpressure is calculated 
according to the design scenario for the flare network, which gives higher backpressure at the 
safety valve. In this case, as it has been shown in section 6.1 the design scenario is: fire in the 
reaction area. 
Two calculations were performed, and the results are: 
a) Isothermal calculation was performed with an independently developed spreadsheet in 
which the API 521 equations have been used (equation 31, 2014) considering maximal 
flow in the tail pipe (i.e. 21007 kg/h) and required in the header (i.e. 15000 kg/h), 
according to the recommendations of API 521 (paragraph 5.5.3, 2014) already 
explained in section 4.5. The result was: 
 
𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 = 3.13 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔 that represents 8.2 % of the set pressure. 
 





b) Adiabatic calculation considering two-phase flow and using the Beggs & Brill 
correlation available in the Aspen Flare System Analyzer v7.3. The result was: 
 
𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 = 3.49 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔 that represents 9.2 % of the set pressure. Other results were: 
- Flow pattern : annular 
- Mach No. (exit tail pipe): 0.244  which fulfills the condition < 0.7  





 The flowsheet of the Aspen is presented in figure 6-18.  
 
 
Figure 6-18. Built-up backpressure calculation of YS700/01-02 using ASFA software. 
Both results were acceptable as the Leser valve can accept a total backpressure of 15%. 
However, the general concept that the isothermal calculation of the backpressure is 
conservative with respect to the adiabatic one (Bonilla, 1978), failed in this case. 
Acoustic Induced Vibration 
Using Eisinger’s (1997) mathematical expression (see section 4.8): 










] + 126.1 
PWL is the sound power level in dB (with reference 10−12 W); 𝑃1 is the upstream pressure 
of the source bara; ΔP is the reduction on pressure, bar; 𝑇1 is the upstream temperature, K; 
W is the gas flow, kg/s; M molecular weight, kg/kmol 
Given values 
ΔP = 42.8 bara – 2.5 bara = 40.3 bar (Total backpressure assumed 2.5 bara as a conservative 
basis) 





𝑃1 = 41.8 𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔 















] + 126.1 = 152 𝑑𝐵 
The allowable PWL is calculated according to the equation: 




According to the piping specification 
DN80   Di = 82.5 mm, t = 3.2 mm 
DN150 Di = 160.3 mm, t = 4 mm 
𝑃𝑊𝐿𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝐷𝑁80 = 173.6 − 0.125 
82.5
3.2
= 170 𝑑𝐵 
𝑃𝑊𝐿𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝐷𝑁150 = 173.6 − 0.125 
160.3
4
= 168 𝑑𝐵 
Thus, 168 dB > 152 dB. It is therefore concluded that the piping downstream of the safety 
valve (tail pipe) is considered safe from AIV fatigue failure. 
Stability of the valve 
The trim characteristic for the Leser valve (model 4564.6062) installed is (figure 6-19):  
 
Figure 6-19.Trim characteristic of the Leser valve model 4564.6062.The left figure corresponds 
to gas relieving and the figure of the right to a liquid. 
The lift is restricted at 4.5 mm. The total lift is 12.5 mm, which means a partial lift of 36%. 
The behavior of the pressure relief valve for gases is as represented for figure 6.19 left, i.e. 
after the overpressure increases until 9.5% the lift pops to the imposed limit of 36%. That is 
why the stability analysis is done at 100% of flow capacity, which corresponds to a 
maximal rated flow of 21007 kg/h of propylene gas.  
At the beginning, when the valve relieves liquid propylene, the behavior is like figure 6.19 
right. 
Inlet line length criteria (Smith et al., 2011)                                                                    





The mathematical expressions presented in section 4.6 have been used. First, Cremers et al. 
(2001, 2003): 
𝐿 < 111.5 ∙ 𝑡0 ∙ √
𝑘𝑇
𝑀𝑊
 ;  𝑡0 >
2𝐿
𝑐






L is the length of the inlet piping, ft (here 5.66 m); 𝑡0 is the opening time of the valve, s; k is 
the isentropic expansion factor (for an ideal gas corresponds to Cp/Cv); T, is the 
temperature ºR; MW is the molecular weight of the fluid; c is the speed of sound, ft/s. 

















In this case 𝑑𝑃𝑆𝑉𝑖 = 40 𝑚𝑚 = 1.575 𝑖𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠, thus 
















= 0.009 𝑠 
The full lift has a length = 0.313 · 40 = 12.52 mm, because has been restricted by the 
manufacturer to 4.5 mm 























1.13 (from API Technical Data Book, 1997) 






= 0.04 𝑠 
According to API 520 (part II, Annex C, 2015) there is not an acoustic reflection point in 
the intersection of the branch (DN 150 and DN 50) because: 
Area DN 50 =
𝜋∙0.05452
4
= 0.00233 𝑚2 
Area DN 150 =
𝜋∙0.15712
4
= 0.0194 𝑚2, the conditions to be fulfilled for considering the 
intersection an acoustic reflection point are: 
0.0194 < 10 ·0.00233 No check !               
𝐿𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚= 0.4 m > 20 ·0.0545 No check ! 
Then, no acoustic reflection in the intersection of the branch of DN 50  with the Pipe DN 
150 is expected. 
Finally 
𝐿 < 111.5 ∙ 𝑡0 ∙ √
𝑘𝑇
𝑀𝑊
= 111.5 ∙ 0.009 ∙ √
1.13∙647
42
= 4.19 𝑓𝑡 = 1.28 𝑚  Chattering !!! 
Inlet line length criteria (Frommann and Friedel, 1998, 2000) ΔP: 20% 









(𝑃𝑆 − 𝑃𝐵)𝑡0 






; 𝑃𝑆 = 38 ∙ 14.5038 = 551 𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑔;  




(551 − 45) 0.009 = 4.11 𝑓𝑡 = 1.25 𝑚   Chattering !!! 
Inlet line length criteria (Frommann and Friedel, 1998, 2000) ΔP: blowdown 







) (𝑃𝑆 − 𝑃𝐵)𝑡0 
The blowdown is 10% according to the Leser Manufaturer for this model. The built-up 
backpressure is 45 psig according to the backpressure calculations. 
𝐿 < 45390 
2.1462
46312
(0.1)(551 − 45) 0.009 = 2.06 𝑓𝑡 = 0.63 𝑚   Chattering !!! 
Oversizing restrictions 
According to Smith et al. (2011) there are two constraints to be fulfilled to have chattering 
due to oversized pressure relief valves: 
a) 𝑤𝑃𝑆𝑉 > 0.2 ∙ 𝑉𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚(𝜌𝑠𝑒𝑡 − 𝜌𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡) +𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 where 𝑤𝑃𝑆𝑉 is the rated flow in lb/s; 
𝑉𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 is the volume of the protected equipment available for gas expansion in ft
3
; 𝜌𝑠𝑒𝑡 
is the density of the fluid at set pressure conditions in lb/ft
3
; 𝜌𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡 is the density of the 
fluid at blowdown conditions; 𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 is the required flow in lb/s. 
Thus, 
𝜌𝑠𝑒𝑡  @ 38 barg and 86 ºC = 6.353 lb/ft
3
 (http://webbook.nist.gov/chemistry/fluid/)   
𝜌𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑡 @ 34.2  barg and 86 ºC = 4.993 lb/ft
3
 (http://webbook.nist.gov/chemisty/fluid) 
𝑉𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 = Volume K700 – Volume internal catalyst = 476 ft
3
 – 205 ft
3
  = 271 ft
3











    Chattering !!! 
b) 𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 > 0.25 ∙ 𝑤𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 
15000 kg/h > 0.25 ·21007 = 5252 kg/h OK !   No chattering !!! 
 
Acoustic pressure losses   
According to Smith et al.(2011) the equation to be fulfilled to avoid chattering for this 
phenomenon is: 
𝑃𝑆 − 𝑃𝑅𝐶 = 𝑃𝑆 ∙ 𝐵𝐷 > ∆𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = ∆𝑃𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 + ∆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐        
Where 𝑃𝑆 is the set pressure; 𝑃𝑅𝐶 is the reseating pressure; BD is the blowdown. 
In this case 𝐿 >
𝑐𝑡
2
   because 5.66 m > 
283∙0.009
2
= 1.27 𝑚  and the following equation has to be 
used according to Darby (2013, 2014): 































∆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 14792 
𝑙𝑏
𝑓𝑡2
=107 psi = 7.4 bar 
∆𝑃𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1.6 𝑏𝑎𝑟 (see inlet pressure drop in this section) 
∆𝑃𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 7.4 bar + 1.6 bar = 9.0 bar 
Thus, 
𝑃𝑆 ∙ 𝐵𝐷 = 38 ∙ 0.10 = 3.8 𝑏𝑎𝑟 < 9 bar   Chattering !!! 
 
Body bowl choking 






















1256.6 mm2; 𝐴𝑒 = outlet area = 5242.4 mm
2 
 (DN 80, NP 16, ID 81.7 mm); k = 1.13 (ideal 













= 322 𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑎 
620.9 psia < 322 psia No check !  Possibility of secondary backpressure !!! 
API Simple Force Balance Method (Melhem, 2015)  
The last version of API 520 (part II, 2015) presents a method developed by Melhem. It is based 
on the following equation for conventional valves: 
𝑃𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 − ∆𝑃𝑓,𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒 − ∆𝑃𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒 − ∆𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 − 𝑃𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒  > 0 
𝑃𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 = 38 ·1.1 = 41.8 barg = 606 psig 
∆𝑃𝑓,𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒 =  𝜏
2∆𝑃𝑓 
𝜏 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (
𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒
𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑒
, 1) = (
0.04
0.009
, 1) = 1 
∆𝑃𝑓,𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒 = 𝜏
2∆𝑃𝑓 = 1
2 ∙ 1.6 𝑏𝑎𝑟 = 1.6 𝑏𝑎𝑟 = 23 𝑝𝑠𝑖 











2    
giving values 
∆𝑃𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒 = 






2 ∙ 109.7 ∙ (𝜋
0.05452
4 )
2 = 707855 𝑃𝑎 + 28515 𝑃𝑎 
∆𝑃𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒 = 736370 𝑃𝑎 
∆𝑃𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒 = 736370 𝑃𝑎 = 7.36 𝑏𝑎𝑟 = 107 𝑝𝑠𝑖 
∆𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘 = 13 bar = 45 psi 
According to Leser documentation for 4564 model, the blowdown for this valve is 10% of the 
set pressure: 
𝑃𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 = 38 − 0.1 ∙ 38 = 34.2 𝑏𝑎𝑟 = 496 𝑝𝑠𝑖 
finally,   
606 psig - 23 psi - 107 psi - 45 psi - 496 psi > 0 
- 65 psi > 0 No check  Chattering !!! 
Engineering Analysis Summary 
According to the engineering analysis procedure described in the first part of this section (see 
table 6.11), the following questions will be treated: 
1) According to the inspection records is there any evidence of past chattering? 
No 
 
2) Is the pressure relief valve well installed according to API 520, ISO 4126-9, etc.? 
No, it does not follow the recommendation that the inlet pipe must be as short as 
possible and with a diameter larger than the inlet flange of the PRV. 
 
3) Is the inlet piping and fittings at least as large as the PRV inlet? 
Yes 
 
4) Is there at least a 2% Set Pressure (SP) margin between PRV blowdown and the inlet 
pressure loss? Yes 
 
SP = 38 barg                                   
Blowdown: 10%  34.2 barg         
2% of 38 barg = 0.76 barg 
ΔP allowable for inlet pipe = 38 – (34.2 + 0.76) = 3.04 bar 
ΔP friction inlet pipe = 1.59 bar 
3.04 bar > 1.59 bar  OK ! 
 
5) Does excessive built-up backpressure occur according to the specific PRV? 
No, the built-up back backpressure is 2.98 bar, thus 
𝟐.𝟗𝟖
𝟑𝟖
𝟏𝟎𝟎 = 𝟕. 𝟖 % < 𝟏𝟎% OK for a conventional valve!!! 
 





6) Is the time that the decompression wave goes back to the protected equipment and 
returns to the valve, less than the time required for the full opening of the valve? See 
point 7. 
 
7) Does the PRV fulfill API 520 II-2015 Simple Force Balance?  
 
The results of the stability analysis are as following: 
 
Parameter evaluated Inlet line 
length, m 
Inlet line length 





Inlet line length 
(Cremers et al., 2001, 2003) 
5.7 1.3 No Yes 
Inlet line length 
(Frommann and Friedel, 1998) ΔP 20% 
5.7 1.3 No Yes 
Inlet line length 
(Frommann and Friedel, 1998) ΔP 
blowdown 
5.7 0.6 No Yes 
Required flow  > 25%  rated flow 
(oversizing) 
  Yes No 
Compressible vapors criteria 
(oversizing) 
  No Yes 
Total backpressure for a conventional 
valve  < 10% SP 
  Yes No 
Body bowl choking   No Unknown 
Acoustic pressure losses   No Yes 
API Simple Force Balance (Melhem, 
2014, 2015) 
  No Yes 
 
8) Is the risk of relieving of the existing pressure relief valve quantified? 
Yes, very low risk. It discharges to flare. 
 
9) Is a risk analysis done comparing an unsuccessful mechanical change in the field with 
the risk of chattering? 
One solution is increasing the diameter of the inlet pipe. The risk is reduced to the 
removal of the existing inlet piping and installation of a new one. Acceptable risk. 
Considerations 
 A new methodology for performing an engineering analysis for the pressure relief 
valves which have an inlet pressure drop greater than 3%, has been presented in this 
thesis, in an integrated way. It has been incorporated in a spreadsheet and can be used 
easily, especially the stability part    
 Concerning the stability issue we have to continue knowing that there are many models 
but little experimental data to validate them. It is the author’s opinion that the model of 
Melhem (2014, 2015) will be used in future, if and only if, the manufacturers can 
provide the exact value of the blowdown. As it was pointed out in section 3.3, the 
dynamic models (Hös et al., 2014, 2015, etc.) can only be applied if specific software is 
available and the detailed mechanical characteristics of the valve are known   
 Another concern for the practicing safety engineer is getting the exact value of the 
blowdown, as mentioned before. This value is not guaranteed by US manufacturers and 
the European ones give a generic value for each series. Moreover, the shop test for 
safety valves does not usually have a system with capacity enough to perform a correct 
blowdown test. 
 





6.8 Optimization of the revision interval of pressure relief valves 
The procedure based on the API 580 (2009) and API 581 (2008) and described in section 4.11 
will be applied here to the pressure relief valve YS702/01. This valve protects the shell of a heat 
exchanger for the case of fire. All the design parameters are already described in section 6.4. 
Design basis 
The accepted level of risk for the petrochemical plants with level 2 contingency analysis, 
studied here is 4.6 m
2
/year (see section 4-11). 
Probability of failure on demand 
To find the initial inspection interval for the shell part of the heat exchanger, the different 
recommendations available in the open literature and given in section 3.5 will be presented in 
table 6-12. To remark that the conditions for evaluating the risk of shell rupture are: the fluid is 
clean propylene and the holdup of the shell of the heat exchanger is small. 
Table 6-12. Initial revision interval of YS 702-01 according to open literature. 
Norm/guideline Initial interval Comments 
Spanish RD 2060/2008 (ITC EP-3) 12 years (Class 4) Corresponds to level B of pressure 
vessels inspection 
Institute of Petroleum IP-12 (1993) 2 years Grade 0; consequence: marginal; 
probability: low. 
API 510 (2006) 5 years If the service is clean, the period 
could be increased to 10 years. 
EEMUA-188 (2009) 5 years According to the risk evaluation 
SAFed (2003) 26 months Clean service 
One worldwide petrochemical 
company 
4 years Clean service 
 
Because of this wide dispersion of recommended intervals, the actual period will be used: 5 
years. 
The results to obtain the modified characteristic life are as following: 
β ηdef Fc MAWP 
(kPa) 
P0(kPa) Fop,j Fenv ηmod 
1.8 37.875 0.75 4500 18000 0.8 1 22.725 
 
The results to obtain the time duration of each inspection cycle is presented here taking into 
account the Confidence Factors (CF): 
Inspection effect Inspection result CFpass CFfail Tdur,i (yr) 
A Pass 0.9 0 5 
 
And the updated characteristic life is: 
Pf,prior Pp,prior Pf,cond Pf,wgt ηupd Pfod 
0.063 0.937 0.094 0.065 22.465 0.065 
 
And finally, the damage factor and the probability of failure are: 
EF 
(event/yr) 
DRRF DR MAWP 
(kPa) 
Df gfft FMS Pf 
0.004 0.1 0.0004 4500 1 6.00E-07 0.11 6.61E-08 






Pf,j = 0.999 and finally 
𝑃𝑓,𝑗
𝑝𝑟𝑑
= 𝑃𝑓𝑜𝑑,𝑗 ∙ 𝐷𝑅𝑗 ∙ 𝑃𝑓,𝑗 = 2.59 ∙ 10
−5 




Consequence of failure on demand 
The event tree for rupture of the protected vessel, releasing propylene is showed in figure 6-20. 
 
Fig 6-20. Consequence analysis event tree for YS702-1 (vapor release case, from part 3, API 581). 
 
 
The results from probability outcome equations, are:  
pvce pflash pfball pphys total 
0.0321 0.0965 0.626 0.245 1 
 
The consequence area results for each event outcome is: 
 VCE Flash fire Fireball Physical explosion 
Component damage, 
m2 (<37.8 kW/m2) 
229 1.2 10343 1292 
Personnel injury, m2 
(<12.6 kW/m2) 
2973 4.6 37415 2650 
 
The flammable consequence results are: 
CAcmd,n  m




and the final consequence area results are: 
gff,n CAcmd,n m
2 CAinj,n  m
2 CA m2 
6.00E-07 6803 24184 24184 
 
Risk calculation 





𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 =  𝑃𝑓,𝑗 ∙ 𝐶𝐴 = 2.6 ∙ 10




/year < 4.6 m
2
/year  it is possible to increase the revision period of 5 years 
Considerations 
 The API procedure gives in an objective way to establish the revision periods allowable 
for a pressure relief valve, according to an acceptable level of risk  
 It has been demonstrated in this case that the valve can increase the revision period to 
more than the 5 years fixed at the beginning. This implies that in some countries the 
authorities may allow increasing the revision periods to 10 or more years (Holland, US, 
etc.), if the residual risks are acceptable. 
 
6.9 Inspection methodology applied to the planned turnarounds                  
Concerning the inspection of safety valves, the new methodology developed in this thesis was 
applied to a programmed turnaround of the plants and conducted over two weeks in February 
2015. 
A total of 45 pressure relief valves were analyzed following the standard procedure explained 
here. A representative case study was elected: the pressure relief valve YS6510B, which 
protects the overpressure upset of a propane-propylene splitter. Figure 6-21 shows the valve 
YS6510B before removal.   
      
Figure 6-21. Pictures of YS6510B in the top of the column before removal. 
The steps to be followed according to the new methodology are: 
1
st
 step: inspection of the valve and system piping during removal  
a) The valve tag must be inspected and verified. Equipment number, installation date, etc. 
must be included.  
b) Immediately after removing the valve, the inlet and outlet nozzles and piping must be 
inspected for plugging and fouling. A specific template has to be used as a field check 
sheet, see figure 6-22. A Management of change procedure (section 3.6) has to be 
conducted in the case that the inlet or outlet nozzles or lines were more than 50% 
plugged. For valves that vent to atmosphere, the vent stack should have a 10 mm weep 
















































Inlet Nozzle Plugging &
Fouling
    0-10%   10-25%     25-50%    50-75%   75-100%
Inlet Pipe Plugging &
Fouling
Outlet Nozzle Plugging &
Fouling
Outlet Pipe Plugging &
Fouling
    0-10%   10-25%     25-50%    50-75%   75-100%
Bolts Gaskets
 
PSV Traveler Tag Instructions:
                     PSV Removal
This tag shall be attached to each PSV (Relief Valve) prior
to removal or installation.  This tag will remain with the PSV
until reinstalled and/or tag is removed at Unit Inspector's
discretion.
Production fills in required return date and shop
turnaround time on tag prior to PSV removal.  For PSVs
replaced by a spare, mark the 'Return to stock' field.
Fill in the 'Order #' and either the Requisition # or the
'Equistar PO#' field as well as the SAP Technical ID, Unit,
Location, and Service fields.
Provide Permit & MSDS to Technician removing PSV
Technician removing PSV (maint. or prod.)
notifies the unit inspector that a PSV is about to be
removed, fills in the Equistar PSV Serial # field, attaches
tag & MSDS to the PSV & removes the PSV noting any
abnormalities such as pipe strain, plugging, fouling,
corrosion, etc. on the comments lines.  Percent pluggage
and/or fouling in the inlet and outlet of the nozzle and piping
shall be noted where possible.
The unit inspector (or designee) inspects the PSV
prior to decontamination, documents abnormalities in the
comments section and signs and dates the tag in the space
provided.
Production decontaminates the PSV and marks tag.
Technician removing PSV notifies shipping that the
PSV is ready for pickup or takes the PSV to stores shipping
area.
                   PSV Installation
Production provides permit & MSDS to technician
installing PSV and fills in 'SAP Technical ID, Unit, &
Location fields.
Technician installing PSV (maint. or prod.)
notifies the unit inspector that a PSV is about to be installed,
inspects inlet and outlet lines for pluggage, installs the PSV,
and documents any abnormalities such as pipe strain, on
the Installation comments lines.
The unit inspector (or designee) inspects the PSV
installation, documents results on the tag and signs and
dates the tag.
Production verifies the PSV installation is correct and
signs the tag when acceptable.
The unit inspector (or designee) removes the tag
and updates the PSV records.
 
 















c) The valve must be decontaminated and prepared for shipping to the repair facility. If a 
valve cannot be verified as being decontaminated, a pre-test should not be performed 




 step: pre-tests and inspection 
Before a pressure relief valve is cleaned, disassembled or repaired, an “as received” inspection 
of the device condition and functionality must be performed. The steps are: 
d) All the valves are visually inspected in the “as received” condition including deposits or 
corrosion which could block the inlet or outlet of the valve. Checking the bellows, 
noting any leakage from the bonnet vent. Verification that set pressure and blowdown 
adjustment seals are present. Condition of inlet and outlet flanges for pitting and other 
anomalies in the seating surfaces. Condition of the spring for corrosion or cracking and 
for correct pressure range at the valve’s operating pressure and temperature. Position of 
set screws and openings in the bonnet. Condition of the external surfaces for any 
indication of a corrosive atmosphere or of mechanical damage. Verification of valve 
components and materials to match the information on the identification tag and 
registration card. 
e) All valves, whether spring or pilot operated, receive a pre-test also known as a POP test. 
The following parameters are documented: Point at which simmering or an audible 
warning occurs; the inlet pressure where the valve pops open, noting also if the action 
was an acceptable pop or if the opening behavior was deficient in any manner; point at 
which the valve closes by reducing pressure noting if proper closure occurred and if any 
leakage is present after closure. 
f) The pressure at which a valve pops open during the pre-test results in different actions 
as follows: 
 If the valve lifts inside the set point tolerance as defined by AD Merkblatt-A2 
(2006) for instance, the test result is acceptable.  
 If the valve lifts outside the test point tolerance as defined by AD Merkblatt-A2, 
but within ± 10% of the set pressure, the test is repeated and the inspection 
engineer decides if the interval should be decreased 
 If the valve lifts at least than 90% of the set pressure the test is repeated and the 
inspection engineer decides if further evaluation is required 
 If the valve lifts a pressure greater than 110% of the set pressure, but less than 
150% of set pressure, or if the valve inlet and/or outlet has more than 50% 
plugging or fouling, the Management of Change exercise must be done 
including a failure analysis 
 If the valve lifts at or greater than 150% of set pressure, or if the valve does not 
lift at 100% of the test stand’s  pressure the investigation and the MOC 
procedure shall begin within 48 hours of the pre-test failure. 
g) A pre-test waiver may be obtained for valves which leak excessively in excess of test 
stand volume capability or if the valve inlet is completely plugged or the valve is 
installed in non-critical services such as thermal relief valve in cooling water services.  
3
rd
 step: disassembly and inspection 
Following pre-test and inspection, relief valves are disassembled and the parts inspected, 
repaired and/or replaced as necessary. 
The work performed is documented according to the valve inspection and minimum work 
requirements sheet (figure 6.23). 
 





ITEM CONDITION RECEIVED WORK PERFORMED 
1.  Inlet Check 
 Flange surface             or 
 
 
 Inlet threads 
 
 Remachine as needed.  If dimensional 
tolerances are exceeded, replace valve 
 Retap or remachine 
2.  Outlet Check 
 Flange surface             or 
 
 
 Inlet threads 
 
 Remachine as needed.  If dimensional 
tolerances are exceeded, replace valve 
 Retap or remachine 
3.  Body Check  
 Wall thickness 
 Bonnet or yoke gasket surfaces 
 
 Clean 
 Machine faces to remove any damage 
4.  Lever Check 
 Cotter pin  
Replace if necessary 




Replace if damaged 
6.  Floating Washers  Replace 
7.  Set Screws Check  
 Bent, broken, corroded 




8.  Adjusting Screw Check 
 Upper washer bearing surface 
 Threads 
 Inside diameter 
 
 Clean with fine emery cloth if dirty or 
slightly marked 
 Replace if pitted or worn 
 If worn, check mfg. allowable tolerance; 
replace if needed. 




 Pitting, Corrosion 
 Integrity of threads 
 Wear at contact with adjusting bolt 
 
 Clean and polish 
 Straighten within mfg tolerances or 
replace 
 Lightly machine or replace 
 
 Remove imperfections  
10.  Spring Check 
 Cleanliness 
 Overall height 
 Parallelism 
 Perpendicularity 
 For Corrosion and Cracks 
 Spring number verification 
 Clean DO NOT BLAST CLEAN 
 Replace if 
 corroded 
 cracked 
 below free height tolerance 
 out of square 
11. Spring Washers Check 
 Cleanliness 
 Pitted or worn 
 Plating  
 
 Clean and polish 
 Replace 
 Replace 
12. Guide Check 
 Bore diameter 
 Bore surface finish 
 For scoring and/or galling of inside bore 
 Thread conditions 
 Bonnet / Body fit 
 Gasket surfaces 
 Clean and polish all surfaces 
 Polish where needed to remove burrs 
 Clean adjusting ring threads 
 Replace if out of mfg tolerance. 
 Replace if pitted or worn 
13. Disc Holder Check 
 Outside diameter for galling, scoring, pitting and the 
dimensions 
 Spindle bearing surface for corrosion and pitting 
 Face for steam cutting and damage 
 Depth of counter bore 















ITEM CONDITION RECEIVED WORK PERFORMED 
 Clean or remachine if necessary or 
replace 
14. Disc Check 
 For seat damage 
 Overall height 
 Seat step 
 Bearing surface 
 Machine surface if needed and if 
allowed by manufacturer otherwise 
replace 
15. Nozzle Check 
 For seat damage 
 Seat dimensions 
 OD 
 ID 
 Seat step 
 Overall height 
 Nozzle ring threads and guiding diameter 
 
 Machine out damage if this does not 
exceed mfg. tolerances, otherwise 
replace 
16. Ring pins Check 
 Bent, broken or corroded 
 Threads damaged 
Replace if damaged in any way 
17. Guide ring Check 
 ID for galling 
 Thread integrity 
 Face for damage such as steam cutting 
 Angles and corners on top surfaces 
 Broken or missing notches 
Replace if any damage is found 
18. Nozzle ring Check 
 ID for galling 
 Thread integrity 
 Face for damage such as steam cutting 
 Angles and corners on top surfaces 
 Broken or missing notches 
Replace if any damage is found 
19. Soft parts Check 
 Condition 
 Replace all soft goods 
 
Figure 6-23. Valve inspection and minimum work requirements sheet. 
4
th
 step: final inspection and testing 
 
Following reassembly of the valve, it is set and tested prior to shipment. A certified test stand 
shall be used with pressure gauges which have been calibrated. The valves in vapor service may 
be tested on either air, nitrogen or steam. Valves in liquid service are tested on water. For 
stainless steel valves, the maximum allowable chloride content is 50 ppm. The steps to be 
followed are: 
h) Leakage tests will be performed at no less than 90% of the set pressure and no more 
than 95% of the set pressure according to API 527 criteria.  
i) A bellows integrity test is performed at a pressure not less than 1.4 barg on the outlet 
side to check for leakage from the bonnet vent. 
j) The blowdown ring of the valve will be set to meet the requirements of the 
manufacturer.  
k) All adjustments access covers are sealed with stainless steel wire looped through holes 
in the valve body and sealed with a lead seal. 
l) A tag indicating the date of testing and inspection should be permanently attached next 




 step: installation inspection 
  
An installation inspection is performed prior to the valve being approved for return to service: 
The work consists of: 





m) The location which the valve has been installed is verified by operators.  
n) Presence of all required accessories are verified, including lifting levers, rupture discs, 
vent piping, weep hole on atmospheric vents, pilot operated valves connected properly, 
etc.  
 
 Inspection interval for new valves 
 
The initial interval is determined according to the chemical severity of the product (see table 6-
13). In this case the propylene was assigned as “clean”. 
 
Table 6-13. Chemical severity of products. 
CHEMICAL SEVERITY CHARACTERISTICS EXAMPLES 
Very Clean A service where the process stream has zero chance of 
polymerizing causing pluggage on the inlet or outlet of the 
relief device 
 Nitrogen 
 Dry breathing air 
 Dry instrument air 
 Carbon monoxide 
Clean A service where the process stream is highly unlikely to 
polymerize causing pluggage on the inlet or outlet of the 
relief device 
 Fuel gas 
 Process air 
 Non-treated air (not dry air) 
 Various hydrocarbons such as 
ethylene or other clean, filtered 
hydrocarbon products at moderate 
temperatures 
Average A service which is not considered “Very Clean” or “Clean” 
but exhibits little chance of pluggage.  Some minor fouling 
of surfaces might occur inside the relief device. 
 Some hydrocarbons with small 
amounts of particulate matter 
 Potential presence of separate 
aqueous phase 
 Service temperatures up to 260° C 
Dirty A service which has exhibited polymerization under certain 
circumstances which are not part of normal operation, or a 
service which is somewhat corrosive in nature. 
 10% or less acid or caustic 
concentrations. 
 Some hydrocarbons with 
particulates in varying amounts 
 Service temperatures over 260° C 
Very Dirty A service which has exhibited polymerization causing 
pluggage during normal operations, or a service which is 
highly corrosive in nature.   
 Butadiene 
 Over 10% acid or caustic 
concentrations. 
 High content of sulfur and/or 
chlorides 
 
And the interval is fixed by table 6-14. In this case, a “clean” product gives 48 months (4 years). 
Table 6-14. Inspection interval according to the severity of the products. 
Chemical Severity Months 




Very Dirty 14 
 
 
Inspection and test interval of existing valves 
 
The existing interval is compared to the interval assigned in the case of when the valve is new. 
When the existing interval is longer and there is no evidence of mechanical damage, the existing 
interval is adopted as a basis for analysis. But when the existing interval is shorter than the 
assigned, the shorter will be adopted for the analysis if and only if: a) adequate documented 
inspection data for a minimum of two test cycles exist  b) there is no evidence of mechanical 





damage to the valve c) management approval is obtained through the Management of Change 
process. 
 
Case study SV6510B 
The following sheet (figure 6-24) was prepared for the safety valves shop  
Inspection Date: February 6, 2015 Equipment: Distillation column 
SAP Order No.:  Service: Splitter C3/C3= 
Unit:  Valve Tag No.: SV6510B 
Date of Last Inspection: February 28, 2012 Requested by: Inspection Department 
Name of Repair/Testing Shop: Static mechanical shop 
Testing and Repairs performed by (print name):  
Company Inspector (print name):  
Valve Specification No.:  
Size: 100 x 150 Model: VSE-2 
MFG: Sempell Serial No.:  
Spring No.:  Valve Type: Conventional 
Valve Capacity:  Capacity Units:  
Operating Temp (°C):  Set Pressure (barg): 20 
Back Pressure (barg):  Vacuum Set (barg): -- 
Vacuum Set:  Inlet Size: 100 
Inlet Rating: PN40 Inlet Type: Flanges 
Outlet Size: 150 Outlet Rating: PN25 
Outlet Type: Flanges Installed with Rupture Disk?  
(Y/N) 
No 
Rupture Disk Lot No.: -- Rupture Disk Set Pressure 
(psi) 
-- 
Rupture Disk Set 
Temperature (°C): 
--   
Comments: 
 
The valve had from its installation (July 26, 1991) an assigned revision interval of 60 months. However, due to leakage problems 
on February 28, 2012, the interval was decreased to 3 years 
 
Figure 6-24. Relief valve shop inspection testing and repair report for YS6510B. 
 
And the shop prepared the following documentation (figure 6-26) 
Was valve upright and on 
skid when received?  (Y/N) 





Pressure of first simmer (psi) Not available POP Pressure (barg) 20 
Pressure at valve closure 
(barg) 
Not available Set Pressure on TAG (barg) 20 
If Pre-Test Not Performed, Explain: 
The Pre-test was performed. No deposits or corrosion present in the inlet and outlet. 
The disc and the seating surfaces have some deposits. Cleaning, machine and lap had been applied. 
SEATS STEMS & GUIDES SPRING INLET OUTLET 
 GOOD 
X 
GOOD  GOOD X GOOD X GOOD 
X FOULED  FOULED  FOULED  FOULED  FOULED 
X CORRODED  CORRODED X CORRODED  CORRODED  CORRODED 
 ERODED  ERODED  ERODED  ERODED  ERODED 
 CRACKED  CRACKED  CRACKED  CRACKED  CRACKED 
 
Figure 6-25. As-received valve inspection for YS6510B. 
 





And finally the shop reported the results of the test using the final test sheet (figure 6-26). 
Set Pressure (barg): 20 
Vacuum Pressure:  
Cold Differential Set (barg): 20 
Bubble Tight at (barg):  
Blowdown: No blowdown ring available 
Tightness B/P Test:  
Nozzle Ring Set 
Notches ________________ UP DOWN 
Guide Ring Set 
Notches ________________ UP DOWN 
Additional Comments 
 

















Figure 6-26. Final test sheet for YS6510B. 
 
Some pictures of the process are presented here: 
 
Figure 6-27. Picture of 6510B disassembled (light corrosion on the disc and on the spring can be 
appreciated). 
 
Figure 6-28. Picture of the disc of 6510B. Detail of deposits and corrosion on the disc. 






Figure 6-29. Picture of the seating surface of 6510B. It is in good condition after machine and leap. 
 
Figure 6-30. Picture of the disc of 6510B after lapping process. 
    
Figure 6-31. Picture of the assembling process of YS6510. 






Figure 6-32. Picture of YS3925 ready to do the test (see the bottle with water to count the bubbles). 
The results of the inspection of the 45 pressure relief valves can be seen in Table 6-15. 
However, the valves which had a prepop test were 32. 
Table 6-15. Results of inspection (Turnaround of February, 2015) 





3085 8 20x25 propylene 13 163 A management of change was open. 
Disc and seating surface were lap 
3027 40 20x25 propylene 50 125 Disc and seating surface were lap 
3028 40 20x25 propylene 42 105 Disc and seating surface were lap 
3082 10 15x25 cooling 
water 
30 300 A management of change was open 
Disc and seating surface were lap 
3083 52 15x25 nitrogen 50 96 Disc and seating surface were lap 
6516 20 20x25 propylene 18 90 Disc and seating surface were lap 
6517 20 20x25 propylene 22 110 Disc and seating surface were lap 
6518 20 20x25 propylene 21 105 Disc and seating surface were lap 
6519 20 20x25 propylene 19.1 95.5 Disc and seating surface were lap 
860-07 7  propylene 2.8 40 Disc and seating surface were lap 
493-01 8 25x25 water 8.8 110 Disc and seating surface were lap 
412-08 8 25x40 mineral oil 8.8 110 Disc and seating surface were lap 
413-03 7.2 25x25 water 5.4 75 Disc and seating surface were lap 
870-15 1  water 0.9 90 Disc and seating surface were lap 
882-01 8 40x50 steam 4 50 Disc and seating surface were lap 
420-04 6 25x25 propylene 3 50 Disc and seating surface were lap 
42-04 30 25x25 propylene -- -- Disc and seating surface were lap 
115 55 25x50 mineral oil 57 104 Disc and seating surface were lap 
117 10 15x25 cooling 
water 
10.5 105 Disc and seating surface were lap 
657 20 25x25 propylene 26.5 133 A management of change was open 
Disc and seating surface were lap 
3023 10 150x250 water 10 100 Disc and seating surface were lap 
3913 6 15x25 cooling 
water 
6 100 Disc and seating surface were lap 
3925 24 25x40 propylene 24 100 Disc and seating surface were lap 
6510B 20 100x150 propylene 20 100 Disc and seating surface were lap 
6511 8 20x25 cooling 
water 
8 100 Disc and seating surface were lap 
551 6 15x25 cooling 
water 
6 100 Disc and seating surface were lap 
821 4 15x25 air -- -- Disc and seating surface were lap 
822 4 15x25 air -- -- Disc and seating surface were lap 
845 4 25x25 air -- -- Disc and seating surface were lap 
810 4 50x80 nitrogen -- -- Disc and seating surface were lap 
491-01 8 80x125 propylene 8 100 Disc and seating surface were lap 










491-02 19 50x80 propylene 19 100 Disc and seating surface were lap 
42-26 34 25x25 propylene -- -- Disc and seating surface were lap 
131 6 25x25 nitrogen -- -- Disc and seating surface were lap 
149 9.5 25x25 mineral oil -- -- Disc and seating surface were lap 
3236 0.75 200x200 nitrogen   Disc and seating surface were lap 
490-02 6 50x250 propylene 6 100 Disc and seating surface were lap 
861-14 30 15 propylene 30 100 Disc and seating surface were lap 
549 6 15x25 water 1 17 A management of change was open 
Disc and seating surface were lap 
07 45 15x25 propylene -- -- Disc and seating surface were lap 
1125  59.5 15x25 propylene -- -- Disc and seating surface were lap 
1126 59.5 15x25 propylene -- -- Disc and seating surface were lap 
3230 5 15x25 nitrogen 5 100 Disc and seating surface were lap 
3232 6 15x25 cooling 
water 
2 33 Disc and seating surface were lap 
548 6 15x25 cooling 
water 
0 0 A management of change was open 
Disc and seating surface were lap 
 
Considerations 
 A new procedure has been presented to do the inspection process in a methodological 
way. The presentation here has been paper based but it is already being implemented in 
a relational database. The information collected during this process is very important in 
order to improve the revision periods in a more objective way 
 The author knows that during a turnaround time pressure is hard and the maintenance 
engineer does not want waste time completing data sheets. However, the documentation 
has to be prepared before the shutdown of the plant, not during it, and the use of forms 
or checklists should facilitate documentation of inspection results 
 A major concern is the handling of valves. Usually this work is done by temporary 
contractors, who do not know how to handle a pressure relief valve. The inspection 
engineer must control this process right from the beginning 
 Some statistical data: 
1. 3 valves opened at a pressure higher than 110%, that means 9% (Smith (1995), 
reported 14%) 
2. 6 valves opened before 90% of the set pressure, that means 19 % 
3. The valve 3082 in a cooling water circuit opened at 30 barg, when the set 
pressure was 10 barg. The inspection period has been modified 
4. The valve 3232 opened at 2 barg, when the set pressure is 6 barg and the 
operating pressure of the cooling water system is 4 barg, that means a leakage. 
The inspection period has been modified as well 
 Lapping is performed in the disc and in the surface seat as standard treatment for all 
valves. But according to the figure 6-23 it should be done only if necessary. However, 
this proposal was not accepted by the inspection department in this turnaround 
 A holistic view of table 6-15 suggests there are some bigger issues related to selection 


















Chapter 7. Conclusions and future research 
 
 
The work performed in this thesis has allowed drawing of the following summarized 
conclusions: 
 
1. A new methodology has been developed to improve the reliability of pressure relief valves, 
which uses a step by step approach based on the nine phases of valves engineering process and 
applied to their whole life cycle. By using it, the probability of errors or latent failures decreases 
significantly. 
 
2. In the framework of this methodology, a series of systematic tools have been designed:  
 a list of parameters to be evaluated in the basic and detail phase of valve design through 
a new safety valve requirement specification 
 a list of documentation to be provided for each PRV concerning all its life cycle  
 a pre-startup safety review checklist   
 a checklist for the verification during the engineering process 
 a new procedure for the technical audit phase. 
These tools improve significantly the whole process of pressure relief valve engineering, 
increasing both its reliability and traceability. 
 
3. The analysis of the diverse methods proposed for calculating the required relief load and the 
valve area has allowed the identification of the most adequate ones: 
Required relief load: 
 fire on a vapor/gas filled vessels: Oudekirk (2002) and Self and Do (2010) 
 fire on liquid filled vessels: a dynamic method carefully analyzing the involved 
phenomena (liquid expansion, boiling or formation of a supercritical fluid, vapor/gas 
thermal expansion) 
 heat exchanger tube breakage: models in PS PPM software, Schmidt (2010) 
methodology 
 distillation columns: Sengupta and Staats (1978) unbalanced heat load model. 
Required area: 
 gas/vapor: assume isentropic flash from upstream pressure to choke pressure/back 
pressure. However, as this is a tedious process, the recommendation is to use the 
conventional API equation with specific considerations according to the value of Z 
 two-phase flow: the direct integration method if a process simulator is available; 
otherwise, use the Schmidt (2013) method 
 supercritical fluids: the methods of Self and Do (2010) or API 520 (part I, 2014) are 
recommended. 
 liquids: API 520 (part I, 2014) or DIN EN ISO 4126-1 (2004) sizing equations. 
 





4. A new method of performing an “engineering analysis” according to API 520 (part II, 2015) 
for the pressure relief valves which have an inlet pressure drop > 3% of the set pressure has 
been developed. 
 
5. A specific risk matrix has been designed to improve the methodology for assigning the 
revision intervals of PRVs though a quantitative approach. This matrix allows the classification 
of each safety valve according to the risk generated in case of failure to open on demand. 
 
6. A new procedure has been developed to improve the revision of a PRV in a turnaround. It 
follows all the steps from removal, transporting it to the workshop, prepop, revision and 
reinstallation (this procedure has not been completely adopted in the studied plants, as it is a 
decision at a corporative level). 
 
7. The new methodology has been applied to three petrochemical plants that have 503 PRVs, 
with no incidents related to these valves so far. The following conclusions were reached: 
Some management people from these plants found that the paperwork increased too much and 
the author had to cope with some initial resistance. Two historical prejudices were detected 
concerning PRVs: lack of complexity, except for pilot operated relief valves, and the fact that 
they rarely give problems to the maintenance crew. Thus, it has been perceived that operators 
associate the function of a PRV more to a gate valve rather than to a control valve. 
There is a lack of knowledge of relief systems among the process engineers. The author found 
very few experts on relief systems in European companies.  
Even though there are very good references for studying this chemical process safety area, the 
design of relief systems is still more an art than a science; a significant example is the 
calculation of the required load for each contingency. 
The author firmly believes that the methodology presented in this thesis will contribute to a 
better reliability of PRVs during their whole life cycle. However, the success of implementing it 
in the refining/petrochemical/chemical companies needs, as a first step, the strong support of the 
management and a good knowledge (preferably by official certification) of relief system by the 
specialist engineers. 
Future research 
The author had to cope with knowledge barriers in developing this thesis. Therefore, the 
research and study of the following topics would be of high interest: 
 the correct value of the discharge coefficient for two-phase flow, not only in pressure 
relief valves but also in restriction orifices and nozzles, be identified on the basis of 
experimental testing and comparison of actual mass flux to theoretical mass flux beyond 
the limited experimentation to-date with water. 
 a robust and reliable model for the prediction of the instability of pressure relief valves 
for gases/vapors and liquids 
 identification of the influence of the body bowl choking in the stability of the safety 
valves 
 estimation of the two-phase density where slip between phases is involved. The local 
density where slip is involved depends on the slip model selected to calculate the slip 
ratio. 
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The publications addressing design, installation and operation of pressure relieving systems fall 
into four major categories: Codes, Laws, Standards and Practices.  There is a considerable 
number of such publications around the world, and many are sections of other codes related to 
boilers or pressure vessels. The definitions are: 
Codes are a set of rules developed by various private or non-governmental organizations to 
define basic design requirements for pressurized and non-pressurized equipment or for the 
handling and storage of hazardous material. Examples are Section I and VIII of the ASME Code 
or the European Pressure Equipment Directive (PED 97/23/EC). These Codes are not 
mandatory in themselves, but are often adopted by industry as standards which represent 
prudent and responsible levels of practice and, as such, may become de facto requirements. For 
instance, in US many local jurisdictions may make adherence to part or all of a recognized Code 
mandatory by law. 
Laws governing the design of pressure relief systems are enacted by national or local 
governments to maintain minimum standards of safety. These laws may adopt recognized Codes 
and practices as mandatory requirements for that jurisdiction. 
Standards are compilations of rules and requirements associated with the design or purchase of 
equipment, materials, services, etc. Standards are produced by individual companies to define 
minimum requirements, or by professional or trade organizations to aid their members in 
specifying requirements for various items. As with Codes, Standards are generally voluntary, 
but laws may adopt an industry or trade association standard. 
Practices are compilations of recommended design procedures, typically prepared and published 
by members of a given industry or used within that industry. While published practices are not 
usually adopted as legal requirements by any jurisdiction, they can often supplement mandatory 
regulations by offering guidance in areas not specifically addressed by Codes and laws. Many 
API publications are recommended practices. 
Since 2002, the two major worldwide Codes are ASME and the PED 97/23/EC. The PED 
supersedes local codes in all European member states, codes such as BS (United Kingdom), 
ISPESL (Italy), TÜV (Germany), Stoomwezen (The Netherlands), UDT (Poland), AFNOR 
(France), etc. Compliance with PED allows the manufacturer to CE mark their product as 
required by the European Union and is an assurance that the product is manufactured in 
accordance with the law. 
According to Hellemans (2006), the ASME and PED codes cover about 80% of all worldwide 
requirements. Exceptions are, however, China and India because they have their own guidelines, 
although these are more focused on boiler applications. 
USA and influence areas 
API (American Petroleum Institute) 





API Standard 520 Sizing, election and Installation of Pressure-relieving Devices in Refineries, 
Part I-Sizing and Selection, 9
th
 Edition, July 2014. 
API Standard 520 Sizing, election and Installation of Pressure-relieving Devices in Refineries, 
Part II-Installation, 6
th
 Edition, March 2015. 
API Standard 521 Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems, 6
th
 Edition, January 2014. 
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 Edition, May 2009. 
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 Edition, July 2007.  
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 Edition, 
November  2009. 
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 Edition, November 2009. 
API Recommended Practice 581 Risk-Based Inspection Technology, 2
nd
 Edition, September 
2008. 
API 510 Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: In-Service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration, 
9
th
 Edition, June 2006. 
API Standard 2000 Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks, 6
th
 Edition, 
November  2009. 
ASME International 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section I, Power Boilers and Section VIII, Unfired 
Pressure Vessels, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York. 
ASME PTC 25.3-1976 Performance Test Code - Safety and Relief Valves, American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers, New York. 
ASME Code for Pressure Piping B31.1-2010, Appendix II: Rules for the design of safety valve 
installations 
Others 
NFPA 30 - Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, National Fire Protection Association, 
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Pre Start-up Safety Review Checklist 
Prio. = 1:  Elevated Risk 
Prio. = 2:  Increased Risk 





Action Prio. Resp. on-
site 
docu yes no 
 Preinstallation, handling and testing         
1 
Is the PRV located where there are pressure fluctuations 
(e.g. close to control valves, orifice plates, elbows, 
discharge of displacement pump or compressor)? 
x        
2 
Is the PRV located at least 10 or more pipe diameters 
from any device that causes turbulence? 
x        
3 
Has the join between inlet piping and main piping a well-
rounded entry branch connection? 
x        
4 Is the PRV located in a vibration area? x        
5 Is the PRV well supported? x        
6 Is the PRV located in the cleaner portion of the process? x x       
7 
Is the inlet and discharge piping free-draining (no 
pockets)? 
x        
8 
Is the PRV installed in a location that facilitates access 
and maintenance? 
x        
9 In case of a Balanced PRV, is the bonnet vented? x        
10 
Is the PRV stored indoors and are the inlet and outlet 
flanges closed off? 
x        
11 
Is the PRV tested before installation to confirm its 
opening pressure setting?  
x x       
12 Is the workshop, where testing will be performed, clean? x        
13 
In case of equipment hydrotesting, is the PRV removed 
or isolated?   
x        
14 Is the PRV mounted in a vertical, upright position? x        
15 Is the bonnet shipping plug removed before installation? x        
16 
Is the PRV transported fixed in a wooden box and in a 
vertical position? 
x x       
17 
Is manufacturer’s operation, maintenance and start-up 
manual available for each type of valve? 
 x       
18 
Before installation, are the flanges surfaces cleaned and 
without damages or scratches? 
x        
19 Are the correct flange gaskets used? x x       
20 Do the gaskets obstruct the inlet or outlet passage? x        
21 
Has the installation been purged before installing the 
PRVs? 
x        







Pre Start-up Safety Review Checklist 
Prio. = 1:  Elevated Risk 
Prio. = 2:  Increased Risk 





Action Prio. Resp. on-
site 
docu yes no 
          
 Inlet piping         
22 
Is the nominal size of the inlet piping and fittings the 
same as or larger than the nominal size of the PRV inlet 
connection? 
x x       
23 Is the equivalent L/D ratio of the inlet piping < 5? x x       
24 
In case L/D>5, has the diameter of the piping been 
increased with respect to PRV inlet connection? 
x x       
25 
In case of an inlet piping to multiple relief valves, is the 
flow area of the common piping at least equal to the 
combined inlet areas? 
 x       
26 Have long radius elbows been used? x x       
27 
Is the PRV installed at the end of a long horizontal inlet 
pipe, where rust or scale may accumulate? 
x        
28 
The nonrecoverable pressure loss is less than 3% of the 
set pressure, using the rated flow if the PRV has no 
modulating characteristics? (with the exception of 
thermal expansion and remotely sensed pilot-operated 
relief valves) 
 x       
29 
In case of a rupture disc installation in the inlet piping, 
does it have the same diameter as the inlet pipe? 
x x       
30 
Is there a process lateral piping connected to the inlet 
piping of the PRV? 
x x       
31 
Is the inlet piping stress-free (mechanical and thermal) 
both static and discharging? 
x x       
32 
The reaction forces and the bending moments are low 
enough not to produce excessive stresses on any of the 
components of the inlet piping? 
 x       
33 
In case of open discharge, have the reaction forces been 
calculated by simplified methods? 
 x       
34 
In case of closed discharge, have the reaction forces been 
calculated by specific software? 
 x       
          
 Discharge piping         
35 
In case of an open discharge, is there a long radius 
elbow?  
x x       
36 
In case of an open discharge, is there a low-point drain 
away from relief valve, structural steel and operating 
area? 
x        
37 
Is there any possibility of piping experiencing brittle 
fracture due to auto-refrigeration? 
 x       
38 
Is the rated capacity of the conventional or balanced 
spring-loaded or pop-action pilot-operated PRV used in 
sizing the discharge piping? 
 x       
39 
Is the common relief header piping in a closed system 
sized using the required flow? 
 x       
40 
In case of a modulating pilot-operated PRV, is the 
discharge piping sized using the required flow?  
 x       
41 
In case of thermal expansion of long pipeline or large 
liquid-filled vessels (e.g. LPG or LNG) is there any 
possibility of evaporation due to solar radiation taken 
 x       







Pre Start-up Safety Review Checklist 
Prio. = 1:  Elevated Risk 
Prio. = 2:  Increased Risk 





Action Prio. Resp. on-
site 
docu yes no 
into account? 
42 
In case of a pilot-operated PRV, can the superimposed 
backpressure be higher than the set pressure allowing 
reverse flow? 
 x       
43 
In case of an isolated valve installed, does it have the 
capability of being locked or car-sealed in the 
appropriate position? 
x        
44 
Has draining been provided to prevent the accumulation 
of liquids on the downstream side of the PRV? 
x x       
          
 Stability         
45 
In case of multiple PRVs with staggered settings, is the 
set pressure determined based on the maximum 
allowable pressure accumulation for multiple valve 
installations? 
 x       
46 
Has stability analysis been done to avoid chattering? 
- Excessive PRV inlet pressure loss 
- Excessive built-up backpressure 
- Acoustic interaction 
- Retrograde condensation in the inlet 
- Improper valve selection 
- Oversized PRV 
 x       
47 
In case the inlet pressure drop > 3% of set pressure, has 
the PRV capacity been corrected? 
 x       
48 
For liquid filled systems, has the liquid static head taken 
into account to adjust the set pressure? 
 x       
49 
In the cases where the inlet pressure drop is higher than 
3%, has an “engineering analysis” been performed? 
 x       
50 
In the calculation of the inlet pressure losses, has the 
entrance friction loss from the protected equipment been 
considered? 
 x       
51 
If the PRV is installed on a normally flowing process 
line, is the 3% rule applied to the sum of the loss in the 
normally nonflowing PRV inlet piping and, the 
incremental pressure loss in the process line caused by 
the flow through the PRV? 
 x       
52 
Are the pressure loss calculations made not only for the 
sizing case, but for the others? 
 x       
53 Is the trim of the PRV appropriate?  x       
          
 Isolation (block) valves         
54 
In case of an isolation valve located in the inlet or outlet 
piping of the PRV, have administrative controls been put 
in place? 
 x       
55 
Has the isolation valve at least the same diameter as the 
inlet or outlet piping? 
x x       
56 
Have the isolation valves the capacity of being locked or 
car-sealed? 
x        
57 
Is a bleed valve installed between the isolation valve and 
the PRV? 
x x       
58 Is the isolation valve painted in a special color? x        







Pre Start-up Safety Review Checklist 
Prio. = 1:  Elevated Risk 
Prio. = 2:  Increased Risk 





Action Prio. Resp. on-
site 
docu yes no 
59 
If three-way changeover valves are installed, have the 
opening and closing consequences of the isolation 
valves, been well understood by the operators? 
x x       
          
 Bonnet          
60 
In case of a balanced valve, is the bonnet vented to 
atmosphere and designed to avoid plugging caused by 
insects or freezing? 
x        
61 
In case of a bellows rupture, has the leakage from the 
downstream side of the PRV to the atmosphere been 
considered? 
 x       
62 
In the case where the vent line of the bonnet is routed 
away from personnel due to hazardous vapors, has a 
dispersion analysis been performed? 
 x       
          
 Bolting and gasketing         
63 
Are the gaskets dimensionally correct for the specific 
flanges? 
x        
64 
According to the design pressure and temperature, are 
the gaskets, flange facings, and bolting adequate? 
 x       
          
 Documentation and training         
65 
Is all the documentation specific for each safety valve 
available (vendor calculations, drawings, spare parts 
recommended, material certificates, maintenance 
instructions, etc.) 
 x       
66 
Are all the pressure relief valves included in the Piping 
and Instrument Diagram of the plant? 
 x       
67 
Has the inspection department all the relevant 
information, and has a dedicated file for each valve been 
opened? 
 x       
68 
Have all the operations personnel received training about 
the safety valves, especially for the balanced valves and 
the changeover valves? 
 x       
          




Annex C: List of pressure relief valves studied 
PLANT III 

























Relief load analysis 























period    RV 
IFT v2.0 
years
YS399/01A B399A Propylene Thermal expansion 888.001 Sv 23,5 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS399/01B B399A Propylene Thermal expansion 888.001 Sv 23,5 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS399/02 B399B Nitrogen PCV39920 failure 885.016 Sv 5,5 6.500 1738,5 50 50 Atm x x x x x x x 5.0 <15 5
YS401/02 B401 Propylene Reaction, fire R400 Sv 40,0 60.000 2827,4 80 100 Flare x x x x x x x 1.2 3.1 3
YS401/03 B401 Propylene Reaction, fire R400 Sv 40,0 60.000 2827,4 80 100 Flare x x x x x x 1.2 3.1 3
H40120 B401 Propylene Overpressure R400 Ball valve 0-40 30.000 100 100 Flare
YS401/05 B401 Heptane Overpressure P409 Sv 160,0 9 12 Internal
YS401/06 B401 Propylene Thermal expansion 404.003 Sv 43,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS401/07 B401 Propylene Thermal expansion 702.003 Sv 46,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 3
YS402/01 B402 Lube oil Overpressure P405 Sv 55,0 25 25 Internal
YS402/02 B402 Lube oil Thermal expansion B404 Sv 52,0 44.2 25 25 Flare x x x x x x missing data 5
YS402/03 B402 Lube oil Overpressure P404 Sv 60,0 15 25 Atm
YS402/04 B402 Cooling water Thermal expansion W404 Sv 8,0 1.000 26,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS402/05 B402 Cooling water Thermal expansion W406 Sv 8,0 1.000 26,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS402/06 B402 Lube oil Overpressure P406A Sv 8,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS402/07 B402 Lube oil Overpressure P406B Sv 8,0 Internal Internal Internal Not considered in the study (internal relief valve for pump P406B). Discharge to suction side 5
YS402/08 B402 Lube oil Overpressure P406A/B Sv 8,0 50 50 Atm
YS403/01 B403 Propylene Auto control failure F490A/B Sv 5,0 555 254,5 25 25 Flare x x x x x x x 0.9 3
YS403/02 B403 Propylene Overpressure Cromatograph Sv 2,0 12 12 Flare
YS404/1 B404 Propylene Fire case, thermal expansion W400 Sv 40,0 30.000 1256,6 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 2.4 14.1 3
YS404/2 B404 Propylene Fire case, thermal expansion W400 Sv 40,0 30.000 1256,6 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 2.4 14.1 3
YS404/3 B404 Propylene Thermal expansion 404.012 Sv 43,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 3
YS404/4 B404 Propylene Thermal expansion 404.014 Sv 43,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 3
YS404/5 B404 Propylene Thermal expansion 404.048 Sv 49,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS404/6 B404 Winog oil Overpressure XP400-1 Sv 60,0 12 12 Atm
YS404/7 B404 Winog oil Overpressure XP400-2 Sv 60,0 12 12 Atm
YS404/8 B404 Winog oil Overpressure XP400-3 Sv 60,0 12 12 Atm
YS404/9 B404 Propylene Thermal expansion 404.070 Sv 43,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS404/10 B404 Propylene Thermal expansion 404.001 Sv 46,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS404/11 B404 Propylene Thermal expansion 404.056 Sv 43,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS404/12 B404 Propylene Thermal expansion 404.056 Sv 43,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS404/13 B404 Propylene Thermal expansion 404.002 Sv 43,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 4
YS404/14 B404 Propylene Thermal expansion 702.020 Sv 46,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x
YS405/1 B405 Catalyst Overpressure R401A Rupture disk 11,5 25 25 Atm
YS405/2 B405 Catalyst Overpressure R401B Rupture disk 11,5 25 25 Atm
YS405/3 B405 Winog oil Overpressure 406.006 Rupture disk 10,0 25 25 Atm
YS405/5 B405 Nitrogen Auto control failure
Failure of 
PCV40503
Sv 0,7 300 415,5 25 40 Atm x x x x x x x 12.7 3
YS405/7 B405 Lube oil Thermal expansion RB401A Sv 63,0 12 12 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS405/8 B405 Lube oil Thermal expansion RB401B Sv 63,0 12 12 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS405/9 B405 Catalyst Overpressure P407A Sv 9,0 15 25 Internal
YS405/10 B405 Catalyst Overpressure P407B Sv 9,0 15 25 Internal
YS405/11 B405 Winog oil Thermal expansion 406.006 Rupture disk 8,5 20 25 Atm
YS406/1 B406 Winog oil Overpressure P402 Sv 55,0 6 9 Internal
Size
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study (internal relief valve for pump P709). Out of service
Not considered  in the study (Discharge to P405 suction side)
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study (internal relief valve for pump P406A). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Calculations
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study (internal relief valve for pump P407A). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study (internal relief valve for pump P407B). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study (internal relief valve for pump P402). Discharge to suction side
 





























Relief load analysis 























period    RV 
IFT v2.0 
years
YS406/2 B406 Lube oil Thermal expansion RB402 Sv 20,0 12 12 Atm
YS411/02 B411 Propylene Reaction, fire R410 Sv 40,0 60.000 2827,4 80 100 Flare x x x x x x x 2.1 3.0 3
YS411/03 B411 Propylene Reaction, fire R410 Sv 40,0 60.000 2827,4 80 100 Flare x x x x x x x 2.1 3.0 3
H41120 B411 Propylene Overpressure R410 Ball valve 0-40 30.000 100 100 Flare
YS411/06 B411 Propylene Thermal expansion 414.003 Sv 43,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS411/07 B411 Propylene Thermal expansion 702.019 Sv 46,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS412/02 B412 Lube oil Thermal expansion B414 Sv 52,0 25 25 Flare x x x x x x missing data 5
YS412/03 B412 Lube oil Blocked outlet P414 Sv 60,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
YS412/04 B412 Cooling water Thermal expansion W414 Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS412/05 B412 Cooling water Thermal expansion W416 Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS412/06 B412 Lube oil Blocked outlet P416A Sv 8,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS412/07 B412 Lube oil Blocked outlet P416B Sv 8,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS412/08 B412 Lube oil Blocked outlet P416A/B Sv 8,0 50 50 Atm
YS413/01 B413 Propylene Auto control failure PCV41318 F490A/B Sv 5,0 670 415,5 25 40 Atm x x x x x x x 2.9 3
YS413/02 B413 Propylene Abnormal heat input 412.043 Sv 40,0 10.000 314,2 25 50 Flare x x x x x x oversized 3
YS413/03 B413 Condensates Fire case B413 Sv 8,0 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 2.2 5
YS413/04 B413 Propylene Thermal expansion Cromatograph Sv 2,0 12 12 Flare
YS414/1 B414 Propylene Fire case, thermal expansion W410 Sv 40,0 30.000 1256,6 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 2.7 14.1 3
YS414/2 B414 Propylene Fire case, thermal expansion W410 Sv 40,0 30.000 1256,6 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 2.7 14.1 3
YS414/3 B414 Propylene Thermal expansion 414.012 Sv 43,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 3
YS414/4 B414 Propylene Thermal expansion 414.014 Sv 43,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 3
YS414/5 B414 Propylene Thermal expansion 414.048 Sv 49,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS414/6 B414 Winog oil Blocked outlet XP400-4 Sv 60,0 12 12 Atm
YS414/7 B414 Winog oil Blocked outlet XP400-5 Sv 60,0 12 12 Atm
YS414/8 B414 Winog oil Blocked outlet XP400-6 Sv 60,0 12 12 Atm
YS414/9 B414 Winog oil Blocked outlet XP400-7 Sv 60,0 12 12 Atm
YS414/10 B414 Winog oil Blocked outlet XP400-8 Sv 60,0 12 12 Atm
YS414/11 B414 Propylene Thermal expansion 414.056 Sv 43,0 1.000 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS414/12 B414 Propylene Thermal expansion 414.056 Sv 43,0 1.000 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS414/13 B414 Propylene Thermal expansion 414.056 Sv 43,0 1.000 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 3
YS414/14 B414 Propylene Thermal expansion 702.026 Sv 46,0 1.000 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS414/16 B414 Propylene Thermal expansion 414.001 Sv 46,0 1.000 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS415/1 B415 Catalyst Overpressure R411A Rupture disk 11,5 25 25 Atm
YS415/2 B415 Catalyst Overpressure R411B Rupture disk 11,5 25 25 Atm
YS415/3 B415 Winog oil Overpressure 406.016 Sv 10,0 25 25 Atm
YS415/7 B415 Lube oil Thermal expansion RB411A Sv 63,0 12 12 Atm
YS415/8 B415 Lube oil Thermal expansion RB411B Sv 63,0 12 12 Atm
YS415/9 B415 Catalyst Overpressure P417A Sv 9,0 15 25 Internal
YS415/10 B415 Catalyst Overpressure P417B Sv 9,0 15 25 Internal
YS415/11 B415 Winog oil Thermal expansion 406.016 Rupture disk 8,5 20 25 Atm
YS416/1 B416 Cooling water Thermal expansion 416.004 Sv 10,0 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS416/2 B416 Cooling water Thermal expansion VW410-1 Sv 50,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS416/3 B416 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion, cooling water failure W415
Sv
45,0 10.000 314,1 25 50
Flare x x x x x x x 0.9 8.4 x x 5
Not considered in the study
Size
Not considered in the study (internal relief valve for pump P417B)
Calculations
Not considered in the study. By vendor
Not considered in the study. By vendor
Not considered in the study. By vendor
Not considered in the study (internal relief valve for pump P417A)
Not considered in the study. By vendor
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study. By vendor
Not considered in tyhe study. By agitator vendor
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study (internal relief valve for pump P416A)
Not considered in the study (internal relief valve for pump P416B)
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study. By vendor
Not considered in the study. By vendor
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period    RV 
IFT v2.0 
years
YS416/4 B416 Propylene Thermal expansion 414.021 Sv 46,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS416/5 B416 Propylene Thermal expansion 414.016 Sv 46,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS416/6 B416 Cooling water Thermal expansion VM410 Sv 8,0 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS416/7 B416 Cooling water Thermal expansion X410 Sv 8,0 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS418/01 B418 Lube oil Overpressure VP410-1 Sv 5,0 50 50 Atm
YS418/02 B418 Lube oil Overpressure VP410-2 Sv 5,0 50 50 Atm
YS418/03 B418 Cooling water Thermal expansion XV410 Sv 8,0 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS420/1 B420 Nitrogen Blocked outlet 420.038 Sv 6,0 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3.0 5
YS420/2 B420 Cooling water Thermal expansion 420.069 Sv 8,0 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS420/4 B420 Nitrogen Failure of PCV42021 420.058 Sv 6,0 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 0.03 5
YS420/5 B420 Cooling water Thermal expansion 420.071 Sv 8,0 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS420/6 B420 Cooling water Thermal expansion 420.052 Sv 8,0 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS420/7 B420 Lube oil Thermal expansion RB422-1 Sv 16,0 15 15 Atm
YS420/8 B420 Lube oil Thermal expansion RB420-1 Sv 16,0 15 15 Atm
YS430/01 B430 Nitrogen Overpressure/Vacuum B430 Kito -0,01 / 0,135 250 250 Atm
YS430/02 B430 Nitrogen Overpressure/Vacuum B431 Kito -0,01 / 0,135 250 250 Atm
YS430/03 B430 Nitrogen Overpressure/Vacuum B432 Kito -0,01 / 0,135 250 250 Atm
YS430/04 B430 Nitrogen Overpressure/Vacuum B433 Kito -0,01 / 0,135 250 250 Atm
YS430/05 B430 Nitrogen Overpressure F443 Kito 0,200 80 80 Atm
YS430/06 B431 Air Overpressure H449 Sv 3,5 100 150 Atm
KT432-01 B432 Air Vacuum/Overpressure B190 Kito -0,005/0,045 7.088/31.416 200 200 Atm
KT432-02 B432 Air Vacuum/Overpressure B191 Kito -0,005/0,045 7.088/31.416 200 200 Atm
KT432-03 B432 Air Vacuum/Overpressure B192 Kito -0,005/0,045 7.088/31.416 200 200 Atm
Y7416 B433 Air Overpressure V375A Sv 3,0 50 80 Atm
Y7417 B433 Air Overpressure V375A Sv 3,0 50 80 Atm
Y7418 B433 Air Overpressure V375B Sv 3,0 50 80 Atm
Y7419 B433 Air Overpressure V375B Sv 3,0 50 80 Atm
Y7420 B433 Air Overpressure V375A Sv 8,0 50 80 Atm
Y7421 B433 Air Overpressure V375B Sv 8,0 50 80 Atm
Y7422 B433 Cooling water Thermal expansion V375A Sv 6,0 50 80 Atm
Y7423 B433 Cooling water Thermal expansion V375B Sv 6,0 50 80 Atm
Y7424 B433 Air Overpressure B375 Sv 8,0 50 80 Atm
YS440/01 B440 Nitrogen Overpressure F442 Kito 0,200 80 80 Atm
YS441/01 B441 Steam Thermal expansion 444.028 Sv 39,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS441/02 B441 Steam Thermal expansion 444.032 Sv 39,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS441/03 B441 Steam Thermal expansion 444.047 Sv 39,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS441/04 B441 Air Failure of steam trap or valve. Calculated for FZ44108 444.012 Sv 8,0 2.000 660,0 40 50 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS441/05 B441 Cooling water Thermal expansion 444.022 Sv 8,0 1.000 254.5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS441/06 B441 Demi water Failure of steam trap or valve. Calculated for FZ44108 444.010 Sv 12,0 2.000 415.5 25 40 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS441/08 B441 Cooling water Thermal expansion 441.072 Sv 8,0 1.000 254.5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS441/09 B441 Cooling water Thermal expansion 441.007 Sv 8,0 1.000 254.5 25 25 Atm
YS441/10 B441 Lube oil Overpressure XPM441A Sv 6,0 Internal
YS441/11 B441 Lube oil Overpressure XPM441B Sv 6,0 Internal
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump XPM441B). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump VP410-1)
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump VP410-2)
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Size Calculations
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump XPM441A). Discharge to suction side
Not considered inthe study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
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period    RV 
IFT v2.0 
years
YS441/12 B441 Cooling water Thermal expansion 441.063 Sv 8,0 1.000 254.5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YB442/01 B441 Hydraulic oil Overpressure XP442-2 Sv 600,0 25 25 Atm
YB442/02 B441 Hydraulic oil Overpressure XP442-1 Sv 600,0 25 25 Atm
YS442/01 B442 Thermal oil Thermal expansion XP443-1 Sv 10,0 25 25 Internal
YS442/02 B442 Thermal oil Thermal expansion XP443-2 Sv 10,0 25 25 Internal
YS442/03 B442 Thermal oil Overpressure. Calculated for FZ44213. Nitrogen 4,5 barg XB443 Sv 1,0 25 25 Atm
YS442/04 B442 Cooling water Thermal expansion 442.001 Sv 8,0 1.000 254.5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS443/01 B443 Cooling water Thermal expansion 443.006 Sv 8,0 1.000 254.5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS443/02 B443 Cooling water Thermal expansion 443.003 Sv 8,0 1.000 254.5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS443/03 B443 Lube oil Thermal expansion XPM440A Sv 6,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS443/04 B443 Lube oil Thermal expansion XPM440B Sv 6,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS450/01 B450 Cooling water Thermal expansion 450.003 Sv 8,0 1.000 254.5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x
YS450/02 B450 Cooling water Thermal expansion 450.021 Sv 8,0 1.000 254.5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS450/03 B450 Cooling water Thermal expansion 450.013 Sv 8,0 1.000 254.5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS450/04 B450 Nitrogen Fire case B451 Sv 6,0 500 415.5 25 40 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS460/01 B460 Cooling water Thermal expansion 460.004 Sv 8,0 1.000 254.5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 2
YS460/02 B460 Air Overpressure H469 Sv 3.5 80 125 Atm
YS470/01 B470 Steam Autocontrol failure. Maximum flowrate of FZ47009 B470 Sv 0,3 12.000 314.1 250 350 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS470/02.1 B470 Nitrogen Pressure/vacuum valve B470 Kito -0,09 100 100 Atm
YS470/02.2 B470 Nitrogen Pressure/vacuum valve B470 Kito 0,27 50 50 Atm
YS471/01 B471 Air Overpressure H474 Sv 6,0 100 150 Atm
YS480/01 B480 Air Overpressure H480A/B/C Sv 3,5 80 125 Atm
YS480/02 B480 Air Overpressure H480A Sv 3,5 100 150 Atm
YS480/03 B480 Air Overpressure H480B Sv 3,5 100 150 Atm
YS480/04 B480 Air Overpressure H480C Sv 3,5 100 150 Atm
YS490/01 B490 Cooling water Thermal expansion 490.001 Sv 8,0 1.000 254.5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS490/02 B490 Propylene Autocontrol failure, fire, thermal expansion 490.003 Sv 6,0 50.000 1227.2 150 250 Flare x x x x x x x 1.0 3
YS491/01 B491 Propylene Blocked outlet, fire, thermal expansion VB490-2 Sv 8,0 20.400 4300,0 80 125 Flare x x x x x x x 2.9 5
YS491/02 B491 Propylene Blocked outlet, fire, thermal expansion VB490-4 Sv 19,0 20.400 1456,0 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 1.9 5
YS491/03 B491 Propylene Blocked outlet, fire, thermal expansion VB490-6 Sv 40,0 20.400 661,0 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 0.6 3
YS491/04 B491 Propylene Overpressure V490 Sv 2,0 125 200 Flare x x x x x x x 5.0 x 5
YS491/05 B491 Cooling water Thermal expansion VW490-2 Sv 8,0 32 50 Atm
YS492/01 B492 Lube oil Overpressure VP490-1 Sv 5,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS492/02 B492 Lube oil Overpressure VP490-2 Sv 5,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS493/01 B493 Cooling water Thermal expansion 493.001 Sv 8,0 25 25 Atm
YS700/01 B700 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion K700 Sv 38,0 15.000 1256,6 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 4.2 8.2 x x x x 5
YS700/02 B700 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion K700 Sv 38,0 15.000 1256,6 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 4.2 8.2 x x x x 5
YS700/03 B700 Nitrogen Fire, thermal expansion W705 Sv 5,5 500 415,5 25 40 Flare x x x x x x x (pending) 5
YS700/04 B700 Propylene Thermal expansion 700.018 Sv 38,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS700/05 B700 Propylene Thermal expansion 700.018 Sv 38,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS701/01 B701 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion K702A Sv 38,0 20.000 1256,6 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 3.1 10.8 5
YS701/02 B701 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion K702A Sv 38,0 20.000 1256,6 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 3.1 10.8 5
YS701/03 B701 Propylene Fire,thermal expansion K702B Sv 38,0 20.000 1256,6 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 3.1 9.9 5
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump VP490-1). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump VP490-2). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study 
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump XPM440A). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump XPM440B). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study. By vendor
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve to tank XB443. Nitrogen blanket 100 mbar)
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve to tank XB443. Nitrogen blanket 100 mbar)
Size Calculations
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
 
 





























Relief load analysis 























period    RV 
IFT v2.0 
years
YS701/04 B701 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion K702B Sv 38,0 20.000 1256,6 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 3.1 9.9 5
YS701/05 B701 Propylene Thermal expansion 701.032 Sv 43,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS702/01 B702 Propylene Fire, cooling water failure, thermal expansion W700 Sv 45,0 10.000 314,2 25 50 Flare x x x x x x x 1.4 7.6 x x x x x 5
YS702/03 B702 Propylene Thermal expansion 702.054 Sv 46,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS702/04 B702 Propylene Thermal expansion 702.012 Sv 46,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS702/05 B702 Cooling water Thermal expansion W700 Sv 45,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS702/06 B702 Lube oil Overpressure P701A Sv 45,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS702/07 B702 Lube oil Overpressure P701B Sv 45,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS702/08 B702 Cooling water Thermal expansion PW701A Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS702/09 B702 Cooling water Thermal expansion PW701B Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS702/10 B702 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion F700 Sv 45,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 0.8 37.8 x 5
YS702/11 B702 Propylene Thermal expansion 702.037 Sv 46,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS702/12 B702 Propylene Thermal expansion 702.006 Sv 46,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS702/13 B702 Propylene Thermal expansion 702.016 Sv 46,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS702/14 B702 Propylene Thermal expansion 702.003 Sv 46,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS702/15 B702 Propylene Fire case W702 Sv 39,0 4.400 198,0 40 65 Flare x x x x x x x 6.5 5
YS702/16 B702 Propylene Thermal expansion 702.056 Sv 46,0 25 25 Flare x x x x x x x (pending) 5
YS710/1 B710 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion K710B Sv 38,0 3.000 314,2 25 50 Flare x x x x x x x 0.47 6.8 5
YS710/2 B710 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion K710B Sv 38,0 3.000 314,2 25 50 Flare x x x x x x x 0.47 6.8 5
YS710/3 B710 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion K710A Sv 38,0 3.000 314,2 25 50 Flare x x x x x x x 0.47 6.8 5
YS710/4 B710 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion K710A Sv 38,0 3.000 314,2 25 50 Flare x x x x x x x 0.47 6.8 5
YS720/1 B720 IPA Fire, thermal expansion B720 Sv 6,0 3.000 660,5 40 50 Flare x x x x x x x 16.5 33.4 x x 5
YS720/2 B720 IPA Overpressure P723A Sv 55,0 6 9 Internal
YS720/3 B720 IPA Overpressure P723B Sv 55,0 6 9 Internal
YS734/1 B730 Silane Overpressure P734A Sv 44,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS734/2 B730 Silane Overpressure P734B Sv 44,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS734/3 B730 Silane Overpressure P734C Sv 44,0 Internal Internal Internal
YB823/1 B823 Teal Fire case B740 Rupture disk 4,9 25 25 Burning pit
YB823/2 B823 Teal Fire case B740 Rupture disk 4,9 25 25 Burning pit
YS823/3 B823 Teal Fire case B740 Sv 4,0 25 25 Burning pit
YS823/4 B823 Teal Fire case B740 Sv 4,0 25 25 Burning pit
YS823/5 B823 Teal Overpressure 824.802 Sv 25,0 25 25 Burning pit
YS740/1 D824 Teal Overpressure P740A Sv 44,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS740/2 D824 Teal Overpressure P740B Sv 44,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS740/3 D824 Teal Overpressure P740C Sv 44,0 Internal Internal Internal
YS750/1 B750 Cooling water Thermal expansion 750.014 Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS750/2 B750 Cooling water Thermal expansion 750.021 Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YB750/01 B750 Peroxide Overpressure P750 Rupture disk 4,0 25 25 Atm
YB750/02 B750 Peroxide Overpressure P750 Rupture disk 4,5 25 25 Atm
YB750/03 B750 Air Overpressure Peroxide room
Explosion relief 
panel
- 1 m2 1 m2 Atm
YB750/04 B750 Peroxide Overpressure P751 Rupture disk 4,0 25 25 Atm
YB750/05 B750 Peroxide Overpressure P751 Rupture disk 4,5 25 25 Atm
YS760/01 B760 Nitrogen Pressure/vacuum valve B760 Kito 0,09/-0,05 50 50 Atm Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study. Discharge to burning pit
Not considered in the study. Discharge to burning pit
Not considered in the study (Internal safety valve for pump P740A). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump P740B). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump P740C). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump P734C). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study. Discharge to burning pit
Not considered in the study. Discharge to burning pit
Not considered in the study. Discharge to burning pit
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for lubricating pump P701A)
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for lubricating pump P701B)
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump P723A). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump P723B). Discharge to suction side
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump P734A). Discharge to suction side
Size Calculations
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump P734B). Discharge to suction side
 
 





























Relief load analysis 























period    RV 
IFT v2.0 
years
YS760/02 B760 Nitrogen Pressure/vacuum valve B762 Kito 0,09/-0,06 50 50 Atm
YS760/03 B760 Nitrogen Pressure/vacuum valve B764 Kito 0,09/-0,07 50 50 Atm
YS760/04 B760 Nitrogen Pressure/vacuum valve B765 Kito 0,09/-0,08 100 100 Atm
YS760/05 B760 Nitrogen Autocontrol valve failure. PCV 76017 760.055 Sv 2,0 50 80 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS760/06 B760 Nitrogen Autocontrol valve failure. Failure of PCV76027
H760/H762/   
H764/H767
Sv 0,7 50 254,469 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 0.3% 5








Overpressure P781 Sv 155 9 12 Internal
YS762/04 B762 Demi water Thermal expansion 762.025 Sv 2,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS851/02 B851 Organic waste Fire case B856 Sv 6,0 4.000 660,5 40 50 Sewerage x x x x x x x 5
YS852/01 B852 Nitrogen Autocontrol valve failure 852.008 Sv 6,0 12 12 Atm
YS852/02 B852 Nitrogen Autocontrol valve failure 852.009 Sv 6,0 12 12 Atm
YS852/03 B852 Propane Autocontrol valve failure 852.022 Sv 6 12 12
Natural gas 
subheader
YS854/01 D1275 Propylene/ethane Thermal expansion 860.019 Sv 15 25 Flare
YS860/01 B860 Propylene/ethane Fire, thermal expansion B862 Sv 40,0 15.500 1256,6 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 5.8% 17.3% 3
YS860/02 B860 Propylene/ethane Thermal expansion 860.001 Sv 40,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 3
YS860/03 B860 Cooling water Thermal expansion W861 Sv 10,0 1.000 63,6 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS860/04 B860 Propylene/ethane Autocontrol valve failure FV41601, thermal expansion W861 Sv 40,0 12.000 1256,7 50 80 Flare x x x x x x x 1.03% 5
YS860/05 B860 Propylene/ethane Blocked outlet, thermal expansion P862A Sv 45,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS860/06 B860 Propylene/ethane Blocked outlet, thermal expansion P862B Sv 45,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS860/07 B860 Propylene/ethane Abnormal heat input, control valve fails open B866 Sv 7 2.000 415,5 25 40 Flare x x x x x x x 1.4% 3
YS860/08 B860 Propylene/ethane Fire, thermal expansion K862 Sv 40,0 15.000 314,2 25 50 Flare x x x x x x x 1.7% 9.6% 5
YS860/09 B860 Propylene Exchanger tube breakage, thermal expansion W865 Sv 25 15.500 706,9 50 80 Flare
x x x x x x x 0.03% 5
YS860/10 B860 Propylene Exchanger tube breakage W867 Sv 25 31.000 1256,6 50 80 Flare
x x x x x x x 1.08% 5
YS860/11 B860 Propylene/ethane Thermal expansion 860.060 Sv 40,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS860/12 B860 Propylene Blocked outlet, fire W866 Sv 40 40.000 1256,6 50 80 Flare
x x x x x x x 1.5% 10.7% 5
YS860/13 B860 Propylene/ethane Thermal expansion 860.019 Sv 40,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS860/14 B860 Propylene Exchanger tube breakage W866 Sv 7,5
7360 (L) / 
12640 (V)
2827,4 65 100 Flare x x x x x x x 2.8% 5
YS860/15 B860 Propylene/ethane Thermal expansion 860.002 Sv 40 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS860/16 B860 Propylene/ethane Thermal expansion Cromatograph Sv 2,0 12 12 Flare
YS860/17 B860 Propylene/ethane Thermal expansion Cromatograph Sv 2,0 12 12 Flare
YS860/18 B860 Propylene/ethane Thermal expansion Cromatograph Sv 2,0 12 12 Flare
YS860/19 D1275 Propylene/ethane Thermal expansion 24.442 Sv 8,0 15 25 Flare
YS861/01 B860 Propylene Fire, abnormal heat input B860 Sv 31,0 14.000 660,5 40 50 Flare x x x x x x x 0.9% 15.3% 3
YS861/02 B860 Propylene Thermal expansion 861.016 Sv 40,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS861/03 B861 Propylene Thermal expansion 861.023 Sv 40,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 3
YS861/04 B861 Propylene Blocked outlet, exchanger tube breakage, fire K860 Sv 15,5 30.800 2827,4 65 100 Flare x x x x x x x 3.66% 16.7% 5
YS861/05 B861 Propylene Abnormal heat input, blocked outlet, fire B864 Sv 15,5 8.000 660,5 40 50 Flare x x x x x x x 11.9% 16.3% x x x 5
YS861/06 B861 Cooling water Thermal expansion V860 Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS861/07 B861 Cooling water Thermal expansion W862 Sv 10,0 1.000 63,6 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS861/08 B861 Propylene Fire case W860 Sv 31,0 9.000 415,5 25 40 Flare x x x x x x x 1.4% 15.0% 5
YS861/09 B861 Propylene Thermal expansion 860.019 Sv 40,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS861/10 B861 Propylene Thermal expansion 861.019 Sv 45,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Dismantled
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump P780). Discharge to suction side
Size Calculations
Not considered in the study (internal safety valve for pump P780). Discharge to suction side





























Relief load analysis 























period    RV 
IFT v2.0 
years
YS861/11 B861 Propylene Thermal expansion 861.019 Sv 45,0 500 63,6 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS861/12 B861 Propylene Thermal expansion Cromatograph Sv 2,0 12 12 Flare
YS861/13 B861 Propylene Thermal expansion Cromatograph Sv 2,0 12 12 Flare
YS861/14 B861 Propylene Mechanical equipment failure P860A Sv 30 500 78,5 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS861/15 B861 Propylene Mechanical equipment failure P860B Sv 30 500 78,5 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS862/01 B862 Lube oil Overpressure VP860-1 Sv 5,0 25 25 Internal
YS862/02 B862 Lube oil Overpressure VP860-2 Sv 5,0 25 25 Internal
YS863/01 B863 Cooling water Thermal expansion XV860-3 Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS863/02 B863 Cooling water Thermal expansion XV860-1 Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS864/01 B864 Propylene Overpressure XV860 Sv Pilot operated 21,0 50,0 50,0 Internal
YS865/01 B865 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion XW860-1 Sv 25,0 25,0 25,0 Flare x x x x x x x 1.7% 5
YS865/2.1 B865 Propylene Fire case XB860-2 Sv 25,0 40,0 100,0 Flare x x x x x x x 1.0% 5
YS865/2.2 B865 Propylene Fire case XB860-2 Sv 25,0 40,0 100,0 Flare x x x x x x x 1.4% 5
YS865/03 B865 Propylene Thermal expansion XT860-1 Sv 25,0 15,0 25,0 Flare x x x x x x x 5
YS865/04 B865 Propylene Fire case XW860-4 Sv 25,0 25,0 40,0 Flare x x x x x x x 1.5% 5
YS865/05 B865 Propylene Fire case XW860-2 Sv 25,0 15,0 25,0 Flare x x x x x x x 1.9% 5
YS870/03 B870 Cooling water Thermal expansion W871 Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS870/04 B870 Lube oil Overpressure VP870A Sv 1,5 Internal Internal Internal
YS870/05 B870 Nitrogen Overpressure V870A Sv 3,5 50 80
YS870/06 B870 Lube oil Overpressure VP870B Sv 1,5 Internal Internal Internal
YS870/07 B870 Nitrogen Overpressure V870B Sv 3,5 50 80
YS870/08 B870 Lube oil Overpressure VP870C Sv 1,5 Internal Internal Internal
YS870/09 B870 Nitrogen Overpressure V870C Sv 3,5 50 80
YS870/10 B870 Cooling water Thermal expansion VW870A Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS870/11 B870 Cooling water Thermal expansion VW870B Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS870/12 B870 Cooling water Thermal expansion VW870C Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS870/13 B870 Cooling water Thermal expansion W872 Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS870/15 B870 Nitrogen Overpressure V873A Sv 1,5 50 80
YS870/16 B870 Cooling water Thermal expansion W873A Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS870/17 B870 Nitrogen Overpressure V873B Sv 1,5 50 80
YS870/18 B870 Cooling water Thermal expansion W873B Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS870/19 B870 Nitrogen Autocontrol valve failure CV87001 870.001 Sv 0,5 500 660,5 40 50 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS881/09 B881 Cooling water Thermal expansion F880B Sv 6,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS881/10 B881 Cooling water Thermal expansion F880A Sv 6,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS881/11 B881 Cooling water Thermal expansion P880A Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS881/12 B881 Cooling water Thermal expansion P880B Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS881/13 B881 Cooling water Thermal expansion P880C Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS881/14 B881 Cooling water Thermal expansion P880D Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS881/15 B881 Cooling water Thermal expansion P880E Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS882/01 B882 Steam Steam trap or valve failure. Calculated for FZ44402 B881 Sv 8,0 2.000 660,5 40 50 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS882/02 B882 Steam Steam trap or valve failure B882 Sv 8,0 25 40 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS882/04 B882 Cooling water Thermal expansion 882.020 Sv 8.0 1.000 254.5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 3
YS884/03 B884 Nitrogen Fire case B800 Sv 50,0 7.000 314,2 25 50 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS884/04 B884 Nitrogen Autocontrol valve failure PCV88418 884.002 Sv 40,0 1.000 113,1 15 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS884/05 B884 Nitrogen Fire case VB800-1 Sv 14,0 12 20 Atm
YS884/06 B884 Nitrogen Overpressure VW800-1 Sv 50,0 12 20 Atm
YS884/07 B884 Cooling water Thermal expansion VW800-1 Sv 8,0 1.000 254,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
YS884/08 B884 Nitrogen Overpressure 884.009 Sv 50,0 12 25 Atm
YS884/09 B884 Nitrogen Overpressure 884.009 Sv 50,0 12 25 Atm
SV151.1A D559 Propylene Fire case PB12A SV 20,0 50,0 80,0 Flare x x x x x x x 2.7% 5
SV151.1B D559 Propylene Fire case PB12B SV 20,0 50,0 80,0 Flare x x x x x x x 2.7% 5
SV151.1C D559 Propylene Fire case PB12C SV 20,0 50,0 80,0 Flare x x x x x x x 2.7% 5
SV151.2 D560 Propylene Fire case 151.816 SV 30,0 15,0 25,0 Flare x x x x x x x 1.9% 5
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study






Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study (discharge to XV860 suction side)
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Size Calculations
Not considered in the study




 PLANTS I&II 






















(Purchase orders + 
Inspection records)
Relief load analysis 























period    RV 
IFT v2.0 years
SV42.01 D451 Propylene Thermal expansion P10B Safety valve 59,5 150 254,0 25 50 Flare x x x x x x 5
SV42.02 D451 Propylene Thermal expansion P10A Safety valve 59,5 150 254,0 25 50 Flare x x x x x x 3
SV42.03 D451 Propylene Thermal expansion 06.404 Safety valve 59,5 150 254,0 15 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
SV42.04 D691 Propylene Thermal expansion 54.044 Safety valve 30,0 25 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
SV42.05 D691 Propylene Fire case W10 Safety valve 50,0 25 25 Flare x x x x x x 1.6% 5
SV42.24 D691 Propylene Fire case P11A Safety valve 20,0 50 50 Flare x x x x x x 0.2% 5
SV42.25 D691 Propylene Fire case P11B Safety valve 20,0 50 50 Flare x x x x x x 5
SV42.26 D691 Propylene Thermal expansion 06.405 Safety valve 34,0 150 254,0 25 25 Flare
SV42.27 D691 Nitrogen Mechanical seal rupture/CVFO PB11A/B Safety valve 17,0 10 10 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y06 D451 Propylene Fire case / Thermal F10 Safety valve 45,0 15 25 Flare
Y07 D452 Propylene Thermal expansion 48.826 Safety valve 45,0 150 254,0 15 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y10 D452 Propylene Thermal expansion 07.801 Safety valve 59,5 150 254,0 15 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y11 D452 Nitrogen PC-0140 failure, fire F15 Safety valve 1,0 100 254,0 25 40 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y12 D452 Nitrogen FIC-0140 failure V15 Safety valve 1,0 100 254,0 25 40 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y13A D452 Propylene Fire, abnormal heat in., thermal exp. K10A Safety valve 45,0 5.530 254,0 25 50 Flare x x x x x x x 15.9% 20.2% x x x x x x 5
Y13B D452 Propylene Fire, abnormal heat in., thermal exp. K10A Safety valve 45,0 5.530 254,0 25 50 Flare x x x x x x x 15.9% 20.2% x x x x x x 5
Y14A D452 Propylene Fire, abnormal heat in., thermal exp. K10B Safety valve 45,0 5.530 254,0 25 50 Flare x x x x x x x 6.9% 20.5% x x x x x x 5
Y14B D452 Propylene Fire, abnormal heat in., thermal exp. K10B Safety valve 45,0 5.530 254,0 25 50 Flare x x x x x x x 6.9% 20.5% x x x x x x 5
Y15a D448 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion K11A Safety valve 45,0 8.782 254,0 25 40 Flare x x x x x x x 1.8% 23.5% x x x 5
Y15b D448 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion K11A Safety valve 45,0 8.782 254,0 25 40 Flare x x x x x x x 1.8% 23.5% x x x 5
Y15c D448 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion K11B Safety valve 45,0 8.782 254,0 25 40 Flare x x x x x x x 1.7% 25.4% x x x 5
Y15d D448 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion K11B Safety valve 45,0 8.782 254,0 25 40 Flare x x x x x x 1.7% 25.4% x x x 5
Y30 D560 Mineral oil Fire case K30 Safety valve 5,5 471,0 50 80 Flare
Y31 D454 Heptane Fire case B32 Safety valve 6,0 7.804 64 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 0.35% > 100% x x x 5
Y34A D454 Mineral oil Failure LS0310/ Fire case B30 Safety valve 5,5 855 80 100 Flare
Y34B D454 Mineral oil  Fire case B710 Safety valve 6,0 855 80 100 Flare
Y70 D561 Nitrogen Failure of PIC0710 B231 Safety valve 1,1 2,5 254,0 25 40 Burning pit x x x x x x 5
Y71 D561 TEAL Fire, autocontrol valve failure B230 Safety valve 1,1 2,5 254,0 25 40 Burning pit
Y72 D561 TEAL Fire case (dismantled equipment) 5
Y80 D459 Atmer Overpressure P80/1 Safety valve 100,0 15 15 Atm
Y82 D459 Heating Water Thermal expansion W85 Safety valve 6,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y83 D459 Heating Water Thermal expansion P85 Safety valve 5,0 64 25 25 Atm 5
Y84 D459 Steam TIC806 fails open W85 Safety valve 4,0 491 25 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y85 D459 Atmer Blocked outlet P281 Safety valve 100,0 15 20 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y86 D459 Atmer Blocked outlet P86 Safety valve 160,0 95 15 20 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y100A D462 Propylene Thermal expansion P103A Safety valve 54,0 64 25 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y100B D462 Propylene Thermal expansion P103B Safety valve 54,5 64 25 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y101 D461 Propylene Reaction R100 Safety valve 40,0 5.000 471 50 80 Flare x x x x x x 3
Y102 D461 Propylene Reaction R100 Safety valve 40,0 5.000 471 50 80 Flare x x x x x x 3
Y103 D462 Propylene Fire, exchanger tube breakage W101 Safety valve 40,0 40 50 Flare x x x x x 1.2% 27.2% x x x 5
Y104 D462 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion W100 Safety valve 39,5 160 64 25 25 Flare x x x x x x 25.8% x x x 2
Y105 D462 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion W100 Safety valve 40,0 160 64 25 25 Flare x x x x x x 25.8% x x x 5
Y106 D462 Propylene Fire, blocked outlet P100A Safety valve 44,5 10.800 254 25 50 Flare x x x x x x 11.8% 13.1% x x x x x x 2
Y107 D462 Propylene Fire, blocked outlet P100B Safety valve 44,5 10.800 254 25 50 Flare x x x x x x 11.8% 13.1% x x x x x x 3
Out of service (Not dismantled due to TEAL handling risk)
Heavy component needs more than 30 min to start boiling. Not considered fire case. This valve was designed originally for containing heptane in protected vessel.
Heavy component needs more than 30 min to start boiling. Not considered fire case. This valve was designed originally for containing heptane in protected vessel.
Size Calculations
Heavy component needs more than 30 min to start boiling. Not considered fire case. This valve was designed originally for containing heptane in protected vessel.
x
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
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Y108 D462 Cooling water Thermal expansion W100 Safety valve 6,0 64 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y109 D462 Cooling water Thermal expansion W101 Safety valve 6,0 32 32 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y111 D449 Catalyst suspension Overpressure R111 Safety valve 6,0 25 40 Atm
Y112 D450 Catalyst suspension Thermal expansion R115 Safety valve 3,0 25 40 Atm
Y114 D465 Nitrogen Autocontrol valve failure PC1063 B108 Safety valve 50,0 100 254,0 25 50 Flare  x x x x x x 5
Y115 D465 Mineral oil Blocked outlet P108 Safety valve 50,0 180 254,0 25 50 Flare
Y116 D465 Cooling water Thermal expansion W108 Safety valve 8,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y117 D465 Cooling water Thermal expansion W107 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y119 D465 Mineral oil Blocked outlet P109 Safety valve 55,0 64,0 25 25 Atm
Y121 D466 Propylene Failure of PC-1205 B121 Safety valve 5,5 20 64 15 25 Flare x x x x x x 3
Y123 D469 Nitrogen Blocked outlet V120A Safety valve 1,0 25 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y124 D469 Nitrogen Blocked outlet V120B Safety valve 1,0 25 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y125 D469 Cooling water Thermal expansion W120 Safety valve 6,0 64 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y126 D469 Nitrogen Autocontrol valve failure PIC1301 F123A/B Safety valve 1,0 64 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y127 D467 Nitrogen Autocontrol valve failure PC1235 FB122 Safety valve 5,0 25 80 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y130 D471 Nitrogen Autocontrol valve failure PC1330 FB130 Safety valve 6,0 20 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
KT130 D471 Nitrogen Overpressure B130 Kito -0,02/+0,05 300 300 300 Atm
Y131 D471 Nitrogen Autocontrol failure PC1331 FB131 Safety valve 6,0 20 25 Atm x x x x x 5
KT131 D471 Nitrogen Overpressure B131 Kito -0,02/+0,05 300 300 300 Atm
YS143 D472 Conveying air Overpressure B26 Kito  -0,02/+0,05 Atm
YS144 D472 Conveying air Overpressure B26 Kito  -0,02/+0,05 Atm
Y148 D474 Heating oil Blocked outlet W140 Safety valve 9,5 25 25 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y149 D474 Heating oil Thermal expansion W140 Safety valve 9,5 25 25 Atm
Y156 D486 Cooling water Thermal expansion W2422 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 50 50 Atm x x x x x x 2
Y157 D480 Cooling water Thermal expansion W157 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y158 D480 Cooling water Thermal expansion W158 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y160 D481 Steam Failure of FC-1607 T160 Safety valve 0,4 400 1521,0 80 150 Atm x x x x x x 5
KT160 D481 Nitrogen Overpressure T160 Kito -0,03/+0,08 300 300 300 Atm
Y164 D481 Air Failure of PC-1640 FB164 Safety valve 6,0 25 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
SV170 D485 Air Autocontrol valve failure H170A/B/C Safety valve 3,0 Atm x x x x x x
SV171 D725 Air Autocontrol valve failure H171 Safety valve 3,0 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y185 D477 Cooling water Thermal expansion W185 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y186 D477 Organic vapour Fire, blocked outlet B185 Safety valve 0,5 50 80 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y286 D459 Atmer Overpressure P286 Safety valve 160,0 15 20 Atm
KV330 D575 Nitrogen Overpressure B330 Kito  -0,025/0,05 300 300 300 Atm
KV331 D575 Nitrogen Overpressure B331 Kito  -0,025/0,05 300 300 300 Atm
Y400 D0792 Nitrogen Failure of PC79201, fire, B400 Safety valve 0,3 15 15 Flare/atm
Y401/04 D461 Nitrogen Ovepressure N2 bottles Safety valve 160,0 12 12 Atm
Y411/04 D565 Nitrogen Ovepressure N2 bottles Safety valve 160,0 12 12 Atm
Y521 D483 Water Thermal expansion W521 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y522 D483 Liquid organic waste Fire B521A Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y523 D483 Liquid organic waste Fire B521B Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y540 D468 Propylene Autocontrol valve failure of PC-1904 W540 Safety valve 1,5 1.134 80 125 Flare
Y541 D468 Propylene Autocontrol valve failure of PC-1904 W540 Safety valve 1,5 1.134 80 125 Flare
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Dismantled
Dismantled
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Size Calculations
Dismantled
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study. Included in pump P108
Not considered in the study. Included in pump P109
Not considered in the study
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period    RV 
IFT v2.0 years
Y542A D468 Propylene Overpressure W541A Safety valve 3,5 32 40 Flare
Y543A D468 Propylene Overpressure W541A Safety valve 3,5 32 40 Flare
Y542B D468 Propylene Overpressure W541B Safety valve 3,5 32 40 Flare
Y543B D468 Propylene Overpressure W541B Safety valve 3,5 32 40 Flare
Y544 D468 Propylene Overpressure B542 Safety valve 6,0 25 40 Flare
Y545 D468 Propylene Overpressure B542 Safety valve 6,0 25 40 Flare
Y546 D468 Propylene Overpressure F545 Safety valve 6,0 25 25 Flare
Y548 D468 Cooling water Thermal expansion W540 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm
Y549 D468 Cooling water Thermal expansion W541 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y551 D468 Cooling water Thermal expansion W542 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y553Condensacion gas retorno Propylene Thermal expansion 45.450 Safety valve 40,0 Flare
Y657 D591 Propylene Thermal expansion W657 Safety valve 20,0 25 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y810 D489 Nitrogen Autocontrol failure of PIRCA-8101 81.502 Safety valve 4,0 375 471,0 50 80 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y811 D489 Cooling water Thermal expansion V811 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y812 D489 Nitrogen Blocked outlet B811 Safety valve 46,0 Atm
Y813 D489 Nitrogen Overpressure W811 Safety valve 46,0 Atm
Y814 D489 Nitrogen Overpressure B812 Safety valve 15,0 Atm
Y815 D489 Cooling water Thermal expansion V812 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y816 D489 Nitrogen Blocked outlet VB812-1 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm
Y817 D489 Nitrogen Blocked outlet VW812-1 Safety valve 15,0 64,0 15 25 Atm
Y818 D489 Nitrogen Blocked outlet VW812-2 Safety valve 49,0 64,0 15 25 Atm
Y821 D490 Compressed air Autocontrol failure of PIRCA-8200 82.330 Safety valve 4,0 130 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y822 D490 Compressed air Autocontrol failure of PIRCA-8201 82.332 Safety valve 4,0 26 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y840 D492 Steam Failure of PV-8101 84.209 Safety valve 20,0 100 254,0 25 40 Atm
Y841 D492 Steam Overpressure B841 Safety valve 7,0 300 254,0 25 40 Atm
Y842 D492 Steam Overpressure B842 Safety valve 7,0 500 254,0 25 40 Atm
Y843 D492 Cooling water Thermal expansion W543 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 20 25 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y844 D489 Nitrogen Overpressure N2 bottles Safety valve 45,0 10/12 10/12 Atm
Y845 Compressed air Overpressure Inst. air header Safety valve 4,0 25 25 Atm
Y846 D490 Nitrogen Failure of PC B250A/B25A Safety valve 6,0 25 25 Atm
HS1001 D461 Propylene Overpressure R100 Ball valve 0-45 10.000 KV 100 100 Flare
Y1123 D452 Propylene Fire case K10C Safety valve 45,0 8.782 254,0 25 40 Flare x x x x x x x 2.3 31.5 x x x 5
Y1124 D452 Propylene Fire case K10C Safety valve 45,0 8.782 254,0 25 40 Flare x x x x x x x 2.3 31.5 x x x 5
Y1125 D452 Propylene Thermal expansion 112.810 Safety valve 60,0 15 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y1126 D452 Propylene Thermal expansion 07.804 Safety valve 60,0 15 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y1311 D558 Cooling water Thermal expansion W20 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 20 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y1312 D558 Ethylene Fire, abnormal heat input K20 Safety valve 45,00 360 44 15 25 Flare x x x x x x x 2.0 16.9 x x x 5
Y1313 D558 Ethylene Overpressure V20 Safety valve 45,00 25 25 Flare
Y1314 D558 Ethylene Overpressure V20 Safety valve 30,00 25 25 Flare
Y1315 D558 Cooling water Thermal expansion V20 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 20 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y1521 D560 Mineral oil Thermal expansion K25 Safety valve 45,0 234 44,0 15 25 Flare
Y1522 D560 Mineral oil Overpressure P26 Safety valve 9,0 25 40 Suction
Y1576 D576 Nitrogen Blocked outlet F342 Safety valve 0,2 25 25 Atm x x x x x x 3


















Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Package unit
Dismantled
Not considered in the study
Package unit V20
Package unit V20
Not considered in the study
Heavy component needs more than 30 min to start boiling. Not considered fire case. This valve was designed originally for containing heptane in protected vessel.
Heavy component needs more than 30 min to start boiling. Not considered fire case. This valve was designed originally for containing heptane in protected vessel.
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period    RV 
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SV2502 D564 Nitrogen Blocked outlet F250B Safety valve 5,0 15 25 Flare
SV2503 D564 Nitrogen Blocked outlet F250C Safety valve 5,0 15 25 Flare
Y3011 D565 Propylene Reaction R300 Safety valve 40,0 5.000 254 25 40 Flare x x x x x x 3
Y3012 D565 Propylene Reaction R300 Safety valve 40,0 5.000 254 25 40 Flare x x x x x x 2
HS30103 D565 Propylene Overpressure R300 Ball valve 0-40 10.000 KV 100 100 Flare
Y3021 D0832 Propylene Fire, blocked outlet P300A Safety valve 45,0 38.000 471 40 65 Flare x x x x x x x 4.1 x x x x x x 3
Y3022 D0832 Propylene Fire, blocked outlet P300B Safety valve 45,0 38.000 471 40 65 Flare x x x x x x x 4.1 x x x x x x 3
Y3024 D566 Propylene Thermal expansion W300A/B Safety valve 40,0 64,0 25 25 Flare x x x x x x 3
Y3025 D566 Propylene Thermal expansion W300A/B Safety valve 40,0 64,0 25 25 Flare x x x x x x 3
Y3026A D0832 Propylene Blocked outlet P301A Safety valve 45,0 64,0 25 40 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y3026B D0832 Propylene Blocked outlet P301B Safety valve 45,0 64,0 25 40 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y3027 D566 Propylene Thermal expansion W300A/B Safety valve 40,0 64,0 20 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y3028 D0832 Propylene Thermal expansion 302.819 Safety valve 40,0 64,0 20 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y3029A D0832 Propylene Mechanical failure PB301A Safety valve 2,5 15 15 Flare
Y3029B D0832 Propylene Mechanical failure PB301B Safety valve 2,5 15 15 Flare
Y3031 D567 Mineral oil Thermal expansion 303.808 Safety valve 7,0 20 25 Atm x x x x x x 2
Y3032 D567 Catalyst suspension Blocked outlet R301 Safety valve 6,0 25 40 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y3033 D567 Cooling water Thermal expansion R301 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y3034 D566 Propylene Fire case W301 Safety valve 40,0 40 40 Flare x x x x x x x 0.7 28 x x x 5
Y3035 D566 Cooling water Thermal expansion W301 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y3044 D568 Nitrogen Overpressure R301/R305 Safety valve 3,0 25 25 Atm
Y3081 D570 Cooling water Thermal expansion W307 Safety valve 10,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y3082 D570 Cooling water Thermal expansion W308 Safety valve 10,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y3083 D570 Nitrogen Overpressure B308 Safety valve 52,0 64,0 15 25 Flare
Y3084 D588 Propylene Fire case F393 Safety valve 6 20 25 Flare
Y3209A D462 Propylene Mechanical seal failure PB103A Safety valve 2,5 15 15 Flare
Y3209B D462 Propylene Mechanical seal failure PB103B Safety valve 2,5 15 15 Flare
Y3211 D571 Propylene Autocontrol failure of PIC32105 B321 Safety valve 6,0 14 44,0 15 15 Flare x x x x x x 3
Y3220 D572 Nitrogen Autocontrol failure of PIC32209 FB322 Safety valve 5,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y3225 D573 Nitrogen Blocked outlet F323 Safety valve 1,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 4
Y3230 D573 Nitrogen Overpressure FB323 Safety valve 5,0 15 25 Atm
Y3231 D573 Nitrogen Autocontrol failure PCV32301 FB323 Safety valve 1,0 25 44,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y3232 D573 Cooling water Thermal expansion W320 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y3233 D573 Cooling water Thermal expansion W325A Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y3234 D573 Cooling water Thermal expansion W325B Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y3301 D575 Nitrogen Overpressure FB330 Safety valve 5,0 15 25 Atm
Y3310 D575 Nitrogen Overpressure FB331 Safety valve 5,0 15 25 Atm
Y3421 D577 Cooling water Thermal expansion S340 Barrel#1 Safety valve 10,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y3430 D577 Lube oil Overpressure P347 Safety valve 10,0 15 25 Atm
Y3511 D581 Cooling water Thermal expansion W357 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y3611 D582 Steam Blocked outlet T360 Safety valve 0,4 2.500 6793,0 150 250 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y3640 D582 Compressed air Blocked outlet FB364 Safety valve 5,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y3811 D587 Cooling water Thermal expansion W380 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y3812 D587 Cooling water Thermal expansion W385 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 3
Not considered in the study
Size Calculations
Not considered in the study
Not considered in the study
Package unit P300A
Package unit P300B








Not considered in the study
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Y3911 D588 Propylene Failure of PC-39104 F390A/B Safety valve 1,5 1.520 80 150 Flare
Y3912 D588 Propylene Failure of PC-39104 F390A/B Safety valve 1,5 1.520 80 150 Flare
Y3913 D588 Cooling water Thermal expansion W390 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm
Y3915 D588 Propylene Overpressure VB390-1 Safety valve 5,0 40 80 Flare
Y3916 D588 Propylene Overpressure VB390-1 Safety valve 5,0 40 80 Flare
Y3917 D588 Propylene Overpressure B392 Safety valve 22,0 40 40 Flare
Y3918 D588 Propylene Overpressure B392 Safety valve 22,0 40 40 Flare
Y3919 D588 Cooling water Thermal expansion W392 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y3920 D588 Propylene Heat exchanger tube breakage W393 Safety valve 3,0 1.380 1.520 80 150 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y3921 D588 Propylene heat exchanger tube breakage W393 Safety valve 3,0 1.380 1.520 80 150 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y3922 D588 Cooling water Thermal expansion W391 Safety valve 4,5 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y3923 D588 Cooling water Fire V390 suction Safety valve 6,0 25 40 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y3924 D588 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion 391.801 Safety valve 22,0 64 20 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y3925 D588 Propylene Fire case B393 Safety valve 24,0 25 40 Flare x x x x x x x 5.3 51.6 x x x x x x 5
Y3926 D730 Cooling water Thermal expansion W395 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y3927 D730 Cooling water Thermal expansion W394 Safety valve 6,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
Y3928 D730 Propylene Blocked outlet, fire B398 Safety valve 22,0 25 40 Flare
Y3929 D730 Propylene Blocked outlet, fire B398 Safety valve 22,0 25 40 Flare
Y3930 D730 Propylene Blocked outlet, fire B396 Safety valve 5,0 50 65 Flare
Y3931 D730 Propylene Blocked outlet, fire B396 Safety valve 5,0 50 65 Flare
Y3932 D730 Cooling water Thermal expansion V391 Safety valve 4,0 64,0 15 25 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y3952 D730 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion W395 Safety valve 20,0 20 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y6211 D590 Steam Blocked outlet W620 Safety valve 6,0 400 254,0 25 40 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y6214 D590 Cooling water Thermal expansion W621 Safety valve 6,0 7.500 64,0 25 40 Atm x x x x x x 5
Y6510A D591 Propylene Fire, cooling water failure K655A/B Safety valve 20,0 35.750 2734,0 100 150 Flare x x x x x x x 2.9 28.9 x x x x 5
Y6510B D591 Propylene Fire, cooling water failure K655A/B Safety valve 20,0 35.750 2734,0 100 150 Flare x x x x x x x 2.9 28.9 x x x x 5
Y6511 D591 Cooling water Thermal expansion W658 Safety valve 8,0 64,0 20 25 Atm x x x x x x x 5
Y6512A D591 Cooling water Thermal expansion W655A Safety valve 8,0 50,0 20 25 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y6512B D591 Cooling water Thermal expansion W655B Safety valve 8,0 50,0 20 25 Atm x x x x x x 3
Y6513A D591 Propylene Thermal expansion P655A Safety valve 25,0 20 25 Flare x x x x x x 3
Y6513B D591 Propylene Thermal expansion P655B Safety valve 25,0 20 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y6514A D591 Propylene Thermal expansion P656A Safety valve 47,0 20 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y6514B D591 Propylene Thermal expansion P656B Safety valve 47,0 20 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y6515A D591 Propylene Thermal expansion P657A Safety valve 25,0 20 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y6515B D591 Propylene Thermal expansion P657B Safety valve 25,0 20 25 Flare x x x x x x 3
Y6516A D591 Propylene Thermal expansion Mech seal P656A Safety valve 48,0 20 25 Flare
Y6516B D591 Propylene Thermal expansion Mech seal P656B Safety valve 48,0 20 25 Flare
Y6516 D591 Propylene Thermal expansion 391.802 Safety valve 22,0 20 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y6517 D591 Propylene Thermal expansion 651.806 Safety valve 20,0 20 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y6518 D591 Propylene Thermal expansion 651.808 Safety valve 20,0 20 25 Flare x x x x x x 5
Y6519 D591 Propylene Fire, thermal expansion W656 Safety valve 20,0 50 80 Flare x x x x x x
Y7416 B433 Compressed air Ovepressure VW375A-1 Safety valve 3,0 15 25 Atm
Y7417 B433 Compressed air Ovepressure VW375A-1 Safety valve 3,0 15 25 Atm
Y7418 B433 Compressed air Ovepressure VB375B-2 Safety valve 3,0 15 25 Atm
Y7419 B433 Compressed air Ovepressure VB375B-1 Safety valve 3,0 15 25 Atm
Y7420 B433 Compressed air Ovepressure VW375A-3 Safety valve 8,0 15 25 Atm
Y7421 B433 Compressed air Ovepressure VW375B-3 Safety valve 8,0 15 25 Atm
Y7422 B433 Cooling water Thermal expansion V375A Safety valve 7,0 64,0 15 25 Atm
Y7423 B433 Cooling water Thermal expansion V375B Safety valve 7,0 64,0 15 25 Atm
Y7424 B433 Compressed air Ovepressure B375 Safety valve 8,0 80 125 Atm
Y7425 D723 Compressed air Ovepressure B376 Safety valve 8,0 80 125 Atm
Y72B Propylene Fire B72 Safety valve 45,0 3.000 1256.6 50 80 Flare x x x x x x 56.4 x x x x 5

























Not considered in the study
 





Annex D: Calculation of relief rate due to fluid expansion and 
external heat for YS 702/01  
 
The design basis for calculating the relief load and required area is exposed in section 6.4. 
 The following Mollier Diagram shows the relieving pressure and the critical pressure, to 
confirm that the relieving of supercritical propylene could give retrograde condensation. 
 
Calculation methodology to be followed: Self and Do (2010)
1





𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎, 𝐴 = 𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 + 𝑖𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 + 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 = 
𝜋 · ℎ · 𝐷 + 𝜋 · ℎ · 𝐷 + 𝜋 · ℎ · 𝐷 = 𝜋 · 0,508 · 3 + 𝜋 · 0,0889 · 25 + 𝜋 · 0,1683 · 5 = 14,41 𝑚2 
𝑄 = 43200 · 𝐹 · 𝐴0,82 = 43200 · 1 · 14,410,82 = 385113 𝑊 
Volume of liquid propylene = 𝜋
0.52
4
∙ 3 + 𝜋
0.082
4
 ∙ 25 + 𝜋
0.162
4
 ∙ 5 = 0.815 𝑚3 
The volume occupied by the tubes is neglected as a conservative basis. 
With the density at 45,5 ºC, the initial mass is obtained. 
𝑀 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 𝜌45,5 ℃ ∙  𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 484 
𝑘𝑔
𝑚3
· 0.815 𝑚3 = 394 𝑘𝑔 
                                                          
1
 Freeman Self and Huyen Do (2010) Calculation of relief rate due to fluid expansion and external heat. 
Revision 4 prepared for the API 2010 summer meeting, August 18, 2010. 
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15𝑠 = 5776695 𝐽 
Summary table: 
Parameter Value Units 
A, wetted area 14,41 m
2 
F 1 - 
Q total 385113 W 
V initial 0.815 m
3 
M initial 394 kg 















) = 𝑀1 − 𝑀2= 𝑉1(𝜌1 − 𝜌2) 
where the vessel volume is V, m
3
; mass in the volume M, kg; fluid density ρ, kg/m
3
; enthalpy H, 
kJ/kg and vessel heat input Q, kJ. Note that time is included in the heat input term. 
In order to obtain the properties in each point, the commercial software Aspen Hysys v7.3 is 































0 5051 45,50 484,40 167,42 0 0 394,00 
  
15 5051 50,49 475,03 182,08 0,01604 7,632 386,37 3,848 1831,7847 
30 5051 55,40 465,21 197,03 0,01717 8,0044 378,36 4,121 1921,0451 
45 5051 60,22 454,80 212,30 0,01862 8,485 369,88 4,468 2036,3159 
60 5051 64,94 443,61 227,92 0,02052 9,122 360,76 4,925 2189,3628 
75 5051 69,54 431,36 243,94 0,02310 9,986 350,77 5,543 2396,6743 
90 5051 73,99 417,48 260,40 0,02704 11,312 339,46 6,489 2714,9817 
105 5051 78,27 399,13 277,42 0,03738 14,954 324,50 8,970 3588,8752 
120 5051 82,37 376,98 295,22 0,04777 18,052 306,45 11,465 4332,5181 
135 5051 86,24 351,20 314,06 0,05973 21,012 285,44 14,335 5042,8753 
150 5051 89,78 322,34 334,30 0,07275 23,513 261,93 17,459 5643,2346 
165 5051 92,83 292,59 356,38 0,08252 24,246 237,68 19,804 5819,1348 
180 5051 95,18 258,51 380,68 0,10709 27,777 209,90 25,703 6666,3736 
195 5051 96,80 219,60 408,27 0,14355 31,715 178,19 34,452 7611,7096 
210 5051 98,77 178,29 440,69 0,18801 33,668 144,52 45,123 8080,2891 
225 5051 104,40 140,57 480,71 0,21723 30,739 113,78 52,135 7377,3948 
240 5051 117,60 111,25 531,48 0,21329 23,893 89,89 51,188 5734,2894 





Once the relief rate has been calculated, the next step is to calculate the required area of the valve. The 
direct integration method of API 520 (2014) is used. 
The maximal mass flux is (in USC units): 
𝐺2 = 𝜌𝑡






When this value has been determinated, the required orifice area can be calculated using the following 




𝐾𝑑 · 𝐾𝑏 · 𝐾𝑐 · 𝐾𝑣 · 𝐺
 
Where A is the effective discharge area (in
2
), W the mass flow rate (lb/h), Kd the discharge coefficient, Kb 
the backpressure correction factor for vapor that should be obtained from the valve manufacturer, Kc the 
combination correction factor for installations with a rupture disk upstream of the PRV and Kv is the 







The design pressure is 652.67 psig, being the maximum allowable overpressure 10%, and the relieving 
pressure is 732.63 psia. The step used, as in the API 520 example, is 4% of the relieving pressure 29.30 
psi. 


























State 1 122,9 732,59 0,00 29,66 0 0 0 
State 2 122,4 703,28 0,00 29,62 -4580,9 -4580,9 2835,45 
State 3 122,0 673,97 0,00 29,59 -4585,8 -9166,7 4006,68 
State 4 121,5 644,67 0,00 29,56 -4590,8 -13757,5 4903,17 
State 5 121,0 615,36 0,00 29,53 -4595,8 -18353,2 5657,10 
State 6 120,6 586,06 0,00 29,50 -4600,7 -22954,0 6319,70 
State 7 120,1 556,75 0,00 29,46 -4605,7 -27559,7 6917,29 
State 8 119,6 527,45 0,00 29,43 -4610,7 -32170,4 7465,49 
State 9 119,1 498,14 0,00 29,40 -4615,7 -36786,0 7974,53 
State 10 118,6 468,84 0,00 29,37 -4620,6 -41406,7 8451,49 
State 11 118,1 439,53 0,00 29,34 -4625,6 -46032,2 8901,55 
State 12 117,6 410,23 0,00 29,31 -4630,5 -50662,7 9328,63 
State 13 117,1 380,92 0,00 29,28 -4635,4 -55298,1 9735,77 
State 14 116,6 351,61 0,00 29,24 -4640,3 -59938,3 10125,41 
State 15 116,1 322,31 0,00 29,21 -4645,1 -64583,5 10499,51 
State 16 115,5 293,00 0,00 29,18 -4649,9 -69233,4 10859,71 
State 17 111,9 263,70 0,02 24,39 -5068,4 -74301,8 9403,20 
State 18 102,5 234,39 0,07 16,14 -6700,0 -81001,8 6494,99 
State 19 92,2 205,09 0,11 11,20 -9931,7 -90933,5 4778,31 
State 20 80,8 175,78 0,16 7,93 -14188,7 -105122,2 3637,79 
State 21 67,9 146,48 0,20 5,61 -20043,1 -125165,3 2809,11 
State 22 52,9 117,17 0,25 3,89 -28565,9 -153731,2 2157,80 
State 23 34,8 87,87 0,29 2,57 -42033,2 -195764,3 1607,38 
State 24 11,4 58,56 0,34 1,53 -66273,6 -262037,9 1106,55 




Gmax 10859,7 lb/s·ft2 






























State 1 148,9 732,59 0,00 27,69 0 0 0 
State 2 148,3 703,28 0,00 27,65 -4906,5 -4906,5 2739,15 
State 3 147,6 673,97 0,00 27,61 -4913,9 -9820,4 3869,31 
State 4 147,0 644,67 0,00 27,57 -4921,5 -14741,9 4733,49 
State 5 146,3 615,36 0,00 27,52 -4929,0 -19670,8 5459,51 
State 6 145,6 586,06 0,00 27,48 -4936,5 -24607,4 6096,94 
State 7 145,0 556,75 0,00 27,44 -4944,0 -29551,4 6671,26 
State 8 144,3 527,45 0,00 27,40 -4951,5 -34502,9 7197,64 
State 9 143,6 498,14 0,00 27,36 -4959,0 -39461,9 7685,99 
State 10 142,9 468,84 0,00 27,32 -4966,4 -44428,3 8143,22 
State 11 142,1 439,53 0,00 27,28 -4973,7 -49402,1 8574,37 
State 12 141,4 410,23 0,00 27,24 -4981,0 -54383,0 8983,30 
State 13 140,6 380,92 0,00 27,20 -4988,1 -59371,1 9373,00 
State 14 136,0 351,61 0,03 22,63 -5449,0 -64820,2 8149,33 
State 15 128,5 322,31 0,08 17,18 -6820,1 -71640,2 6503,96 
State 16 120,5 293,00 0,13 13,33 -8899,8 -80540,0 5349,70 
State 17 111,9 263,70 0,17 10,45 -11417,3 -91957,3 4483,41 
State 18 102,5 234,39 0,21 8,23 -14535,2 -106492,5 3797,09 
State 19 92,2 205,09 0,25 6,45 -18496,4 -124988,9 3226,55 
State 20 80,8 175,78 0,28 5,01 -23691,1 -148680,0 2731,23 
State 21 67,9 146,48 0,32 3,81 -30787,1 -179467,1 2283,56 
State 22 52,9 117,17 0,35 2,81 -41036,2 -220503,3 1863,22 
State 23 34,8 87,87 0,39 1,95 -57087,2 -277590,5 1453,71 
State 24 11,4 58,56 0,43 1,22 -85708,1 -363298,6 1037,60 




Gmax 9373,0 lb/s·ft2 






























State 1 180,3 732,59 0,00 23,54 0 0 0 
State 2 179,1 703,28 0,00 23,51 -5772,6 -5772,6 2525,64 
State 3 178,0 673,97 0,00 23,48 -5779,1 -11551,7 3569,28 
State 4 176,8 644,67 0,00 23,47 -5783,9 -17335,5 4369,55 
State 5 175,6 615,36 0,00 23,46 -5786,6 -23122,1 5044,95 
State 6 174,3 586,06 0,00 23,46 -5787,0 -28909,1 5641,97 
State 7 173,0 556,75 0,00 23,48 -5784,6 -34693,7 6184,91 
State 8 171,7 527,45 0,00 23,51 -5778,7 -40472,4 6689,21 
State 9 167,8 498,14 0,04 21,21 -6071,5 -46543,9 6472,31 
State 10 162,1 468,84 0,11 17,83 -6954,6 -53498,5 5832,98 
State 11 156,1 439,53 0,16 15,08 -8249,9 -61748,4 5300,45 
State 12 149,7 410,23 0,20 12,85 -9721,4 -71469,8 4858,30 
State 13 143,1 380,92 0,24 10,99 -11391,5 -82861,2 4472,95 
State 14 136,0 351,61 0,28 9,41 -13314,7 -96175,9 4125,70 
State 15 128,5 322,31 0,31 8,04 -15560,5 -111736,4 3802,69 
State 16 120,5 293,00 0,35 6,86 -18224,7 -129961,1 3495,31 
State 17 111,9 263,70 0,38 5,81 -21440,7 -151401,8 3196,64 
State 18 102,5 234,39 0,40 4,88 -25403,7 -176805,5 2901,98 
State 19 92,2 205,09 0,43 4,05 -30407,9 -207213,4 2607,25 
State 20 80,8 175,78 0,46 3,30 -36925,6 -244139,0 2308,64 
State 21 67,9 146,48 0,48 2,63 -45764,0 -289903,1 2002,44 
State 22 52,9 117,17 0,51 2,02 -58426,7 -348329,8 1684,26 
State 23 34,8 87,87 0,53 1,46 -78084,2 -426414,0 1348,04 
State 24 11,4 58,56 0,56 0,95 -112814,3 -539228,3 983,76 





Gmax 6689,2 lb/s·ft2 





























State 1 199,1 732,59 0,00 18,27 0 0 0 
State 2 196,9 703,28 0,00 18,03 -7481,8 -7481,8 2205,22 
State 3 194,6 673,97 0,00 17,89 -7560,1 -15042,0 3103,14 
State 4 192,1 644,67 0,00 17,87 -7593,5 -22635,4 3802,13 
State 5 188,6 615,36 0,08 17,11 -7763,5 -30399,0 4218,24 
State 6 183,7 586,06 0,20 15,40 -8354,1 -38753,0 4286,61 
State 7 178,6 556,75 0,27 13,83 -9290,9 -48043,9 4286,96 
State 8 173,3 527,45 0,32 12,41 -10349,8 -58393,8 4240,03 
State 9 167,8 498,14 0,36 11,12 -11543,1 -69936,9 4157,95 
State 10 162,1 468,84 0,40 9,94 -12896,0 -82832,9 4045,43 
State 11 156,1 439,53 0,43 8,87 -14438,4 -97271,3 3911,47 
State 12 149,7 410,23 0,45 7,90 -16190,5 -113461,8 3765,14 
State 13 143,1 380,92 0,48 7,03 -18185,4 -131647,2 3606,36 
State 14 136,0 351,61 0,50 6,23 -20484,9 -152132,2 3435,21 
State 15 128,5 322,31 0,52 5,49 -23169,4 -175301,5 3252,15 
State 16 120,5 293,00 0,54 4,81 -26348,6 -201650,1 3056,90 
State 17 111,9 263,70 0,56 4,18 -30177,2 -231827,3 2849,57 
State 18 102,5 234,39 0,57 3,60 -34879,1 -266706,4 2629,64 
State 19 92,2 205,09 0,59 3,06 -40795,2 -307501,6 2396,46 
State 20 80,8 175,78 0,61 2,55 -48468,9 -355970,5 2148,79 
State 21 67,9 146,48 0,62 2,07 -58827,1 -414797,6 1884,81 
State 22 52,9 117,17 0,64 1,62 -73594,2 -488391,8 1601,52 
State 23 34,8 87,87 0,65 1,20 -96397,3 -584789,1 1294,00 
State 24 11,4 58,56 0,67 0,79 -136450,2 -721239,3 953,09 






Gmax 4287,0 lb/s·ft2 



























State 1 203,3 732,59 0,00 16,13 0 0 0 
State 2 200,4 703,28 0,00 15,85 -8491,7 -8491,7 2064,94 
State 3 197,2 673,97 0,00 15,54 -8651,7 -17143,5 2877,76 
State 4 193,3 644,67 0,17 14,96 -8901,8 -26045,3 3415,15 
State 5 188,6 615,36 0,32 13,71 -9471,8 -35517,1 3652,88 
State 6 183,7 586,06 0,38 12,50 -10360,6 -45877,6 3787,59 
State 7 178,6 556,75 0,43 11,38 -11369,5 -57247,1 3850,62 
State 8 173,3 527,45 0,46 10,34 -12504,6 -69751,8 3860,45 
State 9 167,8 498,14 0,49 9,37 -13780,6 -83532,4 3829,53 
State 10 162,1 468,84 0,51 8,47 -15222,8 -98755,2 3763,78 
State 11 156,1 439,53 0,53 7,63 -16862,3 -115617,5 3671,37 
State 12 149,7 410,23 0,55 6,87 -18724,4 -134341,9 3559,75 
State 13 143,1 380,92 0,57 6,16 -20847,4 -155189,3 3430,72 
State 14 136,0 351,61 0,59 5,50 -23294,7 -178483,9 3285,52 
State 15 128,5 322,31 0,60 4,88 -26151,1 -204635,0 3124,97 
State 16 120,5 293,00 0,61 4,31 -29532,4 -234167,4 2949,65 
State 17 111,9 263,70 0,63 3,77 -33601,0 -267768,5 2759,91 
State 18 102,5 234,39 0,64 3,26 -38592,7 -306361,1 2555,63 
State 19 92,2 205,09 0,65 2,79 -44866,0 -351227,1 2336,32 
State 20 80,8 175,78 0,67 2,34 -52992,5 -404219,5 2101,02 
State 21 67,9 146,48 0,68 1,91 -63946,1 -468165,7 1847,99 
State 22 52,9 117,17 0,69 1,50 -79537,9 -547703,6 1574,41 
State 23 34,8 87,87 0,70 1,12 -103573,1 -651276,6 1275,41 
State 24 11,4 58,56 0,71 0,75 -145710,8 -796987,4 941,96 






Gmax 3860,4 lb/s·ft2 


























State 1 206,2 732,59 1,00 13,72 0 0 0 
State 2 202,2 703,28 1,00 13,36 -10028,5 -10028,5 1892,24 
State 3 197,9 673,97 1,00 12,98 -10308,4 -20337,0 2618,01 
State 4 193,4 644,67 0,56 12,12 -10816,1 -31153,1 3026,48 
State 5 188,6 615,36 0,58 11,21 -11637,5 -42790,6 3279,14 
State 6 183,7 586,06 0,59 10,33 -12607,1 -55397,7 3438,50 
State 7 178,6 556,75 0,61 9,50 -13696,3 -69094,0 3530,07 
State 8 173,3 527,45 0,62 8,71 -14916,3 -84010,2 3569,69 
State 9 167,8 498,14 0,63 7,97 -16284,1 -100294,3 3568,21 
State 10 162,1 468,84 0,64 7,27 -17826,1 -118120,4 3531,65 
State 11 156,1 439,53 0,65 6,61 -19574,8 -137695,2 3466,79 
State 12 149,7 410,23 0,66 5,99 -21560,4 -159255,6 3379,74 
State 13 143,1 380,92 0,67 5,41 -23826,1 -183081,8 3272,76 
State 14 136,0 351,61 0,68 4,86 -26439,1 -209520,8 3147,47 
State 15 128,5 322,31 0,69 4,35 -29488,3 -239009,1 3005,09 
State 16 120,5 293,00 0,70 3,86 -33095,7 -272104,8 2846,41 
State 17 111,9 263,70 0,71 3,40 -37432,8 -309537,6 2671,87 
State 18 102,5 234,39 0,72 2,96 -42749,0 -352286,6 2481,51 
State 19 92,2 205,09 0,72 2,54 -49422,2 -401708,8 2275,00 
State 20 80,8 175,78 0,73 2,14 -58055,6 -459764,3 2051,38 
State 21 67,9 146,48 0,74 1,76 -69676,2 -529440,5 1809,04 
State 22 52,9 117,17 0,75 1,39 -86190,8 -615631,3 1545,17 
State 23 34,8 87,87 0,76 1,04 -111604,6 -727235,9 1254,98 
State 24 11,4 58,56 0,76 0,70 -156074,3 -883310,2 929,41 






Gmax 3569,7 lb/s·ft2 






























State 1 209,8 732,59 1,00 11,13 0 0 0 
State 2 204,8 703,28 1,00 10,73 -12422,4 -12422,4 1691,72 
State 3 199,3 673,97 1,00 10,32 -12899,2 -25321,6 2322,13 
State 4 193,5 644,67 1,00 9,88 -13441,6 -38763,2 2751,87 
State 5 188,6 615,36 0,89 9,22 -14211,5 -52974,7 3002,49 
State 6 183,7 586,06 0,84 8,57 -15260,2 -68234,9 3166,01 
State 7 178,6 556,75 0,82 7,94 -16444,4 -84679,2 3268,73 
State 8 173,3 527,45 0,81 7,34 -17764,8 -102444,0 3323,71 
State 9 167,8 498,14 0,80 6,77 -19241,2 -121685,3 3339,79 
State 10 162,1 468,84 0,79 6,22 -20901,1 -142586,4 3322,68 
State 11 156,1 439,53 0,79 5,70 -22778,4 -165364,8 3277,56 
State 12 149,7 410,23 0,79 5,20 -24909,8 -190274,6 3209,07 
State 13 143,1 380,92 0,79 4,73 -27344,4 -217619,0 3119,58 
State 14 136,0 351,61 0,79 4,28 -30152,9 -247771,8 3010,85 
State 15 128,5 322,31 0,80 3,85 -33429,7 -281201,5 2884,15 
State 16 120,5 293,00 0,80 3,43 -37304,2 -318505,7 2740,31 
State 17 111,9 263,70 0,80 3,04 -41958,6 -360464,2 2579,82 
State 18 102,5 234,39 0,80 2,66 -47657,8 -408122,1 2402,73 
State 19 92,2 205,09 0,81 2,30 -54803,5 -462925,5 2208,72 
State 20 80,8 175,78 0,81 1,95 -64035,6 -526961,1 1996,86 
State 21 67,9 146,48 0,81 1,61 -76443,4 -603404,5 1765,54 
State 22 52,9 117,17 0,82 1,28 -94047,9 -697452,4 1511,97 
State 23 34,8 87,87 0,82 0,96 -121089,4 -818541,9 1231,33 
State 24 11,4 58,56 0,82 0,65 -168312,5 -986854,4 914,57 




Gmax 3339,8 lb/s·ft2 


































State 1 243,7 732,59 1,00 6,95 0 0 0 
State 2 238,6 703,28 1,00 6,66 -19965,0 -19965,0 1329,98 
State 3 233,2 673,97 1,00 6,36 -20857,2 -40822,1 1818,31 
State 4 227,7 644,67 1,00 6,07 -21840,4 -62662,5 2148,73 
State 5 221,9 615,36 1,00 5,77 -22927,1 -85589,5 2389,06 
State 6 215,9 586,06 1,00 5,48 -24132,0 -109721,6 2566,27 
State 7 209,6 556,75 1,00 5,18 -25472,9 -135194,4 2694,59 
State 8 203,1 527,45 1,00 4,89 -26970,6 -162165,1 2782,72 
State 9 196,3 498,14 1,00 4,59 -28651,0 -190816,1 2836,48 
State 10 189,2 468,84 1,00 4,30 -30545,2 -221361,3 2860,09 
State 11 181,7 439,53 1,00 4,01 -32692,6 -254053,9 2856,70 
State 12 173,9 410,23 1,00 3,72 -35142,3 -289196,2 2828,73 
State 13 165,6 380,92 1,00 3,43 -37957,7 -327153,8 2778,13 
State 14 156,9 351,61 1,00 3,15 -41221,3 -368375,1 2706,41 
State 15 147,7 322,31 1,00 2,88 -45043,3 -413418,4 2614,73 
State 16 137,9 293,00 1,00 2,60 -49574,0 -462992,4 2503,95 
State 17 127,3 263,70 1,00 2,33 -55024,5 -518016,8 2374,60 
State 18 115,8 234,39 1,00 2,07 -61700,8 -579717,7 2226,87 
State 19 103,2 205,09 1,00 1,81 -70065,4 -649783,0 2060,56 
State 20 89,2 175,78 1,00 1,55 -80851,9 -730635,0 1874,95 
State 21 73,2 146,48 1,00 1,30 -95303,0 -825937,9 1668,60 
State 22 54,3 117,17 1,00 1,05 -115708,0 -941646,0 1438,99 
State 23 34,8 87,87 0,99 0,80 -146994,2 -1088640,1 1178,62 
State 24 11,4 58,56 0,98 0,55 -201635,6 -1290275,7 880,25 






Gmax 2860,1 lb/s·ft2 











The results for the relief rates and orifice area are plotted in the next figures: 
            
Figure 1. Volumetric relief rate of YS702/01. Figure 2. Mass relief rate of YS702/01. 
   
Figure 3. Orifice area of YS702/01. 
 
Figure 4. % Maximum value vs. reduced temperature of YS702/01. 
Summary table: 
V ,max 52,13 m3/h at 104,4ºC 
M ,max 8080,29 kg/h at 98,77ºC 












































































Reduced Temperature  
Volume Relief
Rate [m3/h]
Mass Relief rate
[kg/h]
Area (mm2)
